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Abstract 
In 2002 and 2003, a series of regulatory reforms (e.g. the Global Settlement or the ‘GS’; 
the Self-Regulatory Organization Rules or the ‘SRO Rules’) were introduced which 
intended to curb analysts’ potential conflicts of interest arising from their investment 
banking incentives. My thesis examines whether and how the 2002/3 reforms affect the 
quality of primary analyst outputs and their consequent impacts on investors and brokers’ 
investment banking deal flow. 
Specifically, I focus on the effect of three regulatory provisions. The first provision is the 
disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 under the SRO Rules in 2002, which induced 
many brokers to change their recommendation ratings systems from a five-tier to a three-
tier scale. The second provision is the five-year mandatory procurement of independent 
research required by the GS and expired in 2009, which aimed to enhance analyst 
independence and eliminate bias in analyst reports. The third provision is the relaxation 
of restrictions imposed in 2002/3 on analyst involvement in equity underwriting activities 
entailed in the JOBS Act of 2012.  
With regards to the impact of these provisions on analyst optimism, I find a reduction in 
analyst optimism of recommendations issued by analysts whose employer changed rating 
systems from a five-tier to three-tier system following the disclosure requirements of 
NASD 2711. I find neither an increase in the optimism of analysts employed by the GS 
signatories following the 2009/10 expiration nor an increase in the optimism of affiliated 
analysts covering emerging growth companies (‘EGCs’) following the JOBS Act.   
With regards to the impact of these provisions on informativeness and profitability of 
recommendations. I find no significant difference in informativeness of recommendations 
following the 2002/3 reforms no matter whether or not analysts changed to use the three-
tier ratings system following NASD 2711. Further, I find a reduction in the 
informativeness of ‘buy-type’ post-IPO/SEO recommendations issued by analysts 
 vi 
employed by GS-signatory brokers following the 2009/10 expiration and an increase in 
the informativeness of the ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations issued by affiliated 
analysts covering EGCs after the JOBS Act, together providing some evidence suggesting 
an increase in the perceived bias of these analysts. I find no significant effect of three 
provisions on improving the profitability of analysts’ ‘buy-type’ recommendations.  
Finally, with regards to the impact of these provisions on the extent to which analyst 
optimism affects brokers’ subsequent deal flow. I find that less extent of the association 
between historical optimism and brokers’ future deal flow in equity underwriting business 
after the 2002/3 reforms for brokers who switched to use the three-tier ratings system 
following the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711. I also find the 2009/10 expiration 
of funding independent research does not affect this association in this regard. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Introduction 
This thesis examines the effect of regulation on analyst behaviour, the investor response 
to and profitability of analyst recommendations and the extent to which analyst optimism 
affects employers’ investment banking market share. Over the past 15 years, several 
regulatory reforms have been implemented that may affect analysts’ investment banking-
related incentives for opportunistic behaviour. The most influential of these reforms was 
the Global Analyst Research Settlement (hereafter ‘Global Settlement’ or ‘GS’), which 
occurred in 2002/3 and affected 12 large investment banks, and the contemporaneous 
regulatory reforms introduced by self-regulatory organisations (SROs; e.g., National 
Association of Securities Dealers [NASD] Rule 2711 and the amended New York Stock 
Exchange [NYSE] Rule 472,1 otherwise referred to as the ‘SRO Rules’), which had 
broader applicability. These reforms aimed to curb conflicts of interest between research 
and investment banking functions, which drove analysts to produce research reports that 
misrepresented their true opinion of the investment worthiness of a covered firm 
(Donaldson, 2003; Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], 2003b). The reforms 
contained a multitude of provisions that aimed to reduce analysts’ abnormal optimism. 
Given that each restriction on analyst behaviour imposes economic costs as well as 
benefits, it is important to understand which, if any, of the provisions entailed in these 
reforms played a significant role in their apparent success. This thesis seeks to provide 
evidence in this regard. 
Given the extent to which investment banking incentives have the potential to taint analyst 
reports, both regulators and academic researchers have an interest in understanding the 
overall effectiveness of the 2002/3 reforms. Prior studies have demonstrated that, in 
                                                 
1 These two regulations are now subsumed in Financial Industry Regulatory Authority [FINRA] Rule 2241, 
which was proposed in November 2014 and amended in December 2015. 
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aggregate, the GS and SRO Rules were at least partly successful in reducing abnormal 
analyst optimism in recommendations (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, & Trueman, 2006; 
Chen & Chen, 2009; Corwin, Larocque, & Stegemoller, 2017) and other outputs (Guan, 
Lu, & Wong, 2012; Hovakimian & Saenyasiri, 2010), thereby improving the 
informativeness of analyst recommendations to investors (Kadan, Madureira, Wang, & 
Zach, 2009). Most previous studies have focused on the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on 
the 12 sanctioned banks (GS signatories). This thesis investigates the regulatory reforms 
more broadly by examining the post-reform effect of specific provisions of the 2002/3 
reforms (the disclosure requirements regarding analyst ratings and changes in ratings 
systems thereby induced). It also explores the subsequent events that relaxed some of the 
regulatory constraints imposed in 2002/3, including the 2009/10 expiration of the 
mandatory procurement of independent research and the relaxation of restrictions on 
analyst involvement in equity underwriting activities entailed in the Jumpstarting Our 
Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012. This thesis also examines the behaviour of 
analysts employed by non-sanctioned banks (i.e., those who were not signatories to the 
GS) more deeply than prior research, offering potential explanations for recent findings 
regarding the ineffectiveness of SRO Rules in reducing investment banking-related 
optimism in these cases (Corwin et al., 2017). More importantly, this thesis provides 
insights and understanding into which provisions in the 2002/3 reforms are particularly 
effective at managing analyst conflicts of interest without diminishing investor protection. 
This study is further distinguished from extant research through the examination of the 
effect of the reforms on the association between brokers’ future investment banking deal 
flow and the extent of analyst optimism in the current period. Whether brokers are 
‘rewarded’ for excess optimism is central to understanding the cause of excess optimism. 
Therefore, the overarching purpose of this thesis is to examine whether and how the 
2002/3 reforms and subsequent relaxation of their provisions affected the quality of 
 3 
analyst reports, as well as their consequent effect on investors’ and brokers’ investment 
banking deal flow. Before stating the formal research question, the chapter will briefly 
describe the elements of the three significant regulatory events that are most relevant to 
this research, as well as their likely influence on analyst behaviour. More details of the 
regulatory changes are provided in Chapter 2. 
SRO Rules and Disclosure Requirements Therein: The SRO Rules (later ‘Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority [FINRA] Rules’) became fully effective in September 
2002 and affected almost all brokerage houses operating in the United States (US) and 
contained numerous provisions aimed at reducing investment banking conflicts of 
interest.2 NASD Rule 2711 (now FINRA Rule 2241) is of particular interest in this thesis 
because it requires the disclosure of conflicts of interest in research reports by research 
analysts, and it limits conflicted conduct (e.g., investment banking personnel involvement 
in the content of research reports and determination of analyst compensation) imposed on 
all brokerages in the US. This thesis particularly focuses on the disclosure requirements 
of NASD 2711 ([h] 4, [h] 5 [A–D]) that are designed to ensure that stock 
recommendations and ratings systems used by analysts are clearly defined, explained and 
consistent with their plain meanings. NASD 2711 (h) 4 and (h) 5 (A–D) further require 
brokers to disclose one-year historical distribution of stock recommendations classified 
into ‘buy/hold/sell’ schema, regardless of the actual ratings systems that the brokers 
employ. While all but one GS signatory broker immediately introduced the use of a three-
tier ratings system in their published investment reports following the reforms, most 
brokers who were not signatories to the GS maintained their old four- or five-tier ratings 
system. Consequently, this thesis uses non-GS brokers to examine the post-reform effect 
of changes in the ratings system. 
                                                 
2 The term ‘brokerage’ is used in a broad sense and refers to all financial institutions employing sell-side 
analysts. 
 4 
Mandatory Procurement of Independent Research Under the Global Settlement: Among 
the many provisions designed to improve the integrity of research, the GS required 
signatories to make payments approximating $460 million US dollars to a fund used to 
procure independent research for a period of five years (26 July 2004–26 July 2009).3 The 
GS signatories had to contract with no fewer than three independent research firms that 
would provide unbiased research to the GS brokers’ customers upon request. The GS-funded 
independent research was expected to discipline the GS brokers’ own research and reduce 
optimistic bias in their research outputs. For most GS brokers, the mandatory procurement 
on independent research expired on 26 July 2009, and it provides a setting in which to 
examine the effectiveness of the five-year procurement by investigating how the 2009/10 
expiration of funding independent research affects the quality of analyst reports. 
JOBS Act 2012: The JOBS Act was designed to reduce the regulatory burdens of small 
issuers going public, and it only applies to the initial public offerings (IPOs) of emerging 
growth companies (EGCs), which are defined as those with annual revenue of less than 
$1 billion. The JOBS Act relaxed several restrictions entailed in the SRO Rules and 
allowed analysts employed by brokers affiliated with EGC issuers through IPO 
underwriting syndicates (‘affiliated EGC analysts’) to have extensive involvement in the 
IPO process, including attendance at pitch meetings and due diligence sessions. Dambra, 
Field, Gustafson and Pisciotta (2018) find evidence of greater short-term earnings 
forecast optimism by affiliated EGC analysts, but do not consider the effect on 
recommendation bias. 
For each of the three regulatory reforms, this thesis identifies the groups of analysts most 
likely to have been affected by the specific regulatory provision studied—namely, 
analysts whose employers changed their ratings system following the disclosure 
requirements of NASD 2711 (h) 4 and (h) 5 (A–D) in 2002/3, analysts who were 
                                                 
3 The five-year settlement with Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC began on 
26 March 2005 and expired on 26 March 2010. 
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employed by GS signatories and who were obligated to procure independent research 
from 2004 to 2009/10, and analysts employed by underwriters of EGCs who were 
affected by the JOBS Act’s relaxation of structural separation restrictions entailed in the 
earlier SRO Rules. This study contrasts the pre- and post-reform behaviour of these 
groups of analysts with those of control observations. Further, it conditions tests 
according to the strength of potential conflicts of interest arising from the employers’ 
affiliation with the covered firm. All of the main tests focus on analyst behaviour during 
specific investment banking-related windows, such as those surrounding or following key 
IPO/seasoned equity offering (SEO) dates and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
announcement dates, because this type of behaviour during these periods is most clearly 
related to the conflicts of interest at the centre of the regulatory reforms studied. 
This thesis addresses the following three key research questions: 
RQ1: Did the regulatory reforms affect analyst excess optimism? 
RQ2: Did the regulatory reforms affect the informativeness and profitability of analyst 
stock recommendations? 
RQ3: Did the regulatory reforms affect the extent to which analyst excess optimism affects 
the employing broker’s investment banking deal flow? 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the logical process through which the three regulatory changes may 
affect analysts and investors, as well as empirical indicators of the groups of analysts that 
are most likely to have been affected by specific regulatory provisions. There is a potential 
direct causal effect of the three regulatory changes on analyst optimism, which may 
consequently affect the market response to analyst outputs, the profitability of analyst 
investment recommendations and the sensitivity of the subsequent change in brokers’ 
market share of investment banking mandates to abnormal optimism associated with 
analyst reports. This section describes the basis of each research question and provides 
supplementary explanations for each research question as follows. 
 6 
The first research question (RQ1) lays the foundation for the latter two and focuses on 
the effect of regulatory changes on a property of analyst reports—namely, analyst 
optimism. Analysts have incentives to compromise objectivity and issue overly optimistic 
research reports to potentially increase their employers’ investment banking-related 
revenues. Excess optimism in analyst reports arising from potential conflicts of interest 
is associated with brokers’ attempts to lure investment banking-mandates in the future 
(Bradshaw, 2011). The 2002/3 reforms aimed to resolve issues of conflicts of interest that 
arise when the banking function has the opportunity or means to influence the objectivity 
of research analysts. Thus, RQ1 predicts that the regulatory effect of the disclosure 
requirements of NASD 2711 induced analysts to change their ratings system on abnormal 
analyst optimism. Further, RQ1 focuses on whether the 2002/3 reforms are effective at 
reducing the optimistic bias in analyst reports and whether the later regulatory relaxations 
increase analyst optimism. 
The second research question (RQ2) explores investor perceptions of the change in 
analyst optimism before and after the regulatory reforms, as well as analysts’ ability to 
provide profitable recommendations of stocks that are worthy of investment. Excess 
analyst optimism associated with compromised objectivity in analyst research potentially 
threatens the credibility of analyst recommendations. Investors may underreact (overreact) 
to such analysts’ favourable (unfavourable) news, which results in a decrease (increase) 
in the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold or sell-type’) stock recommendations. 
Analysts who readily issue ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’ recommendations may fail to identify 
the investment worthiness of particular shares that will be profitable in the long run, which 
results in low profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by such analysts. The 
2002/3 reforms take initiatives to help ensure that research provided to investors is 
objective rather than tainted by investment banking-related influence. Thus, RQ2 
investigates whether the 2002/3 reforms increase (decrease) informativeness conditional 
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upon ‘buy-type’ (or ‘hold and sell-type’) recommendations, as well as the profitability of 
‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by analysts who are subject to the reforms and 
therefore potentially issue less optimism after 2002/3. Moreover, RQ2 focuses on whether 
the later regulatory relaxations have opposite effects on the conditional informativeness 
of stock recommendations, as well as the profitability of ‘buy-type’ ones. 
The third research question (RQ3) switches the focus to analysts’ employers’ perspectives 
and further analyses the effects of regulatory changes on the extent to which analyst 
excess optimism affects brokers’ deal flow. Analysts may have incentives to 
optimistically bias their reports to the covered firms in exchange for their employing 
brokers’ future opportunities in gaining investment banking mandates from the covered 
firms, which leads to a positive association between analyst excess optimism and their 
employers’ deal flow. If the 2002/3 reforms were effective at reducing abnormal analyst 
optimism by curbing their potential conflicts of interest as a result of investment banking 
incentives, analyst optimism during the post-2002/3 reform period should be analysts’ 
genuine options towards the covered firm, rather than overly optimistic coverage to lure 
lead management or advisory mandates for their employing banks. If potential clients 
believe that inducing analysts to be optimistic became more difficult after the reforms, 
they may not use observed (historical) optimism on their choices of future underwriters 
or advisors. Thus, RQ3 raises the question of whether the 2002/3 reforms had a negative 
effect on the extent to which analyst optimism affects brokers’ deal flow and how the 
subsequent relaxation (2009/10 expiration) affects this. 
Research method 
I conduct a series of regression tests designed to investigate the extent to which the 
regulatory changes affect excess analyst optimism, and whether the usefulness of analyst 
outputs to investors and the sensitivity of deal flows of investment banking mandates to 
lagged analyst optimism increased (or decreased) accordingly. I intend to provide 
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evidence of the effectiveness of particular provisions within the regulations and 
subsequent regulatory changes, namely (a) the effects of disclosure requirements of 
NASD 2711 in the SRO Rules, (b) the 2009/10 expiration of the five-year obligation to 
provide independent research required by the GS and (c) the relaxation of the structural 
separation provisions of SRO Rules entailed in the JOBS Act of 2012. To assess the extent 
to which the three regulatory changes were responsible for the improvement (or 
impairment) in analyst outputs, I use a difference-in-difference design to investigate 
whether the regulatory effects on the quality of analyst outputs (e.g., decline in average 
optimism) are associated with indicators of analysts’ potential conflicts of interest, the 
prima facie indicators of change in analyst behaviour (e.g., a change to the ratings system 
used) or the analyst regulation exposures. Similarly, to examine the effect of regulatory 
changes on investor response, profitability and brokers’ deal flow, I condition the tests on 
proxies for analyst investment banking incentives and prima facie indicators of change in 
analyst behaviour or regulation exposures.4 Two general equations are used to briefly 
describe the regressions: 
DV = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 +
∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Eq. 1 
DV = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑇 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑇 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽7𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Eq. 2 
 
DV represents the proxies for analyst optimism, conditional informativeness, profitability 
of ‘buy-type’ recommendations and brokers’ deal flow. IMPACT is the indicator variable 
for the pre-post change in analyst behaviour (adoption of the three-tier ratings system 
following NASD 2711) and analyst regulation exposures (i.e., GS signatories or analysts 
covering EGCs). POST refers to the indicators of cases in post-reform periods. In Eq. 1, 
the two-way interaction term (IMPACT × POST) estimates the incremental effect on DV 
                                                 
4 More details will be introduced in Section 3.2. 
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for analysts who are subject to IMPACT following the regulatory reforms. In Eq. 2, the 
three-way interaction terms (IMPACT × POST × AFF) capture the incremental effect on 
DV following the regulatory reforms for affiliated analysts who are subject to IMPACT 
relative to unaffiliated analysts who are also subject to IMPACT. For the first two reforms 
(the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 in 2002 and the 2009/10 expiration of 
funding independent research), I test the significance of the coefficients for both 
IMPACT × POST in Eq. 1 and IMPACT × POST × AFF in Eq. 2. For the tests related to 
the relaxation of restrictions of the SRO Rules by the JOBS Act, I only test the coefficients 
for IMPACT × POST × AFF in Eq. 2 because the JOBS Act only applies to affiliated 
analysts covering EGCs. Recommendation optimism (OPTIMISMREC) is tested using 
ordered logistic regression, and ordinary least squares (OLS) is used for the remaining 
tests. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by the covered firm in all regressions. 
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Figure 1.1 Regulatory reforms and their effect on analysts, investors and brokers 
Regulatory changes
•Three regulatory events:
•Disclosure requirements of 
NASD 2711 (SRO Rules—
2002/3)
•Expiration of mandatory 
procurement of independent 
research (2009/10)
•Deregulation of restrictions on 
analyst involvement in equity 
issues (JOBS Act—2012)
Analyst behaviour
•Proxies for likely differencess 
in effect of regulation:
•Analysts adopting the new 
three-tier ratings system in 
stock recommendations (NASD 
2711)
•Analysts employed by GS 
signatories (2009/10 expiration)
•Analysts employed by EGCs 
issuers' underwriters (JOBS 
Act)
•Analysts employed by brokers 
affiliated with covered firm 
(ALL REFORMS)
Property of analyst reports
•Analyst optimism
Usefulness to investors
Investment banking deal 
flow (brokers)
•Conditional informativeness of 
stock recommendations
•Profitability
•Brokers' change in investment 
banking market share
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Preface of results 
The purpose and preface of the results associated with the three research questions in this 
thesis are discussed below. 
RQ1: Did the regulatory reforms affect analyst excess optimism? 
Importantly, this thesis presents evidence that the post-2002/3 reduction in the optimism 
of analysts employed by brokers who were not signatories to the GS during M&A and 
IPO windows is significantly greater for those who adopted the three-tier ratings system 
encouraged by the disclosure requirements in NASD 2711. However, no similar evidence 
is found in the windows surrounding SEOs. Further, the study finds no significant effect 
on analyst optimism of the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research by GS 
signatories, and it finds no evidence that the JOBS Act increased abnormal optimism of 
affiliated EGC analysts. Overall, these findings are consistent with prior studies that 
documented a general reduction in average recommendation optimism after the 2002/3 
reforms (Barber et al., 2006; Clarke, Khorana, Patel, & Rau, 2011; Guan et al., 2012; Wu, 
Wilson, & Wu, 2015), but they further suggest that the disclosure requirements of NASD 
2711 are provisions through which analysts’ behaviour will be affected by SRO Rules. 
However, this conclusion holds in the M&A context, but it may not be generalised to 
SEO cases. 
RQ2: Did the regulatory reforms affect the informativeness and profitability of analyst 
stock recommendations? 
The purpose of RQ2 is to understand whether the 2002/3 reforms achieve their ultimate 
goal—namely, greater investor protection—and consequently increase the usefulness of 
analyst reports to investors. More specifically, it investigates the effects of regulatory 
changes on investors’ immediate responses to recommendation levels, as well as changes 
surrounding the M&A announcement and IPO/SEO filing dates as measured by short-
term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) centred on the issuance of the stock 
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recommendations. The results suggest no differential effect of 2002/3 reforms on the 
informativeness of upgrades or ‘buy-type’ recommendations (downgrades or ‘hold and 
sell-type’ ones) surrounding M&A announcement dates or the 24-month window of post-
IPO periods for analysts changing to use the three-tier ratings system following the 
disclosure requirements of NASD 2711. However, the post-reform decrease in 
informativeness of downgrades surrounding M&A announcement dates is greater for 
affiliated analysts who switched their ratings system following NASD 2711, relative to 
unaffiliated analysts who also made a similar change. There is an increase (decrease) in 
informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold and sell-type’) recommendations in the 24-month 
window of post-SEO filings issued by analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings 
system following the 2002/3 reforms. 
Overall, the results are consistent with Kadan et al. (2009), who find no evidence that 
changing to a three-tier ratings system enhances the informativeness of recommendations 
issued during the two years following the equity offering. More specifically, there is no 
evidence that restricting the fineness in recommendation ratings systems (i.e., changing 
from five-tier scales to three-tier scales) impairs the informativeness of upgrades or ‘buy-
type’ recommendations surrounding M&A announcements or during the post-IPO period, 
but further enhances the credibility of recommendations in the post-SEO filing period. 
Moreover, for tests using M&A and SEO contexts, the findings suggest that the market 
response to recommendation downgrades or ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations is 
consistent with the reforms, thereby improving the credibility of recommendations issued 
by affiliated analysts who changed their ratings system. 
The 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research may impair the credibility of 
recommendations once GS signatories cease providing concurrent independent research 
to investors. The results in this study support this notion and suggest the informativeness 
of ‘buy and strong buy’ recommendations issued by GS analysts in the 24-month 
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windows following IPO issue and SEO filing dates decreases following the 2009/10 
expiration of the requirement to fund independent research. In tests using the SEO context, 
this reduction is even greater for affiliated analysts employed by GS signatories. However, 
there is no similar finding surrounding M&A transactions. 
While the relaxation of analyst research restrictions by the JOBS Act intends to encourage 
small businesses to go public, the Act faced criticism regarding the loosening of 
investment protection, which may expose small and inexperienced investors to fraud. 
Consistent with this concern, the results in this study suggest that the JOBS Act may have 
created a perception of increased bias in affiliated analyst recommendations. This study 
finds evidence of an incremental increase in the informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ 
recommendations issued by analysts who are directly affected by the relaxation of 
restrictions regarding involvement in the IPO process. 
I test the regulatory effects on analysts’ ability to identify mispriced stocks and make 
profitability for investors by issuing appropriate recommendations, which is measured by 
long-term buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs). In contrast with Guan et al.’s (2012) 
findings, which suggest a significant reduction for non-GS analysts after the 2002/3 
reforms, I find some evidence of a general increase in profitability of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations surrounding M&A announcements. However, there is no evidence of 
differential profitability in the tests for analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings 
system following NASD 2711, for GS analysts following the 2009/10 expiration or for 
affiliated EGC analysts after the JOBS Act. 
RQ3: Did the regulatory reforms affect the extent to which analyst excess optimism affects 
employing brokers’ investment banking deal flow? 
RQ3 focuses on the regulatory effect on the extent to which analyst excess optimism 
affects brokers’ deal flow. The results suggest that there is a significant negative effect 
on the sensitivity of the change in market shares of IPO/SEO deals to excess optimism 
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after the 2002/3 reforms for brokerage firms that adopted the three-tier ratings system 
encouraged by the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711. This finding implies that 
observed abnormal optimism following the 2002/3 reforms is likely to result from 
genuinely held beliefs rather than analyst opportunistic behaviour associated with 
investment banking incentives. Potential clients may believe that it is more difficult to 
lure brokers with investment banking mandates and entice analysts’ favourable coverage 
since the 2002/3 reforms. Therefore, analyst optimism during the post-2002/3 reform 
period has a smaller effect on covered firms’ choices of future underwriters or advisors. 
No finding is made in tests related to the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent 
research. 
Contributions 
This thesis is of potential interest to investors, research firms, regulators and users of 
analyst reports because it provides relevant evidence on the specific provisions of reforms 
that are effective on analyst and investor behaviour, as well as the extent to which 
abnormal analyst optimism affects brokers’ deal flows. 
This thesis contributes to several areas of the analyst literature. While several prior studies 
have reported that the 2002/3 reforms were effective in reducing the excessive optimism 
of analysts in general (Barber et al., 2006; Chen & Chen, 2009; Kadan et al., 2009) and 
affiliated analysts in particular (Wu et al., 2015), evidence relating to the effectiveness of 
particular provisions of the reforms is more limited. Some provisions of the reforms 
instituted in 2002/3 have been weakened or eliminated in subsequent regulations (e.g., 
2012 JOBS Act; see Dambra et al., 2018), and regulators have acknowledged that there 
is scope for further refinements to both the SRO Rules and the GS agreements 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2012). This thesis builds on the previous 
studies by focusing on the effect of the prominent provisions of regulatory reforms (e.g., 
disclosure requirements of NASD 2711, 2009/10 expiration of funding independent 
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research required by the GS, and the relaxation on restrictions of SRO Rules by the JOBS 
Act) on the quality of analyst reports (i.e., analyst optimism), conditional on the strength 
of potential conflicts of interest and indicators of artificial change in analyst behaviour or 
regulation exposures. 
Currently, there is an expectation from the GS signatories and the federal district court 
that the SEC will agree to a further modification of the GS following the 2010 Order to 
remove some requirements if it is not contrary to the public interest (FINRA, 2017; GAO, 
2012). In addition, regulators such as FINRA and the SEC are carefully evaluating the 
appropriateness of codifying the GS’s remaining terms with a view to reducing the 
regulatory burden and enhancing capital formation without diminishing investor 
protection5 (Bricketto, 2012; FINRA, 2014c, 2017; GAO, 2012). 
This thesis provides evidence of the effectiveness of the major provisions of the 2002/3 
reforms; therefore, the later relaxation is relevant to regulators considering modifications 
to rules aimed at limiting analysts’ opportunistic behaviour. Indeed, it is plausible that 
variations in the uptake of the simpler ratings system may at least partially explain recent 
evidence that the post-reform decrease in affiliated analyst optimism focused on brokers 
who were signatories to the GS, all of whom either adopted or continued to use the three-
tier ratings system following the reforms (Corwin et al., 2017). However, less than one-
third of brokers external to the GS changed their ratings system; thus, the continued use 
of the old five-tier system by many non-GS signatories may have contributed to the 
smaller effect of the reforms on non-GS brokers. 
In addition, this thesis tests the regulatory effect on the usefulness of analyst reports to 
investors (i.e., informativeness and profitability), which is also relevant to investors who 
rely on analyst recommendations and forecasts when making investment decisions. Prior 
                                                 
5 After the GAO report was published in January 2012, the SEC released the ‘Meeting of the SEC 
Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies’ on 1 February 2012. Retrieved from 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec020111presentation-research-analyst-regulation.pdf 
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studies have found mixed evidence of the regulatory effect of informativeness on analyst 
recommendations (Clarke et al., 2011; Cliff, 2007; Loh & Stulz, 2011). This thesis 
examines the effect of regulatory reforms on conditional informativeness to reveal 
whether and which regulatory changes affect the investors’ perceived credibility of 
recommendations. In addition, profitability can better reflect the real effectiveness of the 
use of all analyst outputs on investors rather than some transient abnormal returns 
triggered by the change in recommendations. Prior studies have found a general decrease 
(increase) in the profitability of ‘buy’ (‘hold and sell’) recommendations issued by 
analysts employed by both GS and non-GS signatory brokers since the 2002/3 reforms 
(Guan et al., 2012). The results in this study suggest that the 2002/3 reforms may have 
generally improved analysts’ ability to identify investment-worthy stocks of greater 
profitability of ‘buy’ and ‘strong buy’ recommendations, but they have had no 
incremental effect on analysts who switched to the three-tier ratings system following the 
disclosure requirements of NASD 2711. 
Further, prior studies have documented an average decrease in the number of brokers’ 
investment banking mandates following the 2002/3 reforms, which may reflect several 
factors, including diminished analyst research coverage—especially on smaller firms—
and sell-side analysts migrating to buy-side/money management firms (Craig, 2005; 
Crawford, 2005; FINRA, 2005; Lace, 2003; Mahaney-Walter, 2015). This thesis is the 
first study to examine regulatory effects on the extent to which excess analyst optimism 
affects broker-dealers’ investment banking deal flow. The results suggest that perceived 
analyst optimism among analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings system 
significantly decreased following the 2002/3 reforms. Therefore, analyst optimism after 
the 2002/3 reforms is less likely to be used by potential clients, thereby contributing to 
their employing brokers winning equity underwriting mandates. 
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Structure of this thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the institutional 
background regarding major changes in regulations affecting securities analysts. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature and develops hypotheses regarding the three research 
questions. Chapter 4 reports the methodology and details of definitions and measurements 
of variables. Chapters 5–7 present the sample and analyses of the results of the tests 
related to the effects of the 2002/3 reforms (Chapter 5), the effects of the 2009/10 
expiration of funding independent research (Chapter 6) and the subsequent regulatory 
changes to the SRO Rules entailed in the JOBS Act (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 concludes this 
thesis and discusses some directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background—Major Changes in Regulations 
Affecting Securities Analysts 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the relevant regulatory changes over the period 2000–2014. It 
begins with an overview of the analysts’ role in the market information environment and 
their past misconduct resulting from investment banking incentives. This is followed by 
a discussion of the relevant regulations implemented between 2000 and 2015, from the 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter ‘Reg FD’) to the 2002/3 regulatory reforms and the 
subsequent revisions. Lastly, a reflection of the regulators’ concerns is provided. 
Misconduct by Analysts 
Analysts are information intermediaries whose activities influence the informational 
efficiency of capital markets. Security analysts provide assessments of the investment 
worthiness of particular shares to current and potential investors, who may use the 
information to make investment-related decisions (Schipper, 1991). These stock 
recommendations are published in research reports that contain supporting information 
such as earnings forecasts. Prior studies show that analyst research reports convey 
information to the capital market (Francis & Soffer, 1997; Givoly & Lakonishok, 1979; 
Lys & Sohn, 1990). Further, empirical evidence shows that the price of stocks that have 
analysts following them reflect public information more efficiently than those of other 
listed firms (Elgers, Lo, & Pfeiffer Jr, 2001; Hong, Lim, & Stein, 2000). 
However, there is a long-existing undercurrent of suspicion among academics and 
regulators that the information provided to the market by analyst research may be 
systematically misleading. Analysts employed by investment banks or brokerage houses 
affiliated with the covered firms have incentives to compromise their objectivity and may 
bias their research with a view to increasing their employers’ investment banking- or 
trading-related revenues (Becher & Juergens, 2010; Dechow, Hutton, & Sloan, 2000; 
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Houston, James, & Karceski, 2006; Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008; Lin & McNichols, 1998; 
Michaely & Womack, 1999; O’Brien, McNichols, & Hsiou-Wei, 2005). The initial 
allegations made against the 12 sanctioned banks in the GS followed prima facie evidence 
of numerous forms of misconduct. Merrill Lynch deliberately misinformed market 
participants by issuing enthusiastic reports on stocks that they derided internally (De 
Franco, Lu, & Vasvari, 2007; Jeffrey, 2002; PBS, n.d.). Morgan Stanley was accused of 
too closely aligning its investment banking and research departments, and of instituting 
dysfunctional incentives in the compensation structure of analysts (Smith, 2003). 
Sell-side analysts in the employ of investment banks or brokerage houses may come under 
implicit or occasionally explicit pressure to publish favourable opinions on their 
employers’ current or prospective clients to help boost investment banking-related 
business and corresponding revenues (Lin & McNichols, 1998; Michaely & Womack, 
1999). After the corporate scandals and market crash surrounding the dot-com bubble, 
concerns arose regarding the opacity of the process through which analyst 
recommendations were generated, as well as conflicts of interest affecting these price-
relevant signals. One of the more persistent regulatory crusades has aimed to reduce the 
conflicts of interest that plague the research conducted by analysts—particularly analysts’ 
incentives arising from investment banking ties. Figure 2.1 describes the timeline of the 
key regulations introduced since 2000, which are further discussed below. 
 
Figure 2.1 Timeline of regulations related to analysts during the period 2000–2012 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2009 2012 
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Regulation Fair Disclosure 
The Reg FD was promulgated in August 2000 by the SEC and aimed to curb the practice 
of analysts currying favour with management by biasing their forecasts and 
recommendations to obtain private information about the covered firm. The Reg FD 
aimed to stamp out selective disclosure by mandating that all publicly traded companies 
must disclose material information to all outside users concurrently. Analysts’ ability to 
obtain privileged information from management (Best’s Review, 2001) and their related 
intentions to purposely bias earnings forecasts should be fundamentally eliminated after 
the Reg FD. Therefore, the introduction of Reg FD, which curbs the conflicts of interest 
due to analysts’ incentives to curry favour with management in order to access private 
information about the covered firms, has the potential to reduce analyst optimism. While 
the Reg FD may affect the average changes in optimism in the early twenty-first century, 
which may be indirectly associated with the outputs of reports issued by analysts in 
general, I cannot see an obvious reason why Reg FD would have a differential impact 
according to whether or not brokers later switched to the three-tier rating system, which 
is the focus of this study’s analysis of the 2002/3 reforms. 
2002/3 regulatory reforms (SRO Rules and GS) 
In June and July 2001, the US Congress held hearings titled ‘Analyzing the Analysts’, 
which received testimony that analysts were consciously misleading investors in an effort 
to boost their employers’ investment banking revenues and their own commissions and 
career prospects. In particular, evidence was presented of analysts publicly ‘hyping’ the 
stock of firms that they privately believed were uninvestable in an effort to maximise their 
employers’ chances of winning future underwriting contracts. The Congressional 
hearings drew public attention to analysts’ practices, and in early 2002, the NASD and 
the NYSE proposed new rules (an amended rule in the case of the NYSE) with identical 
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reporting requirements (NASD 2711; NYSE Rule 472) that sought to decouple the 
investment banking and research functions at investment banks. 
2.4.1 Self-Regulatory Organisation Rules and disclosure requirements 
Approved by the SEC in May 2002 and fully effective by September 2002, the SRO Rules 
(or FINRA Rules) affected virtually all brokerage houses operating in the US and: (a) 
restricted relationships and communications between investment banking and research 
analysts, (b) prohibited analyst compensation from investment banking transactions, 
(c) proscribed interactions between research analysts and current or prospective clients 
related to investment banking transactions, and (d) imposed restrictions on publishing 
research reports and public appearances in ‘quiet periods’ of IPO and surrounding the 
lockup expiration. Of greatest relevance to this thesis, the SRO Rules also established 
stringent disclosure requirements for research reports (NASD 2711 [h] 4, [h] 5 [A–D]).6 
Since 9 September 2002, brokerages must clearly define the meaning of each rating 
consistent with its plain meaning in their research reports (NASD 2711 [h] 4). Further, 
the distribution of analysts’ recommendations within the previous 12 months must be 
reported in terms of a simple ‘buy/hold/sell’ classification regardless of the actual ratings 
system used by the brokerage when making stock recommendations. Thus, for the 
purpose of the required disclosure, a brokerage using a five-tier ratings system (e.g., 
‘strong buy/buy/hold/sell/ strong sell’) must convert its historic recommendations to a 
‘buy/hold/sell’ format and report the 12-month history of the frequency of each type of 
recommendation in every research report published (NASD 2711 [h] 5 [A–D]). This has 
induced many brokerages to change their ratings system to align with the required 
disclosure format. 
                                                 
6 NASD Rule 2711 has been superseded by FINRA Rule 2241, effective from 24 December 2015. FINRA 
Rule 2241 C (2) A–C requires the same provisions as NASD Rule 2711 (h) 4 and (h) 5 (A–D). See 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=11946 
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While the proposed SRO Rules were being considered, the New York Attorney General’s 
Office (NYAG) began an investigation into the effect of conflicts of interest on analyst 
behaviour at Merrill Lynch. The allegations came to the fore in April 2002, when the 
NYAG labelled some investment advice provided by Merrill Lynch as ‘tainted’ and stated 
that the firm’s behaviour ‘jeopardizes the integrity of the marketplace. This was an 
outrageous betrayal of their trust and shocking abuse of the system, perverted to produce 
greater revenues’ (McGeehan, 2002; NYAG, 2002). A settlement was reached in May 
2002, under which Merrill Lynch would apologise for its wrongdoing, pay a fine of 
$100 million US dollars and change the way its analysts were compensated. The problems 
identified in the Merrill Lynch case led to an expansion of the NYAG enquiry to other 
large banks (Khan, 2002; Mcgeehan, 2002). 
2.4.2 Global Settlement 
In December 2002, the GS was reached, comprising an agreement between the SEC, 
NASD (now FINRA), NYSE, North American Securities Administrators Association 
(NASAA), NYAG and 12 of the US’ largest investment banks (‘sanctioned banks’). Most 
importantly, the objective of the GS is to sever the ties between investment banking and 
analyst research. It includes the following terms: (a) structural reforms in terms of both 
physically enforced firewalls and prohibited communication between research and 
investment banking departments, (b) prohibition of research analysts’ participation in 
efforts to solicit investment banking business, such as pitches and roadshows during the 
advertising and promotion of IPOs, and any linking of analysts’ compensation to 
investment banking outcomes, (c) enhanced disclosure, including making disclosures 
regarding conflicts of interest, publishing analysts’ performance on websites every 
quarter and publishing reports that discuss termination of coverage, and (d) financial 
penalties totalling approximating $1.435 billion, of which $460 million was designated 
to procure and publish independent research over a five-year period (26 July 2004–
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26 July 2009) (SEC, 2003a). While the GS did not include any provisions regarding the 
use or disclosure of the ratings system employed by a signatory, the signatory firms were 
also subject to the disclosure provisions in the SRO Rules described in the preceding 
paragraph. The round of major reforms was completed in April 2003, when the SEC 
issued the Regulation Analyst Certification (hereafter ‘Reg AC’), which requires analysts 
to certify that the views expressed in their research reports accurately reflect their personal 
views, and to disclose any direct or indirect compensation or payments in connection with 
their recommendations. 
2.4.3 Five-Year Procurement on Independent Research and its Expiration 
A key objective of the GS is to develop a thriving independent research industry that can 
act as a catalyst in restoring the integrity of research (The Washington Post, 2002, May 8). 
To this end, the GS penalised the GS signatories and required them to make payments of 
around $1.435 billion US dollars, of which $460 million was used to procure independent 
research. The GS required that signatories procure independent third-party research 
reports and make these available to their clients for a period of five years (26 July 2004–
26 July 2009) (FINRA, 2005). GS defines ‘independent research’ as:  
(i) a research report prepared by an unaffiliated person or entity, or (ii) a statistical or 
other survey or analysis of research reports (including ratings and price targets) issued by 
a broad range of persons and entities, including persons and entities having no association 
with investment banking activities, which survey or analysis has been prepared by an 
unaffiliated person or entity. (SEC, 2004)  
That is, independent research firms should have no association with investment banking 
activities (e.g., underwriting or distribution). The GS requirement of a five-year 
procurement of independent research reflects regulators’ attempts to restore analyst 
independence in research. 
24 
Regulatory bodies and practitioners believe that giving investors objective investment 
advice through independent research creates value for investors (Buslepp, Casey, & 
Huston, 2014; Ruth & Louise, 2004). The stated overall goal of the GS is to eliminate 
‘undue influence of investment banking interests on securities research at brokerage 
firms’, whereas the objective of procuring independent research is ‘to ensure that 
individual investors get access to objective investment advice’ (SEC, 2003c). GS 
signatories were responsible for the content of procured independent research and had an 
obligation to make the research available to their customers (SEC, 2004).7 Investors could 
access the procured independent research reports via the GS signatory firms’ website or 
by calling a toll-free number to request them. 
The five-year period of procurement on independent research by GS signatories ended on 
26 July 2009 (or 26 March 2010 for Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and Thomas Weisel 
Partners LLC). While Keating’s (2013) white paper and anecdotal evidence (LaCapra, 
2012; Posner, 2012; Morten, 2011) point out that the independent research industry 
created out of the GS has struggled to survive, and it mostly faded into extinction when 
the funding for independent research disappeared after the five years elapsed, another 
more recent research, Allee, Erickson, Esplin, and Larocque (2018), documents a 
substantial increase in independent analyst research from 2011 to 2015. Also, based on 
figures published by Integrity Research (Fuller, 2017), independent research providers in 
the US earn around 20% of capital allocated to producing research in 2017, rising from 
17.4% in 2011, due to a decline in the global market share since 2015. Overall, it is 
uncertain whether the five-year procurement of independent research required by the GS 
had a significant positive effect on the quality of research provided by investment banks. 
                                                 
7  Some records of financial penalty resulting from a failure to fully comply with the obligation of 
availability of independent research reports to retailed investors are presented as follows. In 2009, FINRA 
fined Credit Suisse Securities $275,000 for failing to post all required, current independent research to its 
website (FINRA, 2009). Morgan Stanley was fined $800,000 for failing to disclose that the firm had made 
available independent third-party research in their monthly account statements (Rauch, 2010). 
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Subsequent Deregulation 
Despite the emphasis on protecting small investors and restoring integrity to the 
marketplace by the GS and related regulations, a major public policy dilemma for 
regulators concerns how to strike an appropriate balance between investor protection and 
analyst efficiency. For example, critics of GS argue that it unintentionally caused a 
shrinkage in the number of firms covered by sell-side securities analysts (Wall Street 
Journal, 2006) as a result of reduced commissions from institutional investors (Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority 2005) and a decrease in sell-side research staff and budgets 
(Davis, 2004; Dunaief, 2003; Keating, 2013). Consequently, regulations have been 
introduced that relax the provisions of the GS or SRO Rules, and that are intended to 
improve firms’ access to capital markets—namely, the 2010 Amendments to the GS. In 
March 2010, to facilitate research participation in due diligence deliberations, the 
Southern District of New York (a federal court) approved modifications to the GS to 
allow research analysts and investment banking participation in joint due diligence 
sessions in the presence of a chaperone from legal or compliance departments (SEC, 
2010). 
2.5.1 JOBS Act 
The JOBS Act was introduced in April 20128 and includes provisions with exemptions 
from, and modifications of, the disclosure, accounting, auditing and other requirements 
of the IPO process to reduce costs and risks associated with EGCs—a newly designated 
category of issuers with less than $1 billion of total annual gross revenues (i.e., total 
revenues presented on the income statement in accordance with US generally accepted 
                                                 
8 The JOBS Act was enacted into law on 5 April 2012 and formally approved on 11 October 2012 after the 
SEC provided clarification of provisions to equity analysts. The uncertainty was regarding how the JOBS 
Act would affect permissible analyst behaviour, given the influence of prior analyst regulations. The 
clarification was provided by a SEC Q&A released on August 22, 2012 and the subsequent FINRA 
proposals to amend NYSE Rule 472 and NASD Rule 2711 (Sidley Austin LLP, 2012).  
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accounting principles [GAAP] or International Financial Reporting Standards [IFRS] for 
private foreign issuers) during the most recently completed fiscal year after 8 December 
2011 (SEC, 2016).9 The JOBS Act’s deregulation of the SRO Rules pertaining to analyst 
research are twofold—namely, the expansion of permitted investor communications and 
the relaxation of research analyst restrictions from the SRO Rules. Specifically, 
investment bankers and research analysts may communicate with potential investors and 
formally collaborate with the management team in connection with the IPO of the shares 
of an EGC (Goodwin, 2012). The publication of research reports and public appearances 
are allowed by the offering participants for an EGC following its IPO or before its 
expiration of lockup provisions. However, the JOBS Act does not amend the GS and has 
no effect on the obligations of GS signatories. Table 2.1 compares the regulatory changes 
of GS, the SRO Rules and the JOBS Act associated with sell-side analyst research. 
Table 2.1 Main Differences among the GS, SRO Rules and JOBS Act10 
Subject Global Settlement 
SRO Rules 
(NASD Rule 2711 and 
NYSE Rule 472) 
JOBS Act 
Application 
Applicable to the top 
12 investment banks 
Applicable to all 
brokerage houses in the 
US 
Only applicable to 
EGCs 
Separation of 
analysts and 
investment 
bankers 
Physical separation 
(firewall) between 
research and 
investment banking 
departments 
Extensive restrictions 
on the ability of 
research analysts and 
investment bankers to 
communicate or interact 
Research analysts are 
permitted to participate 
in meetings with the 
company’s management 
at which brokers and/or 
investment banker 
personnel 
(underwriters) involved 
in the IPO are present, 
and are also able to 
attend investor 
meetings arranged by 
investment bankers 
Research 
reports and 
No similar 
requirement 
Restriction on 
publishing research by 
analysts for up to 40 
Analysts employed by 
the brokers and 
underwriters 
                                                 
9 The JOBS Act grants five years of EGC eligibility after the common equity of IPO, but an EGC issuer 
will lose its eligibility when one of the following criteria are met: 1) annual revenues are higher than 
$1 billion; 2) issuing nonconvertible debt securities of more than $1 billion over 36 months in a row; 3) 
issuing a seasoned offering with a public float of $700 million or more. Firms cannot reclaim their EGC 
status once they have lost it. 
10 Derived from SEC (2003a, 2012) and Westenberg (2012). 
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public 
appearances 
days after the date of 
the offering and within 
15 days before or after 
the expiration of lockup 
provisions 
participating in the IPO 
may publish research 
reports and make public 
appearances concerning 
the company both 
before and after the 
filing date, during any 
prescribed post-offering 
quiet period and during 
any blackout period 
before or after the 
expiration of a lockup 
agreement 
Disclosure 
requirements 
No similar 
requirement 
Disclosure for historical 
distribution of 
recommendations 
explained with a three-
tier rating 
No similar requirement 
Monitoring in 
compensation 
Analysts’ 
compensation based 
on investment banking 
revenue is prohibited 
and the work of the 
compensation 
committee must be 
reviewed by an 
oversight committee 
of research 
management 
Disclosure requirement 
regarding investment 
banking compensation 
and non-investment 
banking-related 
compensations from the 
covered issuer 
No similar requirement 
Improve 
research 
integrity 
Procurement of 
independent research 
No similar requirement No similar requirement 
Research departments 
to have their own 
legal and compliance 
staff 
No similar requirement No similar requirement 
No similar provisions 
Prohibition on promises 
of favourable research 
No similar provisions 
No similar provisions 
Prohibition on personal 
trading by analysts 
No similar provisions 
No similar provisions 
Prohibition on 
retaliation against 
analysts 
No similar provisions 
 
Regulators’ Concerns 
Regulators face a dilemma: they may seek to ensure objective and reliable research by 
applying stringent provisions to brokerage firms. For example, a contemporary issue for 
the SEC is the consideration of whether any GS provisions need to be codified to more 
institutions other than the 12 sanctioned banks (GAO, 2012). However, this may be costly 
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because burdensome terms would unfairly affect brokerage firms—especially those that 
were not alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct—and therefore reduce their 
incentive to fund research. Additionally, regulation relaxation may create an incentive for 
analysts to be more optimistic and compromise their research integrity. For example, to 
encourage small businesses and boost the IPO market, the JOBS Act of 2012 relaxed 
provisions of the SRO Rules such as the publication of research reports, public 
appearances following the IPO, and pre-IPO communication among research analysts, 
potential investors and investment bankers. Since the passage of the JOBS Act, affiliated 
analysts have become more optimistic and less accurate compared with unaffiliated 
analysts, which contrasts with the Act’s intent (Dambra et al., 2018). The regulation 
relaxation by the JOBS Act also faces criticism regarding the concerns of the loosen 
essential investor protections, less market transparency, distorted efficient allocation of 
capital, concluding that deregulating public companies perhaps encourages fraud without 
doing much to spur IPOs (Davidoff, 2013; “They have very short memories” 2012). 
  
29 
Chapter 3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Introduction 
This thesis examines the effects of regulatory reforms on the properties of analyst reports, 
corresponding market responses and the extent to which analyst optimism affects brokers’ 
deal flow. This chapter reviews and analyses the findings of the relevant literature and 
develops specific hypotheses relating to the research questions. Central to the research 
questions is an investigation of the effects of the regulations (i.e., the 2002/3 reforms and 
subsequent regulatory changes—namely, the expiration of mandatory funding of 
independent research in 2009/10 and the introduction of the JOBS Act in 2012) on analyst 
behaviour. Therefore, the literature review encompasses studies of broader discussions of 
the effects of regulations on excess analyst optimism in addition to those focusing on how 
the effects relate to investors and deal flow. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on the regulatory 
effects of the 2002/3 reforms. Section 3.3 discusses the mandatory procurement of 
independent research required by the GS, which expired in 2009/10. Section 3.4 focuses 
on legislation that relaxed some provisions of the 2002/3 reforms—that is, the 2012 JOBS 
Act. Section 3.5 provides a summary of this chapter. 
Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms 
3.2.1 Analysts’ Potential Conflicts of Interest Arising from Investment Banking 
Revenues and Excess Analyst Optimism 
Analysts who serve their employers’ and their own interests potentially have incentives 
to compromise their objectivity and work against investors’ interests. Bradshaw (2011) 
documents at least six sources of analyst conflicts of interest or bias identified in earlier 
literature that are purported to cause systematic bias in analyst reports, among which a 
connection between analysts’ behaviour and their employers’ attempts to secure lucrative 
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investment banking contracts is argued to be the most cogent. A significant amount of 
literature shows that analysts employed by investment banks or brokerage houses have 
incentives to bias recommendations or long-term earnings growth forecasts (Dechow et 
al., 2000; Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Michaely & Womack, 
1999; O’Brien et al., 2005) with a view to increasing their employers’ investment 
banking-related revenues. This thesis focuses on analysts employed by institutions that 
provide investment banking services, such as M&A advice and IPO/SEO underwriting, 
because these are the conflicts of interest at the centre of the regulatory reforms studied. 
Much academic attention has focused on incentive-based explanations for compromised 
objectivity in analyst outputs. Specifically, there is evidence that analysts employed by 
investment banks that had recently provided underwriting or M&A advisory services to 
covered firms tended to publish more optimistic research regarding those clients. This 
excess optimism is reflected in recommendations (Kadan et al., 2009; Kolasinski & 
Kothari, 2008; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Michaely & Womack, 1999; O’Brien et al., 2005), 
earnings forecasts (Dugar & Nathan, 1995), long-term growth (LTG) forecasts (Dechow 
et al., 2000; Lin & McNichols, 1998) and the late disclosure of negative information 
(O’Brien et al., 2005). 
Investment banks may benefit from excess optimism in the output of their employed 
analysts because this behaviour may help the bank secure future underwriting or M&A 
advisory fees (Corwin et al., 2017), and this benefit may flow on to the individual analyst 
if compensation or status within the firm is influenced directly or indirectly by investment 
banking revenue. For example, issuing optimistic research for equity underwriting clients 
may assist the investment banking division to increase the demand for the client’s stock 
and help to maintain the stock price after the offering. Providing continued optimistic 
coverage of the stock post-IPO may help insiders within the issuing firm to gain by 
‘spinning’ their stock, which may encourage clients to retain the analysts’ employer for 
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future deals (Houston et al., 2006). Analyst optimism can also directly influence the value 
of the acquisition currency in M&A deals when the purchase consideration includes 
acquirer equity. Issuing optimistically biased recommendations increases the value of the 
acquirer’s stock and therefore enhances the likelihood of successful completion and 
reduces the cost to the acquirer’s shareholders (Wu et al., 2015). Even in the case of ‘all 
cash’ M&A deals, positive coverage may increase the perceived synergies attached to the 
proposed acquisition, and thus the likelihood of completion (Becher, Cohn, & Juergens, 
2015). In addition, positive coverage surrounding M&A deals helps the acquirer to gain 
target shareholders’ acceptance by increasing the perceived value of synergies, thereby 
potentially increasing the analysts’ employers’ chance of winning future advisory 
contracts with the acquirer (Wu et al., 2015). Thus, evidence in the literature is broadly 
consistent with Gasparino’s (2005) summary of the pre-reform environment:  
Ostensibly, the job of the analysts was to recommend what stocks investors should 
purchase. But throughout the 1990s, they gave credibility to the overvalued markets to 
millions of new investors, who were largely unaware that the analysts had taken on a 
more conflicted role of recommending stocks and helping their firms win the lucrative 
investment banking deals from the same companies that helped pay their outsized salaries. 
(Gasparino, 2005, p 8) 
While all analysts may perceive a benefit in providing positive coverage for covered firms 
in the hope of increasing their employers’ chances of winning future advisory or 
underwriting contracts, most of the literature focuses on the behaviour of analysts who 
are presently (or have recently been) affiliated with the covered firm through the 
underwriting of equity issues or the advisory of M&A deals. This literature frequently, 
but not universally, reports evidence that these ‘affiliated analysts’ are more optimistic 
than others. Dugar and Nathan (1995) study analyst reports surrounding seasoned equity 
issues occurring between 1983 and 1988 and find that recommendations issued by 
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affiliated analysts are more optimistic than those of unaffiliated analysts. Lin and 
McNichols (1998) investigate SEOs from 1989 to 1994 and find that analysts employed 
by brokers underwriting an offering tend to issue more optimistic recommendations and 
LTG forecasts than unaffiliated analysts, but that there is no difference in optimism in 
short-term earnings forecasts. Dechow et al. (2000) evaluate the role of LTG forecasts in 
the pricing of initial public equity offerings during the period 1981–1990. Consistent with 
Lin and McNichols (1998), they find that analysts employed by the lead manager of the 
offerings make the most optimistic growth forecasts, and that these are significantly 
associated with post-offering underperformance. Michaely and Womack (1999) provide 
similar evidence for IPOs between 1991 and 1992, while Iskoz (2003) shows that the 
relative excess optimism in affiliated analysts’ reports for IPO firms continued until 2000. 
In addition, optimistically biased coverage by analysts whose employers are affiliated 
with the acquirer firms can potentially result in stock appreciation (Kolasinski & Kothari, 
2008; Womack, 1996). This can enhance the value of stock used as currency in M&A 
transactions, which may in turn lead to higher M&A fees for the investment bank 
(Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008). Consistent with the existence of investment banking-
related conflicts of interest, Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) and Wu et al. (2015) find that 
affiliated analysts employed by acquirers’ advisors are more likely to upgrade acquirer 
stocks even in the period immediately surrounding M&A announcement dates.11 
While providing optimistically biased research may benefit analysts, excess optimism 
may also induce potential costs such as reputational damage and future litigation. Under 
                                                 
11 The literature also recognises that the excess optimism of affiliated analysts may reflect selection bias 
rather than opportunism (Lin & McNichols, 1998). It is plausible that underwriters who employ genuinely 
optimistic analysts are more likely to secure underwriting deals, and that clients are more willing to hire 
investment banks whose opinions of firms are more favourable (Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008; Lin & 
McNichols, 1998). As a result, there could be an association between analyst optimism and affiliation with 
the equity underwriting ties as a result of selection bias. Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) examine 
recommendations and long-term earnings growth forecasts of analysts whose employers are affiliated with 
the acquirer firms in ‘all-cash’ M&A deals whereby the selection bias is less severe because analyst 
optimism cannot directly influence the value of the acquisition currency, as is potentially the case in deals 
involving acquirer equity. However, they still find that analysts affiliated with acquirer advisors 
optimistically upgrade acquirer stocks around ‘all-cash’ M&A deals. 
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Becker’s (1968) ‘theory of collusion’, the harm resulting from collusion depends not only 
on the number of violations, which increase the probability of detection, but also on the 
elasticity of their marginal cost curves, which in turn is positively related to the gains 
from colluding. Thus, collusion between analysts and their employing banks may affect 
the probability of being detected and the potential costs arising from future punishments 
imposed and loss of reputation, particularly for cases where there are large gains from 
colluding. Prior studies show some support for this theory, finding evidence of less biased 
analyst coverage for highly visible stocks. Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2006) find that, 
relative to analysts employed by other firms, analysts employed by ‘bulge’ underwriter 
firms were less optimistic in their quarterly earnings forecasts, LTG forecasts and target 
prices between 1996 and 2002.12 They also find evidence that the lower relative optimism 
is partially attributable to the reputational concerns of large investment banking firms. 
Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2007) examine the effect of the presence of 
institutional investor owners on analyst accuracy and optimism between 1994 and 2000 
and find that the proportional shareholding of institutional investor owners is negatively 
associated with recommendation optimism and positively associated with forecast 
accuracy. This suggests that self-interested analysts weigh career concerns against any 
short-term payoffs from cooperating with their employers when they are monitored by 
institutional investors. Lin and McNichols (1998) report that affiliation status does not 
affect the level of bias in forecasts of short-term earnings immediately before and after 
SEOs, and they argue that this may reflect the fact that the manipulation of earnings 
forecasts is more likely to be detected by investors (and likely to be costlier) than that of 
a LTG forecast or an investment recommendation. 
                                                 
12 Following Eccles and Crane (1988), Cowen et al. (2006) classify bulge investment banks as the six largest 
and banks with the highest reputation on Wall Street—namely, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Salomon Smith Barney and Lehman Bros. 
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In summary, analysts have potential conflicts of interest because of their investment 
banking incentives. They are prone to being optimistic in their reports to help their 
employing banks retain or win future underwriting or M&A advisory deals—particularly 
those analysts whose employers are currently (or have recently been) affiliated with the 
clients covered by the analysts. However, issuing overly optimistic reports may result in 
some costs that may constrain analysts’ opportunistic behaviour. The next section extends 
this discussion and focuses on the effect of the 2002/3 reforms that were intended to curb 
investment banking-related conflicts of interest—particular those of affiliated analysts. 
3.2.2 Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Analyst Behaviour 
The broad intention of the 2002/3 reforms (GS and SRO Rules) was to restore confidence 
in equity markets by curbing analysts’ potential conflicts of interest relating to investment 
banking services. The reforms prohibited the involvement of investment banking in the 
evaluation of research analyst performance and proscribed any direct link between 
investment banking revenue and analyst compensation. Both the GS and SRO Rules 
require significant separation between investment banking and research departments. For 
example, GS requires banks to physically establish firewalls between research and 
investment banking departments. The SRO Rules prevent analysts from participating in 
any form of behaviour aimed at soliciting investment banking business. Any conflicts of 
interest, such as their employers’ existing and potential investment banking relationships 
with the subject companies, are required to be disclosed in analyst reports and public 
appearances. To examine the extent to which these regulatory reforms have achieved their 
broader aims, the next section reviews studies of the general influence of the 2002/3 
reforms on analyst behaviour and the effect on analysts who are affiliated with the 
covered firms. 
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3.2.2.1 Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Analyst Behaviour (Properties of Analyst 
Reports) 
Prior studies find that the GS and SRO Rules affect analyst behaviour, which  is reflected 
in the primary properties of the analyst reports—namely, stock recommendations and 
earnings forecasts. A number of studies document evidence of a decline in the average 
recommendation optimism of analysts following GS (Barber et al., 2006; Clarke et al., 
2011; Guan et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2015). Other studies provide evidence that, regardless 
of affiliation status, analyst recommendations have become more consistent with 
fundamental valuations derived from earnings forecasts following the regulatory reforms 
(Barniv, Hope, Myring, & Thomas, 2009; Chen & Chen, 2009). In addition to the broadly 
felt effect of the SRO Rules on analyst behaviour, Corwin et al. (2017) show a more 
significant reduction in recommendation optimism among analysts employed by GS 
signatory banks, and they attribute these findings to a remarkable increase in the expected 
costs of issuing overly optimistic reports faced by GS signatory banks. 
There are only a few studies of the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on forecasts, and these 
report mixed findings regarding whether analysts’ earnings forecasts have become more 
accurate or whether forecast optimism has decreased post-reform. Hovakimian and 
Saenyasiri (2010) report that optimistic bias in annual earnings forecasts by GS 
signatories declined after the GS, consistent with the intent of those reforms, while Guan 
et al. (2012) document a reduction in the accuracy of earnings forecasts made by 
investment bank analysts during the post-reform period of 2004–2007. 
Academics and regulators are particularly interested in the behaviour of analysts whose 
employing banks are affiliated with covered firms. This is because the effect of the 2002/3 
reforms on affiliated analysts’ behaviour directly reflects the extent to which the 2002/3 
reforms effectively curbed potential analysts’ conflicts of interest arising from their 
investment banking ties. Tests of the differential effect of the 2002/3 reforms on affiliated 
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and unaffiliated analysts identify analyst affiliation either directly—through past and 
future (e.g., Kadan et al., 2009) or current (e.g., Wu et al., 2015) investment banking 
relationships between the covered firm and the analysts’ employer—or indirectly, using 
firm fundamentals that suggest that the covered firm is likely to demand investment 
banking services in the future (Chen & Chen, 2009).13 Wu et al. (2015) find that while the 
level of optimism evident in the recommendations issued by both affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts decreased after the 2002/3 reforms, this reduction in optimism was 
significantly stronger for affiliated analysts. Wu et al. (2015) also discuss untabulated 
analysis and suggest that the 2002/3 reforms had a greater effect on analysts employed 
by the 12 signatories to the GS. Corwin et al. (2017) study optimism in the 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts, identified as those employed by brokers 
who had an investment banking relationship with the covered firm during the preceding 
36 months. They find that the affiliation bias at the sanctioned banks dissipated and was 
eventually eliminated in the years following the 2002/3 reforms. 
While the studies discussed above identify evidence that the reforms reduced analyst 
optimism, others have presented evidence that the reforms have been less than fully 
successful in reducing excess optimism. Cowen et al. (2006) find that, between 1996 and 
2002, analysts employed by brokers that fund research through investment banking and 
trading activities (i.e., full-service firms) made less optimistic forecasts than those at 
brokerage houses that do not provide investment banking services. This suggests that 
trading incentives may play an equally important role in explaining analyst research 
optimism. Cowen et al. (2006) conjecture that the heavy monitoring of investment 
banking connections to analyst behaviour following the GS and SRO Rules may have 
                                                 
13 Chen and Chen (2009) use the company’s net external financing and the significance of the underwriting 
business provided by analysts’ employers as proxy variables for conflicts of interest. They use two variables 
as follows. Net external financing (EXF) equals the sum of changes in the book value of common equity, 
preferred stock and short-term and long-term debt minus net income, all divided by average total assets. IB 
refers to the sum of the underwriter prestige rankings of the analysts’ employers (constructed by Loughran 
& Ritter [2004]) divided by the total assets of the companies followed by the analysts. 
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unexpectedly pressured analysts to increase their optimism in an attempt to increase 
trading volume (and thus commissions). In addition, while Corwin et al. (2017) find 
evidence of a reduction in optimism by analysts employed at GS signatory banks, they 
find no evidence of improvement among other analysts. Specifically, they present 
evidence of affiliation bias at non-GS signatory banks both before and after the reforms, 
and thus conclude the effectiveness of the GS, but they suggest that the concurrent SRO 
Rules had a limited effect on analysts employed by non-GS signatory firms. 
In addition to the two academic studies mentioned above, non-scholarly reports reveal 
that although the regulatory reforms of 2002/3 were intended to curb conflicts of interest 
in equity research, concern remains that they did not achieve this aim (GAO, 2012; 
Keating, 2013). Market participants and observers have argued that regulations requiring 
separation of the research and investment banking divisions of institutions entailed in the 
GS and SRO Rules can be easily circumvented. For example, it may be difficult to detect 
cases in which analysts and investment bankers privately communicate with each other 
outside the firm (GAO, 2012). Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp (2015) report that 44% 
of surveyed analysts confessed that their efforts to help their employers successfully 
generate underwriting business or trading commissions was crucial to the determination 
of their compensation after the reforms. Further, there have recently been continuous 
occurrences of violations of the SRO Rules pertaining to analysts’ engagement or 
involvement in soliciting investment banking business (FINRA, 2014a, 2014b). Taken 
together, it seems likely that conflicts of interest remain despite the 2002/3 reforms. 
Whether the regulatory reforms surrounding GS have improved the quality of analyst 
outputs and thereby enhanced the usefulness of research to investors is therefore both 
uncertain and of clear public interest, particularly to regulators. Regulators such as 
FINRA and the SEC are carefully evaluating the appropriateness of codifying the GS’s 
remaining terms and considering further modifications to, and refinements of, the SRO 
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Rules with a view to reducing the regulatory burden without diminishing investor 
protection (Bricketto, 2012; FINRA, 2014c; GAO, 2012).14 The first section of this thesis 
focuses on the particular provision of the SRO Rules (NASD 2711 [h] 4 and 5 [A–D]) 
and examines whether these prominent provisions were effective in constraining analyst 
optimism and whether any such change improved investor protection. 
While both Wu et al. (2015) and Corwin et al. (2017) present evidence of a generally 
weaker effect of the reforms on analysts not employed by signatories to the GS, neither 
paper investigates which provisions of the reforms were instrumental in reducing 
optimism either at a general level or with respect to affiliated analysts’ excess optimism. 
Among the most prominent provisions entailed in the reforms were the requirements of 
NASD 2711 (h) 4 for brokerages to report the meaning of each rating consistent with its 
plain meaning and NASD 2711 (h) 5 (A–D) for brokerages to publish the 12-month 
history of the distribution of recommendations issued, classified in a simple ‘buy/sell/hold’ 
schema, regardless of the actual ratings system used by an analyst. The intention of the 
stringent disclosure requirements is to give investors relevant and useful information for 
evaluating analyst recommendations. In April 2002, the then president of NASD 
Regulation explained the intention of the NASD proposal, pointing out that investors 
should have a right to be informed of the meanings and historical distribution of ratings 
in recommendations assigned to particular securities, and thus consider whether there is 
bias in the analysts’ coverage (Schapiro, 2002). 
The disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 prescribed that every report containing 
analyst research must provide a plain English meaning of the recommendations produced 
(NASD 2711 [h] 4) and the historical distribution of recommendations expressed in 
simple ‘buy’, ‘hold’ and ‘sell’ categories (NASD 2711 [h] 5 [A–D]). As noted by Kadan 
                                                 
14 After the GAO report was published in January 2012, the SEC released the ‘Meeting of the SEC 
Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies’ on 1 February 2012. Retrieved from 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec020111presentation-research-analyst-regulation.pdf 
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et al. (2009), a large number of brokers who had previously used a five-tier ratings system 
(e.g., ‘strong buy’, ‘buy’, ‘hold’, ‘sell’ and ‘strong sell’) voluntarily switched their ratings 
system to a simpler three-tier ratings system (e.g., ‘buy’, ‘hold’ and ‘sell’) immediately 
following the reform, consistent with the information that they were forced to disclose 
after the implementation of NASD 2711. 
Barber et al. (2006) document that there was a steady reduction in the percentage of buy-
type recommendations issued by analysts in the years following the 2002/3 reforms and 
argue that it was caused by the disclosure requirements of NASD Rule 2711. According 
to their explanation, brokers who readily assigned a relatively high percentage of buy and 
strong buy recommendations under the five-tier ratings system before the reforms were 
implicitly pressured to release less optimistic recommendations/forecasts by the NASD 
2711 requirement for the public dissemination of ratings distributions. Many brokers 
apparently took advantage of the implementation date (9 September 2002) to adopt the 
simplified three-tier ratings system so that their distribution of recommendations would 
be more balanced and more in line with that required by NASD 2711. 
3.2.2.2 Hypotheses 1a and 1b: Effect of Changing Tiers on Analyst Optimism 
In this section, I develop Hypotheses 1a and 1b (H1a and H1b), which examine the effect 
on analyst behaviour of brokers switching from five-tier to three-tier ratings systems. H1a 
and H1b examine the extent to which analyst optimism is affected by analysts’ decision 
to change their ratings system, as encouraged by the disclosure requirements of NASD 
2711. The requirement in NASD 2711 regarding the publication of the historical 
distribution of recommendations (Rule [h] 5 [A–D]) and the requirement that issued 
recommendations must be stated in unambiguous language (Rule [h] 4) may have 
increased the expected costs of issuing overly optimistic or inaccurate recommendations. 
Prima facie, it would appear that the economic meaning of recommendations issued on a 
three-point scale is likely to be more consistent with the literal phrasing of 
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recommendations in an analyst report. Under the five-tier system,15 the precise wording 
of investment recommendations coded as ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ by the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) frequently correspond to recommendations issued to investors 
using language such as ‘accumulate’, ‘overweight’ and ‘underweight’. In addition, a more 
standardised language expressed in only three categories—buy, hold and sell—is required 
for disclosure purposes, which increases the clarity of phrases used in recommendations 
and reduces analysts’ discretion. 16  Investors may use brokerage firms’ historical 
distribution of recommendations and corresponding interpretations under the three-tier 
rating scheme to compare recommendations across and within analysts or brokers and 
unravel any persistent analyst bias in their reports. Thus, this study argues that the 
implementation of the three-tier ratings system can effectively constrain analyst optimism 
because of their self-interest behaviour. 
The hypotheses focus on optimism reflected in recommendations and LTG forecasts 
because prior related research (e.g., Lin & McNichols, 1998) finds evidence of bias in 
these measures, while there is little (if any) evidence of consistent investment banking-
related bias in analysts’ short-term earnings forecasts. 
In addition to the effect of the use of a three-tier ratings system on the optimism expressed 
in the level of recommendations issued by analysts, the three-tier system may restrict the 
extent to which analysts opportunistically upgrade (or fail to downgrade) a covered firm 
at times when conflicts of interest are greatest. There are two reasons why the ratings 
system might affect the likelihood of upgrades or downgrades for analysts, subject to 
conflicts of interest. First, the meaning of an upgrade (downgrade) on a three-tier scale is 
unambiguous; switching from a ‘hold’ to a ‘buy’ implies a change of recommended 
                                                 
15 A very small proportion of analysts use a four-tier ratings system. In this thesis, I treat these similarly to 
those adopting a five-tier system in their recommendations. 
16 NASD 2711 does not require brokers who adopt the three-tier ratings system to use the precise phrases 
‘buy’, ‘hold’ and ‘sell’. For example, they could use ‘underweight’, ‘neutral weight’ and ‘overweight’. 
However, as long as the investors know that three tiers are used in recommendations, the meaning of such 
terms is fairly obvious.  
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investment decision. Movement within the ‘buy’ range on a five-tier scale is of less 
obvious meaning. For this reason, the use of a five-tier scale facilitates the opportunistic 
movement of recommendations within the buy range without the need for an analyst to 
overtly signal that a previously correctly priced firm is now undervalued. Similarly, an 
upgrade from ‘hold’ to a moderate buy descriptor such as ‘accumulate’ may be of less 
clear meaning than an upgrade from ‘hold’ to a simple ‘buy’. It is also possible that, in 
cases where the existing level of a recommendation is equivalent to a ‘weak buy’, analysts 
using a five-tier system who are subject to a conflict of interest will be less likely to 
downgrade to a ‘hold’ recommendation because of the potentially ambiguous nature of 
the extant recommendation. A more mechanistic reason why the three-tier system is likely 
to be associated with less optimistic changes in recommendations is simply the reduced 
scope for changes. A ‘buy’ recommendation under a three-tier system cannot be upgraded. 
To the extent possible, I control for this mechanistic effect in the empirical tests. While 
the motivations for bias in recommendations (or recommendation changes) are well 
known, providing optimistic LTG forecasts may enhance the credibility of a 
recommendation upgrade. Supporting an optimistic recommendation with optimistic 
short-term forecasts is costly to analysts because those forecasts will shortly be shown to 
be inaccurate. 
H1a and H1b investigate recommendations and LTG forecasts issued by analysts 
employed by non-GS signatory brokers. I exclude the observations of recommendations 
or LTG forecasts issued by analysts of GS signatories to rule out the possibility that the 
results are driven by the effect of the GS. Kadan et al. (2009) focus on eight of the 12 GS 
signatories—each of whom changed their ratings system in 2002—and show that 
approximately half of the recommendations previously classified as ‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’ 
under the five-tier system were recorded as ‘hold’ (neutral) recommendations under the 
three-tier system in the months immediately following September 2002. Given that all of 
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the GS signatories (except UBS) switched from a five-tier to a three-tier ratings system 
immediately after the reforms, it is almost impossible to separately identify the long-term 
effects of the change in ratings system from the other provisions of the reforms affecting 
analysts employed by these firms. However, according to my data, of the 235 non-GS 
brokerages that issued recommendations both before and after the reforms, only 70 
(approximately 30%) adopted the three-tier system following the reforms. While almost 
all recommendations issued before the reforms used a five-tier scale (5,644 of 5,944 
recommendation revisions), around two-thirds of these recommendations belonged to 
brokers who subsequently changed their ratings system. Thus, recommendations issued 
by non-GS analysts are separable into those for which the employing brokers changed 
their ratings system and those for which they did not change their ratings system, 
suggesting that the usefulness of this subsample for testing hypotheses is related to the 
change in the ratings system. Focusing the hypotheses on non-GS firms may also help to 
shed light on Corwin et al.’s (2017) finding that, on average, there was no pronounced 
reduction in affiliation bias for non-GS firms following the 2002/3 reforms. If adopting a 
three-tier system in an environment in which the historical distribution of ratings under a 
similar system is disclosed constrains analyst optimism, the failure of a significant 
proportion of non-GS brokers to change their ratings system may partially explain the 
absence of an overall reduction in optimism for analysts employed by non-GS institutions. 
Thus, all hypotheses developed in this section are later tested using samples of analysts 
employed by institutions who were not signatories to the GS. 
In addition to focusing on non-GS brokerages, the hypotheses concentrate on examining 
behaviour during times of the most significant potential for investment banking conflicts 
of interest. Following prior studies, I focus on analyst behaviour during M&A transaction 
windows—the 180-day window surrounding M&A announcement dates (Kolasinski & 
Kothari, 2008; Wu et al., 2015) and during equity offering windows—the two-year 
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window after the IPO issue or SEO filings.17 Analyst recommendations and supporting 
outputs (LTG forecasts) are of potentially greater importance at these times, and the 
analysts’ conflicting incentives are magnified, particularly for those affiliated with the 
acquirer or equity issuer. 
Before the 2002/3 reforms, excess optimism in analyst recommendations benefited 
investment banking businesses. This study argues that, following the reforms, the 
disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 resulted in a substantial increase in the expected 
costs facing analysts who issue optimistically biased recommendations, and that this 
increase should be higher for analysts issuing recommendations under a three-tier system 
relative to those who continued using a five-tier system after the reforms. Thus, I expect 
that the differential shift in the cost-benefit trade-off leads to a larger post-reform 
reduction in optimistic bias for analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings system than 
that demonstrated by analysts who continued to use the five-tier ratings system. 
Thus, the first hypotheses (H1a and H1b) concern the behaviour of all analysts during 
investment banking event windows, without regard for affiliation status, because both 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts may perceive a benefit in providing positive coverage 
for acquirers in the hope of increasing their chances of winning future advisory contracts. 
These hypotheses are presented below:18 
H1a (H1b): The post-reform decrease in optimism that is evident in analyst 
recommendation (LTG forecast) revisions during investment banking event windows is 
greater for analysts who change to the three-tier ratings system than for other analysts. 
                                                 
17 Corwin et al. (2017) study relative analyst optimism during 36 months after investment banking deals 
(i.e., M&A, new equity offerings and raising debts), which may not represent the period of the strongest 
investment banking incentive. While the main hypotheses in this study focus on behaviour during 
investment banking transaction windows, I estimate additional tests using Corwin et al. (2017)’s regime. 
18 For brevity, I omit reference to our research context (M&A announcement periods) in the hypothesis 
statements. 
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3.2.2.3 Hypotheses 2a and 2b: Effect of Changing Tiers on Affiliated Analyst 
Optimism 
H2a and H2b examine whether the association between analyst optimism and analysts’ 
adoption of the three-tier ratings system is stronger for analysts whose employers are 
affiliated with the covered firms through investment banking ties. The 2002/3 reforms 
aimed to curb potential analysts’ conflicts of interest arising from their investment 
banking incentives that result in biases in analyst reports (Richards, 2002). The presence 
of conflicts of interest is directly reflected by the investment banking relationships 
between the brokerage houses and recommended firms. Motivated by previous studies 
(Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Krigman, Shaw, & Womack, 2001; Lin & McNichols, 1998; 
Michaely & Womack, 1999), I propose that analysts whose employers have (or recently 
had) investment banking relations with covered firms are more optimistic than 
unaffiliated analysts. This is because analysts are expected to derive greater benefits from 
issuing optimistic reports associated with their employers’ prior, current and even future 
investment banking clients. To the extent that analysts are rewarded directly or indirectly 
for generating investment banking revenues, the incentive for bias is stronger for affiliated 
analysts. Thus, following Kolasinski and Kothari (2008), Wu et al. (2015) and Corwin et 
al. (2017), who recognise that analysts affiliated with the acquirer or issuer are potentially 
subject to stronger conflicts of interest, the hypotheses predict that any improvement in 
analyst behaviour attributable to a change in the recommendations system will be stronger 
for affiliated analysts than unaffiliated analysts. 
H2a (H2b): The post-reform decrease in optimism evident in analyst recommendation 
(LTG forecast) revisions during investment banking event windows is greater for 
affiliated analysts who change to the three-tier ratings system than for unaffiliated 
analysts who change to the three-tier ratings system. 
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As noted above, these hypotheses consider analyst behaviour at times when analysts’ 
conflicts of interest resulting from investment banking-related incentives are strongest. 
To this end, I examine analyst outputs in the period surrounding three types of 
transactions that frequently require investment banking services. I first focus on analyst 
behaviour in the 180-day window surrounding M&A announcement dates, similar to the 
approach of Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) and Wu et al. (2015). Analyst 
recommendations and forecasts are of potentially greater importance at these times, and 
analysts’ conflicting incentives are magnified, particularly for those affiliated with the 
acquirer. Building on the findings of Wu et al. (2015), I first apply my hypotheses to 
analyst behaviour surrounding M&A transactions. 
I next apply the hypotheses to potential conflicts of interest arising from underwriting 
mandates. For both IPOs and SEOs, I follow Kadan et al. (2009) and examine the 
optimism indicated by analysts’ initial recommendations following the IPO issue date 
(SEO filing date). Prior literature recognises that analysts who are affiliated with issuers 
are potentially subject to stronger conflicts of interest surrounding equity issues (Dugar 
& Nathan, 1995; Kadan et al., 2009; Krigman et al., 2001; Lin & McNichols, 1998; 
Michaely & Womack, 1999). Bradley et al. (2008) find that analysts who are employed 
by lead and co-managers issue more optimistic recommendations and target prices both 
within the first 30 calendar days following the IPO and during the post-quiet period 
(subsequent 11 months after the expiration of the quiet period) than affiliated analysts.19 
Thus, this study argues that optimism reflected in the levels of initial recommendations 
following the IPO issue can represent analysts’ investment banking-related bias. 
                                                 
19 The quiet periods are 25/40 calendar days after the IPO date; the period after the filing date of SEO and 
before the date that the SEC declares the registration statement effective before Securities Offering Reform 
(‘SOR’) in 2005. Affiliated analysts whose employers are underwriting syndicate members are prohibited 
from issuing research reports during quiet periods. 
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Finally, I apply the hypotheses to recommendation revisions surrounding SEO filing dates 
because there is evidence that affiliated analysts are more likely to delay downgrading 
recommendations for seasoned equity issuers (O’Brien et al., 2005). 
3.2.3 Market Effects of the 2002/3 Reforms on Investors 
While NASD 2711 contains numerous provisions, this section focuses on the regulatory 
effect of the particular disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 therein ([h] 4 and [h] 5 
[A–D]) on investor behaviour. Enhanced investor protection is the general purpose of 
regulations (International Organization of Securities Commissions [IOSCO], 1998). 
While the primary properties of analyst reports (forecast accuracy/optimism and 
recommendation optimism) are of apparent interest to investors, ultimately the purpose 
of these reports should be to help investors make informed decisions (Hilary & Hsu, 2013). 
Thus, this section develops testable hypotheses about the effect of regulatory changes on 
the short-term informativeness manifested in the overall market reaction. In addition to 
investor response, hypotheses are introduced regarding the long-term profitability of 
stock recommendation changes. 
3.2.3.1 Market Effects of 2002/3 Reforms on Informativeness of Recommendations 
(Changes) 
Informativeness refers to the extent to which analyst behaviour affects investor beliefs 
regarding the value of the firm. Before the reforms, the proliferation of ‘buy’ 
recommendations may have led the market to discount the information content of such 
bullish investment advice, thereby dampening any market reaction to their issuance. 
Conversely, the extreme rarity of ‘sell’ recommendations may have amplified the 
market’s perception of their implications for firms’ future performance. If the 2002/3 
reforms were perceived by the market as having attenuated the incentive problems 
affecting analyst recommendations, then one would expect to observe this in the 
47 
behaviour of stock returns surrounding the issuance of recommendations. Kadan et al. 
(2009) argue that an increase in the credibility of analyst recommendations should: a) 
increase the informativeness of ‘buy’ recommendations because the market becomes less 
cynical of these ratings, and b) decrease the informativeness of ‘sell’ recommendations 
because these outputs are viewed as a less extreme signal of covered firms’ prospects. 
Kadan et al. (2009, p. 4201) find evidence consistent with this joint hypothesis. 
While Kadan et al. (2009) study the level of recommendations and report increased 
informativeness of ‘buy’ and decreased informativeness of ‘sell’ in the 18-month period 
following the 2002/3 regulatory reforms, much of the analysis in this study focuses on 
the effect of recommendation changes (i.e., upgrades and downgrades) because changes 
in investment advice have a clearer logical association with changes in investor behaviour 
and abstract away from the problems of comparing levels of ratings across different 
systems. Applying the logic of Kadan et al. (2009) to the case of recommendation changes, 
if the reforms generally increased the credibility of recommendations, I expect that the 
informativeness of upgrades will be increased and that of downgrades will be decreased 
following the 2002/3 reforms. 
3.2.3.2 Hypothesis 3: Effect of Changing Tiers on Informativeness 
This section develops H3 relating to the effect of the disclosure requirements of NASD 
2711 on the informativeness of stock recommendation changes. H3 focuses on the extent 
to which investors’ response to recommendations is affected by the adoption of the three-
tier ratings system encouraged by NASD 2711. 
The adoption of the three-tier ratings system following the implementation of NASD 
2711 caused massive reclassifications of existing outstanding recommendations, and the 
distribution of recommendations became more balanced (i.e., less ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’ 
and more ‘hold’ and ‘sell’) after the reforms (Barber et al., 2006). If the implementation 
of NASD 2711, which induced many brokers to adopt the three-tier ratings system, 
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effectively reduced excess optimism related to conflicts of interest, this study conjectures 
that investors may perceive the restored integrity in capital markets and incorporate this 
in their response to information provided by analysts. While the use of a coarser grid of 
recommendation levels may impair the informativeness of recommendations issued 
(Kadan et al., 2009), the more standardised and unambiguous language used to 
communicate recommendations in a three-tier scheme may elicit more significant price 
reactions if investors’ trust in the objectivity of those recommendations improved. Thus, 
I examine post-reform changes in the informativeness of recommendations, conditional 
on the recommendation level, as reflected in the short-term abnormal returns in the 
window surrounding the issuance of the recommendation. 
The likely directional effect on the conditional informativeness of post-reform changes 
from a five-tier to a three-tier system is not clear. The market may perceive an upgrade 
(or a downgrade) issued under the less ambiguous three-tier system during the post-
reform period as signalling a clearer specific investment decision than was the case with 
upgrades under the five-tier system (i.e., an upgrade from ‘hold’ to ‘buy’ is a clearer 
signal than an upgrade from ‘buy’ to ‘strong buy’). This ‘clarity effect’ would suggest a 
stronger positive (negative) reaction for upgrades (downgrades) in the post-reform period 
for analysts switching to the three-tier ratings system. A switch to the three-tier system 
could also enhance the perceived credibility of upgrades because there is no scope for an 
analyst to issue ‘minor upgrades’ (e.g., ‘hold’ to ‘weak buy’) to opportunistically signal 
optimism (I describe this as the ‘credibility effect’). Conversely, there is a potential 
‘fineness effect’, whereby moving to a coarse scale may reduce the precision of the 
information signal implied by a recommendation change because it impairs analysts’ 
ability to distinguish ‘good news’ (‘bad news’) of differing magnitude. Thus, the ‘clarity’ 
and ‘credibility’ effects suggest increased informativeness of upgrades by analysts 
switching to the three-tier system, while the ‘fineness’ effect suggests the opposite. For 
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downgrades, only the ‘clarity’ effect suggests that switching to a three-tier system should 
enhance informativeness; the additional ‘credibility’ of downgrades should be weaker 
after the reforms as these events become less infrequent. 
In terms of average post-reform informativeness conditional on recommendation levels, 
I expect that the clarity effect of switching to the three-tier ratings system will result in 
increased informativeness of recommendations of all levels as a result of less ambiguous 
signals of investment advice under this system. In contrast, the greater coarseness of the 
three-tier scale decreases informativeness by limiting analysts’ opportunities to 
distinguish good or bad news of differing magnitude, which works against the clarity 
effect. Given the existence of these competing forces, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Kadan et al. (2009) find no evidence that changing to the three-tier ratings system 
enhances the informativeness of recommendation levels. Consequently, H3 is stated in a 
null form: 
H3: Changes in the informativeness of recommendations after the 2002/3 reforms are 
similar for analysts who change to the three-tier recommendation ratings system after the 
2002/3 reforms and other analysts. 
3.2.3.3 Hypotheses 4a and 4b: Effect of Changing Tiers on the Informativeness of 
Recommendations Issued by Affiliated Analysts 
To decompose the potentially conflicting effects of the post-reform adoption of the three-
tier recommendation system, H4a and H4b are developed to examine the extent to which 
any effect of such a change differs across affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. 
The 2002/3 regulatory reforms mainly targeted affiliated analysts, and there is some 
evidence that the reforms (in total) were effective in improving the relative 
informativeness of recommendations issued by affiliated analysts. For instance, Cliff 
(2007) demonstrates a stronger market reaction to ‘buy’ and a weaker market reaction to 
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‘sell’ and ‘hold’ recommendations made by affiliated analysts after the implementation 
of NASD 2711. While Kadan et al. (2009) find that affiliated analysts remain reluctant to 
issue pessimistic recommendations following the reforms, and they find no evidence of a 
difference in investor reactions to optimistic and pessimistic recommendations 
immediately before and after the regulations, the extent to which investors discounted 
affiliated ‘neutral’ recommendations issued by GS signatories decreased following the 
regulations. 
I now consider the three effects (i.e., fineness, clarity and credibility) to analyse how using 
the three-tier ratings system induced by NASD 2711 may differentially affect the 
informativeness of recommendation changes issued by analysts whose employers are 
affiliated with the covered firms. While the fineness and clarity effects of adopting the 
three-tier ratings system should not be conditional on analyst affiliation, the potential for 
improvement in the credibility of recommendations should be greater for affiliated 
analysts than for unaffiliated analysts. The regulatory reforms mainly targeted affiliated 
analysts. Prior studies also show different price reactions to recommendations with 
different levels of conflicts of interest (Cliff, 2007; Kadan et al., 2009). To the extent that 
changes in conditional informativeness resulting from a switch to the three-tier system 
reflect the effect of greater credibility of analyst reports, the effect should be stronger in 
the case of affiliated analysts because the scope for improvement in credibility is greater 
for these analysts. If the change to the three-tier system has a significant ‘credibility’ 
effect, I argue that this will be stronger for affiliated analysts. Thus: 
H4a: Increases in the informativeness of recommendation upgrades (or ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations) after the 2002/3 reforms are greater for affiliated analysts who change 
to the three-tier recommendation ratings system after the 2002/3 reforms than for 
unaffiliated analysts who make a similar change. 
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H4b: Decreases in the informativeness of recommendation downgrades (or ‘hold’ and 
‘sell-type’ recommendations) after the 2002/3 reforms are greater for affiliated analysts 
who change to the three-tier recommendation ratings system after the 2002/3 reforms 
than for unaffiliated analysts who make a similar change. 
To test the hypotheses regarding informativeness, I focus on analyst and investor 
behaviour during the same investment banking transaction windows described in H2a and 
H2b viz. windows surrounding M&A announcement dates, windows following IPO issue 
dates and windows surrounding SEO filing dates. The details of these tests are provided 
in Chapter 4. 
3.2.3.4 Market Effects of 2002/3 Reforms on Profitability 
A key consideration when evaluating the quality of analyst recommendations is their 
profitability (i.e., mid- to long-term abnormal returns to an investment decision that 
adopts the recommendation). The objective of analysts’ recommendations is to advise on 
the purchase or sale of mispriced stocks (Graham & Dodd, 1962). The profitability of a 
recommendation reflects analysts’ ability to identify stocks when the price is low or high 
compared with analysts’ estimates of intrinsic value and make appropriate 
recommendations that, if followed by investors, would direct them towards investments 
that earn excess returns. Prior studies suggest that there is an association between analysts’ 
recommendations and future excess returns over longer windows. Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols, and Trueman (2001) report average 4.13% annual gross returns to a monthly 
rebalancing portfolio that buys the stocks with the most favourable consensus 
recommendations, after controlling for transaction costs, market risk, size, book-to-
market and price momentum effects, between 1985 and 1996. Bradshaw (2004) studies 
how analysts’ earnings forecasts are related to their stock recommendations by regressing 
the profitability of recommendations (i.e., one-year-ahead buy-and-hold size-adjusted 
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returns) on valuation metrics commonly used by analysts, such as the residual income 
model, price/earnings-to-growth (PEG) model and projections of LTG. In contrast to 
Barber et al. (2001), Bradshaw finds no significant relationship between the level of 
recommendations and future returns. In addition, he reports that between 1994 and 1998, 
analyst recommendations appeared to be less useful for buy-and-hold investors than 
investment strategies based on the present value models that incorporate their earnings 
forecasts (i.e., residual income valuations and PEG valuations), suggesting that 
recommendations are heavily influenced by analysts’ incentives or biases. 
Prior studies also examine the general effect of regulations on the profitability of 
recommendations. Barniv et al. (2009) examine the effects of the 2002/3 reforms (i.e., 
NASD 2711, NYSE Rule 472 and GS) on the relation between future excess returns (i.e., 
one-year-ahead buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns) and recommendations between 
January 2002 and May 2005. Their results show a seemingly irrational (negative) relation 
between consensus analyst recommendation levels and future returns (i.e., one-year-
ahead buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns) in the pre-Reg period (i.e., between Reg FD 
and the reforms over 2000–2002), and that this significant negative relation persists but 
diminishes after the regulations. Their findings suggest that the 2002/3 reforms had the 
intended effect on the quality of analyst reports reflected in the profitability of 
recommendations, but the effect may be incomplete. Guan et al. (2012) apply similar 
difference-in-difference tests to examine the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on the 
profitability of the trading portfolio based on the level of analysts’ stock 
recommendations between 1998 and 2007. They find that although the risk-adjusted 
profitability of buy recommendations issued by analysts employed by both GS and non-
GS investment banks declined significantly after the 2002/3 reforms, the risk-adjusted 
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profitability of ‘hold’ and ‘sell’ recommendations issued by non-GS analysts improved 
significantly after the reforms.20 
3.2.3.5 Hypothesis 5: Effect of Changing Tiers on Profitability 
H5 examines the effect of the brokers’ decision to use the three-tier ratings system on the 
extent to which the profitability of those analysts’ recommendations is affected by the 
2002/3 reforms. 
The purpose behind the strict disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 is to ensure that 
publicly released recommendations reflect an unbiased view of their research, and less 
biased recommendations should generally provide better guidance in terms of stock 
investment worthiness over an extended period (e.g., 3–12 months). Consistent with this 
notion, Barber et al. (2006) find that there have been less optimistically biased 
distributions of stock ratings of recommendations (e.g., the decreasing percentage of buys) 
since NASD 2711, and these more balanced distributions can be used to predict the 
profitability of analysts’ recommendations. I argue that the change to the three-tier ratings 
system encouraged by the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 at least partly 
contributed to the reduced optimistic bias in recommendations induced by investment 
banking incentives after the 2002/3 reforms. Therefore, the profitability of analysts’ 
recommendations issued by analysts who change to the three-tier ratings system should 
be improved before and after the 2002/3 reforms. Specifically, if the change to the three-
tier ratings system by NASD 2711 has succeeded in constraining the excessive optimism 
among analysts who likely faced higher conflicts of interest, I expect to find that the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by non-GS analysts who adopt the 
                                                 
20 These ‘hold’ and ‘sell’ recommendations were significantly unprofitable before the reforms; thus, the 
significant change in profitability following the reforms manifested itself in recommendations that earned 
no significant abnormal returns. 
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three-tier ratings system encouraged by NASD 2711 is greater than those issued by 
analysts who do not make a similar change. H5 is stated as follows: 
H5: The increase in profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations is greater for analysts 
who changed to the three-tier recommendation ratings system after the 2002/3 reforms 
than for other analysts. 
3.2.3.6 Hypothesis 6: Effect of Changing Tiers on the Profitability of 
Recommendations Issued by Affiliated Analysts 
H6 examines whether the association between profitability and analysts’ adoption of the 
three-tier ratings system encouraged by NASD 2711 is greater for analysts whose 
employers have M&A advisory or equity issuance underwriting mandates with the 
covered firms. 
Prior studies suggest that the optimistic bias in recommendations is greater for affiliated 
analysts relative to unaffiliated analysts (Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Krigman et al., 2001; 
Lin & McNichols, 1998; Michaely & Womack, 1999), which raises the possibility that 
investors who follow affiliated recommendations may suffer poorer investment 
performance than those who take the advice of other analysts. However, prior studies 
have found mixed results. While Michaely and Womack (1999) find that ‘buy’ 
recommendations issued by analysts affiliated with IPO firms significantly underperform 
those issued by unaffiliated analysts in the subsequent three and 12 months, most studies 
find that there is no statistically significant decrement in the profitability of buy 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts relative to those issued by unaffiliated 
analysts. For example, Lin and McNichols (1998) find no significant difference between 
the long-run (two-year) profitability of ‘strong buy’ and ‘buy’ recommendations issued 
by analysts whose employers are lead underwriters of SEOs and those of unaffiliated 
analysts, which suggests that any ‘error’ in recommendations resulting from intentional 
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bias may be offset by affiliated analysts’ potential access to firms’ information. Consistent 
with Lin and McNichols (1998), McNichols et al. (2007) find that affiliated analysts’ buy 
recommendations earn abnormal buy-and-hold returns that are similar to, or greater than, 
those of unaffiliated analysts three, six and 12 months after the announcement during the 
1994–2001 period. 
None of these prior studies have considered the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on the 
profitability of recommendations by affiliated analysts. The 2002/3 reforms aim to curb 
analysts’ potential conflicts of interest that are particularly strong for analysts whose 
employers are affiliated with covered firms through an M&A advisory or underwriting 
relationship (Kadan et al., 2009; Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008; Wu et al., 2015). If the 
2002/3 reforms decreased excessive optimistic bias associated with investment banking 
incentives and improved the profitability of recommendations, I expect that any such 
improvement should be greater for analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings system 
following the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711, which reflects the differential 
effect of greater credibility of analyst reports. The effect should be further stronger in the 
case of affiliated analysts because the scope for improvement in credibility is greater for 
analysts involved in potential conflicts of interest resulting from advisory and 
underwriting relationships between their employers and the covered firms. H6 extends 
H5 to predict a stronger effect for affiliated analysts: 
H6: The increase in profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations is greater for affiliated 
analysts who changed to the three-tier recommendation ratings system after the 2002/3 
reforms than for unaffiliated analysts who make a similar change. 
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3.2.4 Effect of 2002/3 Reforms on the Extent to Which Analyst Optimism Affects 
Brokers’ Deal Flow 
Anecdotal evidence shows that analysts might be pressured to issue overly optimistic 
reports to their clients with a view to influencing banks’ future deal flow (i.e., market 
shares of investment banking mandates). For example, in 1999, Tyco rewarded Merrill 
Lynch the lead management of a $2.1bn bond offering in exchange for favourable 
research coverage from Merrill Lynch hiring a pro-Tyco analyst (Bowe & Silverman, 
2004). Analysts can contribute to retaining or attracting investment banking business for 
their employers by providing optimistically biased reports. 
There is mixed evidence in the literature regarding whether analyst optimism positively 
affects the market share of analysts’ employers’ future investment banking transactions. 
Findings reported by Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006) suggest that aggressive 
analyst optimism may cause a reduction in employing banks’ opportunities to win future 
underwriting mandates because such behaviour may damage the banks’ reputation. The 
authors find that although analyst optimism adds value to the covered issuers, it is not the 
dominant consideration when issuing firms select an underwriter for equity and debt 
issues. Clarke, Khorana, Patel and Rau (2007) study a sample of analysts who switched 
employment between 1988 and 1999 and examine whether their optimistic forecasts or 
recommendations affected their new bank’s chance of winning future market shares of 
investment banking deals. They consider both capital-raising and corporate control 
transactions to develop a comprehensive understanding of the relations between analyst 
optimism, analyst reputation, investment bank reputation and deal flow. Consistent with 
Ljungqvist et al. (2006), they find no evidence that issuing optimistic reports (i.e., forecast 
bias and aggressive recommendations) increases a bank’s chance of winning future near-
term lead investment banking deals. While Ljungqvist et al. (2006) find no evidence that 
optimistic coverage of an issuing firm improved a bank’s likelihood of winning the 
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immediate lead underwriting mandate, Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2009) show 
that, during the pre-reform period (before June 2002), optimistic coverage increased the 
chance of securing co-management appointments, which in turn increased the bank’s 
likelihood of winning long-term future lead-management mandates. Moreover, Ellis, 
Michaely and O’Hara (2011) find that investment banks compete for SEOs by 
intentionally providing optimistic recommendations before the offerings, suggesting a 
positive relation between analysts’ favourable coverage of issuing firms and underwriting 
mandates. Research also considers the effect of optimism in other analyst outputs. For 
instance, Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2011) find that analyst optimism reflected in target 
prices significantly increased an underwriter’s likelihood of attracting equity and debt 
underwriting business for real estate investment trusts between 1996 and 2004. Overall, 
optimistic research may help banks gain a competitive advantage in winning or retaining 
advisory/underwriting mandates in the long run. 
3.2.4.1 Hypothesis 7: Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on the Extent to Which Analyst 
Optimism Affects Brokers’ Deal Flow 
Prior studies also examine the effect of regulatory changes on deal flows. Ljungqvist et 
al. (2006) observe that the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act in the late 1990s expanded 
the range of investment banking transactions with which commercial banks can become 
involved, which changed the existing equilibrium between reputational capital and 
conflicts of interest between investment banking and research. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) 
argue that analysts’ aggressive optimism may increase the likelihood of banks being 
awarded underwriting mandates, but that this behaviour is also regarded by the market as 
a liquidation of reputation capital, and taken together, this does not systematically 
influence banks’ market shares. Boudry et al. (2011) also contend that the enhanced 
scrutiny of analysts’ potential conflicts of interest by the 2002/3 reforms is associated 
58 
with a reduction in the extent to which analyst optimism has affected firms’ underwriting 
choices since the 2002/3 reforms. 
H7 focuses on whether the 2002/3 reforms and the prominent provision therein (i.e., 
NASD 2711) affect the extent to which analyst optimism influences brokers’ deal flows. 
The objective of the 2002/3 reforms is to curb analysts’ potential conflicts of interest 
arising from their employers’ attempts to win future underwriting or advisory mandates. 
Before the reforms, both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts had incentives to issue 
optimistic reports of the covered firms surrounding the investment banking deals. If the 
2002/3 reforms at least partially achieved their goal, I expect this to lead to a reduction in 
aggressive analyst optimism. Following the 2002/3 reforms, analysts may have less 
incentive to provide overly optimistic coverage to lure lead management or advisory 
mandates for their employing banks because their compensation and status are no longer 
determined by investment banking revenues. Of course, at any point in time, some 
analysts will be more optimistic than others. However, I argue that in the post-reform 
period, observed abnormal optimism will more likely reflect genuinely held beliefs rather 
than opportunistic behaviour intended to help brokers win future deals. From the 
perspective of potential clients, if they believe that inducing analysts to be optimistic 
became more difficult after the reforms, then observed (historical) optimism should have 
a smaller effect on their choice of future underwriters or advisors. Therefore, I propose 
that the extent to which analysts’ aggressive optimism affects their employers’ deal flow 
decreases following the 2002/3 reforms. H7 is formally stated as follows: 
H7: The sensitivity of the annual change in the market share of investment banking 
business to the annual change in analyst optimism decreases after the 2002/3 reforms. 
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3.2.4.2 Hypothesis 8: Effect of Changing Tiers on the Extent to Which Analyst 
Optimism Affects Brokers’ Deal Flow 
H8 examines the effect of the implementation of the three-tier ratings system induced by 
NASD 2711 on the extent to which analyst optimism affects brokers’ deal flow. 
Before the 2002/3 reforms, favourable analyst recommendations potentially benefited 
employers’ investment banking business. This study argues that, following the disclosure 
requirements of NASD 2711, any reduction in excess analyst optimism attributable to the 
effect of the 2002/3 reforms will be stronger among analysts who changed their ratings 
system relative to those who did not. Thus, if the extent to which analysts’ intentional 
optimism affects their employers’ deal flow decreased following the 2002/3 reforms, I 
expect that this reduction will also be greater among analysts whose employers 
implemented the three-tier ratings system induced by NASD 2711. H8 examines a 
stronger effect for those analysts changing to the three-tier ratings system after the NASD 
2711. The hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
H8: The decrease in sensitivity of the change in the market share of investment banking 
business to the annual change in analyst optimism after the 2002/3 reforms is greater for 
brokerage firms whose analysts changed to the three-tier recommendation ratings system 
after the 2002/3 reforms than for other brokerage firms. 
To test H7 and H8, I focus on brokers’ market shares in investment banking business such 
as M&A advisory and new equity (IPO/SEO deals) underwriting mandates to develop 
hypotheses. 
This completes the development of the hypotheses relating to changes of behaviour 
around the 2002/3 reforms. The next section develops hypotheses concerning the 
expiration of the mandatory procurement of independent research. 
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Effect of the Five-Year Funding of Independent Research and its Expiration 
3.3.1 Effect of the Five-Year Funding of Independent Research 
In the years immediately following GS, the independent research industry expanded 
rapidly. There were fewer than 50 independent equity research providers in 2000, and this 
number increased to around 350–400 firms in 2005 and 989 in 2008 (Kim, 2005; Retkwa, 
2009). According to Sanford Bragg, Chief Executive of Integrity Research, which tracks 
the independent research industry, ‘It was like a big gold rush when everybody wanted to 
be an independent research provider’ (LaCapra, 2012). However, Buslepp et al. (2014) 
document that only 62 independent research firms were employed by the GS signatories 
during the five years of the GS period.21 Much of the observed growth appears to represent 
new research firms that were unsuccessful in winning GS-mandated business, or it may 
reflect other factors related to GS that increased demand for research boutiques. For 
example, it is plausible that there was a decrease in sell-side research staff and budgets 
after the separation of research from investment banking revenue required by the 2002/3 
reforms, and this may have resulted in sell-side analysts setting up their own speciality 
research firms (Groysberg & Healy, 2013; Morten, 2011).  
3.3.1.1 Hypothesis 9: Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent Research on 
Analyst Behaviour 
Given that independent analysts have no investment banking-related incentives to bias 
their research, their objectives are likely to be more closely aligned with those of investors 
(Gu & Xue, 2008), and consequently they should, all else equal, issue less biased forecasts 
than other analysts. Prior studies find evidence of lesser optimistic bias in independent 
                                                 
21 Buslepp et al. (2014) collect the names of the 62 independent research providers based on the annual 
reports submitted by independent consultants who were designated GS signatories to oversee the 
procurement of the independent research. The submitted annual reports can be requested from the NYAG’s 
office under the Freedom of Information Act. 
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analysts’ research reports. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) report that the average 
optimism reflected in recommendations issued by independent researchers is significantly 
lower than that by unaffiliated and affiliated analysts. Consistent with the intention of GS, 
Allee et al. (2018) find that target prices issued by independent analysts between 2011 
and 2015 are less optimistic than those issued by analysts employed by investment banks. 
The authors also examine the fundamental inputs of independent analysts’ target prices, 
such as the optimism and accuracy of independent analysts’ LTG forecasts, earnings per 
share (EPS) forecasts and cost of equity capital estimates, and they suggest that lower 
optimism in independent analysts’ target prices likely stems from their more conservative 
LTG forecasts. Further, Xue (2017) posits that for independent analysts, the timeliness of 
unfavourable recommendations is greater than that of favourable recommendations. The 
literature also suggests the existence of a disciplining effect of independent analysts’ 
research on the quality of analyst reports of those employed by investment banks. Gu and 
Xue (2008) find that the presence of independent analyst coverage for a firm appears to 
lower the forecast bias and improve the forecast accuracy and relevance of reports issued 
by non-independent analysts. 
H9 investigates the effectiveness of the stipulation in the GS that required signatory banks 
to procure and disseminate independent research reports to their clients for a period of 
five years. These requirements were intended to improve the objectivity of the research 
reports issued by the signatories’ own analysts. If the independent research procured and 
provided by the GS signatories over the five-year period effectively improved the 
objectivity of analyst research (i.e., the disciplining effect), I expect that there may be a 
subsequent deterioration in objectivity following the expiration of the requirement to fund 
independent research in 2009/10. This suggests that there may be an increase in the 
optimism of research outputs issued by analysts whose employers are GS signatory banks 
after they ceased funding and providing independent research. H9, which addresses the 
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effect of the 2009/10 expiration of the five-year obligation required by GS on optimism 
in properties of analyst reports issued by GS-sanctioned banks, is stated as follows: 
H9: The change in the optimism of analyst recommendation (forecast) revisions following 
the expiration of independent research funding is more positive for analysts employed by 
GS signatories than for other analysts. 
3.3.1.2 Hypothesis 10: Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent Research on 
Affiliated Analyst Behaviour 
H10 examines whether the association between analyst optimism and the effect of the 
2009/10 expiration of funding independent research is stronger for analysts employed by 
GS signatory firms that are affiliated with the covered firms through investment banking 
ties. I propose that any change in analyst behaviour attributable to the effect of the 
2009/10 expiration on GS signatory firms will be stronger for their affiliated analysts than 
for unaffiliated analysts. Before the period of mandatory procurement of independent 
research, affiliated analysts employed by investment banks had incentives to issue overly 
optimistic reports to their clients with a view to retaining or winning the advisory or 
underwriting mandates for their employers. 
During the five-year procurement period, while the provision of concurrent independent 
research reports should discipline both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ behaviour, 
there are two reasons why this disciplinary effect on affiliated analysts should be greater 
than the effect on unaffiliated analysts. First, analysts whose GS signatory employers are 
affiliated with the covered acquirers or issuers are subject to stronger conflicts of interest 
because of their greater investment banking incentives. Second, any herding behaviour 
by independent analysts would reinforce the disciplining effect of independent research 
on affiliated analysts’ reports (Xue, 2017). Prior studies suggest that independent research 
analysts are likely to ‘herd’ with affiliated analysts because these analysts have the 
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greatest information advantage (Jacob, Rock, & Weber, 2008), which motivates affiliated 
analysts to acquire more ex ante information (Xue, 2017). 
If the five-year procurement of independent research effectively reduced excess optimism 
in affiliated analysts’ reports, following the disciplining argument, after the expiration in 
2009/10, there should be an increase in optimism among affiliated analysts who are 
employed by GS. I propose that the increase in analyst optimism is greater for affiliated 
analysts relative to unaffiliated analysts. Accordingly, H10 is stated as follows: 
H10: The change in the optimism of analyst recommendation (forecast) revisions 
following the expiration of independent research funding is more positive for affiliated 
analysts whose employers are GS signatories than for unaffiliated analysts whose 
employers are GS signatories. 
Like the earlier hypotheses, I test H9 and H10 using measures of analyst behaviour 
surrounding key investment banking transactions. 
3.3.2 Market Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent Research on 
Investors 
GS’s mandated five-year procurement of independent research for investment banks 
reflects regulators’ beliefs that analyst independence is essential and results in higher 
research quality to capture market expectations (Gu & Xue, 2008). Some extant literature 
provides support for this view. Barber et al. (2007) examine whether there is a difference 
in the informativeness of recommendations issued by independent research firms relative 
to those of investment banks. By analysing a sample of stock recommendations from 
January 1996 to June 2003, the authors report that the average daily abnormal returns of 
‘buy’ recommendations issued by independent research analysts are greater than those 
issued by analysts of investment banks. While forecasts issued by independent analysts 
are less accurate (Jacob et al., 2008), Gu and Xue (2008) show that long-window earnings 
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response coefficients (ERC) are profoundly higher than those for non-independent 
analysts (i.e., those of firms with investment banking business or brokerage houses) for 
both positive and negative earnings news. Consequently, they argue that the forecasts of 
independent analysts are better aligned with investor expectations than those of non-
independent analysts. Allee et al. (2018) find that independent analysts’ reports provide 
consistent detail regarding valuation inputs, such as the cost of equity measures that 
analysts of investment banks often exclude, and typically use a longer timeframe in their 
specific forecast analysis. They suggest the usefulness of independent research reports 
resulting from more objective information in terms of evaluating firms’ value provided 
to investors. 
While regulators believe that mandated independent research can provide investors with 
objective investment advice (Buslepp et al., 2014; Ruth & Louise, 2004), some critics and 
studies conclude that independent research provided by GS signatories fails to provide 
relevant and informative information to investors (Burns, 2005; Fisch, 2007). Individual 
investors were largely unaware of GS, and there was a limited level of awareness of the 
availability of independent research because of the lack of advertising or promotion of 
the independent research by GS signatories. Of all sell-side research reports produced by 
GS signatories, the proportion for which the related independent research was requested 
by at least one individual investor ranged between 10% and 25% (Edick, 2008). Thus, 
critics suspected that post-reform independent research was tailored to institutional 
investors instead of small investors, whom the regulations were primarily designed to 
protect (FINRA, 2005). Buslepp et al. (2014) and Clarke et al. (2011) argue that the 
independent research funded by GS was of lower quality—in terms of both future 
performance and market reaction to recommendations—than research by analysts 
employed by investment banks and that of other independent research firms that were not 
funded by the GS. 
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Thus, this thesis examines whether the five-year procurement of independent research 
required by GS helps to restore investor confidence in sell-side analysts—particularly in 
those who are employed by GS signatories. The following sections discuss the reaction 
of investors in response to analysts’ reports in the short term, and the profitability that 
represents the quality of analysts’ reports following the expiration of funding independent 
research in 2009/10. 
3.3.2.1 Hypotheses 11a and 11b: Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent 
Research on Informativeness 
Prior studies examine investor reactions in response to independent research. Barber et al. 
(2007) investigate the informativeness of ‘buy’ recommendation portfolios (i.e., average 
daily percentage of buy-and-hold abnormal returns to upgrades to buy or strong buy, or 
initiations/resumptions/reiterations with a buy or strong buy rating) before June 2003 and 
show that independent analysts provide more informative ‘buy’ recommendations than 
analysts employed by investment banks. Conversely, they find that investment bank 
analysts’ ‘hold/sell’ recommendations are more informative than those of independent 
analysts (i.e., average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns to downgrades to 
hold, sell or strong sell, or initiations/resumptions/reiterations with a hold, sell or strong 
sell rating). Overall, their findings suggest that before GS, investors responded less 
strongly to ‘buy’ recommendations issued by investment bank analysts because of their 
potential conflicts of interest, and they placed greater trust in the ‘buy’ recommendations 
issued by independent analysts. However, the performance of independent analyst firms 
raised by GS (i.e., independent research providers) is uncertain. Clarke et al. (2011) 
investigate stock recommendations after the 2002/3 reforms and find that the 
recommendations issued by independent research firms that were set up following GS 
generated lower announcement period returns than independent research firms that 
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existed before the GS. 22  Buslepp et al. (2014) study recommendations and 
recommendation changes between 26 July 2004 and 26 July 2009 (26 March 2005–
26 March 2010 for Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC). 
Consistent with Clarke et al. (2011), they find that lower informativeness of buy 
recommendations and downgrades by GS-associated independent research providers, 
relative to those by independent research firms that are not involved in GS, is derived 
from their lower degree of industry expertise and relative lack of general forecasting 
experience.23 They also find that both upgrades and downgrades issued by GS signatory 
banks are significantly more informative than those issued by each firm’s contracted 
independent research providers. 
H11a and H11b examine the effect of the period of mandatory procurement of 
independent research on the informativeness of recommendations (or recommendation 
changes) issued by GS signatories before and after the expiration of this requirement. 
H11a and H11b examine whether the presence of independent research providers 
following covered firms leads to an improvement in the credibility of GS signatory firms’ 
recommendations relative to the situation in which concurrent independent opinions may 
be absent. While prior evidence shows the inferior performance of the independent 
research provided by GS (Busleep et al., 2014; Clarke et al., 2011), I conjecture that the 
quality of analyst reports issued by GS signatories improves after making third-party 
research available to clients. Therefore, the improved quality of research may increase 
credibility (as perceived by investors). There are two possible reasons for this. First, the 
presence of independent research providers may have a monitoring effect on the GS 
signatories. Although the independent analysts of independent research providers do not 
                                                 
22 The independent research firms identified by Clarke et al. (2011) refer to non-investment banks that have 
never been classified as either a lead or co-manager on any equity deal or advised either the target or 
acquirer in an acquisition during the sample period between 2000 and 2007. 
23 Several of the large independent research firms (e.g., Avalon Research, Precursor Research and Sidoti & 
Co.) refused to chase the $460 million funding and did not participate in the competition of being part of 
GS. 
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monitor GS analysts directly, an implicit monitoring mechanism arises when investors 
are able to compare both sets of forecasts and recommendations for the same covered 
firm. Therefore, investors may believe that GS analysts will issue more honest and 
relevant reports than they did in the pre-reform period because greater costs will be 
incurred for them if they disseminate biased and misleading forecasts during the five-year 
procurement period. Second, the presence of contracted independent research providers 
may stimulate information competition among analysts, which may motivate GS analysts 
to increase private information acquisition to maintain their information advantage and 
therefore improve their forecast and recommendation quality. Accordingly, investors’ 
confidence in the accuracy of GS signatories’ forecasting may have improved during the 
five-year procurement period (i.e., the credibility effect). If this is true, I expect to observe 
an impairment in credibility reflected in the informativeness of the recommendations after 
the expiration of the requirement to fund independent research in 2009/10. More 
specifically, I propose that the informativeness of favourable recommendations (or 
upgrades) will decrease and that of unfavourable recommendations (or downgrades) will 
increase after the expiration in 2009/10. H11a and H11b are stated as follows: 
H11a: The change in the informativeness of recommendation upgrades (or ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations) after the expiration of independent research funding is more negative 
for analysts employed by GS signatories than for other analysts. 
H11b: The change in the informativeness of recommendation downgrades (or ‘hold’ and 
‘sell-type’ recommendations) after the expiration of independent research funding is 
more positive for analysts employed by GS signatories than for other analysts. 
68 
3.3.2.2 Hypothesis 12: Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent Research on 
the Informativeness of Recommendations Issued by Affiliated Analysts 
H12 examines whether there is a differential effect of the 2009/10 expiration on investor 
response to recommendations issued by affiliated GS analysts relative to unaffiliated GS 
analysts. This study proposes that the credibility effect of the presence of independent 
research set up by GS on the informativeness of recommendations by GS analysts is 
greater for affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated analysts. This may reflect two effects. 
First, to the extent that the monitoring effect of the presence of parallel independent 
research required by GS reflects the effect of greater credibility on analyst reports of GS 
signatory firms, the effect should be stronger in the cases of affiliated analysts because 
the scope for improvement in credibility is greater for these analysts. Second, relative to 
unaffiliated analysts, affiliated analysts may have more favourable access to 
managements’ private information because of their ties with management. Therefore, 
they can better maintain their information advantage among analysts, including 
independent research providers set up by GS. If investors believe that affiliated analysts 
employed by GS issue more value-relevant reports that reflect firms’ true performance as 
a result of the parallel independent research requirement, the effect of the expiration of 
the procurement of independent research by GS signatories on the change in the 
informativeness of affiliated analysts’ reports should be greater. Then, after the expiration 
of the five-year procurement of independent research in 2009/10, the credibility effect 
may have been reduced, which may induce changes in the informativeness of the 
recommendations issued by GS signatories. If this credibility effect is greater in the case 
of affiliated analysts, I expect that the change in informativeness will be greater for 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts than for recommendations issued by 
unaffiliated analysts. Thus, H12 is stated as follows: 
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H12: The change in the informativeness of recommendation upgrades (downgrades) after 
the expiration of independent research funding is greater for affiliated analysts whose 
employers are GS signatories than for unaffiliated analysts whose employers are GS 
signatories. 
I examine H11a, H11b and H12 in the M&A and IPO/SEO settings, whereby analysts’ 
potential conflicts of interest are stronger because of their investment banking ties (see 
Section 3.2.2.2). For brevity, I do not repeatedly describe the settings of M&A and 
IPO/SEO here. 
3.3.2.3 Hypothesis 13: Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent Research on 
Profitability 
H13 examines whether there is a differential effect of the 2009/10 expiration on the 
profitability of recommendations issued by GS signatories relative to that of the 
recommendations issued by non-GS signatory brokers. 
While several studies document that the 2002/3 reforms have increased the quality and 
credibility of sell-side analyst recommendations and forecasts (Barber et al., 2006; Barniv 
et al., 2009; Kadan et al., 2009), few studies have evaluated the effect on long-term 
profitability of stock recommendations of the five-year procurement of independent 
research. An exception is Buslepp et al. (2014), who find that during the five-year 
procurement of independent research (i.e., 26 July 2004–26 July 2009 or 23 March 2005–
26 March 2010 for recommendations associated with Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and 
Thomas Weisel LLC), buy recommendations issued by independent research providers 
funded by GS signatories had, on average, lower profitability (one-year abnormal returns) 
relative to those issued by GS signatories. However, this finding does not consider any 
effects of the reforms on the profitability of the recommendations issued by GS 
signatories compared with recommendations issued by non-GS signatory brokers. Biased 
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analysts’ recommendations do not reflect the investment worthiness of the stock, which 
leads to reduced future performance (i.e., profitability). If the five-year obligation reduced 
the bias in GS analyst reports because of the disciplining effect of independent research 
and therefore improved the profitability of buy recommendations issued by the GS 
signatories, I predict that the optimism of their analysts may increase after the GS 
signatories cease funding independent research. This is because the disciplining effect 
associated with the mandated independent research has been reduced, which may 
decrease the profitability of their recommendations. I expect that there will be a reduction 
in the long-term performance of the stock returns recommended by GS analysts following 
the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research. Thus, H13 is stated as follows: 
H13: The change in the profitability of recommendations after the expiration of 
independent research funding is more negative for analysts whose employers are GS 
signatories than for other analysts. 
3.3.2.4 Hypothesis 14: Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent Research on 
the Profitability of Recommendations Issued by Affiliated Analysts 
H14 investigates whether the expiration of independent research funding had a greater 
effect on the profitability of recommendations issued by affiliated analysts employed by 
GS signatories relative to unaffiliated analysts also employed by GS signatories. Analysts 
whose employers are affiliated with the covered acquirer or new equity issuer may have 
greater investment banking-related conflicts of interest and may tend to issue more 
optimistically biased reports that will likely lead to less profitable recommendations. If 
the requirement of independent research procurement successfully reduced the affiliation 
bias in GS analyst reports during the five-year obligation period, which means a greater 
disciplining effect on affiliated analysts relative to unaffiliated analysts, then the 2009/10 
expiration of this provision may have induced a differential increase in affiliation bias. If 
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this is true, I expect that there will be a decrease in the profitability of buy 
recommendations issued by GS analysts following the expiration in 2009/10, and that this 
decrease will be greater for affiliated analysts employed by GS signatories relative to 
unaffiliated analysts employed by GS signatories. Thus, H14 is stated as follows: 
H14: The change in the profitability of recommendations after the expiration of 
independent research funding is more negative for affiliated analysts employed by GS 
signatories than for unaffiliated analysts employed by GS signatories. 
3.3.3 Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent Research on the Extent to 
Which Analyst Optimism Affects Brokers’ Deal Flows 
Little is known about how the consequences of the regulatory reforms affect brokers’ deal 
flows. This thesis is the first to study the effect of the five-year procurement of funding 
independent research on the role of analyst optimism in influencing covered firms’ future 
selection of an underwriter or an advisor. If the five-year funding of independent research 
effectively restores the objectivity of the GS analyst reports (and reduces the optimistic 
bias in their reports), I expect a significant reduction in persistent optimism during the 
five-year independent research period for the GS analysts, whose behaviour was 
potentially disciplined by the procured independent research. If the covered firms (i.e., 
potential clients) believe that attempts to influence analysts to be optimistic were less 
likely to be successful during this period, then observed optimism in analyst 
recommendations should have a smaller effect on their future underwriter or advisor 
choices. Therefore, if this effect occurred and dissipated after the expiration of the 
mandatory funding period, I predict that, following the expiration, there will be an 
increase in the extent to which GS analyst optimism is associated with future gains in the 
market share of their employers, as per H15: 
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H15: The change in the sensitivity of the market share of investment banking business to 
analyst optimism following the independent research funding period is more positive for 
GS signatories than for other brokerage firms. 
This completes the set of hypotheses concerning the effect of the expiration of the 
mandatory funding of independent research. The next section develops hypotheses 
relating to the effect of the relaxation of some provisions of the SRO Rules, which are 
entailed in the JOBS Act of 2012. 
Effect of the JOBS Act 
3.4.1 Effect of the JOBS Act on Analyst Behaviour 
While the SRO Rules restrict analyst research in IPO firms (e.g., certain analysts’ 
publication of research reports concerning an issuer, public appearances concerning the 
securities of an issuer and participation in meetings attended by investment banking 
personnel), the JOBS Act relaxed the restrictions on these analysts’ involvement in the 
EGCs’ IPO process. To improve the availability and flow of information available to 
investors before and after an IPO, the JOBS Act relaxed some provisions of the SRO 
Rules to allow analysts employed by members of the EGC issuers’ IPO underwriting 
syndicate (‘EGC affiliated analysts’) to become more extensively involved in the IPO 
process than was permitted under the original SRO Rules. First, the JOBS Act partially 
relaxed the earlier provisions restricting interactions between research analysts and 
investment divisions. Since the proclamation of the JOBS Act, investment banks involved 
in EGC underwriting have been permitted to arrange communications between investors 
and research analysts covering EGC issuers for the purpose of investors’ education, which 
was prohibited under the SRO Rules. EGC-affiliated analysts are permitted to participate 
in company management presentations (e.g., pitch meetings and due diligence sessions) 
in the presence of investment banking staff and may have greater ability to communicate 
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with potential investors and the management of EGC firms. Second, while the provisions 
of the SRO Rules prohibited any research reports and public appearances by research 
analysts during the period before and after the pre-filing of an EGC’s IPO,24 the quiet 
periods during post-offering25 and the periods before and after the expiration, termination 
or waiver of a lock-up agreement,26 the JOBS Act has removed all of these restrictions. 
3.4.1.1 Hypothesis 16: Effect of the JOBS Act on Analyst Optimism 
H16 examines the effect of the JOBS Act on affiliation-related bias reflected in stock 
recommendations issued by analysts covering EGC issuers. Given the fact that the JOBS 
Act directly affects EGC-affiliated analysts only (i.e., those employed by a brokerage in 
the EGC’s IPO underwriting syndicate), H16 focuses on the behaviour of those analysts 
relative to unaffiliated analysts following the same firms. Dambra et al. (2018) find that 
analysts’ pre-IPO participation and communication (restrictions on which were relaxed 
by the JOBS Act) resulted in an increase in analyst forecast optimism. Specifically, they 
find that the initial earnings forecasts issued by affiliated analysts covering EGCs are less 
accurate and more optimistic than those issued by unaffiliated analysts covering the same 
firms and those issued by analysts covering other non-EGC firms following the JOBS 
Act. Applying the broad logic of Dambra et al. (2018) to the case of investment 
recommendations, I propose H16, which predicts that the post-reform increase in 
optimism is stronger for EGC-affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated analysts covering 
these firms. H16 is formally stated as follows: 
                                                 
24 For EGCs’ issuers, ‘gun jumping’ restrictions may not be applied. ‘Gun-jumping’ restrictions are wide-
reaching and include press releases, media interviews, website postings, emails, internal company 
announcements, Facebook posts, Twitter tweets, YouTube videos and online commentary. 
25 The blackout period was up to 40 days after the offering of IPOs. 
26 The blackout period was within 15 days before or after the expiration of lockup provisions. 
74 
H16: The change in optimism of initial analyst recommendations for IPO firms after the 
JOBS Act is more positive for affiliated analysts covering EGCs than for unaffiliated 
analysts covering EGCs. 
The choice to study optimism reflected in stock recommendations rather than earnings 
forecasts is justified by the fact that recommendations are the most important single 
output to investors because they represent an assessment of the overall investment 
worthiness of the stock and incorporate analysts’ other observable outputs (Bradshaw, 
2009). Recommendations directly indicate whether the analysts believe that the covered 
firm overvalued or undervalued, which is the central consideration when investing, and 
they are arguably more likely to influence stock prices than short-term earnings forecasts. 
Further, most of the literature focuses on examining analyst bias by studying stock 
recommendations because the manipulation of an investment recommendation is more 
difficult for investors to detect than that of an earnings forecast (Lin & McNichols, 1998). 
3.4.2 Effect of the JOBS Act on Investors 
This section discusses the effect of relaxing restrictions on analysts’ involvement in the 
IPO process under the JOBS Act regarding the informativeness and profitability of 
analysts’ stock recommendations. While reducing regulatory burdens helps growth firms 
to raise capital, the deregulation may create incentives for strategic optimism, which may 
harm the users of analyst reports. Thus, I develop H17a/b and H18, which examine the 
effect of the JOBS Act on the short-term informativeness and the long-term profitability 
of stock recommendations, respectively. In particular, I study how investors perceive and 
respond to recommendations issued by EGC analysts whose employers have underwriting 
mandates with the covered EGC issuers and whether their favourable recommendations 
can guide profitable investments for investors. 
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3.4.2.1 Hypotheses 17a and 17b: Effect of JOBS Act on the Conditional 
Informativeness of Recommendations by Affiliated Analysts Covering EGCs 
Dambra et al.’s (2018) study is the only extant study examining the effect of deregulation 
entailed in the JOBS Act on the information content of affiliated analyst research 
coverage. They find that the decrease in the unconditional informativeness of 
recommendations (i.e., three-day CARs) issued by affiliated analysts covering EGCs is 
greater than that of the recommendations issued by unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs 
after the JOBS Act. Their findings suggest that affiliated analysts’ research reports for 
EGCs have become less informative because these analysts have been allowed to 
participate more directly in the IPO process since the JOBS Act. 
Following Dambra et al. (2018), I argue that there is less credibility perceived in affiliated 
analysts’ reports covering EGCs compared with the credibility in reports issued by 
unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs. However, instead of pooling CARs of positive and 
negative recommendations in the estimation of absolute informativeness by Dambra et al. 
(2018), I separate tests of conditional informativeness based on ‘buy-type’ and ‘hold and 
sell-type’ recommendations. I argue that investors react differently to the change in these 
two types of recommendations issued by affiliated analysts covering EGCs following the 
JOBS Act because investors expect that excess optimism will increase in analysts’ 
recommendations after the Act. Their ‘buy-type’ recommendations would become less 
informative and their ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations would become more 
informative following the JOBS Act. I apply this logic to investigate the conditional 
informativeness of stock recommendations published within the 24-month post-IPO 
window. This is because analyst recommendations reflect the ultimate purpose of analyst 
investment reports and are commonly used as a proxy of analyst bias in the literature. 
Further, recommendations are examined to capture the regulatory effect on the retail 
investors that the regulations were designed to protect. Prior studies suggest that 
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sophisticated investors, like intuitional buyers, ignore recommendations and rely more on 
forecasts because they are more aware of the analysts’ conflicts of interest (Mikhail, 
Walther, & Willis, 2007). Instead, retail investors are more likely to follow 
recommendations literally—particularly in the case of ‘buy’ and ‘strong buy’ 
recommendations (Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2014). Thus, H17a and H17b are stated 
as follows. 
H17a: The post-JOBS Act change in the informativeness of analyst reports following IPO 
issue dates is more negative for ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by affiliated analysts 
covering EGCs than for those issued by unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs. 
H17b: The post-JOBS Act change in the informativeness of analyst reports following the 
IPO issue date is more positive for ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations issued by the 
affiliated analysts covering EGCs than for those issued by unaffiliated analysts covering 
EGCs. 
3.4.2.2 Hypothesis 18: Effect of the JOBS Act on Profitability 
H18 examines the effect of the relaxation of rules restricting analysts’ involvement in the 
IPO process under the JOBS Act on analysts’ ability to provide investors with profitable 
recommendations of the investment worthiness of stocks. While prior studies focus on 
the effects of the 2002/3 reforms on the quality of analyst reports reflected in the 
profitability of analyst recommendations (Barniv et al., 2009; Guan et al., 2012), this 
thesis is the first study to examine whether the JOBS Act affects the profitability of 
recommendations issued by EGC-affiliated analysts. Dambra et al. (2018) find that 
affiliated analysts’ initial forecasts to EGC issuers have been more optimistic and less 
accurate since the JOBS Act. They suggest that, when left unregulated, greater analyst 
participation in the IPO process potentially creates incentives for analysts to 
optimistically bias their research output to increase future investment banking fees and 
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brokerage revenues. More optimistic and biased analyst recommendations are less likely 
to represent the true investment worthiness of the stock and are more likely to lead to 
weak future performance (i.e., profitability). If the relaxation on analysts’ publications 
and communication in the IPO process by the JOBS Act increases the bias in EGC-
affiliated analyst reports, and therefore impairs the profitability of GS recommendations 
in the post-Act period, I expect that there will be a decrease in the long-term performance 
of the stock returns recommended by EGC-affiliated analysts. Thus, H18 is stated as 
follows: 
H18: The change in the profitability of recommendations after the JOBS Act is more 
negative for affiliated analysts covering EGC issuers than for unaffiliated analysts 
covering EGCs. 
Overall, Section 3.4 reviews the related literature and develops corresponding hypotheses 
regarding the effect of the JOBS Act on analyst behaviour, informativeness and 
profitability of the outputs of analyst research. It develops hypotheses noting that allowing 
analyst involvement during the IPO process after the JOBS Act will increase analyst 
optimism, decrease informativeness and lead to lower profitability in recommendations 
for affiliated analysts covering EGCs and who are directly subject to the JOBS Act. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter developed 18 hypotheses in accordance with the research questions 
identified in Chapter 1. All hypotheses are organised based on three regulatory events: 
the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 in 2002, the 2009/10 expiration of funding 
independent research and the deregulation of the JOBS Act in 2012. Further, I condition 
my hypotheses on proxies for analyst incentives and prima facie indicators of change in 
analyst behaviour or analyst regulation exposures. Further, all hypotheses are subject to 
M&A or IPO/SEO contexts whereby analysts’ potential conflicts of interest are amplified. 
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H1a/b–8 concern the effects of the 2002/3 reforms on analyst optimism (H1a/b and 
H2a/b), which are also reflected on informativeness (H3 and H4a/b), profitability (H5 and 
H6) and the sensitivity of deal flow to changes in analyst optimism (H7 and H8). H1a/b–
H8 propose that the excess analyst optimism decreases following the 2002/3 reforms for 
analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings system than for analysts who do not make 
a similar move. Basically, the logics are that less extent of abnormal analyst optimism; 
more credibility that investors perceive their recommendations; more profitability of 
‘buy-type’ recommendations; less extent to which analyst optimism affects the broker’s 
subsequent deal flow. H9–15 concern the effects of the 2009/10 expiration of independent 
research on analyst optimism (H9 and H10), which are also reflected on informativeness 
(H11a/b and H12), profitability (H13 and H14) and the sensitivity of deal flow to changes 
in analyst optimism (H15). H9–H15 propose the opposite of H1a/b–H8. Once the GS 
signatories cease funding independent research and therefore reduce the disciplining 
effect, I expect more analyst optimism, less (more) informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold 
and sell-type’) recommendations, less profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations and a 
greater extent to which excess analyst optimism affects the brokers’ deal flow. Lastly, 
H16–18 concern the effects of the deregulation of the JOBS Act on analyst optimism 
(H16), informativeness (H17a and H17b) and profitability (H18). The JOBS Act relaxed 
restrictions on analyst involvement in the IPO process required by the SRO Rules to 
potentially induce more analyst optimism as a result of analysts’ potential conflicts of 
interest related to IPO activities. H16–H18 argue similar predictions to H9–H15. The next 
chapter details the empirical designs and measures of variables to test the hypotheses.  
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the research method used to test the hypotheses, which examine 
the effect of the 2002/3 reforms (i.e., GS and SRO Rules) and subsequent regulatory 
changes (i.e., expiration of the mandatory funding of independent research and the 
introduction of the JOBS Act) on analyst optimism, investor response (and profitability) 
and brokers’ market shares of winning advisory and underwriting mandates. A difference-
in-difference design is used to examine simple pre–post changes in analyst, investor and 
client behaviour, and to examine the extent to which the effects of each reform are 
conditioned by proxies for analysts’ exposure to regulation and indicators of conflicts of 
interest. Section 4.2 outlines the structure of the main tests and provides an overview of 
the cross-sectional differences in analysts. Section 4.3 explains the regression models 
used in the tests for hypotheses. Section 4.4 describes the measures of the dependent 
variables, main test variables and control variables used in the models to examine the 
hypotheses. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
Overview of Methodology 
This study investigates the overall effect of the reforms and whether specific provisions 
of the regulatory reforms affect analyst behaviour, investor behaviour and deal flow more 
pronouncedly. To this end, regression models are developed in which changes in analyst, 
investor and client behaviour are conditionally associated with indicators of the prima 
facie effect of the regulation exposure (e.g., brokers’ change in ratings system) and 
indicators of analysts’ potential conflicts of interest. To explain more clearly the structure 
of the main tests for the hypotheses, a schematic analysis is presented below to illustrate 
the broad nature of the tests of regulatory effects around three key dates (the introduction 
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of the 2002/3 reforms, the expiration of the period of mandatory funding of independent 
research in 2009/10 and the introduction of the JOBS Act in 2012). 
Only non-GS brokers are studied in the main tests of the 2002/3 reforms. This is because 
all but one of the 12 GS signatories changed to a three-tier system immediately following 
the reforms, and it is therefore very difficult to separate the effect of the change to the 
ratings system from the other provisions of the GS and SRO Rules for these firms. In 
Figure 4.1, Region I (the rectangle) describes the set of all analyst reports (i.e., 
recommendation changes and LTG forecasts) issued by non-GS signatories during the 
sample period between 1993 and 2014. The composition of various subsets of 
observations used to test the hypotheses is represented by Regions II–IV. The set named 
RegExposure1 represents the subset of analyst reports associated with brokerages that 
changed their ratings system from the traditional four- or five-tier methodology to a three-
tier one following the disclosure requirement of NASD 2711. In empirical tests, these 
observations are identified by setting the value of an indicator variable, Chgto3Tier, to 
equal 1. While these observations are identified by a post-reform change in behaviour, 
both the pre- and post-reform observations from these brokerages are included in this set. 
The second set, Conflict, identifies the output of analysts with potential conflicts of 
interest resulting from past, present and future investment-banking ties between their 
employer and the covered firm. These observations are identified in empirical tests by 
setting the value of a binary variable, AFF, to equal 1. Sources of potential investment 
banking incentives to bias research include cases in which the analyst’s employer 
serves/served as: (a) the covered firm’s M&A advisor (AFFM&A = 1), or (b) the lead or 
co-managing underwriter for new equity issues (AFFIPO = 1 or AFFSEO = 1). The main 
tests examine analyst behaviour in the window immediately surrounding the investment 
banking transactions described above. Additional tests will study all available 
observations and define a covered firm-broker pair as having an affiliation (AFFIB = 1) if, 
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at any point during the preceding 24 months, the analyst’s covered firm had an equity or 
M&A transaction for which the analyst’s employer served as a lead or co-managing 
underwriter or M&A advisor. 
 
Figure 4.1 Set diagram that shows all logical relations between different regions of 
two sets of analysts’ samples used for examining the 2002/3 reforms 
Figure 4.2 presents the sets of observations that form the basis to test the effect of the 
expiration of independent research funding in 2009/10. Region I (the rectangle) represents 
the set of all analyst recommendations and LTG forecasts issued between 2004 and 2014. 
Set RegExposure2 represents the subset of analyst reports for which the employing 
investment banks are the 12 sanctioned signatories to the GS, each of which were required 
to fund and publish independent research over a five-year period. These observations are 
identified in empirical tests by the value of a dichotomous variable (GSSignatory = 1). 
The set Conflict is defined in a similar manner to that described above, representing the 
output of the analysts whose potential conflicts of interest are related to their employers’ 
involvement in M&A advisory (AFFM&A = 1), underwriting mandates of IPO (AFFIPO = 1) 
or SEO (AFFSEO = 1) and aggregated investment banking activities for M&A, IPO/SEO 
or debt (AFFIB = 1) with the firms that the analysts cover. 
Region III 
where 
ChgtoTier3 = 1 
and AFF = 1 
Region II where 
ChgtoTier3 = 1 
and AFF = 0 
Region IV where 
ChgtoTier3 = 0 
and AFF = 1 
RegExposure 1:  
Reports issued by 
analysts employed by 
brokers change to a 3-
tier rating system, 
ChgtoTier3 
Region I. All related analyst reports issued by non-GS 
signatories to examine the effect of the 2002/3 Reforms 
(during 1993–2014, excluding the transition years) 
Conflict: Reports 
issued by the 
potentially 
conflicted analysts, 
AFF, measured in 
M&A, IPO, SEO, 
or aggregate 
investment banking 
activities 
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Figure 4.2 Set diagram that shows all logical relations between different regions of 
two sets of analysts’ samples used for examining the expiration of funding 
independent research 
Tests of the effect of the introduction of the JOBS Act (effective 23 September 2013) 
focus on subsets of observations described in Figure 4.3. Region I (the rectangle) 
represents the set of all non-GS analyst recommendations issued in the post-IPO window 
between 2004 and 2015 (excluding the regulatory transition period). Set RegExposure3 
represents the subset of analyst reports for which the employing investment banks held 
an underwriting mandate for an emerging growth company (EGC) (i.e., EGC = 1). The 
set Conflict is accordingly defined as the output of analysts whose potential conflicts of 
interest are related to their employers’ involvement in underwriting mandates of IPO 
(AFFIPO = 1) with the firms that the analysts cover. 
Each of the primary hypotheses proposed in this thesis will be tested at several different 
levels: (a) unconditional pre–post reform tests of the effect of changes in regulations (pre–
post differences for all observations in Region I in each of the samples described above); 
(b) tests of the pre–post change in the behaviour of analysts whose employers exhibit a 
prima facie response to the regulatory changes (Regions II and III) relative to that of other 
analysts; (c) tests of the pre–post change in the behaviour of analysts whose employers 
exhibit prima facie evidence of responding to the reforms, but for which there are no 
Region III 
where 
GSSignatory 
and AFF = 1 
Region II  
where 
GSSignatory  
= 1and  
AFF = 0 
Conflict: 
Potentially 
conflicted analysts, 
AFF, measured in 
M&A, IPO, SEO, 
or aggregate 
investment banking 
activities 
RegExposure2: Reports 
issued by analysts 
employed by GS 
signatories providing 
five-year independent 
research, GSSignatory 
Region IV  
where 
GSSignatory 
 = 0and  
AFF = 1 
Region I. All related analyst reports issued to 
examine the Expiration of independent research 
(during 2004–2014, excluding the transition years) 
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conflicts of interest (Region II) relative to similar analysts with potential conflicts of 
interest (Region III), and (d) tests of the pre–post change in the behaviour of analysts with 
potential conflicts of interest for which there is no change in prima facie optimism 
(Region IV) relative to potentially conflicted analysts whose employers exhibit a prima 
facie response to the regulatory changes (Region III). Similar tests are developed for 
hypotheses relating to investor response and investment banking deal flow. The purpose 
of these ‘difference-in-difference’ tests is to produce convincing evidence of the causal 
effect of the reforms. 
 
Figure 4.3 Set diagram that shows all logical relations between different regions of 
two sets of analysts’ samples used for examining the JOBS Act 
Regression Models 
This section introduces the regression models used to test the hypotheses derived from 
the three research questions, which address different regulatory effects on analyst 
optimism (see Section 4.3.1), investor response and profitability (see Section 4.3.2) and 
deal flow (see Section 4.3.3). 
4.3.1 Models to Test the Regulatory Effects on Analyst Optimism (RQ1) 
The following sections introduce the models used to examine the changes in analyst 
optimism in response to the three regulatory changes (RQ1). Sections 4.3.1.1–4.3.1.3 
Region III 
where 
EGC = 1 
and AFF = 1 
Region II  
where 
EGC = 1 
and AFF = 0 
Region I. All related non-GS analyst reports issued to 
examine the JOBS Act (during 2004–2015, excluding 
the transition years) 
Conflict 3: 
Potentially 
conflicted analysts, 
AFF 
RegExposure3: Reports 
issued by analysts 
employed by investment 
banks conducting 
underwriting for EGCs 
subject to JOBS Act, 
EGC 
Region IV  
where 
EGC = 0 and 
AFF = 1 
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cover the models for the general and conditional effects of GS and SRO Rules (i.e., 
2002/3 reforms). Sections 4.3.1.4 and 4.3.1.5 present the models for the effects of the 
2009/10 expiration of independent research funding. Section 4.3.1.6 pertains to the effects 
of the JOBS Act. In testing the effect of regulation on analyst optimism, I focus on analyst 
behaviour during windows in which investment banking-related conflicts of interest are 
strongest (i.e., the windows immediately surrounding M&A announcement dates, equity 
issues and the 24-month window following any investment banking association between 
the analyst’s employer and the covered firm). 
4.3.1.1 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Analyst Optimism 
Conditioned by Analyst Affiliation 
To enable a comparison with earlier research, I test the general effect of the 2002/3 
reforms on analyst optimism conditioned by analyst affiliation status before testing the 
hypotheses pertaining to the effect on analyst behaviour of the change in the ratings 
system encouraged by the SRO Rules. To this end, I employ regressions in the form of 
Model 1 (below), which is estimated on a sample spanning 1993–2014, including 
recommendations (growth forecasts) issued by analysts employed by brokers who were 
not GS signatories and who used the traditional five-tier or four-tier ratings system in 
their recommendations before the 2002/3 reforms.27  Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering by firm using the method by Petersen (2009). I exclude observations in the 
transition years (2002/3). 
 𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹+ 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 +
𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 +
𝛽9𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿(𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟) + 𝜀, 
Model 1 
Where 
                                                 
27 The latter sample restriction is imposed to ease the interpretation of results. The number of brokers using 
a three-tier system before the 2002/3 reforms was exceptionally small. 
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Dependent Variables (OPT) 
(1) Proxies for Analyst Optimism in the M&A Context 
UPGRADEM&Arec = An ordinal variable that is equal to 1 if the analyst upgrades their 
recommendation for an acquirer within ±90 days of the M&A 
announcement, 0 if the recommendation is unchanged and −1 if 
there is a downgrade. 
UPGRADEM&ALTG = Analysts’ LTG forecast optimism revisions for acquirers observed 
during the 180-day window surrounding the M&A announcement 
date, measured as the difference between the analyst’s new 
forecast growth and the analyst’s prior forecast growth level. Each 
forecast is standardised by subtracting the consensus forecast 
among unaffiliated analysts. 
(2) Proxies for Analyst Optimism in the IPO/SEO Context 
LEVELIPO3tier = The standardised levels of the initial post-issue recommendations 
under the five-tier ratings system, which codes ‘strong buy’ into 
‘buy’ and ‘strong sell’ into ‘sell’ within the two-year window after 
the issuance of the IPO. 
LEVELSEO3tier = The standardised levels of the initial post-issue recommendations 
under the five-tier ratings system, which codes ‘strong buy’ into 
‘buy’ and ‘strong sell’ into ‘sell’ within the two-year window after 
the filing of the SEO. 
UPGRADESEOrec = An ordinal variable that is equal to 1 if analysts upgrade their 
recommendation for SEO issuers within ±12 months of the SEO 
filing date, 0 if the recommendation is unchanged and −1 if there 
is a downgrade. 
(3) Proxies for Analyst Optimism in the Context of Historic Aggregated Investment Banking 
Activities 
LEVEL3tier = The standardised levels of recommendations issued by an analyst 
under the three-tier ratings system (by coding ‘strong buy’ and 
‘buy’ as 4, ‘hold’ as 3 and ‘sell’ and ‘strong sell’ as 2). 
Independent Variables/Control Variables 
POSTREG2002/3 = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or 
forecast is issued after 9 September 2002 (i.e., the deadline for 
brokerages to comply with the disclosure requirement of the SRO 
Rules), and 0 otherwise. 
AFF = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or LTG 
forecast is issued by an analyst employed by a broker who acted 
as an advisor to the covered acquirer in the M&A transaction (or 
a lead or co-manager to the covered IPO/SEO firm in the equity 
issue), and 0 otherwise. 
DEALVALUE = The natural logarithm of the inflation-adjusted deal value (in 
billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992). 
FIRMCAP = The natural logarithm of the inflation-adjusted market 
capitalisation of the acquirer (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the 
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year-end dollars in 1992) as at the last trading day of the calendar 
month before the analyst recommendation/LTG forecast was 
issued. 
EXP = The number of years since the analyst first published a 
recommendation on I/B/E/S. 
FOLLOW = The total number of analysts with outstanding recommendations 
for the firm in the 30 days preceding the M&A announcement date 
(or the announcement of recommendations in post-IPO/SEO issue 
date/SEO filing date). 
DAYS = The absolute number of days between the M&A announcement 
date (or IPO/SEO issue date/SEO filing date) and the analyst 
report date. 
BROKERSIZE = The number of analysts working for the brokerage house during 
the calendar month of the M&A deal announcement date (or of the 
analyst report date in the IPO/SEO context). 
LEVEL = The level of the stock recommendation provided by the analyst for 
the acquirer before the 180-day event window (or for the SEO firm 
before the 24-month post-filing window). 
OPTIMISMprior = The standardised LTG forecast for the acquirer provided by the 
analyst before the 180-day M&A event window. 
More details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The vector of control variables is based on that used in earlier comparable research 
(Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008; Wu et al., 2015) and is described in detail in Section 4.4.6. 
I test recommendation optimism (UPGRADEM&Arec) using ordered logistic regression, 
and I use OLS for the remaining tests. If the 2002/3 reforms induce a general reduction 
in optimism of unaffiliated analysts employed by non-GS signatory banks during 
investment banking event windows (as per previous research), the coefficient for 
POSTREG2002/3 in regressions of analyst optimism exhibited by unaffiliated non-GS 
analysts using Model 1 should be significantly negative. If there is a reduction in the 
average optimism of affiliated analysts employed by non-GS signatory banks in the post-
reform period, the coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 × AFF in Model 1 should be indicated 
as significant and negative. 
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4.3.1.2 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Analyst Optimism 
Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure to This Regulation (Hypothesis 1) 
H1 investigates whether there is an incremental reduction in optimism for analysts who 
adopt the three-tier ratings system following the implementation of the disclosure 
requirement in NASD 2711 Rule (h) 4–(h) 5 (A-D), and it is tested using Model 2 (below). 
Model 2 is an ordered logistic or OLS regression of the relative optimism implied by 
analyst reports on an indicator of post-2002/3 reform observations, an indicator 
identifying analysts who changed their ratings system following the introduction of 
NASD 2711, the interaction terms thereof and controls. The variable of greatest interest 
is the interaction term between the indicator variable of the post-2002/3 reforms period 
and the corresponding exposure to the aforementioned disclosure requirements in NASD 
2711. The sample spans 1993–2014, excluding observations in transition years (2002/3), 
and is restricted to reports (i.e. recommendations and LTG forecasts in I/B/E/S) issued by 
analysts employed by non-GS signatory brokers who used the traditional five-tier ratings 
system before the requirements of NASD 2711 (effective 9 September 2002). Model 2 is 
specified below. 
𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 +
𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 +
𝜀, 
Model 
2 
Where 
Chgto3Tier = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation pertains to a 
brokerage house that adopted the new three-tier ratings system 
between 2002 and 2004, and 0 otherwise. All observations for 
brokers who changed their ratings system are coded 1, including 
pre-2002 observations. 
The definitions and measurements of all the other variables are described in Model 1. More 
details of variable measurement are provided in Section 4.4. 
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The intercept β0 represents the mean effect on analyst optimism for non-GS analysts who 
did not adopt the three-tier ratings system following the 2002/3 reforms. The coefficient 
β1 captures the incremental optimism during the pre-reform period for non-GS analysts 
whose brokers later adopted the three-tier ratings system. The coefficient β2 captures the 
incremental effect for non-GS analysts who did not adopt the three-tier ratings system 
after NASD 2711 in the post-2002/3 reform period. H1a (1b) would be supported if the 
coefficient for the two-way interaction between ChgtoTier3 and POSTREG2002/3 (i.e., 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3), which captures the incremental effect on analysts who 
changed to the three-tier ratings system following the 2002/3 reforms, is significantly 
negative. 
4.3.1.3 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Analyst Optimism 
Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure to This Regulation and Analyst Affiliation 
(Hypothesis 2) 
H2 examines whether the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on analyst optimism is greater for 
affiliated analysts who changed their ratings system after the introduction of NASD 2711. 
This is tested using Model 3, which regresses analyst optimism against the interactions 
between indicators of post-reform observations (POSTREG), an indicator identifying 
analysts who changed their ratings system following the introduction of NASD 2711 
(Chgto3Tier), potential conflicts of interest arising from investment banking incentives 
(AFF) and controls. The variable of interest is the three-way interaction term among the 
indicators of the post-2002/3 reform period, the indicator of analysts’ change in rating 
systems and analyst affiliation. The period and criteria of the sample selection and sample 
period are the same as those applied in Models 1 and 2. Model 3 is presented below. 
𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 +
𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 +
𝛽5𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
3 
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The definitions and measurements of all other variables are described in Models 1 and 2. 
More details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The coefficient for the intercept (i.e., β0, the base case) represents average optimism 
before the reforms of the unaffiliated analysts whose employers did not subsequently 
adopt the three-tier recommendation ratings system. The coefficient for ChgtoTier3 (β1) 
measures the incremental optimism in analyst outputs in the pre-reform period for 
unaffiliated analysts who adopt the three-tier ratings system following NASD 2711. The 
coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 (β2) measures incremental optimism in analyst outputs 
following the reform for unaffiliated analysts who did not change to the three-tier ratings 
system following NASD 2711. The coefficient for AFF (β3) captures incremental analyst 
optimism for affiliated analysts who did not adopt the three-tier ratings system in the pre-
2002/3 reform period. The coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 (β4) estimates 
incremental optimism in analyst outputs following the 2002/3 reforms period for 
unaffiliated analysts who changed to the three-tier system following the reforms relative 
to unaffiliated analysts who did not change their ratings system. The coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × AFF (β5) is the incremental effect on optimism in the pre-2002/3 reform 
period for affiliated analysts who would subsequently adopt the three-tier ratings system 
following the NASD 2711 disclosure requirements. The coefficient for 
POSTREG2002/3 × AFF (β6) captures the incremental effect on analyst optimism for 
affiliated analysts who did not adopt the three-tier ratings system in the post-2002/3 
reform period. The variable of greatest interest in Model 3 is the three-way interaction 
term (i.e., the coefficient β7 for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF), which represents 
incremental optimism in the outputs of affiliated analysts who switched to the three-tier 
system following the reforms relative to the post-reform optimism of unaffiliated analysts 
who switched their ratings system following the 2002/3 reforms. This three-way 
interaction is predicted to be significantly negative in tests of the post-reform change in 
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relative optimism to support H2. The effect of the post-reforms on the behaviour of 
affiliated analysts who changed their ratings system relative to other affiliated analysts is 
tested by the sum of the coefficients (β4 and β7) for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 and 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF. 
4.3.1.4 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the 2009/10 Expiration of Funding 
Independent Research on Analyst Optimism Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure to 
This Regulation (Hypothesis 9) 
H9 examines whether the effect of the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent 
research on analyst optimism is greater for analysts who are employed by GS signatories. 
To test H9, I employ Model 4, which is an ordered logistic/OLS regression of analyst 
optimism on an indicator of whether analysts are exposed to the expiration of the 
independent research funding period (GSSignatory), an indicator of post-expiration 
observations (POSTREGExp), the interaction between these variables and controls. The 
variable of main interest is the interaction term between the indicator of post-expiration 
observations and the related analyst exposure to the five-year procurement of independent 
research. Regressions based on Model 4 use a sample of outputs from GS and non-GS 
analysts ranging from 26 July 2004 to the end of 2014, excluding the transition period 
(26 July 2009–26 March 2010), which offers similar pre- and post-expiration 
subsamples.28 All regressions are adjusted for clustering by firms using Petersen’s (2009) 
method. 
𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽3𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
4 
 
Where, 
                                                 
28 The five-year expiration of the obligation for the 12 GS sanctioned banks to provide independent research 
are as follows: (a) 26 July 2009 for the 10 banks in the GS; (b) 26 March 2010 for Deutsche Bank Securities 
Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC, whose settlement began on 26 March 2005. 
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POSTREGExp = A dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is 
issued after 26 July 2009, the date of expiration of independent 
research funding required by the GS for GS signatories, and 0 
otherwise. 
GSSignatory = A dummy variable that equals 1 if the output was issued by an analyst 
employed by a brokerage firm that was one of the original 12 
sanctioned banks (and their subsequent name variations), who were 
directly subject to the GS, and 0 otherwise.29 
More details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
Analyst optimism (OPT) is proxied by the measures described in the previous section. 
The intercept, β0, represents the mean effect for analyst optimism for non-GS analysts in 
the pre-2009/10 expiration period. The coefficient, β1, for variable GSSignatory captures 
the incremental effect for GS analysts in the pre-expiration period. The coefficient, β2, for 
variable POSTREGExp captures the incremental effect for non-GS analysts in the post-
expiration period. 
The GS imposed substantial financial penalties on the 12 GS signatories, $460 m of which 
was applied to fund independent research amounting to $460 million over the five-year 
period (26 July 2004–26 July 2009). If the provision of independent research achieved its 
expected objective of decreasing the manipulated research bias tainted by analysts’ 
potential investment banking incentives and therefore restoring investors’ confidence in 
analyst reports, and if the expiration led GS firms to cease acquiring and promulgating 
independent research, then there should be a general increase in the optimism of analyst 
outputs in the windows of the different contexts after the expiration in 2009/10. H9 
predicts that this effect (increase) is greater for the recommendations (LTG forecasts) of 
analysts who are working for GS signatories (and their successors) because these are the 
analysts directly affected by the provision of independent research. Therefore, I expect 
                                                 
29  The original 10 investment firms included in the GS are Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston, 
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Morgan Stanley, 
Citigroup Global Markets, UBS Warburg and US Bancorp Piper Jaffray. In August 2004, Deutsche Bank 
and Thomas Weisel joined the settlement, bringing the total number of participants to 12. 
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that the coefficient, β3, for the interaction between GSSignatory and POSTREGExp in 
Model 5 will be significantly positive. 
4.3.1.5 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the 2009/10 Expiration of Funding 
Independent Research on Analyst Optimism Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure to 
This Regulation and Analyst Affiliation (Hypothesis 10) 
H10 examines whether the effect of the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent 
research on analyst optimism is stronger for affiliated analysts who are employed by GS 
signatory brokers. To test H10, I augment Model 4, adding the regressor, AFF, which 
equals 1 if analysts’ employers are affiliated with covered firms through their investment 
banking ties, and 0 otherwise. In Model 5, I regress analyst optimism against the two- and 
three-way interactions between the indicators of post-expiration observations 
(POSTREGExp), employment by GS signatories (GSSignatory), affiliation with covered 
firms (AFF) and controls. The variable of greatest interest is the three-way interaction 
term, GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF. 
𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
5 
The definitions and measurements of all other variables are described in Model 4. More 
details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The intercept β0 (i.e., base observations) represents the mean optimism of unaffiliated 
analysts who were not employed by GS signatories before the expiration of the mandatory 
procurement of independent research. The coefficient for GSSignatory (β1) measures the 
incremental optimism in analyst outputs in the pre-expiration period for analysts 
employed by one of the 12 GS signatories. The coefficient β2 for POSTREGExp represents 
incremental optimism in analyst outputs for the same group of analysts after the expiration 
of the five-year independent research funding period. The coefficient for AFF (β3) 
captures incremental analyst optimism for affiliated analysts employed by non-GS 
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brokers in the pre-expiration period. The coefficient β4 for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp 
measures incremental optimism of analyst outputs after the expiration of the five-year 
independent research funding for unaffiliated analysts employed by GS signatories 
relative to unaffiliated analysts who are not employed by GS signatories. The coefficient 
for GSSignatory × AFF (β5) is the incremental effect on optimism in the pre-expiration 
period for analysts employed by GS signatories that are affiliated with covered firms. The 
coefficient for POSTREGExp × AFF (β6) captures the incremental effect on analyst 
optimism for affiliated analysts employed by non-GS signatory brokers in the post-
expiration period. The three-way interaction term (GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF) 
captures incremental optimism in the outputs of affiliated analysts employed by GS 
signatories relative to the post-expiration period of optimism of unaffiliated analysts who 
are hired by GS signatories. A significant positive coefficient for this variable would 
support H10. Lastly, the total effect of the expiration on the behaviour of affiliated 
analysts who work for GS signatories in the post-expiration period is tested by the sum 
of the coefficients for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp and 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF. 
4.3.1.6 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the JOBS Act on Analyst Optimism 
Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure to This Regulation and Analyst Affiliation 
(Hypothesis 16) 
H16 examines whether the JOBS Act induced an increase in the optimism of affiliated 
analysts following EGCs in the 24 months following these firms’ IPOs. This is tested 
using Model 6, which regresses analyst optimism during this 24-month window against 
a binary variable EGC (indicating covered firms that satisfy the definition of EGCs under 
the JOBS Act regardless of whether the observations occurred before or after the Act), an 
indicator of observations occurring after the introduction of the JOBS Act (POSTREGJOB), 
a proxy for analysts’ potential conflicts of interest (AFF), the relevant interactions 
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between these three variables and controls. Following Dambra et al. (2018), I include all 
IPOs issued during the pre-JOBS Act period (i.e., between 1 January 2004 and 5 April 
2012) and all deals that occurred during the post-JOBS Act period (i.e., between 11 
November 2012 and 18 March 2015). I exclude the regulatory transition period (5 April 
2012–11 November 2012) because of the uncertainty regarding how analysts permissibly 
become involved in the IPO process under the JOBS Act. I include only recommendations 
issued by analysts employed by non-GS signatories because GS signatory brokers were 
not directly affected by the JOBS Act. The dependent variable and controls are the same 
as previously defined. 
𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐺𝐶 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐺𝐶 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐸𝐺𝐶 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 +
𝜀, 
Model 
6 
Where: 
EGC = A dummy variable that equals 1 if the analyst recommendation relates 
to an EGC (or a pseudo EGC if issued in the pre-Act period), and 0 
otherwise. 
POSTREGJOB = A dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO issue date is after 23 
September 2013—the effective date of the JOBS Act—and 0 
otherwise. 
The definitions and measurements of all other variables are described in Models 4–5. More 
details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The coefficient for the base observations (the intercept β0) measures the average optimism 
of the outputs observed during the pre-JOBS Act period, issued by unaffiliated analysts 
covering firms that do not fit the definition of an EGC under the forthcoming JOBS Act 
(‘non-EGCs’). The coefficient for EGC (β1) measures incremental optimism in analyst 
outputs in the pre-JOBS Act period for unaffiliated analysts covering a pseudo-EGC (i.e., 
an IPO firm that satisfies all requirements of being qualified as an EGC in the pre-JOBS 
Act period). The coefficient (β2) for POSTREGJOBS represents incremental optimism in 
analyst outputs after the JOBS Act for unaffiliated analysts covering non-EGCs. The 
coefficient for AFF (β3) captures incremental analyst optimism for affiliated analysts 
covering pseudo-EGCs in the pre-JOBS Act period. The coefficient (β4) for 
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EGC × POSTREGJOBS measures incremental optimism in analyst outputs after the JOBS 
Act for unaffiliated analysts when covering EGCs relative to unaffiliated analysts who 
are not covering EGCs. The coefficient for EGC × AFF (β5) is the incremental effect on 
optimism in the pre-JOBS Act period for affiliated analysts who are covering a pseudo-
EGC. The coefficient for POSTREGJOBS × AFF (β6) captures the incremental effect on 
analyst optimism for affiliated analysts covering non-EGCs after the passage of the JOBS 
Act. Of greatest interest is the three-way interaction term (EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF), 
which captures the incremental optimism in the outputs of affiliated analysts covering 
EGCs relative to the post-JOBS Act period of optimism of unaffiliated analysts who also 
cover EGCs. This three-way interaction is predicted to be significantly positive in tests 
of the post-JOBS Act change in relative optimism to sustain H16. Lastly, the total post-
Act affects optimism by affiliated analysts covering an EGC is tested by the sum of the 
coefficients (β4 and β7) for EGC × POSTREGJOBS and EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF. 
4.3.2 Models to Test the Regulatory Effects on Investor Response and Profitability 
(RQ2) 
The general form of the models used to examine the hypotheses regarding the effect of 
regulation on investor response and profitability are similar to those used to test the 
regulatory effects on analyst optimism (i.e., Models 1–6). I simply substitute measures of 
informativeness (INFORM) and profitability (PROFIT) for OPT and make minor 
variations to the vector of control variables used. Section 4.3.2 is organised as follows. 
Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 introduce the market effect of the 2002/3 reforms. Section 
4.3.2.1 analyses the differential effect for analyst exposure to the disclosure requirements 
of NASD 2711, and Section 4.3.2.2 further takes analyst affiliation into consideration. 
Sections 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4 provide discussions of the market effect of the 2009/10 
expiration of funding independent research. Similarly, Section 4.3.2.3 analyses the 
differential effect for analysts employed by GS signatories, and Section 4.3.2.4 further 
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analyses the differential effect for affiliated GS analysts relative to unaffiliated ones. 
Section 4.3.2.5 studies investor response and profitability in relation to the effect of the 
JOBS Act by targeting affiliated analysts covering an EGC. 
4.3.2.1 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Investor Response 
and Profitability Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure to This Regulation (Hypotheses 
3 and 5) 
H3 (H5) examines the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on the informativeness (profitability) 
of analysts’ recommendations by analysts who adopt the three-tier ratings system 
following the NASD 2711 disclosure requirements. Both hypotheses are tested using 
Model 7, which regresses informativeness (or profitability) on a variable indicating 
whether analysts adopted the three-tier ratings system after NASD 2711, an indicator of 
post-2002/3 reform observations, the interaction term thereof and controls. I conduct tests 
during the sample period of 1993–2014, excluding the transition years (2002/3), for 
analyst reports issued by non-GS signatories. Again, observations only include the 
brokers who use a traditional five-tier or four-tier ratings system before the 2002/3 
reforms. Given that my samples consist of multiple observations for the same firms, I 
estimate models using OLS with standard errors adjusted for within-firm clustering, as 
per Petersen’s (2009) method. 
The research contexts (M&A/IPO/SEO windows) are identical to those used in tests 
relating to optimism. Specifically, I estimate these tests in several different investment 
banking settings. First, for informativeness tests, I examine the informativeness 
conditioned by recommendation upgrades or downgrades surrounding the M&A 
announcement date and the informativeness conditioned by ‘buy-type’ or ‘hold and sell-
type’ levels during the 24-month post-period after the IPO issue date or the 24-month 
post-period after the SEO filing date. Second, for profitability tests, I examine the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ outstanding recommendations on the tenth day of the M&A 
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announcement date and the profitability of ‘buy-type’ outstanding recommendations on 
the tenth day of the SEO filing date. 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 or 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 
= 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 +
𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 +
𝛽4𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 +
𝛽5𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹+ 𝛽6𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 +
𝛽8𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽11𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 +
𝛽12𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽13𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿(𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟) +
𝜀, 
Model 
7 
Where: 
Dependent Variables (INFORM and PROFIT) 
(1) Proxies for Informativeness in the M&A and IPO/SEO Contexts (INFORM) 
CARM&A = CARs estimated using the market-adjusted model, measured over the 
three-day window centred on the issuance of the change in stock 
recommendation (i.e., upgrades or downgrades) within ±90 days 
centred on M&A announcement dates. All CARs for 
recommendation downgrades are reversed in sign to simplify 
interpretation. 
CARIPO/SEO = CARs estimated using the market-adjusted model, measured over the 
three-day window centred on the issuance of the stock 
recommendations (i.e., ‘buy-type’ or ‘hold and sell-type’ 
recommendations) issued within the 24-month window after the IPO 
issue date or the SEO filing date. All CARs for ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ 
recommendations are reversed in sign to simplify interpretation. 
(2) Proxies for Profitability in the M&A and IPO/SEO Contexts (PROFIT) 
PROFITM&A = The BHAR for each security starting from the tenth day after the 
M&A announcement date and terminating a maximum of 90 days 
(one year) later. If the stock recommendation is downgraded, the 
measurement window terminates the day before the downgrade.30 
PROFITIPO/SEO = The BHAR for each security starting from the tenth day after the SEO 
filing date (or the announcement date of the initial recommendations 
after the IPO issue) and terminating a maximum of 90 days (one year) 
later. If the stock recommendation is downgraded, the measurement 
window terminates the day before the downgrade. 
(3) Control Variables (used only for tests of informativeness) 
PASTFIRMPERF = The firm’s stock return in the six months before the recommendation 
(or the IPO firm’s stock return between the issue date and the 
recommendation if the period is less than six months). 
PASTMKTPERF = 
The cumulative market return in the six months before the 
recommendation. 
MKTSD  The standard deviation of the daily S&P 500 index one month before 
the recommendation. 
                                                 
30 The profitability of ‘hold’ recommendations in the M&A or SEO window are provided in the additional 
tests. In addition, there is an extremely small number of sell-type recommendations that prohibit meaningful 
testing, so I do not discuss the sell-type recommendations here. 
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The definitions and measurements of all other variables are described in Models 1–2. More 
details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The coefficient interpretations of effects on informativeness (H3) and profitability (H5) 
are provided as follows. 
In tests of conditional informativeness using Model 7, a positive coefficient for cases of 
upgrades of recommendations or ‘buy-type’ recommendations, as well as a negative 
coefficient for downgrades of recommendations or ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations, 
would suggest that investors perceive a net improvement in the credibility of analyst 
recommendations. The intercept (β0) represents the average effect on conditional 
informativeness in the pre-2002/3 reform period for analysts who did not adopt the three-
tier ratings system subsequent to the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711. The 
coefficient for ChgtoTier3 (β1) measures the incremental effect on conditional 
informativeness in recommendations in the pre-reform period for unaffiliated analysts 
who adopted the three-tier ratings system following the NASD 2711. The coefficient for 
POSTREG2002/3 (β2) measures incremental informativeness in recommendations 
following the reforms for unaffiliated analysts who did not change to the three-tier ratings 
system following NASD 2711. 
Of greatest interest is the coefficient (β3) for the two-way interaction term, 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3, which represents the incremental effect on the conditional 
informativeness of recommendations for analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings 
system following the 2002/3 reforms. H3 is stated in null form, because while the 
‘fineness effect’ resulting from using a coarse three-tier ratings system is expected to 
reduce the informativeness of recommendations (either of upgrades/buy-types or 
downgrades/sell-types), the ‘clarity effect’ and ‘credibility effect’ attached to this ratings 
system may increase the informativeness of upgrades or buy recommendations (in 
relation to downgrades or ‘sell-type’ recommendations, the incredibility effect would 
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decrease their informativeness). An insignificant coefficient (β3) would fail to reject the 
null of H3, suggesting that there is no differential effect on the conditional 
informativeness in the post-2002/3 reforms, regardless of whether analysts were induced 
to adopt the three-tier ratings system. 
In tests of recommendation profitability, a significant and positive coefficient suggests 
the incremental effect on the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations for acquirers or 
SEO issuers. The intercept (β0), the coefficient for ChgtoTier3 (β1) and the coefficient for 
POSTREG2002/3 (β2) have similar meanings to those discussed in the tests of conditional 
informativeness in ‘buy-type’ recommendations for the acquirers or IPO/SEO issuers. 
The coefficient (β3) for the interaction term, ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3, measures the 
incremental post-2002/3 reform effect on profitability in ‘buy-type’ recommendations for 
analysts who adopt the three-tier ratings system following NASD 2711. This three-way 
interaction is predicted to be significantly positive in tests of post-reform change in 
relative profitability to support H5. 
4.3.2.2 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Investor Response 
and Profitability Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure to this Regulation and Analyst 
Affiliation (Hypotheses 4a/4b and 6) 
H4a (4b) investigates whether the informativeness of upgrade or ‘buy-type’ (downgrade 
or ‘hold and sell-type’) recommendations issued by affiliated analysts who adopted the 
three-tier ratings system following the introduction of NASD 2711 improved (declined) 
by a greater amount than that of other analysts. Collectively, these hypotheses test 
whether the introduction of the three-tier ratings system improved the credibility of 
analyst recommendations. H6 makes a similar prediction for the profitability of the buy-
type recommendations issued by this group of analysts. These hypotheses are tested using 
Model 8, which regresses the informativeness or profitability against an indicator variable 
by identifying analysts who changed their ratings system following the introduction of 
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NASD 2711 (ChgtoTier3), an indicator of post-reform observations (POSTREG2002/3), 
analyst affiliation (AFF), the various interactions between these variables terms and 
controls. All samples and investment banking contexts are similar to those introduced in 
Section 3.3.2.1. 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 𝑜𝑟 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 
= 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽5𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
8 
The definitions and measurements of all other variables are described in Model 7. More 
details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The interpretation of coefficients in tests of conditional informativeness (H4a/b) and 
profitability (H6) are discussed below. For each test, I first explain the interpretations of 
the main effects and the two-way interactions, and then focus the discussion on the 
interpretation of the variable of interest (i.e., the three-way interaction). 
In tests of the informativeness of upgrades or ‘buy-type’ (downgrades or ‘hold and sell-
type’) recommendations, the intercept (β0) represents the mean effect on conditional 
informativeness of recommendations issued before the 2002/3 reforms for unaffiliated 
analysts whose employers did not subsequently adopt the three-tier recommendation 
ratings system. The coefficient (β1) for ChgtoTier3 captures the incremental effect on the 
conditional informativeness of recommendations in the pre-2002/3 reform period for 
unaffiliated analysts who later adopted the three-tier ratings system following NASD 
2711. The coefficient (β2) for POSTREG2002/3 measures the incremental increase 
(decrease) in the informativeness of analyst upgrade or ‘buy-type’ (downgrade or ‘hold 
and sell-type’) recommendations following the 2002/3 reforms for unaffiliated analysts 
failing to adopt the new three-tier ratings system following NASD 2711. The coefficient 
(β3) for AFF estimates the incremental effect of conditional informativeness in the pre-
2002/3 reform period for affiliated analysts who did not adopt the three-tier ratings system. 
The coefficient (β4) for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 measures the incremental effects 
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on the conditional informativeness in analyst recommendations following the 2002/3 
reforms for unaffiliated analysts who changed to the three-tier system following NASD 
2711 relative to unaffiliated analysts who did not immediately take on the three-tier rating 
system. The total post-2002/3 reform effect on the conditional informativeness of 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings system 
is tested by the sum of the coefficients (β4 and β7) for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 and 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF. 
Of greatest interest is the coefficient (β7) for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF, which 
captures the incremental increase in the conditional informativeness in the post-2002/3 
reform period for affiliated analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings system following 
NASD 2711 relative to unaffiliated analysts who made a similar adoption. In tests of H4b 
related to the informativeness of downgrades or ‘hold or sell-type’ recommendations 
using Model 8, the coefficient (β7) for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF represents 
the incremental decrease in the conditional informativeness in the post-2002/3 reform 
period for affiliated analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings system following 
NASD 2711 relative to unaffiliated analysts who made a similar adoption. In tests of the 
M&A (or IPO/SEO) context, H4a (4b) are supported if the coefficient, β7, is predicted to 
be significantly positive (negative) in tests of the post-reform change in the relative 
informativeness of recommendation upgrades (downgrades) surrounding the M&A 
announcement date or in tests of the post-reform change in the relative informativeness 
of ‘buy-type’ (or ‘hold or sell-type’) recommendations during the 24-month window 
during the post-issuance IPO/post-filing SEO period. 
The interpretation of coefficients is similar for tests of profitability, with the obvious 
exception that coefficients indicate effects on profitability. Further, profitability tests are 
restricted to ‘buy-type’ recommendations. For brevity, the main effects and two-way 
interactions are not discussed again here. The coefficient (β7) for the test variable (i.e., 
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three-way interaction term, ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF) captures the 
incremental increase in the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations in the post-
2002/3 reforms period for affiliated analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings system 
following NASD 2711 than for unaffiliated analysts who made a similar adoption. If the 
coefficient (β7) is significantly positive in tests of the post-reform change in relative 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations started at the tenth day following the M&A 
announcement date, or in tests of ‘buy-type’ recommendations started at the tenth day 
following the SEO filing date, H6 is supported. 
4.3.2.3 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent 
Research on Investor Response and Profitability Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure 
to This Regulation (Hypotheses 11a/b and 13) 
H11a/b and H13 examine whether the expiration of the five-year procurement of 
independent research affected investors’ perceptions of the credibility of GS analyst 
reports and the profitability of those analysts’ recommendations. These hypotheses are 
tested using Model 9, which estimates regressions of informativeness or profitability on 
an indicator of whether the analyst’s employer is one of the 12 GS signatories 
(GSSignatory), an indicator of post-expiration observations (POSTREGExp), their 
interaction and controls. The regressions are examined by including both GS and non-GS 
signatory analyst outputs between 26 July 2004 and the end of 2014, excluding the 
transition period (26 July 2009–26 March 2010). 
The regressions based on Model 9 are estimated within two settings: recommendation 
changes observed during the 180-day window surrounding the M&A announcement date 
and the level of recommendations issued during the 24-month period after the IPO issue 
date or the post-24-month period after the SEO filing date. For profitability tests, 
regressions are estimated with the ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued following either 
the announcement of M&A or the filing of SEO. 
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𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 or 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 
= 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽3𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
9 
The dependent variables are defined as described in Model 7. The definitions and 
measurements of all other variables are described in Model 4. More details of the variable 
measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The interpretation of coefficients for these tests is presented below. In tests of the 
conditional informativeness of upgrades or ‘buy-type’ (downgrades or ‘hold and sell-
type’) recommendations, the intercept β0 represents the mean effect on conditional 
informativeness for analysts who are not employed by any GS signatory (i.e., non-GS 
analysts) in the pre-expiration period. The coefficient β1 captures the incremental 
informativeness during the pre-reform period for analysts employed by one of the 12 GS 
signatories (‘GS analysts’). The coefficient β2 captures the incremental effect for non-GS 
analysts in the post-expiration period. The coefficient (β3) for 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp estimates the incremental effect on GS analysts after the 
expiration of the mandatory procurement of independent research in 2009/10. H11a (11b) 
is supported if this coefficient is significantly negative (positive), which suggests an 
incremental decrease (increase) in the conditional informativeness of recommendation 
upgrades (downgrades) surrounding the M&A window or that of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold and 
sell-type’) recommendations during the 24-month window of post-IPO issue/post-SEO 
filing for GS analysts in the post-expiration period. 
In tests of H13 related to the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations, the 
interpretation of the main effects is similar to that of the tests of H11a (11b), so I focus 
my discussion on the interpretation of the test variable (the three-way interaction). The 
coefficient (β3) for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp captures the incremental effect on the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations for GS analysts after the 2009/10 expiration. 
The alternative of H13 will be rejected if the coefficient is significantly negative. 
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4.3.2.4 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the Expiration of Funding Independent 
Research on Investor Response and Profitability Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure 
to This Regulation and Analyst Affiliation (Hypotheses 12 and 14) 
H12 (H14) examines whether the effect of the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent 
research on the conditional informativeness (profitability) of recommendations is 
stronger in cases in which the GS analyst is affiliated with the covered firm. To test these 
hypotheses, I employ Model 10, which regresses the informativeness or profitability 
against variables indicating whether the analyst’s employer is one of the GS signatories, 
post-expiration observations, analyst affiliation, the interactions between these variables 
and controls. All samples and settings of the contexts are similar to those introduced in 
Model 9 (see Section 4.3.2.3). 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀
/𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 
= 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
10 
The definitions and measurements of all variables are described in Model 9. More details of 
the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The interpretations of coefficients in tests of differential effects of conditional 
informativeness (H12) and profitability (H14) using Model 8 are discussed below. 
In tests of the informativeness of upgrades or ‘buy-type’ (downgrades or ‘hold and sell-
type’) recommendations using Model 10, the intercept (β0) represents the mean effect on 
the conditional informativeness of recommendations in the pre-expiration period for 
unaffiliated analysts whose employers are not one of the 12 GS signatories. The 
coefficient (β1) for GSSignatory captures the incremental effect on the conditional 
informativeness of recommendations before the 2009/10 expiration for GS analysts who 
have no affiliation with covered firms. The coefficient (β2) for POSTREGExp measures the 
incremental decrease (increase) in the informativeness of analyst upgrade or ‘buy-type’ 
(downgrade or ‘hold and sell-type’) recommendations in the post-expiration period for 
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unaffiliated analysts who are not employed by any GS signatory. The coefficient (β3) for 
AFF measures the incremental decrease (increase) in the informativeness of analyst 
upgrade or ‘buy-type’ (downgrade or ‘hold and sell-type’) recommendations in the pre-
expiration period for affiliated analysts who do not work for GS signatories. The 
coefficient (β4) for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp measures incremental effects on 
conditional informativeness in analyst recommendations following the 2009/10 
expiration for unaffiliated GS analysts relative to unaffiliated analysts who do not work 
for GS signatories. 
The coefficient (β7) for the test variable, GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF, captures 
the incremental effect in the conditional informativeness of upgrades or ‘buy-type’ 
(downgrades or ‘hold or sell-type’) recommendations in the post-expiration period for 
affiliated analysts who are employed by a GS signatory relative to unaffiliated analysts 
who also work for a GS signatory. H12 is supported if the coefficient, β7, is significantly 
negative (positive) in tests of the post-reform change in the relative informativeness of 
recommendation upgrades (downgrades) surrounding the M&A announcement date, or 
in tests of the post-reform change in the relative informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (or ‘hold 
or sell-type’) recommendations during the 24-month window during the post-issuance 
IPO/post-filing SEO period. 
For tests of H14 related to profitability using Model 8, the coefficient interpretation for 
the main effects and the two-way interaction terms are similar to those described in the 
tests of H12, so this discussion focuses on the interpretation of the test variable (the three-
way interaction). The coefficient (β7) for the test variable (i.e., three-way interaction term, 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF) captures the incremental effect in the profitability 
of ‘buy-type’ recommendations in the post-expiration period for affiliated GS analysts 
relative to unaffiliated GS analysts. If the coefficient (β7) is significantly negative in tests 
of the post-expiration change in the relative profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations 
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started at the tenth day following the M&A announcement date, or in tests of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations started at the tenth day following the SEO filing date, H14 is supported. 
4.3.2.5 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the JOBS Act on Investor Response and 
Profitability Conditioned by Firms’ Exposure to This Regulation and Analyst 
Affiliation (Hypotheses 17a/b and 18) 
H17a (17b) and H18 examine the incremental effects of the JOBS Act on informativeness 
and profitability of recommendations issued by affiliated analysts following EGCs (or 
their pre-reform equivalents). These effects are tested using Model 11, which regresses 
conditional informativeness or profitability against EGC, POSTREGJOB, AFF, the 
interactions thereof and the same vector of controls. An indicator EGC is set as 1 if analyst 
recommendations are issued by analysts covering an IPO firm that conforms to the 
definition of an EGC under the JOBS Act, and 0 otherwise. POSTREGJOBS is an indicator 
of pre-post Act periods. AFF is a proxy for the potential existence of analysts’ conflicts 
of interest resulting from the affiliation between analysts’ employers and covered issuers. 
The variable of interest is the three-way interaction term, EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF, 
which captures the market effect of the JOBS Act for affiliated EGC analysts who are 
targeted by the Act. The sample consists of all recommendations issued within the 24-
month window immediately following IPO issue dates between 1 January 2004 and 
18 March 2015 (excluding cases in the transition period between 5 April 2012 and 
11 November 2012). Only the recommendations issued by analysts who are employed by 
non-GS signatories are included. 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 𝑜𝑟 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 
= 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐺𝐶 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐺𝐶 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐸𝐺𝐶 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 +
𝜀, 
Model 
11 
The dependent variables are defined as described in Model 7. The definitions and 
measurements of all other variables are described in Model 6. More details of the variable 
measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
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The interpretations of coefficients in tests of the effects on informativeness (H17a/b) and 
profitability (H18) are provided as follows. 
In tests of H17a (17b) concerning the conditional informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold 
and sell-type’) recommendations using Model 11, the intercept (β0) represents the average 
effect on conditional informativeness in the pre-JOBS Act period for unaffiliated analysts 
not covering an EGC. The coefficient for EGC (β1) measures the incremental effect on 
conditional informativeness in recommendations in the pre-Act period for unaffiliated 
analysts covering an EGC. The coefficient for POSTREGJOBS (β2) measures the 
incremental decrease (increase) in the informativeness of recommendations following the 
JOBS Act for unaffiliated analysts not covering an EGC. The coefficient (β3) for AFF 
estimates the incremental effect of conditional informativeness in the pre-JOBS Act 
period for affiliated analysts not covering an EGC. The coefficient (β4) for 
EGC × POSTREGJOBS measures the incremental effects on the conditional 
informativeness in analyst recommendations following the JOBS Act for unaffiliated 
analysts covering an EGC relative to unaffiliated analysts not covering an EGC. The 
estimated coefficient (β7) for the three-way interaction term, 
EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF, captures the post-JOBS Act period incremental 
informativeness in the ‘buy-type’ (or ‘hold and sell-type’) recommendations of affiliated 
analysts covering an EGC compared with unaffiliated analysts who also cover an EGC. 
H17a (H17b) is supported if this coefficient (β7) is significantly negative (positive). 
In tests of H18 concerning the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations based on 
Model 11, the coefficient interpretations of the main effects and the two-way interaction 
terms are similar to those introduced for H17a (17b), so this discussion focuses on the 
interpretation of the test variable (the three-way interaction term). 
H18 examines the effect of the deregulation by the JOBS Act on the profitability of ‘buy-
type’ recommendations of affiliated analysts covering an EGC following the JOBS Act 
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relative to unaffiliated analysts also covering an EGC. This differential effect is tested by 
the coefficient (β7) for EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF. If the affiliated EGC analysts’ 
involvement in the IPO process potentially induces greater conflicts of interest, which 
likely damage the quality of analyst reports, EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF considered 
singularly using Model 11 should be significantly negative in tests of the post-JOBS Act 
change in relative profitability conditional upon ‘buy-type’ recommendations in the 24-
month window of the post-IPO period. H18 is thus supported. 
4.3.3 Models to Test the Regulatory Effect on Brokers’ Deal Flow (RQ3) 
This section introduces the models for testing the hypotheses that examine the effect of 
the regulations on the extent to which analyst optimism affects brokers’ investment 
banking deal flow. Section 4.3.3.1 introduces the model used to test the effect of the 
2002/3 reforms on the extent that analyst optimism affects deal flow. Section 4.3.3.2 
further explores the differential effect on analysts who are more exposed to the disclosure 
requirements of NASD 2711. Section 4.3.3.3 focuses on the effect of the 2009/10 
expiration of funding independent research. 
4.3.3.1 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on the Extent to Which 
Analyst Optimism Affects Deal Flow (Hypothesis 7) 
H7 examines whether the 2002/3 reforms affect the extent to which analyst optimism 
affects brokers’ future investment banking market share. To test H7, I employ Model 12, 
which regresses the change in the market share of investment banking business ∆MSt+1 
against the change in analyst optimism ∆OPT, the indicator variable of post-2002/3 
reforms period POSTREG2002/3, the interaction between these two variables, 
∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3 and controls. I use the annual change in the industry market 
share secured by non-GS signatories as the dependent variable, which is calculated 
separately within the market for investment banking roles in M&A deals and equity issues 
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(i.e., IPO and SEO transactions) separately. The sample period spans 1993–2014 
(excluding the transition years between 2002 and 2003). All regressions are estimated 
using OLS and include only the recommendations of non-GS analysts who used the five-
tier or four-tier ratings system before the 2002/3 reforms. Model 12 is specified as follows. 
∆MSt+1 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽3∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽4𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝛽5 𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀 
Model 
12 
Where: 
∆MSt+1 = The change in a broker’s industry-year market share from year t to 
year t+1. This is measured separately for M&A deals and IPO/SEO 
deals. Industry market share is calculated as the total advisory (or 
underwriting) fee raised by a broker in a particular industry in year t 
divided by total advisory (underwriting) fees of all deals completed 
in that particular industry during year t. 
MSt+1 = The yearly industry-year market share in year t+1 in M&A deals or 
IPO/SEO deals. 
∆OPTt = The change of analyst optimism (from year t−1 to year t), which 
represents the average analyst optimism of recommendations issued 
by the broker’s analysts relative to the consensus optimism level for 
the industry in the year, weighted by covered firms’ market 
capitalisation. Details in its measure are provided in Section 4.4.3. 
Control Variables: 
𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 = The change of the average size of covered firms (nature log value of 
capitalisation) from year t−1 to year t for a broker in the industry.  
𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 = The change of the industry average of all analysts’ experience from 
year t−1 to year t for a broker, weighted by the analysts’ contribution 
in the industry (i.e., proportion of the recommendations issued by 
individual analysts in the total recommendations issued by all 
analysts in the industry and year t). 
𝑀𝑆𝑡 = The yearly industry-year market share in year t in M&A deals or 
IPO/SEO deals. 
The definitions and measurements of all other variables are previously described in Model 1. 
More details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The reason the variables are measured in ‘changes’ rather than levels is to capture the 
main effect of prior growth in analyst optimism from t−1 to t on future growth in the 
industry market share from t to t+1. The control variables of average firm size and 
average analyst industry experience (i.e., chg_lnavgSIZE and chg_indavgEXPwindcy) are 
measured in ‘changes’ (i.e., from year t−1 to t) accordingly. However, in an alternate 
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specification, I test the level of market share at t+1, MSt+1, for broker j as another measure 
of next market share controlling for market share at t (i.e., 𝑀𝑆𝑡). In this case, the control 
variables of average firm size and average analyst industry experience are measured in 
‘levels’ (i.e., lnavgSIZE and indavgEXPwindcy) accordingly. 
The intercept β0 represents the mean change in market share from year t to t+1 for non-
GS signatory brokers in the pre-2002/3 reform period in which abnormal 
recommendation optimism equals 0. The coefficient for ∆OPTt captures the average 
association between excess optimism and future changes in the market share during the 
pre-reform period for non-GS brokers. The coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 captures the 
incremental average annual change in market share for non-GS brokers, whereby 
abnormal optimism equals 0, for the post-2002/3 reform period relative to the pre-reform 
period. The coefficient for the variable of interest—the two-way interaction 
∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3—captures the incremental association between abnormal broker 
optimism and subsequent changes in market share for the post-reform period relative to 
the pre-reform period. Given that the excess optimism in analyst reports potentially 
attracts new investment banking business in the pre-2002/3 reform period, if the 2002/3 
reforms effectively decreased abnormal analyst optimism, analyst optimism during the 
post-reform period is more likely to be a genuine opinion rather than opportunistic 
behaviour in exchange of winning future investment banking deals. If potential covered 
firms believe that luring analyst optimism by offering brokers future deals has become 
more difficult since the 2002/3 reforms, the historic optimism should have a smaller effect 
on the firms’ choices of future advisors or underwriters. The coefficient β3 is expected to 
be significantly negative to support H7. 
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4.3.3.2 Testing the Regulatory Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on the Extent to Which 
Analyst Optimism Affects Deal Flow, Conditional Upon Firms’ Exposure to the 
2002/3 Reforms (Hypothesis 8) 
H8 examines the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on the extent to which analyst optimism 
affects brokers’ future investment banking market share conditional on whether brokers 
adopted the three-tier ratings system following NASD 2711. H8 is tested based on Model 
13, which augments Model 12 by including a variable indicating brokers who changed 
their ratings system following the introduction of NASD2711, ChgtoTier3 and its 
interactions with the change in analyst optimism ∆OPT, and an indicator of post-reform 
observations, POSTREG2002/3. 
∆MSt+1 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 +
𝛽4∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽5∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 × 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽7∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
13 
The definitions and measurements of all variables are previously described in Model 1 and 
Model 12. More details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
The interpretation of coefficients in tests of deal flow (H8) is provided as follows. The 
intercept β0 represents the mean effect on the change in market share in the pre-2002/3 
reform period whereby abnormal recommendation optimism equals 0 for non-GS 
signatory brokers who did not adopt the three-tier ratings system encouraged by NASD 
2711. The coefficient for ∆ OPTt captures the average association between excess 
optimism and future changes in the market share during the pre-reform period for non-
GS brokers who did not adopt the three-tier ratings system induced by NASD 2711. The 
coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 captures the incremental average annual change in market 
share for non-GS brokers who did not adopt the three-tier ratings system following NASD 
2711, whereby abnormal optimism equals 0 for the post-2002/3 reform period relative to 
the pre-reform period. The coefficient for ChgtoTier3 captures the incremental effect in 
the post-2002/3 reform period whereby abnormal recommendation optimism equals 0 for 
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non-GS brokers who adopted the three-tier ratings system induced by NASD 2711. The 
coefficient for the two-way interaction ∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3 captures the incremental 
association between abnormal broker optimism and subsequent changes in the market 
share for non-GS signatory brokers who did not adopt the three-tier ratings system 
following NASD 2711 in the post-reform period relative to the same brokers in the pre-
reform period. 
The test variable is the three-way interaction, ∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3 × ChgtoTier3. Its 
coefficient captures the incremental association between abnormal broker optimism and 
subsequent changes in the market share following the 2002/3 reforms for non-GS 
signatory brokers whose analysts issue increasing optimism and adopt the three-tier 
ratings system encouraged by the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 relative to the 
non-GS signatory brokers who did not make a similar change in their tier systems of 
recommendations. The coefficient β7 is expected to be significantly negative to support 
H8. 
More interpretations of significant coefficients are case-specific and will be discussed in 
the results section. 
4.3.3.3 Testing the Regulatory Effect of Analyst Optimism on Deal Flow, 
Conditional upon Firms’ Exposure to the Expiration of Funding Independent 
Research (Hypothesis 15) 
H15 examines the effect of the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research on 
the extent to which analyst optimism affects the future investment banking market share 
for brokers subject to the five-year procurement of independent research required by the 
GS. H15 is tested using Model 14, which regresses the change of the industry-year market 
share from year t to year t+1 (∆MSt+1) against the change in analyst optimism, ∆OPTt, an 
indicator of post-expiration observations, POSTREGExp, an indicator of whether the 
broker is one of the 12 GS signatories, GSSignatory, the interactions between these 
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variables and controls. The variable of interest is the three-way interaction between ∆OPT, 
POSTREGExp and GSSignatory. The OLS regressions in Model 14 are estimated on a 
sample comprising both GS (treatment) and non-GS signatory (control) observations 
between 2004 and 2015, excluding the transition period (26 July 2009–26 March 2010). 
∆MSt+1 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽3𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽4∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽5∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 × 𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 +  𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 ×
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽7∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 ×
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
14 
 
The intercept (β0) represents the average effect on the change of the market share during 
the pre-expiration period whereby abnormal recommendation optimism equals 0. The 
coefficient for ∆OPT captures the average association between excess optimism and 
future changes in the market share during the pre-reform period for non-GS brokers. The 
coefficient (β2) for POSTREGExp measures the incremental average annual change in the 
market share in M&A or IPO/SEO deals for non-GS signatory brokers whereby abnormal 
optimism equals 0 for the post-expiration period relative to the pre-expiration period. The 
coefficient for ∆ OPT × POSTREGExp measures the incremental association between 
abnormal non-GS signatory broker optimism and subsequent changes in the market share 
for the post-expiration period relative to the pre-expiration period. The three-way 
interaction term, ∆ OPTt × POSTREGExp × GSSignatory, captures the incremental 
association between abnormal broker optimism and subsequent changes in the market 
share during the post-expiration period for GS signatory brokers relative to non-GS 
signatory brokers. H15 will be supported if the coefficient (β7) for 
∆OPTt × POSTREGExp × GSSignatory is significantly positive. 
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4.3.4 Summary of Methods Used to Test Hypotheses 
Section 3.3 described the conventional difference-in-difference research design used to 
test the hypotheses examining regulatory effects on analyst behaviour (i.e., changing to 
the three-tier ratings system, procuring independent research over a five-year period, and 
entitling to the exemptions as a result of covering EGCs), which affect analyst optimism 
(as recommendation optimism and LTG forecast optimism revisions), investor response 
(as conditional informativeness), profitability and deal flow. The empirical models are 
designed to be applied in multiple contexts, including the 180-day window surrounding 
the M&A announcement date and the post-IPO issuance/post-SEO filing period whereby 
affiliated analysts may have the greatest conflicts of interest because of their investment 
banking incentives. The next section discusses the measurement of key variables in 
greater detail. 
Measurement of Variables 
This section introduces the measurement of variables used to test the hypotheses. It begins 
by describing measures of recommendation optimism and LTG forecast optimism (see 
Section 4.4.1), informativeness and profitability (see Section 4.4.2) and deal flow (see 
Section 4.4.3). It then describes the measurement of the main variables (see Sections 4.4.4 
and 4.4.5) and control variables (see Section 4.4.6). 
4.4.1 Measuring Analyst Optimism (Recommendation Changes and LTG Forecast 
Optimism Revision) 
The dependent variable, OPT, measures analyst optimism implicit in recommendations 
or LTG forecasts observed during investment banking event windows (M&A and 
IPO/SEO contexts). The proxies for analyst optimism applied in each investment banking 
context are described below. 
Proxies for Analyst Optimism during M&A Events 
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I construct two proxies for analyst optimism observed during the 180-day window centred 
on M&A announcement dates: (a) UPGRADEM&Arec, an ordinal variable that is equal to 
1 if the analyst upgraded their recommendation during the 180-day event window, 0 if 
there is an unchanged recommendation and −1 if the analyst downgraded the 
recommendation during the event window; and (b) UPGRADELTG, which is defined as the 
change in individual analysts’ LTG forecast for acquirers across the 180-day M&A event 
window. I use ordered logistic regressions to test recommendation optimism 
(UPGRADEM&Arec) and OLS regressions for the remaining tests. Detailed measurements 
of the two proxies are provided as follows. 
I measure optimism in recommendations (UPGRADEM&Arec) using the method described 
by Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) and Wu et al. (2015). I obtain all available analyst 
recommendations on the acquirer firms within ±90 days of the M&A announcement 
dates, and reverse the uniform numerical coding of recommendations recorded on I/B/E/S 
such that 5 = ‘strong buy’ and 1 = ‘strong sell’ so that the recommendation level is 
increasing in optimism. I also obtain the latest available recommendations issued by each 
analyst for the acquirer immediately before the 180-day event window, but within two 
years of the M&A announcement date. I then calculate the revision in recommendations, 
UPGRADEM&Arec, as a categorical variable that equals 1 if, during the 180-day window, 
the analyst upgrades their recommendation to a more favourable level (e.g., changes from 
a ‘hold’ to a ‘buy’), 0 if there is no change in recommendation and −1 if the analyst 
downgrades their recommendation to a less favourable level. 
I adapt Kolasinski and Kothari’s (2008) approach to measure the optimism implied by 
revisions to LTG forecast optimism (UPGRADELTG). Following Kolasinski and Kothari 
(2008), who measure optimism in the levels of LTG forecasts, I obtain all available LTG 
forecasts on the acquirer firms within ±90 days centred on the M&A announcement date. 
For each M&A transaction, there must be at least one ‘affiliated’ and two ‘unaffiliated’ 
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LTG forecasts so I can calculate each analyst’s deviation from consensus. To control for 
analyst herding behaviour (Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000; Trueman, 1994; Welch, 
2000), I eliminate any unaffiliated forecast issued after the earliest forecast by an 
affiliated analyst within the event window. The LTG forecast optimism implied by the 
level of an analyst forecast (i.e., OPTIMISMLEV) is identified as the difference between 
the analyst forecast and consensus (median) forecast estimated of unaffiliated analysts. 
The measure of analyst optimism implied by the revisions to LTG forecasts 
(UPGRADELTG) is equal to the difference between OPTIMISMLEV observed during the 
measurement window and OPTIMISMLEV observed for that analyst immediately before 
the M&A event window. 
Proxies for Analyst Optimism Following and Around Equity Issues 
The main measure of analyst optimism relating to equity issues is the standardised level 
of the initial post-issue recommendations (LEVEL3tier). Following the design of O’Brien 
et al. (2005), I adapt the window length of two years following equity issues (or the filing 
of the SEO) to collect recommendations for tests. I then reverse the uniform numerical 
coding of five-tier recommendations recorded on I/B/E/S such that 5 = ‘strong buy’, 
4 = ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, 2 = ‘sell’ and 1 = ‘strong sell’ so that the recommendation level (i.e., 
LEVEL5tier) is increasing in optimism. Finally, following Corwin et al. (2017), to ensure 
that the results are not driven by the shift in recommendation scales from a five-tier to a 
three-tier ratings system, I standardise the observed levels of recommendations so they 
are all consistent with the use of a three-tier system: for ratings issued under a five-tier 
ratings system, I recode ‘strong buy’ to ‘buy’ and ‘strong sell’ to ‘sell’ to obtain one of 
the main dependent variables, LEVEL3tier. The standardised LEVEL3tier is thus coded as 
4 for all ‘buy-type’ recommendations, 3 for ‘hold’ recommendations and 2 for all ‘sell-
type’ recommendations. 
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In the tests of analyst behaviour around SEOs, I employ an additional proxy for optimism, 
UPGRADESEOrec, which measures recommendation changes between the most recent pre-
filing recommendation (i.e., the last available recommendation issued during the 90-day 
period before, but within two years of the SEO filing date) and the first post-filing 
recommendation within the 12-month period after the SEO filing date.31 The categorical 
variable UPGRADESEOrec equals 1 if the level of the analyst’s first recommendation after 
the filing date is more favourable than the level of the most recent recommendation before 
the filing date, 0 if unchanged and −1 if the level of the analyst’s first recommendation 
after the filing date is less favourable than that of the most recent recommendation before 
the filing date. 
4.4.2 Measuring Investor Response (Informativeness) and Profitability 
Measuring Informativeness 
To measure informativeness, I calculate the cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted 
return between day −1 and day +1 centred on the change of recommendation (or 
recommendation issue) day (i.e., CAR(−1,1)) by summing the daily abnormal returns 
(daily return minus the decile size-matched return on the Center for Research in Security 
Prices [CRSP] NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted market index). This three-day 
window is commonly used in the stock returns and earnings announcement literature 
(Bernard & Thomas, 1990; Chopra, Lakonishok, & Ritter, 1992; Savor, 2012), which has 
been demonstrated to have significant predictive power for subsequent stock returns 
(Jiang & Zhu, 2017). The informativeness, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑗(−1,1), is winsorised at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to control for outliers. The corresponding calculations are introduced as per 
Equations 3 and 4: 
                                                 
31 This measure cannot use IPO-based tests because there no recommendation is issued before the IPO issue 
date. 
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𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑗
 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑗 −  𝑅𝑚𝑡 Eq. 3 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑗(−1,1) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑗
𝑡+1
𝑖=𝑡−1
 Eq. 4 
 
Where 𝑅𝑡
𝑗
 is the return at date t (the announcement or revision day of the recommendation 
changes or recommendations) for firm j; 𝑅𝑚𝑡  is the date t size-decile value-weighted 
portfolio return based on rankings of all CRSP universe of NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ 
stocks; 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑗
 is the size-decile market-adjusted return at date t for firm j. 
Measuring Profitability 
Following Lin and McNichols (1998), I measure the profitability of recommendations 
conditional on the direction of the recommendation (BHARs) using the daily buy-and-
hold returns for firm j over the investing window for the recommended security less the 
buy-and-hold return over the same investing window for the relevant size-decile index 
series embedded in the main CRSP US stock database. Given the low incidence of sell-
type recommendations, the main tests focus on buy-type recommendations. I identify the 
outstanding buy-type recommendations (including initiations, resumptions and 
reiterations of coverage) on the eleventh day after the M&A announcement date or the 
SEO filing dates. I exclude the recommendation returns over the first 10 trading days to 
allow reasonable time for analysts to assess the proposed deal and estimate its effect on 
the value of the firm. For the profitability tests related to the JOBS Act, I adopt Barber et 
al. (2007) to commence the investing windows of BHARs at the second day following the 
announcement date of the initial ‘buy-type’ recommendations after the IPO issue. The 
BHAR of recommendations at the first day is excluded to reflect that small investors may 
become aware of favourable recommendations with a delay. I define the end of the 
investment window for recommendations as either one year in the future or the date on 
which the analyst first revises their recommendations to less favourable levels (i.e., 
119 
downgrade) or stops covering the firm—whichever is earlier (adapted from Barber et al., 
2007). Returns are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles to control for outliers. 
Equation 5 is stated as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(𝑡,𝑇)
𝑗
 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑗,𝑖)
𝑇
𝑡
− ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑖)
𝑇
𝑡
 Eq. 5 
 
Where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(𝑡,𝑇)
𝑗
 refers to the BHAR for firm j in the period between date i and date T. t 
represents the commencement day of the BHAR window and T refers to the end day of 
the BHAR window. 𝑅𝑗 is the return of the firm j at date i (i = t ~ T). 𝑅𝑚,𝑖 is the size-decile 
value-weighted portfolio return based on the rankings of all CRSP universe of NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ stocks at date i (i = t ~ T). 
4.4.3 Measuring Deal Flow (Change in Market Share) and Change in Analyst 
Optimism at the Broker’s Level 
Measuring Deal Flow (Change in Market Share) at the Broker Level 
Following Clarke et al. (2007), I define deal flow as the change in industry market share 
for the broker in the year t. 𝑀𝑆𝑡 is estimated as the total advisory fees of all M&A deals 
(or the total underwriting fees of all IPO/SEO deals) raised by a broker in a particular 
industry i in year t divided by total advisory fees (or underwriting fees) of all deals 
completed in that particular industry i during the year t. The change in deal flow, ∆𝑀𝑆𝑡+1, 
is the first difference in the levels measure, as per Equation 6. I calculate ∆𝑀𝑆𝑡+1 
separately for M&A deals and equity issues (IPO/SEO deals) transactions. In an alternate 
specification, I use 𝑀𝑆𝑡+1, the lead industry market share of the broker j in the year t+1 
as the dependent variable and re-estimate the regressions, including a control for the 
current year market share (𝑀𝑆𝑡). To measure the industry market share, the industry 
sectors are identified using the industry classification based on the first two digits of the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes, as shown in Table 4.1: 
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∆𝑀𝑆𝑡+1,𝑗,𝑖 = 𝑀𝑆𝑡+1,𝑗,𝑖  − 𝑀𝑆𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 
Eq. 6 
𝑀𝑆𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 = 
𝐼𝐵𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 ∑ 𝐼𝐵𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑗(1~𝑁)
⁄  
 
Where 𝐼𝐵𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 refers to the investment banking fee (i.e., advisory fee or underwriting 
fee) raised by broker j in industry i in year t. ∑ 𝐼𝐵𝑓𝑒𝑒
𝑖,𝑡𝑗(1~𝑁)  is the aggregated investment 
banking fee raised by all brokers j (= 1~N) in industry i at year t. 
Table 4.1 Classification of Industries 
Range of SIC 
Codes 
Division 
0100–0999 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
1000–1499 Mining 
1500–1799 Construction 
2000–3999 Manufacturing 
4000–4999 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
service 
5000–5199 Wholesale Trade 
5200–5999 Retail Trade 
6000–6799 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
7000–8999 Services 
9100–9729 Public Administration 
 
Measuring Change in Analyst Optimism at the Broker Level 
The change in optimism of the analysts working for a broker in a given year, 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑗
𝑡 , is defined as the capitalisation-weighted level of recommendations 
issued by broker j for firms in industry i during year t minus the weighted 
recommendation level for all recommendations issued by brokers in that industry i during 
the same year t, as per Equation 7: 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑗
𝑡  = ∑ 𝑤 ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 −  ∑ 𝑤 ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 
Eq. 7 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑗
𝑡  = 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑗
𝑡  −  𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖,𝑗
𝑡−1  
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Where the capitalisation-weighted ratio w equals the total firms’ capitalisations covered 
by the broker in the industry divided by total firms’ capitalisations in the industry. Level 
is defined as standardised levels of recommendations (i.e., specifying ‘buy-type’ as 4, 
‘hold’ as 3 and ‘sell-type’ as 2). 
4.4.4 Measuring Analyst Affiliation 
I identify broker and analyst affiliation using several methods employed in earlier 
literature. All methods are based on investment banking relationships between brokers 
and covered firms—the key data for which are obtained from Thomson Reuters Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum and merged with analyst data from I/B/E/S.32 In tests 
focusing on M&A event windows, affiliated brokers are those contracted as an advisor 
by the acquirer (Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008). For IPO/SEO-based tests, affiliated brokers 
are those who provide underwriting or co-underwriting services to the issuer (Kadan et 
al., 2009). In tests of longer-term effects of affiliation, I identify affiliated brokers as those 
who have had M&A advisory, IPO/SEO or debt underwriting relationships with the 
covered firm during the previous 24 months (as per Corwin et al., 2017). In each case, 
analysts employed by, and a broker affiliated with, the covered firm are described as 
‘affiliated analysts’, and their affiliation status is indicated by the value of the binary 
variable AFF (as per Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008; Wu et al., 2015). 
4.4.5 Measuring Broker’s Adoption of the Three-Tier Ratings System in 
Recommendations 
I identify the effect of changes to the ratings system employed by a broker using the 
dichotomous variable ChgtoTier3. ChgtoTier3 equals 1 if a recommendation (forecast) 
was issued by an analyst working for a brokerage that switched from a five-tier to a three-
                                                 
32 Given that there are no common identifiers across the two databases, this involved manually conducting 
proximity matching using corporate and broker names, and validating uncertain matches using ad hoc 
internet searches. 
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tier ratings system during the period between January 2002 and December 2004, and 0 
otherwise. This indicator variable identifies analysts working for brokerages who 
changed their ratings system, but the recommendations (forecasts) of such analysts are 
coded as 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 = 1 for observations throughout the study period (i.e., both before 
and after the brokerage changed its ratings system). 
4.4.6 Control Variables 
The common control variables included in the models to test hypotheses regarding analyst 
and investor behaviour (analyst optimism, informativeness and profitability) are largely 
based on Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) and Wu et al. (2015). I include common controls 
for analyst and broker characteristics, such as analyst experience (EXP), analyst following 
(FOLLOW) and brokerage firms’ size (BROKERSIZE). I also include common controls 
for characteristics of investment banking deals, such as the deal value (lnDEALVALUE), 
the timing of issuing analyst reports surrounding the deal (DAYS) and firm size of the 
M&A acquirer or new equity/debt issuer (lnFIRMCAP). I use a set of common controls 
across all regressions because these variables representing characteristics of analysts and 
brokers’ behaviour, as well as investment banking deals, are potentially associated with 
analyst excessive optimism. Therefore, these common controls are associated with 
corresponding investors’ perceptions of the credibility of analyst reports and the quality 
of analyst recommendations in terms of long-term profitability. For example, investors 
may have less confidence and respond less to ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by 
overly optimistic analysts, and they may overreact to their ‘sell-type’ recommendations. 
In addition, such analysts’ ‘buy-type’ recommendations may result in less profitable long-
term returns. 
For informativeness tests, in addition to the set of common controls, I follow Kadan et al. 
(2009) to include other control variables for past firm performance (PASTFIRMPREF) 
and some market characteristics to control momentum effect and changes in volatility that 
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potentially affect price reactions, such as past market performance (PASTMKTPERF) and 
market volatility (MKTSD). 
For deal flow tests, I include controls representing characteristics at the brokers’ industry 
level that may affect the likelihood of brokers winning future deals, such as the change 
of the average acquirer or the issuer firms’ size (lnavgSIZE), the change of average 
brokers’ industry experience (IndavgEXPwindcy) and prior market share (MS). The 
discussion of the control variables is provided below. 
4.4.6.1 Common Control Variables 
Analyst Experience (EXP) 
I control for analyst experience (EXP)—a surrogate for analyst ability and skill—using 
the number of years since the first analyst’s recommendation or forecast was recorded in 
I/B/E/S. Prior research shows that experienced security analysts’ earnings forecasts have 
superior earnings forecasting performance and show greater improvement in accuracy as 
they gain more experience because, compared with inexperienced analysts, they have the 
ability to completely incorporate information or private information about their covered 
firms in prior earnings (Clement, 1999; Mikhail et al., 2003). Thus, there is a lower 
uncertainty of valuing the firm and less probability that such analysts will issue 
abnormally optimistic forecasts and recommendations. However, Hong, Kubik et al. 
(2000) show that more experienced analysts are more likely to deviate from consensus. 
Therefore, it is expected that the association between analysts’ general experience and 
analyst optimism (also for informativeness and profitability) may be in either positive or 
negative direction. 
FOLLOW 
I include a control variable for analysts following (FOLLOW), a surrogate for analyst 
potential herding behaviour, which is expected to be negative. Increased forecast accuracy 
and less optimistic bias forecasts have been found for more heavily followed firms after 
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controlling for firm-specific forecasting difficulty (Das et al., 1998; Duru & Reeb, 2002). 
This suggests that it is less likely for a particular analyst to be excessively optimistic when 
a greater number of analysts covering the same firm induce herding behaviour (Kolasinski 
& Kothari, 2008). I expect that ‘buy-type’ (‘sell-type’) stock recommendations issued by 
a greater number of analysts covering the same firm are more (less) informative to 
investors, and such ‘buy-type’ recommendations may have a greater performance in long-
term profitability. 
BROKERSIZE 
Prior studies find that analysts from larger brokerage houses have more resources to 
support their research (e.g., databases, forecasting technologies, more talented employees 
and training) and potentially have closer ties with firms’ management (Clement, 1999; 
Jacob et al., 1999; Mohanram & Sunder, 2006), which suggests less optimism in their 
forecasts and recommendations. However, Jackson (2005) suggests that larger brokers 
are involved with greater trading volumes, which may lead to incentives to bias their 
recommendations to generate more commission fees. Thus, brokerage size may affect 
analyst optimism (or informativeness and profitability) either positively or negatively. 
Following Hong and Kubik (2003) and Ertimur, Muslu and Zhang (2011), brokerage size 
(BROKERSIZE) is measured as the number of analysts at the brokerage house that 
employs the analyst. 
DEALVALUE 
M&A deals’ value (DEALVALUE) is measured as the natural logarithm of total 
consideration the acquirer paid for the M&A deal, adjusted for inflation. The deal value 
of IPO/SEO deals is calculated as the natural logarithm of total proceeds of the issue, 
adjusted for inflation. A positive relation between analyst optimism and the M&A (or 
IPO/SEO) deals’ value is expected on the grounds that larger consideration usually comes 
with larger advisory (or underwriting) fees. The materiality of investment banking 
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revenue may bring about potential conflicts of interest for analysts to provide favourable 
reports (Ertimur et al., 2007). Analysts have potentially greater incentives to 
optimistically bias their recommendations or LTG forecasts when the total consideration 
of the investment banking deal is larger. Therefore, a negative association is expected 
between the investment banking deal value and informativeness (also profitability) of 
‘buy-type’ recommendations. In contrast, ‘sell-type’ recommendations are more 
informative when the investment banking deal value is greater. 
DAYS 
I use an absolute measure in the number of days between M&A or IPO/SEO transactions 
and analyst reports (DAYS) as a proxy for the likelihood of timing for an analyst to bias 
their research. It is more likely for affiliated analysts to be optimistically biased closer to 
the investment banking transaction date (Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008). Thus, a negative 
relation is expected between relative optimism and the number of days between the 
analyst’s report and the transaction date. I also expect a positive relation between the 
informativeness (profitability) of ‘buy-type’ recommendations and DAYS, as well as a 
negative relation between the informativeness of ‘sell-type’ recommendations and DAYS. 
FIRMCAP 
The size (i.e., market capitalisation) of acquirer or issuer firms (FIRMCAP) takes the log 
transformation adjusted by inflation (1992 CPI). Larger firms may have more power to 
influence analysts to optimistically bias their reports in exchange for private information 
(Das et al., 1998; Francis & Philbrick, 1993; Libby et al., 2008). Thus, I predict that 
optimistic bias is more likely to be generated in analyst reports if the size of the affiliated 
acquirer (or issuer) firm is larger; in such cases, investors will respond less to ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations and more to ‘sell-type’ recommendations. Lastly, I expect that there 
will be less profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations if FIRMCAP is larger. 
Prior Optimism (LEVELprior or OPTIMISMprior) 
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I control for the level of optimism existing before the start of the measurement window 
(LEVELprior or OPTIMISMprior) because this may affect the scope for change in optimism 
(Wu et al., 2015). For example, a buy under the three-tier ratings system cannot be 
upgraded, which mechanistically reduces the scope for changes. 
4.4.6.2 Additional Control Variables for Informativeness Tests 
PASTFIRMPERF/PASTMKTPERF/MKTSD 
To test the informativeness of the recommendation (or recommendation revisions), 
following Kadan et al. (2009), I include two additional controls—past firm and market 
performance (PASTFIRMPERF and PASTMKTPERF)—to control for momentum effects, 
which are important determinants of new recommendations (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, & 
Lee, 2004; Womack, 1996). The predictive power of the level of recommendations is 
driven from the stocks of high price momentum (Jegadeesh et al., 2004), which is found 
to be positively associated with future return over the next 12 months (Jegadeesh & 
Titman, 1993). Therefore, the association between PASTFIRMPERF (or 
PASTMKTPERF) and the conditional informativeness of recommendations (INFORM) is 
expected to be positive. PASTFIRMPERF is calculated as the size- and industry-adjusted 
firm’s stock returns in the six months preceding the recommendation. PASTMKTPERF 
is the cumulative market return in the six months before the recommendation. I include 
another control variable—the standard deviation of market returns (MKTSD)—to account 
for the effect of volatility changes on price reactions. French, Schwert and Stambaugh 
(1987) find evidence of a positive relation between stock market volatility and abnormal 
stock returns. Therefore, it is expected that the higher volatility of the market will be 
positively associated with the conditional informativeness measured as market-adjusted 
returns. MKTSD is the standard deviation of the daily S&P 500 index one month before 
the recommendation. 
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4.4.6.3 Control Variables for Deal Flow Tests 
chg_lnavgSIZE/ chg_indavgEXPwindcy 
To test the regulatory effect on deal flow, I include two control variables. chg_lnavgSIZE 
is the natural log value of the average size (capitalisation) of the covered firms by a broker 
in one particular industry from year t−1 to year t. The covered firm size is closely 
associated with the value of potential future investment banking opportunities (Clarke et 
al., 2007). Thus, the association between the change in the market share and 
chg_lnavgSIZE is expected to be positive. 
chg_indavgEXPwindcy is the change in the industry average of all analysts’ experience 
from year t−1 to year t, weighted by the analysts’ contribution in the particular industry 
to a broker. As more senior analysts (measured by years since the first appearance in 
I/B/E/S) typically make more optimistic recommendations (Hong, Kubik, et al., 2000) 
and more experienced analysts are more likely to be employed by successful banks 
(Ljungqvist et al., 2009), a positive association is expected between the change in the 
market share and chg_indavgEXPwindcy. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the research design used to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 3. Section 4.2 provided an overview of the regression models and the research 
scope. Section 4.3 described both the general and fully specified models. Section 4.4 
discussed the various measures for the dependent variables (analyst optimism, investor 
response, profitability and deal flow) and control variables. Chapter 5 will describe the 
data collection process and the selection criteria used to determine the final sample for 
the hypotheses related to the effect of the 2002/3 reforms. In addition, the chapter will 
discuss the descriptive statistics, present the empirical results and analyse the effects of 
the 2002/3 reforms on analyst optimism, investor behaviour and brokers’ deal flow. 
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Appendix 4.0-1 Two-Stage Matched-Sample Approach (Propensity Score Matching) 
This section introduces the PSM model, which potentially provides valid estimates of 
average treatment effects when the subject of interest (ChgtoTier3 or GSSignatory) is a 
dichotomous measure (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). This thesis uses the PSM model to 
correct for potential endogeneity threats. The PSM approach first estimates the propensity 
score (the conditional probability) of a subject to a treatment group based on vector 
variables (e.g., BROKERSIZE, FIRMCAP, EXP, FOLLOW and DEALVALUE) and then 
matches the treatment observations (analyst outputs with ChgtoTier3 = 1 or 
GSSignatory = 1) to control observations (analyst outputs with ChgtoTier3 = 0 or 
GSSignatory = 0) based on the estimated propensity score so that the differences in the 
relevant characteristics of the two groups are decreased. To test whether the matching 
procedure produces a balanced matched sample, I conduct univariate analysis of the mean 
differences in the matching variables across the treatment and control groups. If all mean 
differences are significantly different from 0, the sample is considered balanced with 
respect to these matching variables. I then conduct OLS regression analysis to examine 
the regulatory effect on analyst optimism based on the PSM sample. The models are as 
follows. Models PSM1 and PSM2 are used to test the hypotheses that concern the 
regulatory effect of the 2002/3 reforms on analyst optimism. Models PSM1b and PMS2b 
are used to test the hypotheses that concern the regulatory effect of the 2009/10 expiration. 
First-stage model (PSM) 
𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 = 
𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝜀, 
Model 
PSM 
1 
Second-stage model (PSM) 
𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽5𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 +  𝛽8𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 +
𝛽9𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 +
𝛽12𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽13𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 +
𝛽14𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿(𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟) + 𝜀, 
Model 
PSM 
2 
All variables are defined in Section 4.4.  
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First-stage model (PSM) 
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 = 
𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝜀, 
Model 
PSM 
1b 
Second-stage model (PSM) 
𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽5𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽7𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
 𝛽8𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽9𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑋𝑃 +
𝛽11𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽12𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽13𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 +
𝛽14𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿(𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟) + 𝜀, 
Model 
PSM 
2b 
All variables are defined in Section 4.4.  
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Chapter 5 Sample and Results of Tests of the Effect of the 2002/3 
Reforms 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results of tests of the regulatory effect of the 2002/3 
reforms on analyst optimism (H1a/b and H2a/b) and investor behaviour (H3–H6) and the 
extent to which analyst optimism affects brokers’ deal flows (H7 and H8). Section 5.2 
describes the procedure of the sample selection. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 provide descriptive 
statistics of variables of regressions used in tests of the M&A and IPO/SEO contexts. 
Section 5.5 reports the multivariate results for the hypotheses. Section 5.6 summarises 
the results and concludes this chapter with contributions and limitations of the study. 
Sample Selection 
The main samples consist of analyst recommendations and LTG forecasts for US public 
acquirers in M&A deals (or underwriters in IPO/SEO deals) from the I/B/E/S database 
for the period 1993–2014, issued by US analysts for whom an employing brokerage can 
be identified. The recommendations and forecasts of analysts employed by the 12 
investment banks that were signatories to the GS are excluded33 because all but one of 
these institutions changed their ratings system at the time of the reforms, and separating 
the effect of the change in ratings system from the other specific provisions of GS is 
confounded by collinearity. 34  The main samples also exclude observations between 
1 January 2002 and 31 December 2003 because a succession of regulatory developments 
occurred in close order during this period, and separating their effects is problematic. 
Table 5.1 reports the sample selection process for the main sample of revisions to analysts’ 
stock recommendations and LTG forecasts within the 180-day window surrounding the 
                                                 
33  The signatories to the GS are Bear Stearns, Citigroup (Salomon Smith Barney), CS First Boston, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Thomas 
Weisel, UBS Warburg and US Bancorp Piper Jaffray. 
34 Nonetheless, all significant results reported in this paper hold if I include the GS brokers in the sample. 
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M&A announcement date. The M&A sample is limited to statutory M&As of assets deals 
because analysts’ incentives are uncertain in deals such as paybacks, acquisitions of 
certain assets, acquisitions of partial interest, recapitalisations, spinoffs, split-offs, 
exchange offers and acquisitions of remaining interest (Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008). 
Likewise, I obviate the possibility of tackling more complicated incentives for analysts 
employed by the targets’ advisors and thus restrict my sample to deals required by public 
acquirers. There are 13,548 deals left in the sample after considering these criteria. Next, 
advisors’ names obtained from SDC Platinum are matched with brokers’ names from 
I/B/E/S. As in Wu et al. (2015), I require at least one financial advisor to have been 
retained by the acquirer, and I obtain 10,280 matched M&A deals for the revision of 
recommendations and 11,110 cases for forecasts. Third, I merge the available cases of 
recommendation changes and LTG forecasts for acquirers in M&A deals using a 180-day 
event window. I first discard the observations that lack a prior recommendation (or 
forecast) within two years of the M&A announcement date. Further, to calculate the LTG 
forecast optimism measure, I require that the acquirer is covered by at least two 
unaffiliated analysts. For the recommendations samples, there must be at least one 
recommendation by an unaffiliated analyst during the M&A event window. Finally, I 
exclude M&A deals for which the deal value or other control variables are unavailable. 
After eliminating observations in the transition years (2002–2003) and observations 
relating to GS signatory brokers, there are 15,654 observations in the sample of 
recommendation changes and 3,898 in the LTG forecasts, issued by non-GS signatories. 
Of the 15,654 recommendation changes, 4,993 represent non-zero values (i.e., either an 
‘upgrade’ [2,570] or a ‘downgrade’ [2,423]). Of this number, 4,895 have sufficient data 
to estimate abnormal returns over the three-day window surrounding the announcement 
of the recommendation change, leaving samples of 2,511 (2,367) to test the 
informativeness of the upgrades (downgrades). The number of available observations of 
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‘buy-type’ recommendations that are current 10 days after the M&A announcement date 
is 6,321. After matching to the requisite return data, this yields a final sample of 5,767 
‘buy-type’ recommendations used to test the profitability hypotheses. 
Table 5.1 Sample Selection for Recommendations and LTG Forecasts in the M&A 
Context 
Descriptions 
Recommend-
ations 
LTG 
Forecasts 
Total number of M&A deals with public acquirers from SDC between 
1993 and 2014 (October) 13,548 13,548 
Total number of M&A deal which can match brokers and advisors (at 
least one matched broker as advisor for a M&A deal) 10,280 11,110 
Cases merged M&A deals with recommendations or forecasts 38,677 21,167 
Less LTG forecasts for which consensus cannot be calculated  10,687 
Less missing data for controls −1,212 −487 
Observations with available data 1993–2014 37,465 10,200 
Less observations pertaining to GS signatories −16,695 −5,099 
Full Sample 20,770 5,101 
Less observations in 2002 and 2003 −4,816 −1,134 
Final available sample 15,954 3,967 
Less observations of brokers who do not use non-3 tier rating before the 
2002/3 reform 
−300 −69 
Final available sample  15,654 3,898 
Available sample of recommendation upgrades used to test conditional 
informativeness 
2,511 
Available sample of recommendation downgrades used to test 
conditional informativeness 
2,367 
Available sample of buy-type recommendations used to test profitability 5,767 
 
Table 5.2 describes the selection procedure for the sample of analysts’ initial stock 
recommendations within the 24-month window during the post-IPO/SEO period. I obtain 
data for equity issues for issue dates between 1993 and 2014. After excluding all closed-
end funds and trusts and all unit investment trusts (as per Kadan et al., 2009), there are 
6,046 IPO deals and 11,235 SEO deals available. I then match affiliated brokers’ names 
from I/B/E/S with IPO or SEO deals as long as they participated as lead or co-manager 
underwriters. This results in 5,222 IPO deals and 10,588 SEO deals that have at least one 
matched broker as an underwriter. I then merged the deals with affiliated and unaffiliated 
recommendations issued within the 24-month window of the post-IPO/SEO period, 
requiring at least one affiliated and one unaffiliated recommendation retained for a deal. 
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This provided 44,218 and 115,860 recommendation-deal observations for IPO and SEO, 
respectively. Of these cases, I identify analysts’ initial recommendations issued during 
the 24 months following the IPO/SEO issue date. This leads to a surviving sample of 
24,007 for recommendation-IPO deal cases and 37,117 for recommendation-SEO deal 
cases. A further 1,142 cases for IPO and 1,028 cases for SEO were eliminated because of 
unavailable data for control variables. Finally, I constrain samples only to the 
observations relating to non-GS signatories that used a four- or five-tier ratings system 
before the 2002/3 reforms, and I further exclude cases that occurred in the transition years 
(2002–2003), thereby leaving final samples of 12,435 initial recommendation-IPO deal 
cases and 19,252 initial recommendation-SEO deal cases. 
There were 10,649 (31,924) cases of ‘buy-type’ and 5,982 (21,966) cases of ‘hold or sell-
type’ recommendations issued in the 24-month period post-IPO (post-SEO filings) after 
eliminating the cases that do not have sufficient data to estimate CAR(−1,1) surrounding 
the announcement of the recommendations. The number of available observations of the 
‘buy-type’ recommendation level that are current 10 days after the SEO filing date is 
10,206. After matching to the requisite return data, 9,053 ‘buy-type’ recommendations 
remain for the final sample used to test the profitability hypotheses. 
Table 5.3 describes the selection process for the industry-year deal flow sample for 
brokers who conduct advisory mandates either for acquirer or target firms in M&A 
transactions. Panel A reports the broker-transaction-level data for M&A deals. I first 
obtain 24,360 M&A transactions between 1990 and 2016, where either the acquirer or 
target are public firms. Further, I only include transactions of statutory mergers and 
acquisitions of assets to exclude transactions with unclear analyst incentives (Kolasinski 
& Kothari, 2008). After further restricting the sample to cases with at least one matching 
broker’s name on I/B/E/S, the sample is reduced to 18,551 deals. I track each broker’s 
historical M&A mandates as either an advisor for the acquirer or target firms to organise 
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a sample of broker-transaction pairs with 22,943 cases (22,873 cases after eliminating 
brokers that never had an M&A advisory business during the sample period).  
Table 5.2 Sample Selection for Recommendations in the IPO/SEO Context 
Descriptions IPO SEO 
Total number of IPO/SEO deals with underwriters from SDC between 
1993 and 2014 
6,046 11,235 
Total number of IPO/SEO deal which can match brokers and 
underwriters (at least one matched broker as an underwriter for an IPO 
or a SEO deal) 
5,222 10,588 
Cases merged IPO/SEO deals with recommendations  44,218 115,860 
Cases of initial recommendations after IPO or SEO 24,007 37,117 
Less missing data for controls −1,142 −1,028 
Observations with available data 1993–2014 22,865 36,089 
Less observations pertaining to GS signatories −8,952 −12,884 
Full Sample 13,913 23,205 
Less observations in 2002 and 2003 −1,323 −3,598 
Final available sample  12,590 19,607 
Less observations of brokers who do not use non-3 tier ratings before the 
2002/3 reform 
−155 −355 
Final available sample  12,435 19,252 
Available sample of ‘buy-type’ recommendation used to test conditional 
informativeness 
10,649 31,924 
Available sample of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendation used to test 
conditional informativeness 
5,982 21,966 
Available sample of buy-type recommendations used to test profitability N/A 9,053 
 
Finally, 22,827 cases of broker-transaction pairs remain after excluding missing values 
of calculated market shares. Panel B reports the sample of analyst optimism at the broker-
industry-year level. I collect 545,777 observations of all available analyst-covered firm 
recommendations from I/B/E/S between 1993 and 2015. I delete all of the missing values 
of: (1) GVKEY from the Linking Table provided by CRSP (4,765 cases), (2) index of 
SIC (or ‘indc’) from the Compustat database (20,766 cases) and market capitalisation 
(MKTCAP) from the CRSP database (1,952 cases). There are 518,294 cases of analyst-
covered firm recommendations, for which I estimate analyst optimism at the broker-
industry-year level, leaving 16,703 observations. Panel C reports the sample of the change 
in the M&A market share at the broker-industry-year level. I first convert the sample of 
the broker-transaction market share from Panel A into broker-industry-year observations 
to obtain 5,276 cases of industry-specific market share (MSt). I then compute its lead 
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value (MSt+1), resulting in 4,570 broker-industry-year observations of lead market share 
cases. I merge this sample with the industry-year sample of size-adjusted 
recommendation optimism calculated for each broker (i.e., 16,703 cases obtained from 
Panel B), which leads to 4,570 broker-industry-year cases. After considering the missing 
values of the control variables (443 cases), the extreme cases of market share (i.e., 
MSt+1 = 1 or 0; 945 cases) and 991 cases for GS signatories,35 I successfully obtain each 
non-GS broker’s market share for each industry year (i.e., MSt+1), with 915 cases, and the 
change value (i.e., ∆MSt+1 = MSt+1 − MSt), with 597 cases. Then, the final sample for the 
change value of broker-industry-year market shares contains 546 cases after deleting the 
observations in the transition years (2002/3) and industries occurring infrequently (i.e., 
less than 30 times) in the sample.36 
Table 5.4 shows a similar sample derivation for capital-raising transactions (i.e., IPO and 
SEO deals). Panel A reports the broker-transaction-level data for IPO and SEO deals. I 
retrieve the data for equity issues from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum between 1990 
and 2016, excluding all closed-end funds and trusts and all unit investment trusts (Kadan 
et al., 2009). The initial sample size is therefore 20,887 cases. Applying the same 
procedures as above (i.e., Panel A of Table 5.3), I track each broker’s historical IPO or 
SEO mandates as either an underwriter for IPO or SEO firms to manage a sample of 
broker-transaction pairs with 97,441 cases (97,282 cases after missing values during the 
sample period). Panel B reports the same sample of 16,703 observations for analyst 
optimism at the broker-industry-year level introduced in Panel B of Table 5.3. Panel C 
reports the sample of the change in the IPO and SEO market share at the broker-industry-
year level. I first estimate the broker-transaction market share of 97,282 cases from Panel 
                                                 
35 I obtain results similar to the main results if I use different samples without excluding the extreme values 
(i.e., IndMSt+1 = 1 or 0) in tests of M&A deal flows, but for tests of IPO/SEO deal flows, the results have 
weaker significance. 
36  The incidence frequency for the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (indc = 1) industry is 0, for 
Construction (indc = 3) it is 3 and for Wholesale Trade (indc = 6) it is 28 in the final sample. 
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A into broker-industry-year observations and thus obtain 10,901 cases of industry-
specific market share (MSt) for brokers. I then calculate its lead value, resulting in 9,656 
industry-year observations of lead market share cases for brokers (MSt+1). I merge this 
sample (i.e., 9,656 cases of MSt+1) with the industry-year sample of size-adjusted 
recommendation optimism calculated for each broker (i.e., 7,233 cases obtained from 
Panel B), which results in 6,748 broker-industry-year cases. After eliminating the missing 
values of control variables (875 cases), the extreme cases of market share (i.e., MSt+1 = 1 
or 0; 666 cases)37 and 1,491 cases for GS signatories, I successfully obtain 3,716 cases of 
non-GS brokers’ market share for each industry year (MSt+1) and calculate the change 
value (i.e., ∆MSt+1 defined as MSt+1 − MSt), leaving 3,422 cases. The final sample for the 
change in industry-year market shares in the following year (∆MSt+1) is 3,006 cases after 
deleting the observations in the transition years (2002/3) and industries occurring 
infrequently (i.e., less than 30 times) in the sample.38 
                                                 
37 Supra note 5. 
38 The incidence frequency of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (indc = 1) industry is 6, and for Public 
Administration (indc = 10) it is 2 in the final sample. 
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Table 5.3 Sample Selection for Deal Flow of M&A Deals 
Descriptions M&A 
Panel A: Data of the Market Share at Broker–Transaction Level  
Total number of acquirer and target advisory of M&A transactions from SDC between 1990 and 2016 (November)  24,360 
LESS those M&A deals that cannot be matched with any broker, leaving the no. of M&A transactions that can 
match brokers and advisors (at least one matched broker as an advisor for a M&A deal) 
−5,809 18,551 
No. of broker-acquirer or target advisory transaction pairs, estimated from the M&A transactions with matched 
brokers and advisors above  
 22,943 
LESS those brokers who never get acquirer or target advisory deals (broker-transaction sample) −70 22,873 
LESS missing values of calculated market share 
Broker-acquirer or target advisory transaction pairs with market share (broker-transaction 
sample) 
−46 22,827 
Panel B: Recommendation Optimism (from I/B/E/S) 
Available analyst-covered firm recommendations in Detail History File (1993–2015)  545,777 
LESS missing values of GVKEY −4,765 541,012 
LESS missing values of INDUSTRY data −20,766 520,246 
LESS missing values of MKTCAP, leaving the final available sample of analyst-covered firm recommendations −1,952 518,294 
No. of broker-industry-year observations for optimism, estimated from the analyst-covered firm 
recommendations above 
 16,703 
Panel C: Data of the Change in Market Share at Broker-Industry-Year Level    
Broker-acquirer or target advisory cases with market share, estimated from broker-acquirer or target advisory 
transaction pairs with market share from Panel A (broker-industry-year sample, MSt) 
 5,276 
LESS missing values of calculated lead market share, leaving the sample of broker-acquirer or target advisory 
cases with lead market share (broker-industry-year sample, MSt+1) 
−706 4,570 
LESS missing values of broker-industry-year observations for optimism from Panel B, leaving merged 
broker-industry-year sample with broker-industry-year observations for optimism 
−1,276 3,294 
LESS missing values of controls −443 2,851 
LESS cases where lead market share equals to 0 or 1 −945 1,906 
LESS GS firms −991 915 
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LESS cases where the change of market share is not available −318 597 
LESS observations in transition years 2002–2003 −41 556 
LESS observations in industries with infrequent incidence (indc = 1, 3 and 6) 
Final sample of the change in market share at broker-industry-year level  
−10 546 
 
Table 5.4 Sample Selection for Deal Flow of IPO/SEO Deals 
Descriptions IPO/SEO 
Panel A: Data of the Market Share at Broker-Transaction Level 
Total number of IPO and SEO transactions from SDC between 1990 and 2016 (November)  20,887 
LESS those IPO and SEO deals that cannot be matched with any broker, leaving the no. of IPO and SEO 
transactions that can match brokers and underwriters (at least one matched broker as an underwriter for an IPO or 
SEO deal) 
−1,919 18,968 
No. of broker-IPO or SEO underwriting transaction pairs, estimated from the IPO and SEO transactions with 
matched brokers and underwriters above 
 97,441 
LESS those brokers who never get IPO or SEO deals (broker-transaction sample) −0 97,441 
Less missing values of calculated market share 
Broker-IPO or SEO transaction pairs with market share (broker-transaction sample) 
−129 97,282 
Panel B: Recommendation Optimism (from I/B/E/S) 
Available analyst-covered firm recommendations in Detail History File (1993–2015)  545,777 
LESS missing values of GVKEY −4,765 541,012 
LESS missing values of INDUSTRY data −20,766 520,246 
LESS missing values of MKTCAP, leaving the final available sample of analyst-covered firm recommendations −1,952 518,294 
No. of broker-industry-year observations for optimism, estimated from the analyst-covered firm 
recommendations above  
 16,703 
Panel C: Data of the Change in Market Share at Broker-Industry-Year Level 
Broker-IPO or SEO transaction pairs with market share, estimated from broker-IPO or SEO transaction pairs 
with market share from Panel A (broker-industry-year sample, MSt) 
 10,901 
LESS missing values of calculated lead market share, leaving the sample of broker-IPO or SEO cases with lead 
market share (broker-industry-year sample, MSt+1) 
−1,245 9,656 
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LESS missing values of broker-industry-year observations for optimism from Panel B, leaving merged 
broker-industry-year sample with broker-industry-year observations for optimism 
−2,908 6,748 
LESS missing values of controls −875 5,873 
LESS cases where lead market share equals 0 or 1  −666 5,207 
LESS GS firms 
−1,491 3,716 
LESS cases where the change of market share is not available −294 3,422 
LESS observations in transition years 2002–2003 −416 3,006 
LESS observations in industries of infrequent incidence (indc = 1 and 10) 
Final change of market share from broker-industry-year sample 
−0 3,006 
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Descriptive Statistics for Tests Using the M&A Context 
Table 5.5 reports cross-tabulated frequency statistics for the raw data used to estimate the 
measures of analyst optimism (the first two dependent variables). Panel A describes the 
distribution of recommendation changes in the pre-reform (1993–2001) and post-reform 
(2004–2014) periods. In the pre-reform period, 5,644 recommendations are issued by 
analysts using the five-tier system; of these, 3,748 pertain to analysts who later adopted 
the three-tier system. The cohort of analysts who later changed to the three-tier system 
exhibit higher frequencies of both upgrades (16.89% of cases) and downgrades (17.34%) 
in the 180-day window of the M&A announcement date than the cohort of analysts who 
continued to use the five-tier system after 2003 (14.61% upgrades, 15.40% downgrades). 
In the final section of Panel A, I describe recommendation changes in the post-reform 
period. Both cohorts of analysts exhibit more upgrades than downgrades, but the 
difference between these frequencies is greatest among analysts who did not change their 
ratings system (17.16% upgrades and 14.79% downgrades). 
Panel B of Table 5.5 presents disaggregated descriptive statistics for LTG forecasts, 
which form the basis of the second optimism measure. I report mean LTG forecasts of 
22% in the pre-2002/3 reform sample, slightly higher than the 20% reported by Kolasinski 
and Kothari (2008) over a similar period, but who do not restrict their sample to non-GS 
brokerages. The reduction in the level of mean growth forecasts for analysts changing 
their ratings system between the pre- and post-reform periods (22%–15%) is significant 
at the 1% level (𝑡 =  10.0644; 𝑝 < 0.001). 
Table 5.6 reports descriptive statistics for all variables used in tests of the hypotheses in 
the M&A context. All continuous variables that have not been log transformed are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Consistent with Wu et al. (2015), more than 
93% of the outstanding recommendations just before the 180-day event window 
(LEVELprior) are neutral or favourable (i.e., ‘hold’ or better). The main effect for 
141 
ChgtoTier3 suggests that approximately 52% (33%) of recommendations (LTG forecasts) 
are issued by analysts employed by brokerages who changed their recommendation 
system from five-tier to three-tier in the period immediately after the reforms. All 
recommendations issued by these analysts, regardless of whether they were issued pre- 
or post-reform, are coded 1 for this variable. I also report CARs and BHARs over various 
windows in Panel C and Panel D of Table 5.6. The descriptive statistics for the control 
variables are broadly consistent with those reported in Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) and 
Wu et al. (2015). 
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics for Data Used to Calculate Recommendation and 
Long-Term Growth Forecast Optimism (M&A Context) 
Panel A: Frequencies of Upgrades and Downgrades of Recommendation Changes 
Period Analyst  Total 
Downgrade Flat Upgrade 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Pre- 
2002/3 
reforms 
Analysts who use 
4 or 5-tier system 
before the reforms 
(final sample) 
5644 942 16.69% 3792 67.19% 910 16.12% 
Affiliated analysts 302 31 10.26% 235 77.81% 36 11.92% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 
5342 911 17.05% 3557 66.59% 874 16.36% 
Analysts who 
changed to 3-tier 
system in 2002/3 
3748 650 17.34% 2465 65.77% 633 16.89% 
Analysts who did 
not change to 3-
tier system in 
2002/3 
1896 292 15.40% 1327 69.99% 277 14.61% 
Post- 
2002/3 
reforms 
Analysts who use 
4 or 5-tier system 
before the reforms 
(final sample) 
10010 1481 14.80% 6869 68.62% 1660 16.58% 
Affiliated analysts 511 56 10.96% 392 76.71% 63 12.33% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 
9499 1425 15.00% 6477 68.19% 1597 16.81% 
Analysts who 
changed to 3-tier 
system in 2002/3 
4357 645 14.80% 3022 69.36% 690 15.84% 
Analysts who did 
not change to 3-
tier system in 
2002/3 
5653 836 14.79% 3847 68.05% 970 17.16% 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on LTG Forecast  
Period Analyst  N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min 
25th  
%ile 
Median 
75th 
%ile 
Max 
Analysts who use 
4 or 5-tier system 
2569 0.22 0.14 −0.02 0.13 0.19 0.28 1.84 
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Pre- 
2002/3 
reforms 
before the reforms 
(final sample) 
Affiliated analysts 69 0.27 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.75 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 2500 0.22 0.14 −0.02 0.13 0.19 0.28 1.84 
Analysts who 
changed to 3-tier 
system in 2002/3 
712 0.22 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.2 0.28 1.39 
Analysts who did 
not change to 3-
tier system in 
2002/3 
1857 0.22 0.14 −0.02 0.125 0.18 0.28 1.84 
Post- 
2002/3 
reform 
Analysts who use 
4 or 5-tier system 
before the reforms 
(final sample) 
1329 0.14 0.16 −2.90 0.1 0.13 0.18 1.98 
Affiliated analysts 82 0.14 0.08 −0.09 0.1 0.14 0.2 0.36 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 1247 0.14 0.17 −2.90 0.1 0.13 0.18 1.98 
Analysts who 
changed to 3-tier 
system in 2002/3 
591 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.1 0.14 0.18 1.45 
Analysts who did 
not change to 3-
tier system in 
2002/3 
738 0.14 0.20 −2.90 0.09 0.13 0.186 1.98 
Final available sample refers to the observations excluding the transition years, which are used for 
regression tests. 
Table 5.6 reports descriptive statistics for all variables used in tests of the hypotheses in 
the M&A context. All continuous variables that have not been log-transformed are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Consistent with Wu et al. (2015), more than 
93% of the outstanding recommendations just before the 180-day event window 
(LEVELprior) are neutral or favourable (i.e., ‘hold’ or better). The main effect for 
ChgtoTier3 suggests that approximately 52% (33%) of recommendations (LTG forecasts) 
are issued by analysts employed by brokerages that change recommendation systems 
from five-tier to three-tier in the period immediately after the reforms. All 
recommendations issued by these analysts, regardless of whether they were issued pre- 
or post-reform, are coded 1 for this variable. I also report CARs and BHARs over various 
windows in Panels C and D of Table 5.6. The descriptive statistics for the control 
variables are broadly consistent with those reported by Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) and 
Wu et al. (2015). 
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Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis (M&A Context) 
Panel A: Sample for Tests Using Recommendation Changes (n = 15,654) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
UPGRADEM&Arec 0.01 0.56 −1 −1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 0.52 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺 0.64 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 6.69 1.77 0.75 2.72 5.51 6.59 7.90 9.03 9.66 11.00 12.20 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 3.82 11.74 0.00 0.02 0.25 0.73 2.70 8.33 15.73 60.14 198.76 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 8.76 1.80 1.33 4.72 7.46 8.80 10.11 11.06 11.67 12.53 13.48 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 25.32 53.38 0.04 0.16 1.79 6.73 24.64 64.16 112.18 267.46 664.89 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 4.87 4.11 0 0 2 4 7 11 13 17 21 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 14.65 7.82 1 2 8 14 20 25 29 35 52 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 58.71 32.55 0 0 29 69 90 90 90 90 90 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 16.01 10.39 1 1 8 14 23 30 35 46 62 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 3.83 0.97 1 1 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 
Panel B: Sample for Tests Using LTG Forecast Optimism and Revision (n = 3,898) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
UPGRADEM&ALTG 0 0.07 −0.27 −0.27 −0.11 −0.03 0 0.03 0.11 0.28 0.28 
𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺 0.34 0.47 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 6.84 1.80 1.79 3.29 4.16 5.51 6.67 8.13 10.00 11.37 12.19 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 4.89 14.07 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.25 0.79 3.38 22.13 86.80 196.35 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 31.60 54.27 0.03 0.21 0.54 3.20 11.90 34.82 132.83 271.08 556.96 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 9.45 1.70 3.82 5.52 6.44 8.27 9.62 10.72 12.04 12.81 13.36 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 10.83 6.65 0 0 1 5 11 15 23 28 32 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 14.34 7.19 1 3 4 8 13 19 28 31 36 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 56.02 31.50 0 0 3 27 63 90 90 90 90 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 25.28 17.49 1 1 5 11 20 37 63 72 81 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟  0 0.22 −7.43 −0.23 −0.1 −0.03 0 0.03 0.13 0.3 1.58 
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Panel C: Sample for Tests with Investors’ Responses: CARs for UPGRADE and DOWNGRADE cases  
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
CARs for UPGRADE cases (n = 2,511) 
CAR(−1,1) 0.02 0.07 −0.17 −0.17 −0.08 −0.01 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.27 0.27 
PASTFIRMPERF 0.02 0.33 −1.09 −1.09 −0.53 −0.14 0.03 0.19 0.58 0.89 0.89 
PASTMKTPERF 0.07 0.13 −0.58 −0.36 −0.16 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.25 0.34 0.55 
MKTSD 0.01 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
CARs for DOWNGRADE cases (n = 2,367) 
−CAR(−1,1) 0.03 0.10 −0.25 −0.25 −0.08 −0.01 0.02 0.06 0.21 0.41 0.41 
PASTFIRMPERF −0.04 0.34 −1.09 −1.09 −0.68 −0.18 −0.02 0.15 0.48 0.89 0.89 
PASTMKTPERF 0.07 0.14 −0.57 −0.39 −0.20 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.24 0.34 0.49 
MKTSD 0.01 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Panel D: Sample for Profitability BHARs for Buy/StrongBuy (n = 5,767) cases of full sample 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,1𝑦)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  −0.03 0.46 −0.97 −0.97 −0.74 −0.30 −0.04 0.18 0.79 1.70 1.70 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,90𝑑)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  −0.01 0.23 −0.65 −0.65 −0.40 −0.14 −0.02 0.11 0.38 0.71 0.71 
UPGRADEM&Arec is a categorical value that takes three values—namely, 1 if analysts improve recommendation within ±90 days of the M&A announcement, 0 if unchanged and −1 if there is a downgrade; 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀 refers 
to LTG forecast optimism, defined by individual analysts’ LTG forecast deducting unaffiliated consensus; UPGRADEM&ALTG refers to LTG forecast optimism revision within ±90 days of the M&A announcement, defined by 
individual analysts’ LTG forecast optimism deducting its latest prior value (i.e., 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀 − 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟); 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days 
(i.e., [−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as the buy and hold return for each security less the same-period buy and hold return for the portfolio of firms matched by size decile 
from CRSP. The window period of BHARs starts at the tenth day after the M&A announcement date and lasts for one year unless the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the investment bank. Note that 
here I show winsorised CARs and BHARs at 1/99%, and all CARs for recommendation downgrades are flipped in sign to make the interpretation consistent. 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the brokerage 
house applies the new three-tier ratings system in stock recommendations during the period 2002–2004, and 0 otherwise. POSTREG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 
9 September 2002—the deadline for brokerages to comply with the disclosure requirements of the SRO Rules—and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates that the analyst is affiliated with the acquirer’s advisor; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported 
as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total consideration paid by the acquirer in the M&A deals. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with 
the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of acquirer firms as at the last trading day of the calendar month before the analyst report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analyst’s first 
time published on I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within one calendar month preceding the M&A announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to 
the absolute number of days between the M&A announcement date and the analyst’s report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the same calendar month of the 
M&A deal announcement date. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 represents the level of stock recommendation for the same acquirer firm, provided by the same analyst just before the 180-day event window. 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟is the LTG forecast 
optimism for the same acquirer firm, provided by the same analyst just before the 180-day event window. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents past firm performance, which is defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before 
the recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents past market performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the standard deviation of daily S&P 500 
index one month before the recommendation. 
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Descriptive Statistics in the IPO/SEO Context 
Table 5.7 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of recommendations used to 
estimate the measures of analyst optimism in the IPO/SEO context. Panel A reports the 
distribution of recommendations issued during the 24-month post-issuance period for 
IPOs between 1993 and 2014, excluding observations in the transition years of 2002/3, 
and broken down according to the type of recommendation issued. Consistent with Kadan 
et al. (2009, Table 2), the frequencies of buy-type recommendations issued for IPO firms 
dominate those of the other types. ‘Buy’ and ‘strong buy’ recommendations occupy 
87.16% (69.71%) of their total recommendations issued during the pre- (post-) 2002/3 
reforms. In contrast, the proportions of ‘hold’ and ‘sell/strong sell’ recommendations are 
relatively low. This biased distribution of recommendations is more optimistic for 
affiliated analysts (‘buy-type’ recommendations are 92.44% in the pre-reform period and 
77.70% in the post-reform period). This implies that all analysts, especially affiliated ones, 
are extremely optimistic in the post-24-month period after IPO issue, which is consistent 
with selection bias regarding the IPO/SEO firms’ underwriter choice (Baker & Wurgler, 
2002; O’Brien et al., 2005). 
Before the 2002/3 reforms, there were 5,399 initial recommendations issued by analysts 
who used a four- or five-tier ratings system. Of these cases, 3,488 pertain to analysts who 
subsequently switched to the three-tier ratings system after the reforms. The second 
section of Panel A shows the distribution of initial recommendations issued during the 
24-month post-IPO window after the 2002/3 reforms. Analysts who changed from a five-
tier to a three-tier ratings system during the transition years issue slightly less optimistic 
initial recommendations (i.e., 67.76% of recommendations are ‘buy-type’) than those 
who did not change their ratings system (71.36% of recommendations are ‘buy-type’) 
during the transition years. The standardised levels of recommendations (LEVELIPO3tier) 
are coded such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’ and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’. 
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The reduction in optimism following the 2002/3 reforms for analysts who changed to the 
three-tier ratings system encouraged by NASD 2711 (the means of LEVELIPO3tier: 3.881 
pre-reform; 3.661 post-reform) is significantly greater than that for the analysts who did 
not change to the three-tier ratings system (the means of LEVELIPO3tier: 3.862 pre-reform; 
3.692 post-reform) (t = 5.13; p < 0.001, untabulated).39 
Panel B of Table 5.7 reports the frequencies of each recommendation type for initial 
recommendations in the 24-month period following SEOs, and it also shows evidence of 
optimistically biased distributions. Comparing the frequencies of these recommendations 
issued before and after the 2002/3 reforms, the analysts who switch to the three-tier 
ratings system after the reforms exhibit a greater decrease in the issuance of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations (78.86% pre-reform, 53.18% post-reform) and a greater increase in 
issuing ‘hold’ (19.82% pre-reform, 43.29% post-reform) and ‘sell-type’ 
recommendations (1.32% pre-reform, 3.5% post-reform) relative to those who do not 
change to the three-tier ratings system after the reforms. Further, analysts who change to 
the three-tier ratings system significantly decrease the optimism in their post-SEO filings 
initial recommendations after the 2002/3 reforms (means of LEVELSEO3tier: 3.775 pre-
reform; 3.496 post-reform), and this reduction is greater than that of those who do not 
change to the three-tier ratings system (means of LEVELSEO3tier: 3.742 pre-reform; 3.554 
post-reform) (t = 5.66; p < 0.001, untabulated).40 
 
Table 5.7 Descriptive Statistics for Data Used to Calculate Recommendation 
Optimism (IPO/SEO Context) 
Panel A: Frequencies of Initial Recommendation Levels for IPO 
Period Analyst  Total 
Buy/StrongBuy Hold Sell/StrongSell 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Pre- 
2002/3 
reforms 
Analysts who use 
4 or 5-tier system 
before the reforms 
(final sample) 
5,399 4706 87.16% 639 11.84% 54 1.00% 
                                                 
39 The definition of INILEVEL3tier is introduced in Section 4.3.1.1 (Model 1) and Section 4.4.1. 
40 Supra note 9. 
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Affiliated analysts 2195 2029 92.44% 158 7.20% 8 0.36% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 
3204 2677 83.55% 481 15.01% 46 1.44% 
Analysts who 
changed to 3-tier 
system in 2002/3 
3488 3090 88.59% 381 10.92% 17 0.49% 
Analysts who did 
not change to 3-
tier system in 
2002/3 
1911 1616 84.56% 258 13.50% 37 1.94% 
Post- 
2002/3 
reforms 
Analysts who use 
4 or 5-tier system 
before the reforms 
(final sample) 
7036 4905 69.71% 1996 28.37% 135 1.92% 
Affiliated analysts 3175 2467 77.70% 696 21.92% 12 0.38% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 
3861 2438 63.14% 1300 33.67% 123 3.19% 
Analysts who 
changed to 3-tier 
system in 2002/3 
3213 2177 67.76% 982 30.56% 54 1.68% 
Analysts who did 
not change to 3-
tier system in 
2002/3 
3823 2728 71.36% 1014 26.52% 81 2.12% 
Panel B: Frequencies of Initial Recommendation Levels for SEO 
Period Analyst  Total 
Buy/StrongBuy Hold Sell/StrongSell 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Pre- 
2002/3 
reforms 
Analysts who use 
4 or 5-tier system 
before the reform 
(final sample) 
7,510 5857 77.99% 1523 20.28% 130 1.73% 
Affiliated analysts 2417 2029 83.95% 366 15.14% 22 0.91% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 
5093 3828 75.16% 1157 22.72% 108 2.12% 
Analysts who 
changed to 3-tier 
system in 2002/3 
4622 3645 78.86% 916 19.82% 61 1.32% 
Analysts who did 
not change to 3-
tier system in 
2002/3 
2888 2212 76.59% 607 21.02% 69 2.39% 
Post- 
2002/3 
reforms 
Analysts who use 
4 or 5-tier system 
before the reforms 
(final sample) 
11742 6696 57.03% 4570 38.92% 476 4.05% 
Affiliated analysts 3555 2179 61.29% 1308 36.79% 68 1.91% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 
8187 4517 55.17% 3262 39.84% 408 4.98% 
Analysts who 
changed to 3-tier 
system in 2002/3 
4974 2645 53.18% 2153 43.29% 176 3.54% 
Analysts who did 
not change to 3-
tier system in 
2002/3 
6768 4051 59.86% 2417 35.71% 300 4.43% 
Final available sample refers to the observations excluding the transition years, which are used for 
regression tests. 
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Table 5.8 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used to test the hypotheses in the 
IPO/SEO context. The main interest variable, ChgtoTier3, suggests that approximately 
54% (50%) of initial recommendations for IPO (SEO) are provided by analysts who 
change their recommendation system from five-tier (or non-three-tier) to three-tier 
immediately after the implementation of NASD 2711. Additionally, statistics of CARs 
and BHARs with various estimated windows are provided in Panels C–E of Table 5.8, 
along with the corresponding control variables, which are consistent with those reported 
in previous studies. BHARs are only calculated for SEOs because their required periods 
of investing windows started from the tenth day of the filing dates (i.e., before issue), for 
which market data are not available to IPO firms. Collectively, on average, there are 
negative outcomes in both short-term (the mean of BHAR(0,90d)B/SB: −0.1%) and long-
term (the mean of BHAR(0,1y)B/SB: −1.30%) abnormal returns of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations.
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Table 5.8 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis (IPO/SEO Context for Pre- and Post-2002/3 Reforms) 
Panel A: Sample for Tests of Initial Recommendations Issued by Analysts Using Non-3 tier System in the pre-reform period in IPO Context (n = 12,435) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿5𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 4.20 0.85 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELIPO3tier 3.76 0.46 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 0.54 0.50 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
POSTREG2002/3 0.57 0.50 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.43 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 4.95 1.18 1.59 2.66 3.21 4.13 4.84 5.63 7.05 8.24 10.19 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.37 1.44 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.28 1.15 3.80 26.65 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 6.51 1.48 1.38 3.35 4.17 5.52 6.44 7.44 9.13 10.34 12.22 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 2.32 7.32 0.004 0.03 0.06 0.25 0.63 1.70 9.19 31.07 203.78 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 4.36 4.35 0 0 0 1.00 3.00 7.00 13.00 17.00 22.00 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 5.80 4.29 1 1 1 3 5 7 14 20 42 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 242.29 213.63 0 19 26 41 178 412 654 713 731 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 14.94 9.75 1 1 3 7 13 21 33 46 61 
Panel B: Sample for Tests of Initial Recommendations Issued by Analysts Using Non-3 tier System in the pre-reform period in SEO Context (n = 19,252) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿5𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 3.98 0.94 1 1 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELSEO3tier 3.62 0.55 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 0.50 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
POSTREG2002/3 0.61 0.49 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.31 0.46 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 5.05 1.16 0.71 2.59 3.29 4.29 4.97 5.74 7.09 8.13 10.33 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.38 1.33 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.31 1.20 3.41 30.57 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 7.13 1.51 0.79 4.05 4.85 6.09 6.99 8.04 9.89 11.09 13.28 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 5.18 21.35 0 0 0 0.44 1.09 3.09 19.67 65.83 585.93 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 4.27 4.19 0 0 0 1 3 6 13 17 22 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 8.47 5.77 1 1 2 4 7 11 20 27 44 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 262.02 214.35 0 2 12 78 217 410 642 771 2449 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 15.46 10.24 1 1 3 8 13 22 35 46 62 
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Panel C: Sample for Tests of Informativeness: CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (n = 10,649) and CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases in IPO Context (n = 5,982) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (n = 10,649) 
CAR(−1,1) 0.01 0.10 −0.35 −0.35 −0.15 −0.03 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.31 0.31 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.06 0.45 −1.44 −1.22 −0.68 −0.16 0.05 0.29 0.84 1.34 1.34 
PASTMKTPERF 0.05 0.11 −0.53 −0.36 −0.12 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.43 
MKTSD 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 
CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases (n = 5,982) 
−CAR(−1,1) 0.06 0.15 −0.30 −0.30 −0.13 −0.02 0.02 0.09 0.38 0.69 0.69 
PASTFIRMPREF −0.10 0.50 −1.44 −1.44 −1.03 −0.37 −0.05 0.20 0.64 1.15 1.34 
PASTMKTPERF 0.04 0.12 −0.59 −0.42 −0.15 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.44 
MKTSD 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Panel D: Sample for Tests of Informativeness: CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (n = 31,924) and CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases (n = 21,966) in SEO Context 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (n = 31,924) 
CAR(−1,1) 0.01 0.08 −0.27 −0.27 −0.11 −0.02 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.29 0.29 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.11 0.38 −1.15 −0.90 −0.47 −0.10 0.07 0.28 0.82 1.30 1.30 
PASTMKTPERF 0.06 0.12 −0.586 −0.400 −0.122 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.21 0.29 0.46 
MKTSD 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 
CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases (n = 21,966) 
−CAR(−1,1) 0.03 0.12 −0.31 −0.31 −0.11 −0.02 0.01 0.05 0.28 0.60 0.60 
PASTFIRMPREF −0.02 0.40 −1.15 −1.15 −0.74 −0.21 0.00 0.19 0.61 1.16 1.30 
PASTMKTPERF 0.05 0.13 −0.586 −0.439 −0.238 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.21 0.30 0.46 
MKTSD 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 
Panel E: Sample for Tests of Profitability: BHARs for Buy/StrongBuy (n = 9,053) cases in SEO Context 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,1𝑦)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  −0.01 0.04 −0.35 −0.29 −0.05 −0.01 −0.004 0.001 0.01 0.03 0.03 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,90𝑑)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  −0.001 0.004 −0.02 −0.02 −0.008 −0.003 −0.001 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.01 
LEVEL5tier is the level of initial recommendation following the IPO issue or SEO filing dates, coded of the five-tier recommendations recorded on I/B/E/S such that 5 = ‘strong buy’, 4 = ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, 2 = ‘sell’ and 
1 = ‘strong sell’; LEVELIPO3tier or LEVELSEO3tier is the standardised level of initial recommendation following the IPO issue or SEO filing dates, coded of the three-tier rating system such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 
3 = ‘hold’ and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’; 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days (i.e., [−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 
are measured as the buy and hold return for each security less the same-period buy and hold return for the portfolio of firms matched by size decile from CRSP. The window period of BHARs starts at the tenth day after the 
SEO filing date and lasts for one year unless the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the investment bank. Note that here I show winsorised CARs and BHARs at 1/99% and all CARs for recommendation 
downgrades are flipped in sign to make interpretation consistent. 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the brokerage house applies the new rating three-tier system in stock recommendations during the period 
2002–2004, and 0 otherwise. POSTREG2002/3 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 9 September 2002—the deadline for brokerages to comply with the disclosure requirement of 
the SRO Rules—and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates that the analyst is affiliated with the IPO or SEO issuer’s underwriter; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) 
and natural logarithm of total proceeds amount in the IPO or SEO deals. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of IPO or SEO 
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firms as at the last trading day of the calendar month before the analyst report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analyst’s first time published on I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst’s report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total 
number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within one calendar month preceding the recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between the IPO issue (or SEO filing) date 
and the analyst report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the same calendar month of the recommendation announcement date. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents 
past firm performance, which is defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents past market performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the 
six months before the recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month before the recommendation. 
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Table 5.9 reports descriptive statistics for all variables used to test the effect of the 2002/3 
reforms on the extent to which analyst optimism affects brokers’ deal flow. Panel A 
describes the sample for tests of deal flow in the M&A context, which consists of 546 
cases of industry-year change in market share ∆MSt+1. MSt+1 shows that, on average, a 
broker may earn nearly 2% of M&A advisory fees within an industry year, with a slightly 
downward trend in growth (mean of ∆MSt+1 is −0.02%) in market share. The maximum 
value of the change in industry-year market shares of M&A deals for brokers, ∆MSt+1, 
reaches 22%, and the minimum value is at the proximity of −23%, but its interquartile 
range (IRQ) (i.e., P75–P25) only disperses 1.2%, which suggests that most of the ∆MSt+1 
ranges between −0.6% and 0.6%. In addition, the change in individual brokers’ size-
adjusted analyst recommendation optimism at the industry-year level is, on average, 
0.002% (∆OPTt), with the maximum value at 8%, the minimum value at −11% and its 
IRQ at 0.4%. 
Panel B reports the sample for tests of deal flow in the equity issues context, which 
includes 3,006 cases of industry-year change in market share, ∆MSt+1. Overall, a broker 
may occupy about 1% (mean of MSt+1) of the IPO/SEO underwriting business with a 
slightly upward trend in growth (mean of ∆MSt+1 is 0.03%) in the industry year. The 
maximum of industry-level ∆MSt+1 for IPO/SEO deals are about 15%, and the minimum 
value is around −19%, but its IRQ (i.e., P75–P25) is only 0.9%, which means that most 
of ∆MSt+1 are between −0.4% and 0.5%. In addition, the ∆OPTt at the industry-year level 
is, on average, 0.002% (∆OPTt), but with a relatively large maximum value (0.10). 
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Table 5.9 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis (Deal Flow) 
Panel A: Sample for Tests of Deal Flow in M&A Context—2002/3 Reform (n = 546) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
∆MSt+1 −0.0002 0.03 −0.23 −0.09 −0.04 −0.006 −0.0003 0.006 0.04 0.10 0.22 
∆OPTt 0.00002 0.01 −0.11 −0.02 −0.01 −0.002 0.000001 0.002 0.01 0.02 0.08 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺 0.54 0.50 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 0.62 0.49 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 0.16 0.78 −3.62 −1.87 −0.96 −0.23 0.13 0.52 1.43 2.59 4.02 
∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 −0.0014 0.05 −0.62 −0.10 −0.04 −0.01 −0.00021 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.71 
MSt 0.02 0.03 0.00004 0.0001 0.0004 0.002 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.26 
Panel B: Sample for Tests of Deal Flow in IPO/SEO Context—2002/3 Reform (n = 3,006) 
∆MSt+1 0.0003 0.02 −0.19 −0.05 −0.02 −0.004 0.0002 0.005 0.02 0.05 0.15 
∆OPTt 0.00002 0.01 −0.11 −0.02 −0.01 −0.001 0.00001 0.002 0.01 0.02 0.10 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺 0.44 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 0.51 0.50 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 0.14 1.02 −5.72 −2.93 −1.47 −0.34 0.12 0.61 1.78 3.13 6.61 
∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 0.0005 0.06 −0.93 −0.14 −0.05 −0.01 0.00002 0.01 0.06 0.16 1.06 
MSt 0.01 0.02 0.00004 0.0002 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.24 
∆MSt+1 is the change in a broker’s industry-year market share from year t to year t+1. This is measured separately for M&A deals and IPO/SEO deals. Industry market share is calculated as the total advisory (or underwriting) 
fee raised by a broker in a particular industry in year t divided by the total advisory (underwriting) fees of all deals completed in that particular industry during year t. ∆OPTt is the change in analyst optimism (from year t−1 to 
year t), which represents the average analyst optimism of recommendations issued by the broker’s analysts relative to the consensus optimism level for the industry in the year, weighted by covered firms’ market capitalisation. 
𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the brokerage house applies the new rating three-tier system in stock recommendations during the period 2002–2004, and 0 otherwise. POSTREG2002/3 is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 9 September 2002—the deadline for brokerages to comply with disclosure requirement of the SRO Rules—and 0 otherwise. ∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the change in the 
average size of covered firms (nature log value of capitalisation) from year t−1 to year t for a broker in the industry; ∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 is the change in the industry average of all analysts’ experience from year t−1 to year 
t for a broker, weighted by the analysts’ contribution in the industry (i.e., the proportion of the recommendations issued by individual analysts in the total recommendations issued by all analysts in the industry and year t). MSt 
is the yearly industry-year market share in year t in M&A deals or IPO/SEO deals. 
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Multivariate Results 
This section introduces the results of the hypotheses tests relating to the effect of the 
2002/3 reforms on analyst optimism (see Section 5.5.1) and investor response and 
profitability (see Section 5.5.2), as well as the effect of analyst optimism on deal flow 
conditioned on the effect of the 2002/3 reforms (see Section 5.5.3). 
5.5.1 Results for the Tests of Hypotheses 1a (1b) and 2a (2b): Effect of 2002/3 
Reforms on Analyst Optimism 
H1a (1b) predicts that the reduction in optimism reflected in analyst recommendation 
(LTG forecast) revisions following the 2002/3 reforms is greater for analysts who adopt 
the three-tier ratings system following the reforms relative to those who did not make 
such change. The main tests for H1a and H1b comprise regressions of the following form: 
𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 +
𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 2 
Control Variables 
DEALVALUE = the natural logarithm of the inflation-adjusted deal value (in billions 
of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) 
FIRMCAP = the natural logarithm of the inflation-adjusted market capitalisation 
of the acquirer (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars 
in 1992) as at the last trading day of the calendar month before the 
analyst recommendation/LTG forecast was issued 
EXP = the number of years since the analyst first published a 
recommendation on I/B/E/S 
FOLLOW = the total number of analysts with outstanding recommendations for 
the firm in the 30 days preceding the M&A announcement date (or 
the announcement of recommendations in the post-IPO/SEO issue 
date/SEO filing date) 
DAYS = DAYS refers to the absolute number of days between the M&A 
announcement date (or IPO/SEO issue date/SEO filing date) and the 
analyst report date 
BROKERSIZE = the number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the 
calendar month of the M&A deal announcement date (or of the 
analyst report date in the IPO/SEO context) 
LEVEL = the level of the stock recommendation provided by the analyst to the 
acquirer prior to the 180-day event window (or for the SEO firm 
before the 24-month post-filing window) 
OPTIMISMprior = the standardised LTG forecast for the acquirer provided by the 
analyst before the 180-day M&A event window. 
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More details of the variable measurements are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
Where OPT is the proxies for analyst optimism defined in Section 4.3.1.1. ChgtoTier3 is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 for recommendations or LTG forecasts issued by 
analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings system following the disclosure requirements 
introduced in NASD 2711, and 0 otherwise. POSTREG2002/3 is the indicator variable that 
equals 1 for observations in the period of post-2002/3 reforms, and 0 otherwise. 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 is the interaction of ChgtoTier3 and POSTREG2002/3. 
Control variables are defined in Section 4.4.6. 
The coefficient for ChgtoTier3 captures the incremental optimism during the pre-2002/3 
reform period for analysts whose brokers later adopted the three-tier ratings system 
relative to analysts who did not later change their ratings system. The coefficient for 
POSTREG2002/3 measures the incremental optimism in the post-2002/3 reform period for 
analysts who did not adopt the three-tier ratings system encouraged by NASD 2711, while 
the coefficient for interaction (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3) estimates the incremental 
effect of the analysts’ adoption of the three-tier ratings system on analyst optimism in the 
post-2002/3 reform period. H1a and H1b imply that there is a reduction in analyst excess 
optimism after the 2002/3 reforms, and that this change is greater for analysts who 
voluntarily switch their ratings in stock recommendations to the three-tier scale after the 
implementation of the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711. If this is the case, the 
coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 should be significantly negative in 
regressions based on Model 2. 
H2a (2b) examines whether the reduction in analyst optimism evident in recommendation 
(LTG forecast) revisions after the 2002/3 reforms is greater for affiliated analysts who 
adopted the three-tier ratings system following the reforms relative to unaffiliated 
analysts who made a similar change. The main tests of H2a and H2b comprise regressions 
of the following form: 
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𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽5𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
3 
 
Where AFF equals 1 if the recommendations (or LTG forecasts) are issued by analysts 
whose employers are affiliated with the covered firm via investment banking ties (through 
M&A advisory mandates), and 0 otherwise. The three-way interaction term 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF captures the incremental effect of the 2002/3 
reforms on analyst optimism for affiliated analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings 
system following the disclosure requirements of NASD2711 relative to the post-reform 
optimism of unaffiliated analysts who also changed to the three-tier ratings system. H2a 
and H2b predict that among the analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings system 
following NASD2711, the decrease in analyst optimism after the 2002/3 reforms was 
greater for affiliated analysts relative to unaffiliated ones. If this is the case, the coefficient 
for the three-way interaction term should be significantly negative. 
Columns 1–6 of Table 5.10 summarise the regression results of the tests for H1a and H2a, 
which investigate changes in stock recommendations surrounding the M&A 
announcement date, issued by analysts whose employers are non-GS signatories that used 
the five-tier ranking system in the pre-reform era. 
Four samples are employed to test H1a and H2a: (1) the final available sample of 
recommendations described in Table 5.1; (2) a propensity score matched (PSM) sample 
comprising all recommendations issued by non-GS signatory analysts who changed to 
the three-tier ratings system following the enactment of NASD 2711 (treatment 
observations) and matched recommendations issued by analysts who did not make a 
similar change (control observations); (3) the PSM sample excluding observations 
whereby the outstanding recommendation prior to the M&A window was at its maximum 
or minimum value (e.g., a ‘strong buy’ or a ‘strong sell’ under a five-tier system), which 
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I refer to as the ‘PSM NOTMAXMIN’ sample;41 (4) the PSM NOTMAXMIN sample 
restricted to observations falling within four years of the reforms (1998–2007, excluding 
transition years). The analysis of the results presented in Columns 1–6 of Table 5.10 is 
presented below. 
The R-squared statistics are, like Wu et al. (2015), in the vicinity of 12%, implying a 
reasonable model fit and higher than those reported in prior studies that are close in nature 
to this thesis (e.g., 0.4%–0.6% in Table 6 by Kolasinski & Kothari, 2008; 5.1% for M&A 
relationship by Corwin et al., 2017). The coefficients for control variables are consistent 
with predictions and prior literature. lnDEALVALUE is significantly and positively 
associated with analyst optimism, suggesting that large consideration correlated with 
larger advisory (or underwriting) fees potentially creates greater incentives for analysts 
to optimistically bias their reports. In general, lnFIRMCAP is significantly positive, 
consistent with larger-sized firms that are more likely to induce optimistic bias in analyst 
reports. EXP is not significant as expected, suggesting that analysts with more experience 
do not necessarily issue more or less optimistic reports. However, in alternative samples, 
EXP is significantly positive, which implies that experienced analysts may more likely 
become optimistic without restricted scope for change in recommendations. FOLLOW is 
significantly and negatively associated with analyst optimism, which means that analyst 
herding behaviour—whereby a greater number of analysts cover the same firm—may 
constrain excess analyst optimism. While DAYS is not significant for the tests of the full 
sample (Samples 1 and 2), it is significantly negative for both tests’ PSM NOTMAXMIN 
sample (Sample 3) and the PSM NOTMAXMIN sample for the 1998–2007 period 
(Sample 4). Thus, in general, analysts will become more optimistic when approaching the 
investment banking dates, and this effect is more pronounced for the restricted samples. 
BROKERSIZE is not significant, suggesting that brokerage size may affect analyst 
                                                 
41 The two-stage PSM models are introduced in the Appendix 4.1. 
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optimism in either direction. Level means the prior optimism that affects the scope for 
change in optimism is significantly negative across all samples, as expected. 
Before testing the hypotheses, I examine the unconditional effect of the 2002/3 reforms 
on the average level of optimism reflected in recommendation upgrades (Column 1). In 
Model 1, I report an estimated coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 of −0.2419 (𝑝 < 0.001), 
which implies that there is a significant reduction in the level of optimism exhibited by 
unaffiliated analysts following the 2002/3 reforms. The main effect for AFF is positive 
and significant ( 𝛽  = 0.4182; p < 0.001), suggesting that affiliated analysts were 
abnormally optimistic in the pre-reform period. Like Wu et al. (2015), but contrary to 
Corwin et al.’s (2017) findings regarding optimism in the three years following 
investment banking events, I find a reduction in average optimism of affiliated analysts 
employed by non-GS signatory banks in the post-reform period, as indicated by the 
significant negative coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 × AFF (𝛽 = −0.2670; p = 0.015) and 
for the combined coefficients POSTREG2002/3 + POSTREG2002/3×AFF (𝛽  = −0.5089; 
p < 0.001). However, Corwin et al. (2017) use a measure of affiliation based on historic 
investment banking transactions rather than current affiliation, which may explain the 
difference in findings. I now proceed to examine the extent to which the reduction in 
optimism is conditioned by changes to the ratings system employed.
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Table 5.10 Regressions of Analyst Optimism: Recommendation Changes and LTG Forecast Revision Optimism in M&A Context 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES 
DV: UPGRADEM&Arec 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 3 
(Annual 
PSM) 
Model 3 
PSM for 
NOTMAX
MIN 
Model 3 
PSM for 
NOTMAX
MIN 
1998–2007 
VARIABLES 
DV: UPGRADEM&ALTG 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 3 
(Annual 
PSM) 
            
ChgtoTier3  0.0952* 0.0754 0.1485** 0.2242** 0.3703*** ChgtoTier3  −0.0006 −0.0022 −0.0058 
  (0.074) (0.169) (0.044) (0.034) (0.002)   (0.864) (0.514) (0.197) 
POSTREG2002/3 −0.2419*** −0.1736*** −0.1812*** −0.2239*** −0.3291*** −0.3001*** POSTREG2002/3 −0.0042 −0.0034 −0.0043 −0.0086 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005)  (0.205) (0.383) (0.279) (0.176) 
AFF 0.4182***  0.1995 0.0772 0.3354 −0.2683 AFF 0.0039  −0.0197 −0.0145 
 (0.000)  (0.213) (0.698) (0.361) (0.482)  (0.730)  (0.271) (0.557) 
ChgtoTier3× POSTREG2002/3  −0.1294** −0.1030 −0.1615* −0.3709*** −0.5148*** ChgtoTier3×POSTREG2002/3  −0.0019 0.0013 0.0084 
  (0.042) (0.115) (0.060) (0.002) (0.000)   (0.696) (0.785) (0.229) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF   0.2728 0.4217* −0.0505 0.4961 ChgtoTier3×AFF   0.0425* 0.0355 
   (0.139) (0.082) (0.905) (0.292)    (0.053) (0.228) 
POSTREG2002/3×AFF −0.2670**  0.0602 0.2234 0.0888 1.0503** POSTREG ×AFF −0.0055  0.0326 0.0401 
 (0.015)  (0.757) (0.361) (0.823) (0.016)  (0.706)  (0.145) (0.254) 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/
3 ×AFF 
  −0.4527* −0.6622** −0.3051 −1.3110** 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/
3 ×AFF 
  −0.0671** −0.1024** 
   (0.053) (0.028) (0.520) (0.018)    (0.018) (0.017) 
lnDEALVALUE 0.0305** 0.0281** 0.0305** 0.0267* 0.0153 −0.0024 lnDEALVALUE −0.0007 −0.0007 −0.0008 −0.0013 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.091) (0.429) (0.928)  (0.229) (0.217) (0.208) (0.233) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0343* 0.0290 0.0337* 0.0364* 0.0368 0.0478 lnFIRMCAP 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0002 
 (0.062) (0.111) (0.066) (0.096) (0.200) (0.200)  (0.971) (0.973) (0.971) (0.920) 
EXP 0.0036 0.0037 0.0035 0.0056 0.0174*** 0.0243** EXP 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.399) (0.388) (0.405) (0.266) (0.005) (0.014)  (0.108) (0.101) (0.135) (0.533) 
FOLLOW −0.0125*** −0.0132*** −0.0124*** −0.0118** −0.0040 −0.0048 FOLLOW −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0002 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.033) (0.586) (0.598)  (0.211) (0.213) (0.217) (0.612) 
DAYS 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0102*** −0.0083*** DAYS 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001** 
 (0.892) (0.894) (0.904) (0.887) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.084) (0.075) (0.065) (0.018) 
BROKERSIZE 0.0029** 0.0023 0.0021 0.0032 0.0015 0.0002 BROKERSIZE −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 
 (0.046) (0.129) (0.178) (0.204) (0.671) (0.966)  (0.661) (0.725) (0.781) (0.726) 
LEVEL −1.0855*** −1.0831*** −1.0858*** −1.0865*** −1.3524*** −1.3766*** OPTIMISM_prior −0.0801** −0.0801** −0.0799** −0.0658 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.236) 
Constant cut1 −5.9740*** −6.0012*** −5.9444*** −5.9658*** −7.3538*** −7.1386*** Constant 0.0047 0.0054 0.0059 0.0090 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.522) (0.464) (0.427) (0.418) 
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Constant cut2 −1.9577*** −1.9871*** −1.9272*** −1.9060*** −3.4992*** −3.5941***   −0.0006 −0.0022 −0.0058 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.864) (0.514) (0.197) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
AFF+POSTREG×AFF 0.1511**      AFF+POSTREG×AFF 0.0496**    
 (0.020)       (0.022)    
ChgtoTier3× POSTREG2002/3 + 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/
3 ×AFF 
  −0.5557*** −0.8236*** −0.6759* −1.8258*** 
ChgtoTier3× POSTREG2002/3 + 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/
3 ×AFF 
  
−0.0657**
* 
−0.0939** 
   (0.015) (0.005) (0.073) (0.000)    (0.009) (0.013) 
            
Observations 15,654 15,654 15,654 10,458 6,911 3,764 Observations 3,898 3,898 3,898 1,755 
R-squared 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.123 0.0824 0.0805 R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.061 0.052 
F test 3413 3400 3479 2375 935.9 504.9 F test 1.674 1.884 1.749 1.519 
UPGRADEM&Arec is a categorical value that takes on three values—namely, 1 if analysts improve recommendation within ±90 days of the M&A announcement, 0 if unchanged and −1 if there is a downgrade; 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀 refers to LTG forecast 
optimism defined by individual analysts’ LTG forecast deducting unaffiliated consensus; UPGRADEM&ALTG refers to LTG forecast optimism revision within ±90 days of the M&A announcement, defined by individual analysts’ LTG forecast 
optimism deducting its latest prior value (i.e., 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀 −  𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟); 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the brokerage house applies the new rating three-tier system in stock recommendations during the period 
2002–2004, and 0 otherwise. POSTREG2002/3 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 9 September 2002—the deadline for brokerages to comply with the disclosure requirement of the SRO Rules—
and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates that the analyst is affiliated with the acquirer’s advisor; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total consideration paid 
by the acquirer in the M&A deals. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of acquirer firms as at the last trading day of the calendar month before 
the analysts’ report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analysts’ first time published on I/B/E/S until the year of the analysts’ report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within one calendar 
month preceding the M&A announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between the M&A announcement date and the analysts’ report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage 
house during the same calendar month of the M&A deal announcement date. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 represents the level of stock recommendation for the same acquirer firm, provided by the same analyst just before the 180-day event window. 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟is the LTG forecast optimism for the same acquirer firm, provided by the same analyst just before the 180-day event window. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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I first discuss whether there is evidence of an incremental effect of analysts switching to 
the three-tier ratings system on analyst optimism before and after the 2002/3 reforms (as 
implied in H1a). Column 2 of Table 5.10 reports the main test of H1a, which predicts that 
the reduction in optimism after the 2002/3 reforms is greater for analysts who adopt the 
three-tier ratings system immediately following the reforms than for other analysts (i.e., 
analysts who persisted in using a five-tier system after the reforms). Consistent with my 
prediction, the estimated coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 (𝛽 =  −0.1294; 
𝑝 = 0.042) is negative and significant at the 5% level, thus supporting H1a. 
I then test H2a, which predicts that the effect on the optimism of the change in the rating 
systems following the 2002/3 reforms is stronger for affiliated analysts than for 
unaffiliated analysts (see Columns 3–6). Column 3 includes an additional main effect, 
AFF, which identifies affiliated analysts with the acquirer and its two-way and three-way 
interactions with ChgtoTier3 and POSTREG2002/3. The two-way interaction, 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3, measures the incremental post-reform reduction in the 
optimism of unaffiliated analysts who adopt the three-tier ratings system relative to 
unaffiliated analysts who do not make the change. The coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 is negative and marginally insignificant in a two-tailed test 
(𝛽 = −0.1030; 𝑝 = 0.115). 
The three-way interaction, ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF, shows that the 
incremental post-reform reduction in optimism is greater for affiliated analysts who 
switched to the three-tier ratings system relative to unaffiliated analysts who changed to 
the same system. The estimated coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF is 
significantly negative ( 𝛽  = −0.4527; p = 0.053), thus supporting H2a. Further, the 
aggregate post-reform effect of changing to the three-tier ratings system for affiliated 
analysts is measured by ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 and 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF. The combined coefficient is significantly negative 
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( 𝛽  = −0.5557; p = 0.015). Collectively, these results suggest that the post-reform 
decrease in affiliated analysts’ optimism is greater for those who switch to the three-tier 
ratings system, and that the total effect size for this group of analysts is significant. 
In summary, the results show that, on average, analysts employed by brokers who 
changed the ratings system following the 2002/3 reforms experienced a significantly 
greater reduction in optimism than other analysts, and that the reduction in optimism was 
greater for analysts with a stronger potential for conflicts of interest (i.e., affiliated 
analysts). Thus, H1a and H2a are supported. 
The results are reported for three additional tests of H2a in Columns 4–6 of Table 5.10. 
Given that mean client size (FIRMCAP), broker size (BROKERSIZE) and other covariates 
(EXP, FOLLOW) vary significantly across treatment and control firms, and the linear 
control for the effect of these factors on optimism may be imperfect, I re-estimate Model 
3 using a PSM sample. This approach matches the treatment (Chgto3tier = 1) and control 
(Chgto3Tier = 0) cases according to DEALVALUE, FIRMCAP, BROKERSIZE, EXP and 
FOLLOW within each calendar year, such that there is no significant difference in these 
covariates across treatment and control samples.42 
Column 4 presents the results of the PSM regressions, which are similar to those in the 
unrestricted sample. The aggregate coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 + 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF is significant and negative (β = −0.8236; p = 0.005), 
and the reduction in optimism by unaffiliated analysts who change their ratings system 
(ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3) is negative and significant (β = −0.1615; p = 0.060).43 
More importantly, the coefficient for the three-way interaction 
                                                 
42 The average pseudo R2 of the year-specific logit regressions is approximately 15%, and at least two 
covariates are significant in each regression. An annual caliper equivalent to an absolute p-score difference 
of 1.6% generates a sample that is balanced across covariates in every year. 
43 Similar results are obtained if the sample is restricted to recommendations issued by brokers who employ 
at least 10 analysts, and to brokers who provide M&A advisory services at least once (twice) during the 
sample period. 
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ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF is significantly negative (β = −0.6622; p = 0.028), 
suggesting that H2a is supported using the PSM sample. 
Columns 5–6 further restrict the PSM sample to cases whereby the existing level of 
analyst recommendations prior to the M&A event window is not at its extreme values 
(e.g., ‘strong buy’ or ‘strong sell’ in a five-tier; ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ in a three-tier ratings 
system). In this subsample, regardless of whether a three-tier or five-tier system is used, 
it is possible for an analyst to either upgrade or downgrade their initial recommendations. 
If the above results reflect the fact that a greater proportion of observations lay at the 
extreme levels prior to the M&A window under a three-tier system, I should find no 
significant result if I re-estimate the regressions for cases where the pre-event 
recommendation is neither of the extreme cases. Like the earlier PSM results, there 
remains a significant effect of the reforms on unaffiliated analysts who changed their 
ratings system (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 : 𝛽  = −0.3709; p = 0.002); however, the 
three-way interaction term used to test H2a (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF; 
coefficient  𝛽  = −0.3051; p = 0.520) is not significant, and the aggregate effect for 
affiliated analysts is only marginally significant (𝛽 = −0.6759; p = 0.073). To further 
investigate the causes of the insignificance of the three-way interaction, the regression is 
further restricted to observations falling within four years of either side of the reform 
years (i.e., 1998–2001 and 2004–2007 inclusive), whereby the potential for 
contaminating effects from other events is reduced. These results are tabulated in Column 
6, which shows that the three-way interaction (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF; 
𝛽 = −1.3110; p = 0.018) is negative and significant, consistent with the reforms having a 
stronger effect on affiliated analysts who changed their ratings system than other affiliated 
analysts. H2a is therefore supported in this restricted PSM NOTMAXMIN sample. Taken 
together, there is evidence that the main results do not simply reflect the fact that fewer 
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recommendations have the potential to be upgraded (or downgraded) under a three-tier 
scale than under a five-tier scale. 
In untabulated analyses, each of the above models was re-estimated using standard logit 
regressions separately to estimate the probability of a) an upgrade and b) a downgrade. 
The results of these regressions reveal that the major effect of the reforms was on the 
likelihood of analysts downgrading their recommendations during the M&A event 
window. All of the results for the post-reform effect of the change to the three-tier ratings 
system (both generally and on affiliated analysts specifically) were supported at greater 
confidence levels when modelling the probability of a downgrade. There were no 
significant effects of the reforms on the probability of an upgrade. 
Columns 7–10 of Table 5.10 provide the results of the OLS regression analyses for testing 
H1b and H2b using LTG forecast optimism to measure analyst optimism. Two samples 
are used to test H1b and H2b: (1) the final available sample of LTG forecasts provided in 
Table 5.1 and (2) a PSM sample comprising treatment and control LTG forecasts that are 
subject to the same matching criteria as tests that use recommendation optimism. 
All models are well fitted. The adjusted R2 statistics for the regression tests using LTG 
forecast optimism revision are around 0.05~0.06, which is higher than that reported by 
Kolasinski and Kothari (2008, Table 7, p. 838: 0.001~0.004), who examine the effect of 
M&A affiliation on LTG forecasts in general. Control variables are substantively similar 
to those reported in Columns 1–6, but they have weakened significance, except for DAYS, 
which is consistently significant and positive throughout all samples. This suggests that 
the longer the interval between a forecast recommendation and the M&A announcement, 
the more optimistic the LTG forecasts. 
The results of the tests of the overall effect of the reforms on optimism as reflected in 
LTG forecasts will now be discussed. The results in Column 7 suggest that there was no 
unconditional effect of the 2002/3 reforms on the optimism of either affiliated or 
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unaffiliated analysts. Similarly, the coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3, 
representing the incremental effect of the change to the three-tier ratings system on LTG 
forecast optimism following the 2002/3 reforms (Column 8), is also insignificant 
(𝛽 = −0.0019, 𝑝 = 0.696). Thus, there is no evidence to support H1b. 
Model 3 (Column 9) tests the conditional effect of changes to the three-tier ratings system 
on affiliated and unaffiliated analysts (H2b). The coefficient for the interaction 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 is insignificant (𝛽  = 0.0013, 𝑝  = 0.785), indicating that 
there was no differential effect of the change in the ratings system on unaffiliated analysts 
following the 2002/3 reforms. However, H2b is supported by evidence that the reforms 
induced a greater reduction in LTG forecast optimism following the 2002/3 reforms by 
affiliated analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings system than affiliated analysts who 
did not change their ratings system (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF: 𝛽 = −0.0671, 
p = 0.018). Finally, the aggregate post-reform reduction in optimism for affiliated 
analysts changing to the three-tier ratings system (the sum of the coefficients for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 and ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF) is significantly 
negative (β = −0.0657, p = 0.009). Similar results are generated when I re-estimate the 
regression on a PSM sample of analysts who switched to the three-tier system and those 
who did not (Column 10). Taking these results together, there is evidence of a reduction 
in LTG forecast optimism of affiliated analysts who changed their ratings system 
following the 2002/3 reforms relative to those who did not change, thus supporting H2b. 
Moreover, there is some evidence of an association between this improvement (i.e., 
reduction in analyst excess optimism) and the change to the three-tier ratings system 
employed at an aggregate level. 
I then examine the effect of the 2002/3 reforms (and the particular disclosure requirements 
of NASD 2711 within) on analyst optimism proxied by the level of initial 
recommendations issued during the 24-month window following the IPO issue dates. It 
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is important to note that all initial recommendations that were issued under a five-tier 
ratings system are recoded into a simple buy/hold/sell scheme to measure the dependent 
variable in these tests. The results are shown in Table 5.11. Like the earlier tests, the 
sample is restricted to recommendations issued by analysts whose employers are not GS 
signatories and who did not use the three-tier ratings system before the 2002/3 reforms. 
The R2 statistics are well fitted around 0.08~0.09 and are greater than those reported by 
Corwin et al. (2017, Table 2, p. 623: 0.051 for equity relationship). Three samples are 
employed: (1) the final available sample for IPOs reported in Table 4.2, (2) the PSM 
sample and (3) the PSM sample restricted to observations between 1998 and 2007. 
Control variables are generally consistent with predictions except for lnDEALVALUE, 
which is significantly negative, suggesting that smaller first offerings may induce more 
favourable initial recommendations issued by analysts after issues. 
Column 1 reports that the unconditional effect of the 2002/3 reforms on the average level 
of recommendation optimism when unaffiliated analysts publish their reports for the first 
time after offerings shows an estimated negative (β = −0.1817) coefficient for 
POSTREG2002/3, which is significant at the 1% level (p < 0.001). This suggests that there 
is a pronounced decline in the level of optimism issued by unaffiliated analysts who cover 
IPO firms following the 2002/3 reforms. The estimated coefficient for AFF is positive 
and significant ( 𝛽  = 0.0673, p < 0.001), suggesting that affiliated analysts were 
abnormally optimistic towards their IPO clients before the 2002/3 reforms. While the 
post-reform reduction in optimism is lower for affiliated analysts than unaffiliated 
analysts (POSTREG2002/3 × AFF, 𝛽  = 0.575, p = 0.001), there is a reduction in the 
aggregate post-reform optimism of affiliated analysts employed by non-GS signatory 
banks following the 2002/3 reforms, as indicated by the significant negative combined 
coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 + POSTREG2002/3 × AFF (untabulated; 𝛽  = −0.1242, 
p < 0.001).  
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Table 5.11 OLS Regressions of Analyst Optimism: Initial Recommendation in IPO 
Context 
 
Column 2 of Table 5.11 provides the results of the tests of H1a, which examines whether 
the effect on reduction in analyst optimism following the 2002/3 reforms, reflected in the 
level of initial recommendations after the IPO issue date, is greater for analysts who 
change to the three-tier ratings system encouraged by NASD 2711 relative to analysts 
who do not make the change. The estimated coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3, 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
DV: LEVELIPO3tier 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 3 
Annual PSM 
Model 3 
Annual PSM 
(1998–2007) 
      
ChgtoTier3  0.0681*** 0.0845*** 0.0254 0.0359 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.194) (0.139) 
POSTREG2002/3 −0.1817*** −0.1005*** −0.1290*** −0.1545*** −0.2291*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AFF 0.0673***  0.0886*** 0.0691*** −0.0393 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.285) 
ChgtoTier3×POSTREG2002/3  −0.1049*** −0.0837*** −0.0066 −0.0167 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.804) (0.627) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF   −0.0310 0.0003 0.0560 
   (0.141) (0.992) (0.182) 
POSTREG2002/3×AFF 0.0575***  0.0868*** 0.1242*** 0.2321*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 ×AFF   −0.0659** −0.1070*** −0.1951*** 
   (0.033) (0.004) (0.000) 
lnDEALVALUE −0.0443*** −0.0436*** −0.0429*** −0.0459*** −0.0559*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0118** 0.0082 0.0105** 0.0113* 0.0098 
 (0.027) (0.127) (0.047) (0.099) (0.298) 
EXP 0.0058*** 0.0071*** 0.0057*** 0.0063*** 0.0049** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) 
FOLLOW −0.0088*** −0.0096*** −0.0086*** −0.0094*** −0.0108*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS −0.0001** −0.0002*** −0.0001** −0.0000 −0.0000 
 (0.027) (0.000) (0.032) (0.618) (0.901) 
BROKERSIZE −0.0007* −0.0009** −0.0016*** −0.0038*** −0.0044*** 
 (0.087) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant cut1 4.0112*** 4.0506*** 3.9702*** 4.0170*** 4.1508*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
AFF+POSTREG×AFF 0.1247***     
 (0.000)     
ChgtoTier3× POSTREG2002/3 + 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 ×AFF 
  −0.1496*** −0.1135*** −0.2117*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 12,435 12,435 12,435 8,507 4,270 
R-squared 0.083 0.077 0.088 0.080 0.095 
F test 89.37 77.81 66.93 49.09 31.56 
LEVELIPO3tier is the standardised level of initial recommendation following the IPO issue date, coded of three-tier rating system 
such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’ and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’; 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
brokerage house applies the new three-tier ratings system in stock recommendations during the period 2002–2004, and 0 otherwise. 
POSTREG2002/3 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 9 September 2002—the deadline 
for brokerages to comply with the disclosure requirement of the SRO Rules—and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates that the analyst is 
affiliated with the IPO issuer’s underwriter; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-
end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total proceeds amount in the IPO deal. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-
adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of IPO firms as at the last trading day of 
the calendar month before the analyst’s report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analyst’s first published report on 
I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst’s report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within 
one calendar month preceding the recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between the 
IPO issue date and the analyst’s report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house 
during the same calendar month of the recommendation announcement date. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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which captures the incremental effect on optimism in the initial post-IPO 
recommendations following the 2002/3 reforms for analysts who change to the three-tier 
ratings system, is negative and significant at the 1% level (β = −0.1049; p < 0.001). Thus, 
H1a is supported. 
H2a proposes that the effect on analyst optimism of the change in the ratings system is 
stronger for affiliated analysts than unaffiliated analysts. In Column 3 of Table 5.11, the 
three-way interaction ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF captures the incremental 
reduction in optimism following the 2002/3 reforms for affiliated analysts who switched 
to the three-tier ratings system relative to unaffiliated analysts who also changed to the 
same system. The coefficient is negative and significant (β = −0.0659; p = 0.033), which 
supports H2a. Further, the aggregate post-reform effect of the change to the ratings system 
on affiliated analysts (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 + 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF) is found to be negative and strongly significant 
(β = −0.1496; p < 0.001). 
Column 4 reports the regression tests based on a PSM sample to reduce potential 
endogeneity threats after matching treatment (ChgtoTier3 = 1) and control 
(ChgtoTier3 = 0) firms according to deal size, firm size, analyst experience and following. 
H2a is supported by the negative and significant coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF (β = −0.1070; p = 0.004). Column 5 obtains robust 
and consistent results if restricting the IPO deals only to the period between 1998 and 
2007. 
Collectively, the results shown in Table 5.11 (using the IPO context) are consistent with 
those shown in Table 5.10 (tests in the M&A window), which indicates that the brokers’ 
change in the ratings system encouraged by NASD 2711 is associated with a decrease in 
analyst optimism, particularly for outputs of reports issued by affiliated analysts.44 
                                                 
44 I also obtain consistent results of the tests using the SEO context, which support H1a and H2a. See 
Appendix 5.1. 
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Table 5.12 reports the results of tests of H1a and H2a, whereby analyst optimism 
(UPGRADErec) is proxied by recommendation changes surrounding the filing date of 
SEOs. Results for the average effect of the change to the ratings system are similar to 
those reported above. In Column 2, the evidence supports H1a with a negative and 
significant coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 (β = −0.1058; p = 0.002), which 
suggests that the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on reduction in optimism is greater for 
analysts who change to the three-tier ratings system following the reforms than for other 
analysts. In Column 3, while H2a is not supported (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF: 
β = −0.0557; p = 0.401), the aggregate post-reform effect of changing to the three-tier 
ratings system on analyst optimism for affiliated analysts is significantly negative 
(ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 + ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF; β = −0.1462; 
p < 0.001). Column 4 of Table 5.12 provides the results of the PSM regressions. While 
the coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF is negative, no significance is 
found to support H2a (β = −0.0473; p = 0.577). However, the aggregate coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 + ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF is significantly 
negative at the 1% level (β = −0.1906; p = 0.001), which suggests that the aggregate 
effect of the 2002/3 reforms of changing to the three-tier ratings system on the reduction 
in recommendation optimism is greater for affiliated analysts. Column 5 of Table 5.12 
shows similar results using a PSM sample for the restricted period (1998–2007). 
Collectively, there is reasonably consistent evidence that changes in the ratings system 
likely induced by the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 were associated with a 
reduction in analyst optimism. This evidence is found in the tests whereby 
recommendation optimism is observed surrounding M&A announcement dates and is 
reflected in the initial recommendation during the 24-month window following IPO 
issues (or the recommendation revisions surrounding the SEO filings date). However, 
there is no general effect of the change in the ratings system on the optimism revision of 
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LTG forecasts. Moreover, the effect on recommendation optimism is notably stronger for 
affiliated analysts in both the M&A and IPO contexts, whereby analysts’ potential 
conflicts of interest are amplified.45 
Table 5.12 Regressions of Analyst Optimism: Recommendation Changes in SEO 
Context 
                                                 
45 Similar results are also found in tests using the level of initial recommendations after the SEO filing dates 
as a proxy for analyst optimism (see Appendix 5.1). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
DV: UPGRADESEOrec 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 3 
Annual PSM 
Model 3 
Annual PSM 
(1998–2007) 
      
ChgtoTier3  0.0755** 0.0443 0.1072* 0.1692** 
  (0.010) (0.310) (0.063) (0.045) 
POSTREG2002/3 −0.1577*** −0.1239*** −0.1118*** −0.0914* −0.0971 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.065) (0.174) 
AFF 0.1529***  0.1113** 0.1324** 0.0822 
 (0.000)  (0.011) (0.015) (0.285) 
ChgtoTier3×POSTREG2002/3  −0.1058*** −0.0906* −0.1434** −0.1959** 
  (0.002) (0.077) (0.028) (0.047) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF   0.0708 0.0342 0.0300 
   (0.194) (0.637) (0.777) 
POSTREG2002/3×AFF −0.0396  −0.0004 0.0022 0.0795 
 (0.243)  (0.993) (0.973) (0.390) 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 ×AFF   −0.0557 −0.0473 −0.0446 
   (0.401) (0.577) (0.726) 
lnDEALVALUE −0.0360** −0.0263* −0.0359** −0.0439** −0.0173 
 (0.017) (0.077) (0.017) (0.011) (0.484) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0717*** 0.0607*** 0.0713*** 0.0834*** 0.0823*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXP −0.0022 −0.0012 −0.0022 −0.0058** −0.0097** 
 (0.296) (0.568) (0.304) (0.014) (0.035) 
FOLLOW −0.0107*** −0.0128*** −0.0108*** −0.0129*** −0.0130*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS −0.0004*** −0.0004*** −0.0004*** −0.0004*** −0.0004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BROKERSIZE 0.0008 0.0007 −0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0002 
 (0.326) (0.396) (0.987) (0.926) (0.917) 
LEVEL −0.6218*** −0.6138*** −0.6229*** −0.6251*** −0.6340*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant cut1 2.2735*** 2.3204*** 2.2660*** 2.2492*** 2.1560*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
AFF+POSTREG×AFF 0.1133***     
 (0.000)     
ChgtoTier3× POSTREG2002/3 + 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 ×AFF 
 
 
−0.1462*** −0.1906*** −0.2405*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
      
Observations 6,723 6,723 6,723 4,863 2,081 
R-squared 0.479 0.475 0.480 0.502 0.469 
F test 659.9 674 495 439.7 172 
UPGRADESEOrec is an ordinal variable equal to 1 if analysts upgrade their recommendation for SEO issuers within ±12 months of 
the SEO filing date, 0 if the recommendation unchanged and −1 if there is a downgrade; 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the brokerage house applies the new rating three-tier system in stock recommendations during the period 2002–2004, 
and 0 otherwise. POSTREG2002/3 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 9 September 
2002—the deadline for brokerages to comply with the disclosure requirement of the SRO Rules—and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates 
that the analyst is affiliated with the SEO issuer’s underwriter; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted 
with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total proceeds amount in the SEO deal. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in 
billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of SEO firms as at the last 
trading day of the calendar month before the analyst’s report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analyst’s first published 
report on I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst’s report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same 
firm within one calendar month preceding the recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days 
between the SEO filing date and the analyst’s report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the 
brokerage house during the same calendar month of the recommendation announcement date. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
171 
Potential Confounding Effects from Other Regulations 
Due to the contemporaneous or near contemporaneous timing of the SRO Rules, a series 
of regulatory reforms implemented in the early 2000s have the potential to confound 
attempts to isolate the effect of any specific reform on analyst behaviour in general. In 
particular, the introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter ‘Reg FD’), effective 
23 October 2000, was intended to reduce analysts’ incentives to issue optimistic output 
in order to win favour with management and gain access to private information. To 
examine the potential confounding effect of Reg FD, I regressed recommendation 
optimism on ChgtoTier3, an indicator of post-Reg FD observations (POST-RegFD), their 
interaction and controls using samples terminating at the end of 2001. The results of these 
regressions, using both the full samples and PSM samples with each of investment 
banking windows are reported in the table Appendix 5.3. While POST-RegFD is negative 
and significant in the M&A regressions, there is no evidence that this effect was stronger 
for firms who subsequently change to the three-tier system (ChgtoTier3 × POST-RegFD 
is positive and insignificant in both samples). Regressions estimated during post-IPO and 
SEO windows (Columns 3 to 6) also report insignificant interactions between ChgtoTier3 
and POST-RegFD.  
Reconciliation with Corwin et al. (2017) 
This section reports the results of additional tests which reconcile my findings with those 
reported recently by Corwin et al. (2017), which tests hypotheses that overlap some of 
those reported here.  
Corwin et al. (2017) examine the impact of the GS on optimistic bias in recommendations 
issued by affiliated analysts whose employing brokers provided investment banking 
businesses to the covered firms for a sample spanning 1996 and 2009. Their findings 
suggest a post-reform reduction in affiliation bias in analyst recommendations for GS 
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analysts, but that the concurrent SRO Rules seems largely ineffective in reducing excess 
optimism for non-GS analysts after the settlement.  
While my findings suggest that the variation in the uptake of the simpler three tier ratings 
systems may at least partially explain Corwin et al. (2017)’s evidence, their empirical 
method differs from mine, particularly with respect to sample derivation and the measure 
of analyst affiliation. First, to capture an ongoing firm-bank pair investment banking 
relationship that is beyond transactional basis, they use a long-term measure of analyst 
affiliation based on the incidence of any equity, debt or M&A transactions during the 
years prior to recommendation issue dates. Second, recommendation levels (rather than 
changes) are used to estimate analyst optimism. Second, Corwin et al. (2017) focus on 
analysts whose employers are the top 25 investment banks in terms of market share, 
including both GS and non-GS analysts. However, my tests of the 2002/03 reforms 
exclude the GS broker, but examine all non-GS signatory brokers.        
To demonstrate the impact of imposing the modelling choices of Corwin et al. (2017), I 
perform OLS regression analyses and report the corresponding results shown in Table 
Appendix 5.4. The sample is restricted to recommendations issued by analysts employed 
by the top-25 investment banks (following Corwin et al. 2017, Table A1). The R2 statistics 
are generally around 0.09~0.10, which is greater than 0.05~0.06 provided by Corwin et 
al. (2017, Table 2). The sample used in tests including all the recommendations matched 
to IPO, SEO, debt, and M&A deals occurring between 1990 and 2016 (November), 
instead of the period between 1996 and 2009 used in Corwin et al. (2017). I employ 
Models 1-3 (introduced in Section 5.5.1), with the following amendments: (1) I use 
standardised recommendation levels (rather than changes) as a proxy for analyst 
optimism (i.e. OPT2) and (2) I use a long-term measure of analyst affiliation (AFF2) by 
considering all recommendations issued during the 24 months following any of equity, 
debt, and M&A transactions, similar to the measure of investment banking relationships 
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designed by Corwin et al. (2017). Here I use a 24-month window following any of 
investment banking activities to identify affiliated recommendations, instead of a 36-
month window used by Corwin et al. (2017).   
Column 1 of Table Appendix 5.4 presents the unconditional effect of the 2002/3 reforms 
on the average level of analyst optimism in recommendations issued during the two years 
following investment banking events. In Column 1, the significantly negative coefficient 
for POSTREG2002/3 × AFF2 (β = −0.0475; p = 0.000) suggests a significant reduction in 
affiliation bias for analysts employed by top-25 brokers after the 2002/3 reforms. 
Columns 2 and 3 further report the results of testing Model 1 employing subsamples of 
GS analysts and non-GS analysts, respectively. The significantly negative coefficient for 
POSTREG2002/3 × AFF2 (β = −0.0852; p = 0.000) shown in Column 3 reveals that there 
is a post-reform reduction in affiliation bias is for non-GS analysts who are employed by 
top-25 brokers. This evidence is consistent with my previous results in Table 5.10 but 
contrary to what Corwin et al. conclude.  
The results of tests applying Models 2 and 3 are reported in Columns 4 and 5, respectively. 
Column 4 reports a significantly negative coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 (β 
= −0.1732; p = 0.000). Thus, focusing on the analysts who are employed by top-25 
brokers, the decrease in recommendation optimism following the 2002/3 reforms is 
greater for those who changed to use the 3-tier ratings system after the implementation of 
NASD 2711, relative to those who did not. However, in Column 5, the insignificant 
coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF2 (β = 0.0365; p = 0.329) implies that 
for those analysts who changed to 3-tier ratings system after the 2002/3 reforms, there is 
no incremental decrease in optimism for affiliated analysts relative to unaffiliated ones. 
Overall, the reconciled results are largely consistent to my previous findings in Table 5.10 
and further suggest that the post-reform reduction in recommendation optimism is larger 
for analysts who adopted the 3-tier ratings systems following the disclosure requirement 
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of NASD 2711, regardless of whether the analysts are employed by any non-GS or top-
25 non-GS brokers. Results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar if I further restrict the 
sample to years between 1996 and 2009, as per Corwin et al. (2017).       
5.5.2 Results for the Tests of the Effect of 2002/3 Reforms on Investor Response 
(Hypotheses 3 and 4a/b) and Profitability (Hypotheses 5 and 6) 
Given that there are potentially competing effects of the adoption of the three-tier system 
on informativeness (the ‘clarity’ and ‘credibility’ effects suggest greater informativeness, 
while the ‘fineness’ effect implies the opposite), there is no prediction for the direction of 
any association between changes to the ratings system and average conditional 
informativeness of recommendation changes. H3 is thus stated in null form, proposing 
that there is no differential effect on the conditional informativeness of analyst 
recommendations after the 2002/3 reforms for analysts who switched to the three-tier 
ratings system relative to those who did not. However, because the ‘credibility’ effect of 
changes to the recommendation ratings system should be greater for affiliated analysts, 
H4a (4b) predicts that there is a greater post-reform increase (decrease) in informativeness 
of recommendations upgrades or ‘buy-type’ recommendations (downgrades or ‘hold and 
sell-type’ recommendations) for affiliated analysts who adopt the new ratings system than 
for unaffiliated analysts who change their ratings system. The tests of H3 and H4a (4b) 
comprise two regressions of the following forms: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 +
𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀, 
Model 7 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽5𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 8 
Control variables (in addition to the controls defined in Model 2) 
PASTFIRMPERF = the firm’s stock return in the six months before the recommendation 
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PASTMKTPERF = 
the cumulative market return in the six months before the 
recommendation 
MKTSD = the standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month before the 
recommendation. 
 
Where INFORM is the informativeness conditional on the direction of recommendation 
changes (‘upgrades’ or ‘downgrades’) or levels (‘buy-type’ or ‘hold and sell-type’) 
measured as the three-day abnormal returns centred on the announcement of 
recommendations. 46  All other variables are defined in Sections 4.3.2.1–4.3.2.2, and 
control variables are described in Section 4.4.6. 
Table 5.13 summarises the regression results for the tests of the post-reform change in 
the relative informativeness of recommendation revisions in the M&A context. To 
examine the conditional informativeness, four samples are employed: (1) the final 
available sample of 2,511 cases for upgrades; (2) the final available sample of 2,367 cases 
for downgrades;47 (3) the restricted sample of 2,249 cases for upgrades to ‘buy’ or ‘strong 
buy’; and (4) the restricted sample of 1,928 cases for downgrades to ‘hold’, ‘sell’ or 
‘strong sell’. All models are reasonably fitted well. The R2 statistics range from 0.02 to 
0.03 for Models 7 and 8 in tests of conditional informativeness conditional upon upgrades, 
and they range from 0.09 to 0.10 for tests of conditional informativeness conditional upon 
downgrades. These statistics are similar to the R2 of 0.08 (0.07) for tests of difference in 
price reactions to all recommendations in the pre-2002/3 reform period (and in the post-
2002/3 reform period) reported by Kadan et al. (2009, Table 3), which is the study closest 
in nature to this thesis. However, Table 3 of Kadan et al. (2009, p. 4201) uses all 
recommendation types (instead of upgrades or downgrades) in one regression with no 
intercept, and it does not control for analyst and broker characteristics. 
                                                 
46 None of the results reported in this section are substantively affected if I employ return windows spanning 
days (−2, 2) or (−5, 5). 
47 Samples 1 and 2 and the selection process are described in Section 5.3. 
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The coefficients for control variables are generally consistent with the predictions 
introduced in Section 4.4.6. PASTFIRMPERF and PASTMKTPERF, which control for 
momentum effects, should be positively associated with informativeness conditional to 
upgrades and downgrades. In Table 5.13, the coefficients for PASTFIRMPERF reported 
in Columns 1–4 for informativeness conditional upon upgrades are significantly positive, 
and those in Columns 5–6 for informativeness conditional upon downgrades are 
significantly negative. However, there is no significance of coefficients for 
PASTMKTPERF, except for that reported in Column 6 based on Model 8. The coefficients 
for market volatility MKTSD are significantly positive for informativeness upon 
downgrades, but not for upgrades cases. Other control variables are generally consistent 
with prediction in this study (and with prior literature), except for EXP, which is not 
significant as expected, suggesting that investors do not necessarily respond more to 
analysts with more experience.48 
Columns 1–4 of Table 5.13 report the results of the OLS regressions of conditional 
informativeness (i.e., cumulative abnormal returns for days [−1, +1]) for recommendation 
upgrades issued during the 180-day window of the M&A announcement date. In Column 
1, the incremental post-reform effect on the conditional informativeness of 
recommendations issued by all analysts who change to the three-tier ratings system is 
insignificant, as indicated by the coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 
( 𝛽  = 0.0002; p = 0.981), thus failing to reject the null of H3. The coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF in Column 2, which captures the incremental effect 
                                                 
48 lnDEALVALUE is neagively correlated with the informativeness of the recommendation upgrades, but 
the coefficients for lnDEALVALUE are positive (not significant) in tests of informativeness conditional 
upon recommendation downgrades, reported in Columns 5–8. lnFIRMCAP is negatively associated with 
the informativeness of recommendation downgrades. FOLLOW is positively associated with 
informativeness conditional upon downgrades, which means that investors respond more to downgrades of 
recommendations when a greater number of analysts cover the same firm. Although there is no positive 
relation between informativeness conditional upon recommendation upgrades and DAYS, there is a negative 
relation between the informativeness of recommendation downgrades and DAYS reported in Columns 5–6 
of Table 5.3. Lastly, BROKERSIZE is not significant as predicted, suggesting that brokerage size may affect 
conditional informativeness in either direction. 
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of affiliation status for analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings system following 
the 2002/3 reforms, is also insignificant (𝛽 = 0.0076; p = 0.825), thus failing to support 
H4a. Results are similar for the subsample restricted to recommendation changes that 
resulted in a ‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’ recommendation (Columns 3 and 4). In summary, 
neither the incremental effect of analysts changing their ratings system after the 2002/3 
reforms (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 in Column 1), nor the incremental effect of 
affiliation status for analysts who changed the system 
(ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF in Column 2), are significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that the change to the ratings system neither impaired nor improved the 
informativeness of the recommendation upgrades. 
Columns 5–8 of Table 5.13 report the results of similar tests of the conditional 
informativeness of recommendation downgrades issued during the 180-day window of 
the M&A announcement date. The abnormal returns used as the dependent variables in 
the regressions have had their sign reversed so that a more positive coefficient implies 
greater informativeness. For downgrades, the ‘clarity’ effect of changes to the 
recommendation system suggests additional informativeness, while both the ‘credibility’ 
and ‘fineness’ effects imply a decrease in informativeness following a switch to the three-
tier system. The results in Column 5 show that the coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 is once more insignificant (𝛽 = 0.0060, p = 0.477), thereby 
failing to reject the hypothesis of no differential effect of the change to the three-tier 
ratings system on conditional informativeness (H3). However, there is evidence of a 
significant post-reform decrease in the informativeness of downgrades issued by affiliated 
analysts who changed their ratings system. In Column 6 of Table 5.13, the coefficient for 
the pre-reform informativeness of downgrades issued by affiliated analysts who later 
changed their ratings system (ChgtoTier3 × AFF) is significantly positive (𝛽 = 0.0897, 
p = 0.009), which is consistent with the market perception that, for an affiliated analyst 
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to issue a downgrade, the news must be of greater significance. After the reforms, the 
incremental informativeness of downgrades issued by this group of analysts decreases  
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Table 5.13 OLS Regressions of Conditional Informativeness of Recommendation Upgrades and Downgrades in M&A Context 
 UPGRADE DOWNGRADE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 7 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 8 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 7 
To Buy 
/StrongBuy 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 8 
To Buy 
/StrongBuy 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 7 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 8 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 7 
To Hold/Sell 
/StrongSell 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 8 
To Hold/Sell 
/StrongSell 
         
ChgtoTier3 0.0009 0.0016 0.0003 0.0011 0.0086 0.0057 0.0066 0.0038 
 (0.860) (0.767) (0.953) (0.841) (0.209) (0.411) (0.428) (0.648) 
POSTREG 0.0041 0.0036 0.0047 0.0041 −0.0066 −0.0074 −0.0087 −0.0090 
 (0.413) (0.473) (0.367) (0.439) (0.328) (0.280) (0.267) (0.257) 
AFF  0.0369  0.0354  −0.0333  −0.0393 
  (0.158)  (0.173)  (0.217)  (0.267) 
ChgtoTier3×POSTREG 0.0002 −0.0000 −0.0016 −0.0020 0.0060 0.0096 0.0090 0.0119 
 (0.981) (0.996) (0.805) (0.759) (0.477) (0.265) (0.361) (0.231) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF  −0.0241  −0.0234  0.0897***  0.0930** 
  (0.410)  (0.422)  (0.009)  (0.039) 
POSTREG×AFF  −0.0069  −0.0036  0.0206  0.0072 
  (0.811)  (0.900)  (0.549)  (0.868) 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺 ×AFF  0.0076  0.0103  −0.0933**  −0.0756 
  (0.825)  (0.766)  (0.032)  (0.162) 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.0192*** 0.0189*** 0.0192*** 0.0189*** −0.0397*** −0.0396*** −0.0434*** −0.0427*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PASTMKTPERF −0.0161 −0.0171 −0.0151 −0.0162 −0.0223 −0.0228* −0.0193 −0.0190 
 (0.128) (0.106) (0.166) (0.137) (0.103) (0.096) (0.218) (0.225) 
MKTSD −0.3806 −0.3842 −0.3833 −0.3905 0.9055** 0.9382** 1.0235** 1.0961** 
 (0.145) (0.141) (0.170) (0.162) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.012) 
lnDEALVALUE −0.0030*** −0.0029*** −0.0032*** −0.0030*** 0.0011 0.0011 0.0016 0.0016 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.392) (0.386) (0.276) (0.272) 
lnFIRMCAP −0.0014 −0.0011 −0.0013 −0.0010 −0.0162*** −0.0161*** −0.0174*** −0.0175*** 
 (0.252) (0.372) (0.289) (0.434) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXP 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.118) (0.102) (0.239) (0.215) (0.150) (0.180) (0.172) (0.195) 
FOLLOW −0.0000 0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0000 0.0024*** 0.0023*** 0.0027*** 0.0026*** 
 (0.909) (0.891) (0.733) (0.947) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS −0.0001 −0.0001* −0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0001* −0.0001* −0.0000 −0.0000 
 (0.114) (0.097) (0.339) (0.287) (0.085) (0.087) (0.690) (0.681) 
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BROKERSIZE 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.869) (0.961) (0.901) (0.708) (0.420) (0.472) (0.195) (0.198) 
Constant 0.0546*** 0.0499*** 0.0568*** 0.0515*** 0.1185*** 0.1189*** 0.1160*** 0.1174*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
ChgtoTier3×POSTREG+ ChgtoTier3×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺 ×AFF 
 0.0075  0.0082  −0.0837*  −0.0636 
  (0.823)  (0.808)  (0.050)  (0.232) 
         
Observations 2,511 2,511 2,249 2,249 2,367 2,367 1,928 1,928 
R-squared 0.024 0.028 0.025 0.030 0.093 0.097 0.099 0.102 
F test 5.190 4.476 4.825 4.267 20.17 15.80 17.45 13.57 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days (i.e., [−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; CARs for recommendation 
downgrades are flipped in sign to make the interpretation consistent. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents past firm performance, which is defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before the 
recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents past market performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the standard deviation 
of the daily S&P 500 index one month before the recommendation. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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significantly (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF; 𝛽  = −0.0933, p = 0.032), to the 
extent that the significant difference in the informativeness of downgrades between 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts in this subsample disappears post-reforms 
(ChgtoTier3 × AFF + ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF;  𝛽  = −0.0036, p = 0.892). 
Columns 7–8 of Table 5.13 focus on downgrades that result in a ‘hold’, ‘sell’ or ‘strong 
sell’ recommendation (i.e., if downgrades from ‘strong buy’ to ‘buy’ are excluded). The 
results are shown in Columns 5–6, but the coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF in Column 8 becomes marginally insignificant in 
two-tailed tests, therefore failing to support H4b. 
Thus, the analysis of the informativeness of recommendation downgrades during M&A 
windows provides some (mixed) evidence of a) the potential existence of a ‘credibility’ 
problem affecting the recommendations of affiliated analysts working under the five-tier 
system pre-reform, and b) a significant reduction in the perceived credibility problem 
after the reforms for affiliated analysts who adopted the new ratings system. I argue that 
this juxtaposition of results in less likely to reflect the effect of a change in the ‘fineness’ 
or ‘clarity’ effect on recommendations because there is no corresponding change in the 
informativeness of downgrades issued by unaffiliated analysts who change their 
recommendation system. 
Table 5.14 reports the conditional informativeness (i.e., CARs for days [−1, +1]) of all 
recommendations issued during the 24-month window after the IPO issue dates, 
categorised into ‘buy-type’ and ‘hold and sell-type’ groups. The R2 statistics range from 
0.06 to 0.08 for informativeness conditional upon ‘buy-type’ recommendations during 
the post-IPO period and from 0.20 to 0.23 for informativeness conditional upon ‘hold and 
sell-type’ recommendations, which are similar to those reported by Kadan et al. (2009, 
Table 3). The coefficients for control variables are generally consistent with the 
predictions in this study, except for MKTSD, EXP and BROKERSIZE. I fail to find a 
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positive association between market volatility (MKTSD) and conditional informativeness 
of recommendations (INFORM) in tests of informativeness conditional upon ‘buy-type’ 
or ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations. The coefficients for EXP are significantly 
positive, which suggests that the informativeness of the recommendations issued by 
analysts with more experience is greater. BROKERSIZE is not significant, suggesting that 
brokerage size may affect the conditional informativeness of recommendations in either 
direction. 
Columns 1–3 of Table 5.14 show the test results of the conditional informativeness of all 
‘buy-type’ recommendations issued during the 24-month post-IPO period. A general 
increase is found in informativeness after the 2002/3 reforms, as evidenced by the 
significantly positive coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 (𝛽 = 0.0155, p < 0.001). However, 
the coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 reported in Column 2 is not significant 
(𝛽 = 0.0007, p = 0.857). Thus, it fails to reject the null form H3 and thereby finds no 
average effect of the change in the ratings system on the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations. Further, Column 3 reports that the coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF is not significant (𝛽 = 0.0088, p = 0.271), thereby 
failing to support H4a. This suggests that there is no increase in the credibility of 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts covering IPO firms following the 2002/3 
reforms. 
Columns 4–6 of Table 5.14 report the test results of the conditional informativeness of 
‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations issued during the 24-month window after the IPO 
issue. In Column 5, the coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 is not significant; 
thus, the null form H3 is not rejected. Further, in Column 6, the coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF is negative but insignificant ( 𝛽  = −0.0058, 
p = 0.707). Thus, there is no evidence to support H4b, which suggests that there is no 
decrease in the informativeness of less favourable recommendations issued by affiliated 
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analysts in the post-IPO 24-month window relative to those issued by unaffiliated analysts. 
Overall, the results shown in Table 5.14 suggest that the change to the three-tier ratings 
system neither impaired nor improved the conditional informativeness of 
recommendations issued in the two-year window following the IPO issue dates. 
Table 5.15 reports the test results of H3 and H4a (4b) by using the conditional 
informativeness of all recommendations issued during the 24-month window following 
the SEO filing dates. Again, I use measure CAR(−1,1) for the informativeness conditional 
upon two types of recommendations: ‘buy-type’ and ‘hold and sell-type’ in tests. The R2 
statistics range from 0.06 to 0.07 for informativeness conditional upon ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations during the post-SEO filing period, and from 0.20 to 0.21 for 
informativeness conditional upon ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations. These statistics 
are similar to those reported by Kadan et al. (2009, Table 3, p. 4201). 
The coefficients for control variables are generally consistent with those reported in Table 
5.14, except for MKTSD. The association between market volatility (MKTSD) and 
conditional informativeness of recommendations (INFORM) is also positive, but the 
coefficients for MKTSD in tests of conditional informativeness conditional upon ‘hold 
and sell-type’ recommendations have weaker significance. 
Columns 1–3 of Table 5.15 report the test results of the change in the conditional 
informativeness of post-SEO ‘buy-type’ recommendations after the 2002/3 reforms. In 
Column 1, the coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 is significantly positive (β = 0.0161; 
p < 0.001), which suggests a general increase in the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations issued in the 24-month post-filing SEO window following the 2002/3 
reforms. In Column 2, this increase is consistently greater for analysts who adopt the 
three-tier ratings system after the reforms, as evidenced by the significant positive 
coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 (β = 0.0053; p = 0.004). Therefore, the null 
of H3 is rejected. However, in Column 3, while there is evidence of an increase in the 
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informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by unaffiliated analysts who 
change to the three-tier ratings system after the reforms relative to other unaffiliated 
analysts (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 β = 0.0057; p = 0.010), there is no evidence of a 
differential effect for affiliated analysts (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF 
𝛽 = −0.0019, p = 0.616). Thus, there is no support for H4a.  
Table 5.14 OLS Regressions of Conditional Informativeness of All the 
Recommendations after the IPO 
 ‘BUY-TYPE’ 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
‘HOLD’ AND ‘SELL-TYPE’ 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 7 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 8 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 7 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 8 
       
ChgtoTier3  −0.0016 0.0001  0.0034 0.0040 
  (0.541) (0.968)  (0.589) (0.600) 
POSTREG2002/3 0.0155*** 0.0148*** 0.0106*** 0.0213*** 0.0205*** 0.0162** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.027) 
AFF   −0.0065   0.0148 
   (0.115)   (0.130) 
ChgtoTier3× 
POSTREG2002/3 
 0.0007 −0.0024  0.0030 −0.0013 
  (0.857) (0.613)  (0.700) (0.892) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF   −0.0049   0.0043 
   (0.335)   (0.731) 
POSTREG2002/3×AFF   0.0125**   0.0219* 
   (0.028)   (0.061) 
ChgtoTier3×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 ×AFF 
  0.0088   −0.0058 
   (0.271)   (0.707) 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.0461*** 0.0461*** 0.0466*** −0.1203*** −0.1201*** −0.1200*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PASTMKTPERF 0.0137 0.0137 0.0140 −0.0335* −0.0340* −0.0347* 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.152) (0.075) (0.070) (0.064) 
MKTSD 0.1987 0.2021 0.1968 0.0974 0.0890 0.2271 
 (0.254) (0.246) (0.259) (0.770) (0.790) (0.495) 
lnDEALVALUE 0.0022* 0.0022* 0.0024* −0.0147*** −0.0148*** −0.0163*** 
 (0.075) (0.073) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0014 0.0014 0.0009 −0.0089*** −0.0089*** −0.0068*** 
 (0.164) (0.158) (0.381) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
EXP 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0009* 0.0008* 0.0004 
 (0.230) (0.231) (0.183) (0.068) (0.078) (0.450) 
FOLLOW −0.0015*** −0.0015*** −0.0015*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000* −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.057) (0.232) (0.231) (0.569) 
BROKERSIZE 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 −0.0002 
 (0.604) (0.503) (0.271) (0.765) (0.809) (0.237) 
Constant −0.0200*** −0.0194*** −0.0149** 0.1414*** 0.1400*** 0.1262*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
ChgtoTier3× 
POSTREG2002/3 + 
ChgtoTier3×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 ×AFF 
  0.0063   −0.0071 
   (0.334)   (0.575) 
       
Observations 10,649 10,649 10,649 5,982 5,982 5,982 
R-squared 0.063 0.064 0.066 0.207 0.207 0.215 
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F test 72.12 60.13 46.61 155.7 130 102.2 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days (i.e., 
[−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; CARs for ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations are 
flipped in sign to make the interpretation consistent. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents past firm performance, which 
is defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents 
past market performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months before the 
recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷  is the standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month before the 
recommendation. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
Columns 4–6 of Table 5.15 show the test results of H3 and H4b, which examine the effect 
of the reforms on the conditional informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ 
recommendations issued within the 24-month window following the SEO filing date. In 
Column 5, the coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 is significantly negative 
(β = −0.0143; p < 0.001), rejecting the null of H3. This implies that the post-reform 
decrease in the informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations issued after the 
SEO filing dates is greater for analysts who switched to the three-tier ratings system than 
for other analysts. Further, in Column 6, the significantly negative coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF (β = −0.0248 p = 0.002) provides support for H4b. 
The post-reform decrease in the conditional informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings system 
between 2002 and 2004 is greater than that exhibited by unaffiliated analysts who 
changed their ratings system. 
Overall, based on the results shown in Table 5.15, the change of ratings system from a 
five-tier to a three-tier scale increases the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations 
and decreases the ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations issued after the SEO filings. 
While there is no incremental change in the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for affiliated analysts who changed their ratings system, the reduction 
in the informativeness of the ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations after the SEO is 
greater for affiliated analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings system relative to 
unaffiliated analysts who made a similar change. 
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Thus, Tables 5.13–5.15 investigate the effects of the 2002/3 reforms on the conditional 
informativeness of sell-side analysts’ recommendations and determine whether any 
effects are stronger for analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings system.  
Table 5.15 OLS Regressions of Conditional Informativeness of All the 
Recommendations in SEO Context 
 ‘BUY-TYPE’ 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
‘HOLD’ AND ‘SELL-TYPE’ 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 7 
CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 8 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 7 
-CAR 
(−1,1) 
Model 8 
       
ChgtoTier3  −0.0024* −0.0027  0.0128*** 0.0095*** 
  (0.079) (0.106)  (0.000) (0.009) 
POSTREG2002/3 0.0161*** 0.0135*** 0.0110*** −0.0004 0.0079*** 0.0045 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.817) (0.005) (0.157) 
AFF   −0.0035   0.0020 
   (0.110)   (0.714) 
ChgtoTier3× 
POSTREG2002/3 
 0.0053*** 0.0057**  −0.0143*** −0.0094** 
  (0.004) (0.010)  (0.000) (0.025) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF   0.0010   0.0130* 
   (0.704)   (0.058) 
POSTREG2002/3×AFF   0.0079***   0.0177*** 
   (0.004)   (0.004) 
ChgtoTier3×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 ×AFF 
  −0.0019   −0.0248*** 
   (0.616)   (0.002) 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.0469*** 0.0469*** 0.0470*** −0.1090*** −0.1089*** −0.1087*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PASTMKTPERF 0.0180*** 0.0178*** 0.0180*** −0.0158** −0.0156** −0.0166** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.022) (0.015) 
MKTSD 0.3745*** 0.3778*** 0.3868*** 0.0204 0.0158 0.0255 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.867) (0.897) (0.834) 
lnDEALVALUE −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 0.0062*** 0.0063*** 0.0058*** 
 (0.783) (0.743) (0.801) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnFIRMCAP −0.0011** −0.0010* −0.0011** −0.0208*** −0.0209*** −0.0202*** 
 (0.046) (0.050) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXP 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0003 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.119) 
FOLLOW −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 
 (0.137) (0.139) (0.251) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.909) (0.861) (0.968) 
BROKERSIZE −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0002*** −0.0003*** 
 (0.703) (0.743) (0.731) (0.117) (0.007) (0.001) 
Constant 0.0017 0.0027 0.0039 0.1291*** 0.1233*** 0.1196*** 
 (0.521) (0.308) (0.175) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
ChgtoTier3× 
POSTREG2002/3 + 
ChgtoTier3×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 ×AFF 
  0.0038   −0.0342*** 
   (0.221)   (0.000) 
       
Observations 31,924 31,924 31,924 21,966 21,966 21,966 
R-squared 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.203 0.204 0.206 
F test 211.1 176.7 133.5 558.9 467.5 355.3 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days (i.e., 
[−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; CARs for ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendation are 
flipped in sign to make interpretation consistent. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents past firm performance, which is 
defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents past 
market performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months before the 
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recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷  is the standard deviation of the daily S&P 500 index one month before the 
recommendation. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
Using a 180-day window surrounding M&A announcements and a 24-month window 
after IPO issues, the results support the null of H3 by showing evidence that for analysts 
who changed to the three-tier ratings system, there is no significant change in price 
reactions to the announcement of either upgrades or downgrades in the M&A context (see 
Table 5.13) or ‘buy-type’ and ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations in the IPO context 
(see Table 5.14) after the 2002/3 reforms. However, in the SEO tests shown in Table 5.15, 
there is a significantly greater increase in the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations and a significantly greater decrease in ‘hold and sell-type’ 
recommendations among analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings system after the 
2002/3 reforms. 
These findings do not support H4a because there is no evidence of an abnormal increase 
in the informativeness of upgrades or ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by affiliated 
analysts who switched their ratings system after the reforms relative to unaffiliated 
analysts who made a similar switch. H4b is supported, as evidenced by the incremental 
decrease in the informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations for affiliated 
analysts who changed their ratings system after the reforms relative to unaffiliated 
analysts who also changed. However, this decrease is significant only in tests using the 
M&A (and not for tests using downgrades to ‘hold, sell and strong sell’) and SEO contexts. 
Overall, the results shown in Tables 5.13–5.15 substantially support H3 in the M&A and 
IPO tests. There is no evidence to suggest any improvements in the perceived credibility 
of the favourable recommendations under the new three-tier ratings system (i.e., upgrades 
or ‘buy-type’ ones) following the 2002/3 reforms, thus failing to support H4a. H4b is 
partially supported by the tests that use downgrades in the M&A context and ‘hold and 
sell-type’ recommendations in the SEO context. This suggests that the news of 
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significance to the extent that investors respond more to affiliated analysts to issue a 
downgrade or unfavourable recommendation was mitigated after those affiliated analysts 
changed to the three-tier ratings system following the 2002/3 reforms. 
I now move on to examine the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on the profitability of 
recommendations, which represents analysts’ ability to identify stocks that are worthy of 
investment and to provide long-run profitable recommendations to investors. H5 
examines the effect of the 2002/3 reforms on the profitability of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for analysts who changed to the three-tier ratings system after the 
2002/3 reforms. H6 further investigates whether there is an incremental effect on 
affiliated analysts who switched to the three-tier ratings system after the 2002/3 reforms 
compared with unaffiliated analysts who made the same change. Models 7 and 8 are 
employed to test H5 and H6, but the controls of PASTFIRMPERF, PASTMKTPERF and 
MKTSD are taken out of the regressions of the profitability tests: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽3𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 9 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
10 
 
Where PROFIT is the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendation (‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’) 
outstanding on the tenth day after the M&A announcement or SEO filing dates, measured 
as buy and hold abnormal returns for a maximum of 90 days (one year). All other 
variables are defined in Sections 4.3.2.3–4.3.2.4, and control variables are described in 
Section 4.4.6. 
Table 5.16 reports the test results of H5 and H6, which examine the effect of the 2002/3 
reforms on the profitability of analyst ‘buy-type’ recommendations outstanding on the 
tenth day after the M&A announcement date (H5) and any differential effect for affiliated 
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analysts (H6). 49  The profitability of all ‘buy’ and ‘strong buy’ recommendations is 
measured by the size-decile adjusted BAHR to an investment in the acquirer’s stock 
initiated 10 days after the M&A announcement date and extending for either one year (or 
90 days) or until the analyst first downgrades their recommendation or stops coverage—
whichever occurs first. Given the small number of ‘sell-type’ recommendations, I do not 
tabulate the regressions of their profitability, but the results of these tests are discussed at 
the end of this section. Given the high leverage potentially exerted by extreme 
observations, I report the results using measures of the dependent variable that have been 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Three samples are employed: (1) the full available sample described in Tables 5.1 and 
5.2, (2) a sample case whereby the recommendations are unchanged relative to the level 
outstanding prior to the 180-day M&A window (i.e., UPGRADE = 0) and (3) a sample 
restricted to cases whereby the prior recommendation was buy (LEVELprior = ‘buy’). 
The results of the tests using the full available sample are presented in Columns 1–4, the 
results of the tests based on the restricted Sample 2 are shown in Columns 5–8 and the 
results of the tests using Sample 3 are reported in Columns 9–12. 
All models are reasonably well fitted. The R2 statistics ranged from 0.009 to 0.02, which 
is similar to the ranges reported by Barniv et al. (2009, Table 5: 0.004~0.135) and Guan 
et al. (2012, Table 4: 0.019~0.02). The coefficients for the control variables are generally 
consistent with the predictions described in Section 4.4.6.50 
                                                 
49 Similar results are obtained if commencing the return measurement window five days after the M&A 
announcement date. 
50  For the full sample (Sample 1) reported in Columns 1–4 of Table 5.16, the M&A deals’ values 
(DEALVALUE) are positively associated with PROFIT for BHAR(0,90day), but not for BHAR(0,1y), which 
suggests that the 90-day profitability of recommendations after the M&A announcement date increases 
when M&A deals’ values are bigger, but this association disappears for the longer period profitability of 
recommendations. The negative association between the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations and 
FIRMCAP is expected, but I find the opposite result for BHAR(0,90day) reported in Column 3–4, which 
implies that greater firm size is associated with larger profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations. There 
is no predicted direction to the coefficients for EXP, but Columns 1–2 show significantly positive 
coefficients for EXP. More experienced analysts may issue more profitable recommendations after the 
M&A announcement date. ‘Buy-type’ recommendations may be expected to have greater performance in 
long-term profitability, but I do not find significantly positive coefficients for FOLLOW in tests of 
BHAR(0,1y) in Columns 1–2. However, there is a negative association between FOLLOW and PROFIT for 
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Table 5.16 shows the OLS analyses of tests of profitability in the M&A context. While I 
find a positive coefficient for the effect of the reforms on profitability in recommendations 
issued by analysts who did not change to the three-tier ratings system in Column 1 of 
Table 5.16 (POSTREG2002/3: 𝛽 = 0.0802; p < 0.001), there is no incremental effect on 
profitability conditional on either changes to the three-tier ratings system or affiliation; 
thus, there is no support for H5 and H6. In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.16, I restrict the 
measurement window for returns to a maximum of 90-days post-investment. In these 
regressions, there is no unconditional effect of the reforms, and while the coefficient for 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 in Colum 3 is insignificant in a two-tailed test (𝛽 = 0.0180; 
p = 0.179), the average analyst working for a broker who changed their ratings system 
transitions from issuing significantly unprofitable recommendations pre-reform 
(ChgtoTier3 in Column 3: 𝛽  = −0.0193; p = 0.074) to issuing returns of mean 
profitability in the post-reform period (ChgtoTier3 + ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 in 
Column 3: sum of coefficients = −0.0012; p = 0.874, untabulated). 
The results for the alternative samples in Columns 5–8 (Sample 2 with UPGRADE = 0) 
and those in Columns 9–12 (Sample 3 with LEVELprior = ‘buy’) are consistent with the 
main results for the full sample. 
 
                                                 
BHAR(0,90day) in Columns 3–4. No positive relation is found between DAYS and PROFIT. Lastly, the 
coefficients for BROKERSIZE are not significant as expected. The remaining results of the control variables 
for Samples 2 and 3 are substantively similar to those for the full sample. 
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Table 5.16 OLS Regressions of Profitability of Recommendation in M&A Context 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 
full sample UPGRADE = 0 LEVELprior = ‘Buy’ 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
             
ChgtoTier3 0.0047 −0.0021 −0.0193* −0.0232** 0.0137 0.0043 −0.0141 −0.0194 −0.0038 −0.0016 −0.0333* −0.0371** 
 (0.830) (0.927) (0.074) (0.037) (0.579) (0.865) (0.239) (0.117) (0.914) (0.965) (0.058) (0.042) 
POSTREG 0.0802*** 0.0834*** 0.0055 0.0058 0.0930*** 0.0974*** 0.0109 0.0115 0.0162 0.0266 −0.0297* −0.0314* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.609) (0.596) (0.000) (0.000) (0.365) (0.348) (0.650) (0.465) (0.092) (0.083) 
AFF  −0.0278  −0.0140  −0.0336  −0.0224  0.1042  −0.0222 
  (0.736)  (0.731)  (0.710)  (0.611)  (0.371)  (0.701) 
ChgtoTier3×POSTREG −0.0079 −0.0043 0.0180 0.0210 −0.0190 −0.0144 0.0114 0.0145 0.0013 −0.0012 0.0317 0.0342 
 (0.770) (0.877) (0.179) (0.129) (0.539) (0.651) (0.450) (0.349) (0.978) (0.980) (0.178) (0.161) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF  0.0792  0.0496  0.0986  0.0614  −0.0666  0.0485 
  (0.389)  (0.276)  (0.327)  (0.210)  (0.620)  (0.467) 
POSTREG×AFF  −0.0726  −0.0124  −0.0885  −0.0162  −0.1814  0.0231 
  (0.444)  (0.792)  (0.394)  (0.748)  (0.175)  (0.729) 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺 ×AFF  −0.0023  −0.0261  0.0002  −0.0211  0.0951  −0.0332 
  (0.984)  (0.646)  (0.999)  (0.730)  (0.588)  (0.704) 
lnDEALVALUE 0.0065 0.0063 0.0070*** 0.0071*** 0.0075 0.0072 0.0057** 0.0058** −0.0005 −0.0006 0.0051 0.0052 
 (0.138) (0.150) (0.001) (0.001) (0.138) (0.154) (0.020) (0.020) (0.945) (0.933) (0.172) (0.160) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0027 0.0023 0.0045* 0.0046* 0.0044 0.0040 0.0071** 0.0071** 0.0090 0.0090 0.0087* 0.0089** 
 (0.618) (0.664) (0.090) (0.087) (0.477) (0.519) (0.018) (0.019) (0.313) (0.315) (0.050) (0.046) 
EXP 0.0040** 0.0040** 0.0008 0.0008 0.0038** 0.0038** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0050* 0.0049* −0.0003 −0.0004 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.343) (0.339) (0.041) (0.041) (0.871) (0.866) (0.066) (0.070) (0.799) (0.797) 
FOLLOW 0.0013 0.0012 −0.0028*** −0.0028*** 0.0016 0.0015 −0.0028*** −0.0028*** 0.0017 0.0016 −0.0029*** −0.0028*** 
 (0.233) (0.264) (0.000) (0.000) (0.212) (0.240) (0.000) (0.000) (0.352) (0.385) (0.001) (0.002) 
DAYS 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.221) (0.207) (0.862) (0.847) (0.349) (0.326) (0.044) (0.041) (0.257) (0.229) (0.806) (0.821) 
BROKERSIZE 0.0004 0.0005 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0002 0.0021* 0.0021* 0.0007 0.0007 
 (0.493) (0.405) (0.719) (0.765) (0.719) (0.846) (0.485) (0.545) (0.064) (0.055) (0.216) (0.215) 
Constant −0.2099*** −0.2050*** −0.0599*** −0.0607*** −0.2415*** −0.2358*** −0.0997*** −0.0998*** −0.2304*** −0.2370*** −0.0670** −0.0688** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.041) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG+Chgto
Tier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺 ×AFF 
 −0.0065  −0.0051  −0.0142  −0.0065  0.0939  0.0010 
  (0.953)  (0.926)  (0.908)  (0.912)  (0.581)  (0.990) 
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Observations 5,767 5,767 5,767 5,767 4,464 4,464 4,464 4,464 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,010 
R-squared 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.010 0.018 0.020 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.009 
F test 9.877 7.314 5.728 4.296 9.210 6.983 4.771 3.743 2.547 1.970 1.899 1.378 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as the buy and hold return for each security less the same-period buy and hold return for the portfolio of firms matched by size decile from CRSP. The window period of BHARs 
starts at the tenth day after the M&A announcement date and lasts for one year, unless the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the investment bank. This table shows winsorised 
BHARs (0,1y) and BHARs (0,90d) at 1/99%; p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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In untabulated tests, I examine the abnormal returns following ‘hold’ recommendations 
(there are too few sell-type recommendations to model sensibly). I did not develop a 
hypothesis for the profitability of ‘hold’ recommendations because the investment advice 
implied is unclear. However, prior literature typically groups ‘hold’ with ‘sell-type’ 
recommendations (Lin & McNichols, 1998), implying that negative returns are more 
profitable. On this basis, I find a general improvement in the profitability of analysts who 
changed their ratings system after the 2002/3 reforms, as evidenced by a significantly 
negative coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 (β = −0.0904 p = 0.053). However, 
this should not necessarily be interpreted as a measure of the success of the reforms 
because it may reasonably be argued that the issuance of a ‘hold’ recommendation for an 
acquirer suggests to investors that the proposed acquisition will not destroy value. 
Table 5.17 presents similar tests of the profitability of recommendations outstanding 10 
days after the SEO filing dates. The investment window of BHARs is terminated either 
after one year (or 90 days) or when the analyst downgrades their buy recommendation to 
a less favourable level or stops their coverage on the SEO firm—whichever occurs first. 
Three samples are used in the testing and they are defined similarly to those in Table 5.16. 
The R2 statistics are fairly well fitted, ranging from 0.008 to 0.031, and similar to those 
reported by Guan et al. (2012, Table 4: 0.019~0.02). Control variables are similar to those 
reported in Table 5.16. 
The analyses of the regression tests of profitability in the SEO context are provided as 
follows. Column 1 shows that there is an overall improvement in the profitability of buy-
type recommendations issued by analysts who did not change to the three-tier ratings 
system, as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficient for POSTREG2002/3 
(β = 0.049; p < 0.001). 
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Table 5.17 OLS Regressions of Profitability of ‘Buy-Type’ Recommendation in SEO Context 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 
full sample UPGRADE = 0 LEVELprior = ‘Buy’ 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
             
ChgtoTier3 0.0005 −0.0004 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0023 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 −0.0032 0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.691) (0.822) (0.216) (0.582) (0.859) (0.570) (0.138) (0.716) (0.916) (0.627) (0.343) (0.559) 
POSTREG2002/3 0.0049*** 0.0029* 0.0003** −0.0001 0.0050 0.0030 0.0005*** 0.0002 0.0073 0.0011 0.0006* −0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.090) (0.018) (0.467) (0.106) (0.440) (0.008) (0.489) (0.137) (0.859) (0.055) (0.996) 
AFF  −0.0064***  −0.0008***  −0.0110**  −0.0008***  −0.0190***  −0.0011** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.010) 
ChgtoTier3× POSTREG2002/3 −0.0010 0.0007 −0.0001 0.0002 −0.0028 −0.0014 −0.0003 −0.0002 0.0073 0.0084 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.575) (0.768) (0.426) (0.335) (0.497) (0.798) (0.207) (0.619) (0.327) (0.377) (0.890) (0.923) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF  0.0020  0.0006**  0.0028  0.0004  0.0053  −0.0001 
  (0.445)  (0.018)  (0.618)  (0.278)  (0.584)  (0.917) 
POSTREG2002/3×AFF  0.0037  0.0011***  0.0020  0.0007**  0.0117  0.0012** 
  (0.150)  (0.000)  (0.724)  (0.050)  (0.186)  (0.027) 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/
3 ×AFF 
 −0.0035  −0.0009**  −0.0008  −0.0003  0.0024  0.0003 
  (0.322)  (0.010)  (0.924)  (0.566)  (0.870)  (0.708) 
lnDEALVALUE −0.0026*** −0.0023*** 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0056*** −0.0047*** −0.0002* −0.0001 −0.0050** −0.0040* −0.0001 −0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.350) (0.224) (0.000) (0.001) (0.074) (0.163) (0.030) (0.083) (0.483) (0.717) 
lnFIRMCAP −0.0006 −0.0010* −0.0002*** −0.0003*** −0.0014 −0.0023* −0.0001 −0.0002** −0.0031 −0.0041** −0.0002 −0.0002* 
 (0.250) (0.060) (0.000) (0.000) (0.234) (0.058) (0.132) (0.048) (0.114) (0.041) (0.122) (0.054) 
EXP −0.0001 −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0010** −0.0010** −0.0000 −0.0000 
 (0.637) (0.913) (0.537) (0.480) (0.166) (0.337) (0.489) (0.604) (0.029) (0.041) (0.215) (0.245) 
FOLLOW 0.0011*** 0.0010*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0021*** 0.0019*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0025*** 0.0024*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.214) (0.180) (0.230) (0.274) (0.050) (0.040) (0.002) (0.003) (0.128) (0.142) (0.224) (0.253) 
BROKERSIZE 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.345) (0.293) (0.120) (0.036) (0.603) (0.401) (0.042) (0.012) (0.433) (0.251) 
Constant −0.0074*** −0.0039 −0.0008*** −0.0004 0.0028 0.0090 −0.0009** −0.0004 0.0024 0.0125 −0.0009* −0.0004 
 (0.002) (0.136) (0.001) (0.120) (0.610) (0.131) (0.012) (0.245) (0.788) (0.202) (0.082) (0.515) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
ChgtoTier3× 
POSTREG2002/3+ 
 −0.0028  −0.0007**  −0.0021  −0.0004  0.0107  0.0003 
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ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/
3 ×AFF 
  (0.311)  (0.014)  (0.721)  (0.228)  (0.349)  (0.580) 
             
Observations 9,053 9,053 9,053 9,053 4,892 4,892 4,892 4,892 1,999 1,999 1,999 1,999 
R-squared 0.019 0.021 0.008 0.010 0.016 0.020 0.012 0.014 0.025 0.031 0.018 0.025 
F test 19.14 15.06 8.152 7.180 9.035 7.672 6.370 5.261 5.671 4.884 3.987 3.901 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as the buy and hold return for each security less the same-period buy and hold return for the portfolio of firms matched by size decile from CRSP. The window period of BHARs 
starts at the tenth day after the SEO filing date and lasts for one year, unless the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the investment bank. This table shows winsorised BHARs (0,1y) 
and BHARs (0,90d) at 1/99%; p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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However, there is no evidence of a differential effect for analysts who changed their 
ratings system (ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3; β = −0.001 p = 0.575 in Column 1), thus 
failing to support H5. In Column2, there is no evidence that the 2002/3 reforms 
abnormally improved the profitability in recommendations issued by affiliated analysts 
who changed to the three-tier ratings system; thus, H6 is not supported 
(ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF; β = −0.0035 p = 0.322). Conversely, the 
significantly negative coefficient for ChgtoTier3 × POSTREG2002/3 × AFF in Columns 2 
suggests that the profitability in recommendations after the SEO filings become worse 
after the 2002/3 reforms for affiliated analysts who adopted the three-tier ratings system 
after the reforms relative to the unaffiliated analysts who made a similar change. Similar 
results are also found for tests using the shorter return window of BHAR (0,90day) in 
Columns 3–4. Lastly, the results for H5 and H6 using the other two restricted samples, 
shown in Columns 4–12, are similar to those reported in Columns 1–2. 
In conclusion, this chapter examines the effectiveness of the 2002/3 regulatory reforms 
in curbing analysts’ potential conflicts of interest resulting from investment banking 
incentives in the M&A advisory or equity underwriting business. The findings show (a) a 
significant decrease in abnormal optimistic bias in recommendation revisions after the 
2002/3 reforms, (b) significantly greater reduction in recommendation optimism for 
analysts whose employers changed the ratings system after the reforms, and (c) a 
generally greater effect of the change in the ratings system on the recommendation 
optimism of affiliated analysts (although this is not the case in relation to tests using SEO-
defined windows). While tests of the effect of the change in the ratings system on LTG 
forecast optimism were less consistent, a significant reduction in optimism is found for 
affiliated analysts who change their ratings system. For the tests conducted in the M&A 
and SEO settings, the market response to the recommendation changes was consistent 
with the 2002/3 reforms for improving the credibility of recommendation downgrades 
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issued by affiliated analysts who changed their ratings system (downgrade decrease in 
informativeness). In SEO windows, there is further evidence of an increase (decrease) in 
the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold and sell-type’) recommendations issued by 
analysts who change to the three-tier ratings system following the 2002/3 reforms. Finally, 
while the reforms as a whole appear to have improved the profitability of analysts’ buy-
type recommendations in both the M&A and SEO windows, there is only evidence in 
short-term (i.e., 90 days) profitability for M&A cases that this was affected in either 
direction by the change in the ratings system. 
5.5.3 Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on the Extent to Which Analyst Optimism Affects 
Deal Flow (Hypotheses 7 and 8) 
Table 5.18 shows the test results of H7 and H8, which examine the regulatory effect of 
the 2002/3 reforms on the sensitivity of brokers’ investment banking market share to the 
lagged optimism of their analysts, and the extent to which this is affected by the change 
in the ratings system. Two main samples are employed: (1) the main sample described in 
Table 5.3 (M&A deals) and (2) the main sample described in Table 5.4 (IPO/SEO deals). 
The tests of H7 and H8 comprise two main regressions as follows: 
∆MSt+1 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽3∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽4𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝛽5 𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀 
Model 
12 
∆MSt+1 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 +
𝛽4∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 + 𝛽5∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 × 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + 𝛽7∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/3 × 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
13 
Definitions of variables: 
∆MSt+1 = The change in a broker’s industry-year market share from year t to 
year t+1. This is measured separately for M&A deals and IPO/SEO 
deals. Industry market share is calculated as the total advisory (or 
underwriting) fee raised by a broker in a particular industry in year t 
divided by total advisory (underwriting) fees of all deals completed 
in that particular industry during the year t. 
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∆OPTt = The change in analyst optimism (from year t−1 to year t), which 
represents the average analyst optimism of recommendations issued 
by brokers’ analysts relative to the consensus optimism level for the 
industry in the year, weighted by the covered firms’ market 
capitalisation. 
𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 = The change in the average size of covered firms (nature log value of 
capitalisation) from year t−1 to year t for brokers in the industry. 
𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 = The change in the industry average of all analysts’ experience from 
year t−1 to year t for a broker, weighted by the analysts’ contribution 
in the industry (i.e., proportion of the recommendations issued by 
individual analysts in the total recommendations issued by all 
analysts in the industry and in the year t). 
𝑀𝑆𝑡 = The brokers’ industry-year market share in year t in M&A deals or 
IPO/SEO deals. 
 
Where ∆MSt+1 is the change in brokers’ industry-year market share from year t to year 
t+1, separately measured for M&A deals and equity issues (IPOs and SEOs).51 ∆OPTt is 
the change value-weighted analyst optimism from year t−1 to year t for brokers. 
POSTREG2002/3 is an indicator variable that equals 1 for observations in the period after 
the 2002/3 reforms, and 0 otherwise. ChgtoTier3 is an indicator variable that equals 1 for 
brokers who adopt the three-tier ratings system induced by the NASD 2711, and 0 
otherwise. In Model 12, the coefficient for the two-way interaction 
∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3 captures the incremental association between abnormal broker 
optimism and subsequent changes in the market share for the post-reform period relative 
to the pre-reform period. A significant negative coefficient for ∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3 
will support H7, which predicts a reduction in the sensitivity of the change in the market 
share of investment banking mandates (∆MSt+1) to the change in lagged analyst optimism 
(∆OPTt) following the 2002/3 reforms. The coefficient for the three-way interaction 
∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3 × ChgtoTier3 in Model 13 captures the incremental association 
between abnormal broker optimism and subsequent changes in the market share 
                                                 
51 I obtain consistent results if the level of the future market share is used as the dependent variable. See 
Appendix 5.2. 
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following the 2002/3 reforms for brokers whose analysts adopt the three-tier ratings 
system relative to brokers whose analysts did not make a similar change. A significant 
negative coefficient for ∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3 × ChgtoTier3 will support H8, which 
proposes that the change in the sensitivity of the brokers’ investment banking market 
share to lagged optimism of their analysts after the 2002/3 reforms should be greater for 
brokers who changed to the three-tier ratings system than for those who did not. Control 
variables are defined in Section 4.4.6. 
The models are generally well fitted, with R2 statistics of 24.2%~24.9% for M&A cases 
and 21.9%~23.1%. These statistics are greater than those reported by Clarke et al. (2007, 
15% for M&A and 13.23% for Equity in Table 5), which is the closest study in nature to 
this thesis. The control variables are generally presented as predicted. chg_lnavgSIZE and 
chg_indavgEXPwindcy are positively associated with ∆MSt+1, but they lack significance. 
Columns 1–3 of Table 5.18 report the tests of H7 and H8 for brokers’ industry-specific 
market share of M&A advisory mandates. The coefficient for ∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3 
in Column 2 is insignificant (β = 0.0327; p = 0.926), therefore failing to support H7. In 
Column 3, the coefficient for the three-way interaction term, 
POSTREG2002/3 × ChgtoTier3 × ∆OPTt is insignificant, suggesting there is no pronounced 
difference in the sensitivity of the change of market shares for an M&A advisory business 
at year t+1 to change in analyst optimism at year t—regardless of whether analysts switch 
to the three-tier ratings system. 
Columns 4–5 of Table 5.18 report similar tests, but they focus on brokers’ industry-
specific market share of equity issue mandates. The average historical association 
between the change in optimism (∆OPTt in Column 4) and the change in future market 
share (∆MSt+1) is not significantly positive. No evidence is found of an average post-
reform reduction in the association between changes in optimism and changes in future 
market share (POSTREG2002/3 × ∆ OPTt; β = 0.0262; p = 0.726 in Column 5), which 
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suggests that the sensitivity of the change in brokers’ future IPO/SEO underwriting 
market share to the lagged optimism of their analysts did not decrease after the 2002/3 
reforms, thus failing to support H7. However, a significantly negative coefficient is found 
for the three-way interaction term POSTREG2002/3 × ChgtoTier3 × ∆OPTt in Column 6 
(β = −0.4457; p = 0.006). This significantly negative coefficient for the main test variable 
suggests that the post-reform reduction in the sensitivity of ∆MSt+1 to ∆OPTt is greater 
for brokerages that changed to the three-tier ratings system relative to those who did not 
make a similar move, therefore supporting H8. 
Collectively, before the 2002/3 reforms, favourable analyst coverage of a company may 
induce that company to hire the broker to underwrite a securities offering. In the findings 
in this chapter, while I do not find that this effect became reduced after the 2002/3 reforms, 
there is an incremental negative association between excess analyst optimism and 
subsequent market shares of equity deals following the 2002/3 reforms for brokers who 
switched to the three-tier ratings system after NASD 2711.  
Table 5.18 OLS Regressions of Market Shares within Industries (M&A and 
IPO/SEO Cases) 
 M&A Cases Equity Cases 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES DV: 
∆MSt+1 
 Model 12 Model 13  Model 12 Model 13 
    
      
∆OPTt 0.1660 0.1193 −0.1858 −0.0103 −0.0216 −0.1806*  
(0.335) (0.620) (0.803) (0.774) (0.632) (0.073) 
POSTREG2002/3  0.0046* 0.0079*  0.0026*** 0.0031***  
 (0.054) (0.053)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ChgtoTier3   0.0039   0.0024***  
  (0.311)   (0.001) 
∆OPTt × 
POSTREG2002/3 
 0.0327 0.3711  0.0262 0.3031** 
 
 (0.926) (0.644)  (0.726) (0.020) 
POSTREG2002/3 ×Chgto
Tier3 
  −0.0047   −0.0009 
 
  (0.343)   (0.392) 
∆OPTt ×ChgtoTier3   0.3383   0.2012*  
  (0.672)   (0.074) 
∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/
3 ×ChgtoTier3 
  −0.4653   −0.4457*** 
 
  (0.634)   (0.006) 
chg_lnavgSIZE 
(∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) 
0.0015 0.0018 0.0018 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.293) (0.213) (0.213) (0.475) (0.268) (0.195) 
chg_indavgEXPwindcy 
(∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦) 
0.0495* 0.0419 0.0445 0.0007 −0.0005 0.0007 
 
(0.079) (0.200) (0.194) (0.876) (0.925) (0.890) 
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MS −0.4780*** −0.4953*** −0.4972*** −0.4037*** −0.4177*** −0.4231***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0082*** 0.0060*** 0.0031 0.0062*** 0.0053*** 0.0041***  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.358) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
      
Observations 546 546 546 3,006 3,006 3,006 
R-squared 0.242 0.247 0.249 0.219 0.225 0.231 
F test 43.18 29.50 17.75 210.9 145.3 89.95 
∆MSt+1 is the change in brokers’ industry-year market share from year t to year t+1. This is measured separately for M&A deals 
and IPO/SEO deals. Industry market share is calculated as the total advisory (or underwriting) fee raised by a broker in a particular 
industry in year t divided by total advisory (underwriting) fees of all deals completed in that particular industry during year t. 
∆ OPTt is the change of analyst optimism (from year t−1 to year t), which represents the average analyst optimism of 
recommendations issued by brokers’ analysts relative to the consensus optimism level for the industry in the year, weighted by 
covered firms’ market capitalisation. ∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸  is the change in the average size of covered firms (nature log value of 
capitalisation) from year t−1 to year t for brokers in the industry. ∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 is the change in the industry average of all 
analysts’ experience from year t−1 to year t for brokers, weighted by analysts’ contributions in the industry (i.e., proportion of the 
recommendations issued by individual analysts in the total recommendations issued by all analysts in the industry and year t). MSt 
is the yearly industry-year market share in year t in M&A deals or IPO/SEO deals. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Summary, Discussion of Results, Contributions and Limitations 
Chapter 5 investigates the four types of effects of the 2002/3 reforms on analyst optimism 
(H1a/b and H2a/b), investor response (H3 and H4a/b) and profitability (H5 and H6), as 
well as the sensitivity of the market share to lagged analyst optimism (H7 and H8) by 
focusing on the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711, a prominent rule in the SRO 
Rules implemented on 9 September 2002. 
Table 5.19 presents the results for all tests of the hypotheses regarding the regulatory 
effects of the 2002/3 reforms, which comprise four panels to test these four effects 
respectively. Panel A summarises the results reported in Tables 5.10–5.12, which 
examine the effect on analyst optimism. The findings generally show that the previously 
documented decrease in analyst optimism following the 2002/3 reforms is associated with 
the analysts’ change to the three-tier ratings system that was encouraged by the disclosure 
requirements of NASD 2711. In Table 5.10, no supportive evidence is found for H1b 
using LTG forecast optimism revision as the alternate tests. However, the level of 
optimism reflected in analyst upgrades to the recommendation for acquirer firms in the 
window surrounding M&A announcements is more profoundly reduced after the reforms 
for analysts employed by brokers who changed from a five-tier to a three-tier ratings 
system. Also, this effect concentrates in the behaviour of analysts with the greatest 
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potential conflicts of interest (affiliated analysts). Further, the results in the settings of 
IPO and SEO shown in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 are generally consistent with those reported 
in Table 5.10. The level of analyst optimism reflected in the analysts’ first 
recommendation during the 24-month window after the IPO issue date or the SEO filing 
date significantly decreases after the reforms for the analysts whose employers changed 
to the three-tier ratings system immediately after NASD 2711. This effect is also greater 
for affiliated analysts for IPO tests (but not for SEO tests). 
Panel B summarises the results reported in Tables 5.13–5.15, which examine the effect 
of the 2002/3 reforms on investor response. The results show that, on average, the change 
in the ratings system did not improve the informativeness of upgrades (or ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations) and did not impair the informativeness of downgrades (or ‘hold or 
sell-type’ recommendations) surrounding the M&A announcement date (or following the 
IPO issue date), therefore supporting H3. However, in Table 5.15, using the SEO context, 
I show that the increase in informativeness of ‘buy-type’ and the decrease in ‘hold and 
sell-type’ recommendations issued by analysts who changed their ratings system are 
greater after the 2002/3 reforms. H4a and H4b are related to the incremental effect on 
conditional informativeness for affiliated analysts. While H4a is not supported throughout 
all of the tests shown in Tables 5.13–5.15, Table 5.13 and Table 5.15 generally support 
H4b. An incremental decrease in ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations is issued by 
affiliated analysts who switched their ratings system after the 2002/3 reforms, consistent 
with an improvement in the credibility of these affiliated recommendations. 
Panel C summarises the results reported in Tables 5.16 and 5.17. There is no evidence 
that the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations increased for analysts who switched 
their ratings system following the 2002/3 reforms. Further, there is no evidence of an 
incremental effect on analyst affiliation. Therefore, both H5 and H6 are not supported. 
203 
Finally, Panel D summarises the results found in Table 5.18, which report the effect of 
the 2002/3 reforms on the extent to which lagged excess analyst optimism affects brokers’ 
subsequent change in market share. H7 is not supported throughout all of the tests (both 
M&A and IPO/SEO deals), which suggests there is no evidence of any decrease in the 
sensitivity of abnormal analyst optimism to deal flow after the 2002/3 reforms. However, 
H8 is supported in tests of IPO/SEO deals, showing that there is a reduction in the 
sensitivity of change of the future market share of IPO/SEO underwriting business to the 
lagged optimism of their analysts after the 2002/3 reforms for brokers who switched to 
the three-tier ratings system following NASD 2711 compared with those who did not. 
Table 5.19 Summary of Results for All Hypotheses Tests Regarding the Regulatory 
Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms 
                                 Hypotheses 
Tables     
Panel A: Tests of Hypotheses That Examine the Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Analyst Optimism 
 H1a H1b H2a (AFF) H2b (AFF) 
Table 5.10 M&A 
(UPGRADErec) 
Yes  Yes  
Table 5.10 M&A 
(UPGRADELTG) 
 No  Yes 
Table 5.11 IPO (level) Yes  Yes  
Table 5.12 SEO (change) Yes  No  
Panel B: Tests of Hypotheses That Examine the Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Investor Response 
 H3 H4a (AFF) H4b (AFF)  
Table 5.13 M&A (upgrades) Yes No   
Table 5.13 M&A (downgrades) Yes  
Yes (no for 
tests using 
downgrades to 
‘hold, sell and 
strong sell’) 
 
Table 5.14 IPO (‘buy and strong 
buy’ cases) 
Yes No   
Table 5.14 IPO (‘hold, sell and 
strong sell’ cases) 
Yes  No  
Table 5.15 SEO (‘buy and 
strong buy’ cases) 
No (+) No   
Table 5.15 SEO (‘hold, sell and 
strong sell’ cases) 
No (-)  Yes  
Panel C: Tests of Hypotheses That Examine the Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on Profitability 
 H5 H6 (AFF)   
Table 5.16 M&A (‘buy and 
strong buy’ cases) 
No No   
Table 5.17 SEO (‘buy and 
strong buy’ cases) 
No No   
Panel D: Tests of Hypotheses That Examine the Effect of the 2002/3 Reforms on the Extent to Which 
Analyst Optimism Affects Deal Flow 
 H7 H8   
Table 5.18 M&A deals No No   
Table 5.18 IPO/SEO deals No Yes   
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The findings regarding recommendation optimism have clear implications for regulators 
who are contemplating modifications to the SRO Rules that would encourage a return to 
the ‘old ways’. While the three-tier system is potentially less informative to investors, 
there is no evidence of a problem in this regard; in fact, there is some evidence of an 
improvement, suggesting that improved credibility of affiliated recommendations 
dominates any effect of restricting analysts’ scope for signalling a change in opinion. 
While the change to the three-tier ratings system is not associated with any improvement 
in the long-term profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations, the findings in this study 
suggest that abnormal analyst optimism has a smaller effect on the increase in the 
IPO/SEO deal flow for brokers who switched their ratings system following the 2002/3 
reforms. 
The methodology design in this thesis has several limitations. First, it is extremely 
challenging to extricate the effect of other coincidental events that may also influence 
analysts’ evaluations for cover firms, such as the subprime mortgage crisis that occurred 
during the US recession from December 2007 to June 2009. Further, the close proximity 
of the 2002/3 reforms to the introduction of the Regulation Fair Disclosure Act (effective 
October 2000) adds further noise to tests of the average effect of the 2002/3 reforms. 
However, it is not clear why this earlier legislation would bias tests of the effect of the 
change in the ratings system. Second, the recommendation and forecast data are subject 
to the vagaries of the I/B/E/S service, including a lack of current translation files with 
which to definitively identify brokers and analysts. Finally, the results focus on the 
behaviour of analysts around M&A transactions and IPO/SEO deals, and may not 
generalise to other circumstances. 
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Appendix 5.1 OLS Regressions of Analyst Optimism: Initial Recommendation in 
SEO Context 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES LEVELSEO3tier  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 3 
Annual PSM 
Model 3 
Annual PSM 
(1998 - 
2007) 
      
ChgtoTier3  0.0524*** 0.0387*** 0.0249 0.0540** 
  (0.000) (0.006) (0.162) (0.034) 
POSTREG2002/3 -0.1828*** -0.1371*** -0.1445*** -0.1584*** -0.1964*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AFF 0.0811***  0.0542*** 0.0435** -0.0374 
 (0.000)  (0.005) (0.047) (0.273) 
ChgtoTier3×POSTREG2002/3  -0.1113*** -0.0762*** -0.0624*** -0.0876*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.008) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF   0.0414* 0.0591** 0.0720* 
   (0.057) (0.033) (0.091) 
POSTREG2002/3×AFF -0.0288*  0.0405* 0.0528* 0.1155*** 
 (0.076)  (0.095) (0.055) (0.005) 
ChgtoTier3× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/
3 ×AFF 
  -0.1232*** -0.1461*** -0.1731*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
lnDEALVALUE -0.0485*** -0.0446*** -0.0477*** -0.0470*** -0.0235* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.071) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0397*** 0.0336*** 0.0394*** 0.0407*** 0.0307*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
EXP -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0024* -0.0033 
 (0.243) (0.720) (0.220) (0.065) (0.133) 
FOLLOW -0.0103*** -0.0107*** -0.0102*** -0.0110*** -0.0094*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0015*** -0.0017*** -0.0021*** -0.0016** -0.0016** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.049) 
Constant cut1 3.8374*** 3.8661*** 3.8213*** 3.8335*** 3.8374*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
AFF+POSTREG×AFF 0.0522***     
 (0.000)     
ChgtoTier3 ×   POSTREG2002/3 + 
ChgtoTier3 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺2002/
3 ×AFF 
 
 
-0.1994*** -0.2084*** -0.2606*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 19,252 19,252 19,252 13,621 6,282 
R-squared 0.071 0.070 0.074 0.074 0.074 
F test 125.1 113.5 98.04 79.26 41.95 
LEVELSEO3tier is the standardised level of initial recommendation following the SEO issue date, coded of three-tier rating system 
such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’ and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’; 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
brokerage house applies the new three-tier ratings system in stock recommendations during the period 2002–2004, and 0 otherwise. 
POSTREG2002/3 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 9 September 2002—the deadline 
for brokerages to comply with the disclosure requirement of the SRO Rules—and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates that the analyst is 
affiliated with the SEO issuer’s underwriter; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-
end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total proceeds amount in the SEO deal. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-
adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of SEO firms as at the last trading day of 
the calendar month before the analyst’s report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analyst’s first published report on 
I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst’s report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within 
one calendar month preceding the recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between the 
SEO issue date and the analyst’s report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house 
during the same calendar month of the recommendation announcement date. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 5.2 OLS Regressions of Market Shares within Industries (M&A and IPO/SEO cases) Using MSt+1 as the Dependent Variable 
M&A Cases Equity Cases 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES DV:  
MSt+1 
   
VARIABLES DV:  
MSt+1 
   
    
        
∆OPTt 0.1660 0.1192 -0.1854 ∆OPTt 0.0070 -0.0114 -0.1153  
(0.335) (0.620) (0.803)  (0.840) (0.792) (0.235) 
POSTREG2002/3  0.0046* 0.0078* POSTREG2002/3  0.0026*** 0.0032***  
 (0.054) (0.054)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ChgtoTier3   0.0039 ChgtoTier3   0.0025***  
  (0.311)    (0.000) 
∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3  0.0328 0.3707 ∆OPTt × POSTREG2002/3  0.0454 0.2359*  
 (0.926) (0.644)   (0.529) (0.059) 
POSTREG2002/3 ×ChgtoTier3   -0.0047 POSTREG2002/3 ×ChgtoTier3   -0.0011  
  (0.343)    (0.293) 
∆OPTt ×ChgtoTier3   0.3378 ∆OPTt ×ChgtoTier3   0.1323  
  (0.672)    (0.223) 
∆OPTt×POSTREG2002/3×ChgtoTier3   -0.4647 ∆OPTt×POSTREG2002/3 ×ChgtoTier3   -0.3112**  
  (0.635)    (0.048) 
chg_lnavgSIZE 0.0015 0.0018 0.0018 chg_lnavgSIZE 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003  
(0.293) (0.213) (0.213)  (0.481) (0.267) (0.198) 
chg_indavgEXPwindcy 0.0495* 0.0419 0.0445 chg_indavgEXPwindcy 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0006  
(0.079) (0.200) (0.194)  (0.788) (0.968) (0.896) 
MS 0.5219*** 0.5047*** 0.5028*** MS 0.5884*** 0.5743*** 0.5683***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0082*** 0.0060*** 0.0031 Constant 0.0063*** 0.0053*** 0.0041***  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.357)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
       
Observations 546 546 546 Observations 3,006 3,006 3,006 
R-squared 0.273 0.278 0.279 R-squared 0.391 0.396 0.400 
F test 50.68 34.52 20.74 F test 482.2 328.1 199.9 
MSt+1 is the brokers’ industry-year market at year t+1. This is measured separately for M&A deals and IPO/SEO deals. Industry market share is calculated as the total advisory (or underwriting) fee 
raised by a broker in a particular industry in year t divided by total advisory (underwriting) fees of all deals completed in that particular industry during year t. ∆OPTt is the change of analyst optimism 
(from year t−1 to year t), which represents the average analyst optimism of recommendations issued by brokers’ analysts relative to the consensus optimism level for the industry in the year, weighted 
by covered firms’ market capitalisation. ∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the change in the average size of covered firms (nature log value of capitalisation) from year t−1 to year t for brokers in the industry. 
∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 is the change in the industry average of all analysts’ experience from year t−1 to year t for brokers, weighted by analysts’ contributions in the industry (i.e., proportion of the 
recommendations issued by individual analysts in the total recommendations issued by all analysts in the industry and year t). MSt is the yearly industry-year market share in year t in M&A deals or 
IPO/SEO deals. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 5.3 Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
 M&A IPO SEO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 3  Model 3 Annual 
PSM 
Model 3  Model 3 Annual 
PSM 
Model 3  Model 3 Annual 
PSM 
       
ChgtoTier3 0.0435 0.1311* 0.2935** 0.1601 0.2422*** 0.1675* 
 (0.496) (0.099) (0.017) (0.263) (0.001) (0.073) 
POST-RegFD -0.6528*** -0.6188** -0.1435 0.0144 0.0250 -0.0664 
 (0.001) (0.026) (0.602) (0.961) (0.886) (0.726) 
ChgtoTier3×POST-RegFD 0.0240 0.0598 -0.0208 -0.0886 0.0891 -0.0097 
 (0.914) (0.879) (0.945) (0.811) (0.668) (0.970) 
Constant cut1 -5.8857*** -5.8780*** -5.8025*** -5.3544*** -4.3450*** -3.6266*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant cut2 -2.0951*** -2.0238*** -2.6338*** -2.4683*** -1.4166*** -0.9491*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
       
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,849 2,241 4,061 1,985 6,345 3,245 
R-squared 0.110 0.108 0.0515 0.0489 0.0220 0.0211 
This table reports ordered logit regressions of recommendation optimism for the M&A, IPO and SEO samples, for a period spanning 1993 to 2001 inclusive. In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable, 
UPGRADEM&Arec, is an ordinal variable that is equal to 1 if the analyst upgrades their recommendation for acquirer j within ±90 days of the M&A announcement, 0 if the recommendation is unchanged 
and −1 if there is a downgrade. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 (Columns 5 and 6), LEVELIPO3tier (LEVELSEO3tier), is the standardised level of the analyst’s initial post-issue recommendation 
within the two-year window after the IPO issue date (SEO filing date) of the firm. Recommendations issued under the five-tier ratings system are converted to their three-tier equivalent (‘strong buy’ is 
recoded to ‘buy’ and ‘strong sell’ is recoded to ‘sell’). POST-RegFD is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the recommendation is issued between 24 October 2000 and 31 December 2001. Standard 
errors are clustered at the stock level. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Appendix 5.4 OLS Regressions of Analyst Optimism (Recommendation Levels) 
Using an Overall Measure of Analyst Affiliation for the Top-25 Investment Banks  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Model 1 Model 1 
For GS 
analysts 
Model 1 
For non-GS 
analysts 
Model 2 Model 3 
      
ChgtoTier3    0.0011 -0.0045 
    (0.898) (0.628) 
POSTREG2002/3 -0.3545*** -0.4689*** -0.2468*** -0.2100*** -0.2103*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AFF2 0.0634*** 0.0268*** 0.0909***  0.0663** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.029) 
ChgtoTier3× POSTREG2002/3    -0.1732*** -0.1710*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
ChgtoTier3×AFF2     -0.0030 
     (0.924) 
POSTREG2002/3 ×AFF2 -0.0475*** 0.0410*** -0.0852***  0.0077 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.832) 
ChgtoTier3×POSTREG2002/3×AFF2     -0.0365 
     (0.329) 
lnDEALVALUE -0.0102*** -0.0086*** -0.0118*** -0.0093*** -0.0098*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0526*** 0.0604*** 0.0489*** 0.0534*** 0.0538*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXP 0.0016*** -0.0003 0.0020*** 0.0010* 0.0007 
 (0.007) (0.687) (0.003) (0.097) (0.215) 
FOLLOW -0.0111*** -0.0094*** -0.0125*** -0.0112*** -0.0110*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0014*** -0.0004*** -0.0022*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 3.5280*** 3.4416*** 3.5621*** 3.5220*** 3.5152*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
ChgtoTier3 ×  POSTREG2002/3+ 
ChgtoTier3×POSTREG2002/3×AFF2 
    -0.2075*** 
     (0.000) 
      
Observations 128,981 68,393 60,588 128,981 128,981 
R-squared 0.094 0.122 0.063 0.099 0.100 
F test 601.9 567.4 282.4 622 447.3 
LEVEL3tier is the standardised level of recommendations issued during the 24 months following the investment 
banking transactions (equity, debts, and M&As), coded of three-tier rating system such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 
3 = ‘hold’ and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’; 𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑡𝑜3𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the brokerage house 
applies the new three-tier ratings system in stock recommendations during the period 2002–2004, and 0 otherwise. 
POSTREG2002/3 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 9 September 
2002—the deadline for brokerages to comply with the disclosure requirement of the SRO Rules—and 0 otherwise; 
𝐴𝐹𝐹2 indicates that analysts’ employers (investment banks) are affiliated with the covered firms with IPOs/SEOs, 
debts, and M&As through underwriting or advisory mandates; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions 
of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total proceeds amount in the IPO deal. 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of 
market capitalisation of IPO firms as at the last trading day of the calendar month before the analyst’s report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is 
the number of years starting from the analyst’s first published report on I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst’s report; 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within one calendar month preceding 
the recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between the IPO issue date 
and the analyst’s report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house 
during the same calendar month of the recommendation announcement date. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Chapter 6 Sample and Results of Tests of the Impact of Expiration of 
Funding Independent Research 
Introduction 
This chapter reports and discusses the empirical results of testing hypotheses which 
examine the regulatory impact of the 2009/10 expiration of five-year procurement of 
independent research on analyst optimism (H9 and H10) and investor behaviour (H11a/b 
- H14) as well as on the extent to which analyst optimism affects the brokers’ deal flows 
(H15).52 Section 6.2 describes the procedure of the sample selection. Following this, 
Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 provide the descriptive statistics of samples for testing 
hypotheses. Section 6.5 discusses the multivariate results. Lastly, Section 6.6 summarises 
the results and concludes this chapter. 
Sample Selection 
The sample selection is similar to previous procedure for the tests of the regulatory 
impacts of the 2002/3 reforms except for two revisions. First, to test the impacts of the 
expiration of funding independnet research in 2009/10, I include the samples that consist 
of analyst reports issued by US analysts for whom an employing brokerage can be 
identified from I/B/E/S and SDC databases for the years 2004 - 2014. Second, because of 
the pre-post reform tests of changes in the analyst optimism of GS analysts relative to 
non-GS analysts, the samples include all the analyst outputs issued by both GS and non-
GS signatory brokers. The details of data selection are introduced as follow. To observe 
analyst optimism surrounding the M&A announcement, I first collect the main properties 
of analyst reports, like analyst recommendations and long-term growth forecasts, for US 
public acquirers in M&A deals. To observe analyst and investor behaviour surrounding 
equity issues, I include analysts’ recommendations and underwriters for issuers in 
                                                 
52 The five-year period of funding independent research required by the Global Settlement is July 26, 2004 
– July 26, 2009 but the five-year settlement with Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners 
L.L.C. began on March 26, 2005 and expired on March 26, 2010. (See supra note 2). 
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IPO/SEO deals. Also, I collect and calculate the brokers’ market shares of both M&A and 
IPO/SEO transactions, preparing for the tests of brokers’ deal flow. The main samples 
include all the analyst outputs issued by both GS and non-GS signatory brokers. Further, 
I exclude the observations before July 26th, 2004, and those in the transition period 
between July 26th, 2009 and March 26th, 2010 due to the difficulty in separating effects 
of regulatory developments and occurrences in close order during those periods.  
Table 6.1 presents the selection procedure for the samples of recommendation revisions 
and long-term growth forecasts (LTG forecasts) within the 180-day window surrounding 
the M&A announcement date. Following Kolasinski and Kothari (2008), I only restrict 
samples to statutory mergers and acquisitions of assets deals required public acquirers, 
related to clear analysts’ investment banking incentives. I successfully match advisors to 
brokers by their names and then merge available cases of M&A deals for reversion of 
recommendations and LTG forecasts. The samples are further selected by the following 
requirements so I can efficiently calculate the proxies for analyst optimism. First, I 
eliminate observations in lack of prior recommendation (forecast) within the two-year 
pre-event windows of M&A announcement date. Second, I also require that there are at 
least two unaffiliated analysts following the acquirer to calculate the LTG forecasts’ 
consensus which is used for optimism revision measure. Lastly, I exclude the 
observations with missing data of corresponding deal value and control variables. After 
eliminating observations occurred before July 26, 2004, and in the transition period (i.e. 
July 26th, 2009 - March 26th, 2010), I obtain 14,591 cases in the sample of 
recommendation revisions and 1,964 in the LTG forecast optimism revisions.  
Of the 14,591 observations of recommendation changes, 4,141 observations are non-zero 
value (i.e. either an ‘upgrade’ (2,140) or a ‘downgrade’ (2,001)). Of this number, 3,901 
have sufficient data (including controls) to estimate abnormal returns over the 3-day 
window surrounding the announcement of the recommendation change. The number of 
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available observations of the ‘buy-type’ recommendation level current ten days after the 
M&A announcement date is 4,741, which after matching to the requisite return data yields 
a final sample of 4,445 ‘buy-type’ recommendations used in testing my profitability 
hypotheses. 
Table 6.1 Sample Selection for Recommendations and LTG Forecasts in M&A 
context 
Descriptions Recommendations LTG Forecasts 
Total number of M&A deals with public acquirers from SDC 
between 2004 and 2014 (October) 
5,300 5,300 
Total number of M&A deal which can match brokers and 
advisors (at least one matched broker as advisor for a M&A 
deal) 
4,154 11,110 
Cases merged M&A deals with recommendations or 
forecasts 
38,677 21,167 
Less LTG forecasts for which consensus cannot be calculated  10,687 
Less missing data for controls -4,530 -2,077 
Observations with available data 1993–2014 37,465 8,610 
Less observations before 26th July 2004 and in transition 
period (July 26th, 2009 and March 26th, 2010) 
-22,874 -6,646 
Final available sample  14,591 1,964 
Available sample of recommendation upgrades used to test 
conditional informativneess 
2,021 
Available sample of recommendation downgrades used to 
test conditional informativness 
1,880 
Available sample of buy-type recommendations used to test 
profitability 
4,445 
 
Table 6.2 describes the selection procedure for the samples of recommendations within 
the 24-month window during the post IPO/SEO period as follow. First, the samples of 
firms which raise capital through an IPO or SEO during the period between 1993 and 
2014 are provided by the SDC database. Following Kadan et al. (2009), I exclude all 
closed-end funds and trusts, as well as all unit investment trusts to prepare the deals of 
IPO or SEO for the match. Second, a broker is identified as affiliated to the IPO or SEO 
deal as long as it was a lead underwriter or a co-manager in the offering (I require at least 
one matched broker as a lead underwriter). Then, I merge deals with affiliated and 
unaffiliated recommendations which are the first time issued during the 24-month 
window of post IPO/SEO period and require one deal retain at least one of each affiliated 
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and unaffiliated recommendations. Third, after eliminating all the observations without 
available data for control variables, I further exclude the observations beyond the sample 
period (i.e. eliminating cases before July 26, 2004, and between July 26th, 2009 and 
March 26th, 2010). Thereby I leave the final samples to 10,046 of initial 
recommendation-IPO deal cases and 14,372 of initial recommendation-SEO deal cases.  
 
There are 6,214 (21,347) cases of ‘buy-type’ and 6,079 (23,041) cases of ‘hold or sell-
type’ recommendations issued in a 24-month period of post-IPO (post-SEO filings), after 
eliminating those cases which do not have sufficient data to estimate cumulative abnormal 
returns CAR(-1,1) surrounding the announcement of recommendations. The number of 
available observations of the ‘buy-type’ recommendation level current 10 days after the 
SEO filing date is 4,328. After matching to the requisite return data, 3,688 ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations left for the final sample used in testing the profitability hypotheses. 
   
Table 6.2 Sample Selection for Recommendations in IPO/SEO context 
Descriptions IPO SEO 
Total number of IPO/SEO deals with underwriters from SDC 
1993 and 2014 
6,046 11,235 
Total number of IPO/SEO deal which can match brokers and 
underwriters (at least one matched broker as an underwriter for 
an IPO or a SEO deal) 
5,222 10,588 
Cases merged IPO/SEO deals with recommendations  44,218 115,860 
Cases of initial recommendations after IPO or SEO 24,007 37,117 
Less missing data for controls -4,350 -5,080 
Observations with available data 1993–2014 22,865 36,089 
Less observations before 26th July 2004 and in transition 
period (July 26th, 2009 and March 26th, 2010) 
-12,819 -21,717 
Final available sample  10,046 14,372 
Available sample of ‘buy-type’ recommendation used to test 
conditional informativneess 
6,214 21,347 
Available sample of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendation used 
to test conditional informativneess 
6,079 23,041 
Available sample of buy-type recommendations used to test 
profitability 
N/A 3,688 
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Table 6.3 reports the selection criteria for industry-year observations of the deal flows for 
the brokers who retain or obtain advisory mandates for acquirer or target firms. I follow 
a procedure similar to that shown in Table 4.3 except that I include both GS and non-GS 
signatory brokers in the sample. Panel A is exactly the same as the Panel A of Table 4.3, 
which leads 22,827 cases of broker-transaction pairs available for calculation of market 
shares. Panel B reports the broker-industry-year level data using the same selection 
procedure shown in Panel B of Table 4.3, and I obtain 16,701 broker-industry-year 
observations for optimism. Panel C reports the broker-industry-year observations of the 
change in IPO/SEO market shares. I convert 22,827 cases of broker-transaction pairs 
obtained from Panel A into observations at the industry-year level and have 5,276 cases 
of MSt for which further has been calculated into 4,570 industry-year cases of MSt+1. I 
then merge the market share data with industry-year recommendation optimism for each 
broker (16,703 cases from Panel B), which results in 3,294 broker-industry-year cases of 
MSt+1. After excluding those observation missing control variables (443 cases) and the 
observations where MSt+1 equals zero or one,53 I also further exclude the observations 
where the change of market share at the preceding year (∆MSt+1) is not available (502 
cases). All observations occurred before July 26, 2004, and in the transition period 
between July 26th, 2009 and March 26th, 2010 are not included (707 cases). Lastly, I 
delete the cases within infrequent industries having with infrequent incidence (i.e. less 
than 30 times; the industries for agriculture, forestry and fishing (indc = 1), construction 
(indc = 3), and wholesale trade (indc = 6)). I successfully obtain the final sample in the 
change of market shares for M&A deals with 677 industry-year observations. 
 
 
                                                 
53 I obtain results similar to my main ones if using different samples without excluding the extreme values 
(i.e. IndMSt+1=1 or 0) in tests of M&A deal flows and for tests of IPO/SEO deal flows, the results have 
stronger significance. 
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Table 6.3 Sample Selection for Deal Flow of M&A Deals 
Descriptions M&A 
Panel A Data of the Market Share at Broker-Transaction Level 
Total number of  acquirer and target advisory of M&A transactions 
from SDC between 1990 and 2016 (November) 
 24,360 
LESS those M&A deals which cannot be matched with any broker, 
leaving the no. of M&A transactions which can match brokers and 
advisors (at least one matched broker as an advisor for a M&A deal) 
-5,809 18,551 
No. of broker-acquirer or target advisory transaction pairs, estimated 
from the M&A transactions with matched brokers and advisors above  
 22,943 
LESS those brokers who never get Acquirer or Target Advisory deals 
(broker-transaction sample) 
-70 22,873 
LESS missing values of calculated market share 
Broker-acquirer or target advisory transaction pairs with 
market share (broker-transaction sample) 
-46 22,827 
Panel B Recommendation Optimism (from I/B/E/S) 
Available analyst-covered firm recommendations in Detail History 
File (1993-2015) 
 545,777 
LESS missing values of GVKEY -4,765 541,012 
LESS missing values of INDUSTRY data -20,766 520,246 
LESS missing values of MKTCAP, leaving the final available sample 
of analyst-covered firm recommendations 
-1,952 518,294 
No. of broker-industry-year observations for optimism, 
estimated from the analyst-covered firm recommendations 
above 
 16,703 
Panel C Data of the Change in Market Share at Broker-Industry-Year Level 
Broker-acquirer or target advisory cases with market share, estimated 
from Broker-acquirer or target advisory transaction pairs with 
market share from Panel A (broker-industry-year sample, MSt) 
 5,276 
LESS missing values of calculated lead market share, leaving the 
sample of broker-acquirer or target advisory cases with lead market 
share (broker-industry-year sample, MSt+1) 
-706 4,570 
LESS missing values of broker-industry-year observations for 
optimism from Panel B, leaving merged broker-industry-year 
sample with broker-industry-year observations for optimism 
-1,276 3,294 
LESS missing values of Controls -443 2,851 
LESS cases where lead market share equals to zero or one -945 1,906 
LESS cases where the change of market share is not available -502 1,404 
LESS observations before July 26th 2004 and in transition period (July 
26th , 2009 and March 26th, 2010) 
-707 697 
LESS observations in industries with infrequent incidence (indc = 1,3, 
and 6) 
Final sample of the change in market share at broker-
industry-year level 
-30 667 
 
Table 6.4 shows the sample selection for brokers’ winning the underwriting mandates of 
equity-issuing transactions (i.e. flow of IPO/SEO deals). I apply the same selection 
criteria as that used in Table 4.4 but do not constrain samples to non-GS signatories. Panel 
A reports the broker-transaction level data for equity deals. I applied the same selection 
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procedure introduced in Panel A of Table 4.4. I collect all the deals of the equity issues 
from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum between 1990 and 2016, except excluding all 
closed-end funds and trusts, as well as all unit investment trusts. I then manage the 
industry-year sample of broker-deal pairs (97,441 cases) and calculate the lead market 
share (97,282 cases). Panel B follows the same selection criteria to that in Panel B of 
Table 4.4, which leads to 16,703 broker-industry-year observations for analyst optimism. 
Panel C reports the broker-industry-year data for the change in IPO/SEO market shares 
(∆MSt+1). I convert the broker-transaction 16,703 cases obtained from Panel B into 
10,901 broker-industry-year cases of MSt, for which 9,656 cases of MSt+1 can be 
calculated. Further, I merge this lead value of market share data (MSt) with the size-
adjusted recommendation optimism at broker-industry-year level (i.e. 16,703 cases from 
Panel B), leaving 6,748 broker-industry-year observations. I then exclude the 
observations with missing data of control variables (535 cases) and where the lead value 
of the market share is zero or one (727 cases).54 I calculate the change in market share 
(∆MSt+1) and the change in recommendation optimism within the industries as well as 
the change in controls and obtain 4,694 broker-industry-year observations of ∆MSt+1. 
Finally, after eliminating observations before July 26, 2004, and in the transition period 
between July 26th, 2009 and March 26th, 2010 (i.e. 2,776 cases in total), I obtain the final 
sample in the change of market shares for IPO/SEO deals with 1,918 industry-year cases. 
Table 6.4 Sample Selection for Deal Flow of IPO/SEO Deals 
Descriptions IPO/SEO 
Panel A Broker-Transaction Level Data (Market Share Data from IPO/SEO Transactions) 
Total number of  IPO and SEO transactions from SDC between 1990 
and 2016 (November) 
 20,887 
LESS those IPO and SEO deals which cannot be matched with any 
broker, leaving the no. of IPO and SEO transactions which can match 
brokers and underwriters (at least one matched broker as an 
underwriter for an IPO or SEO deal) 
-1,919 18,968 
No. of broker-IPO or SEO underwriting transaction pairs, estimated 
from the IPO and SEO transactions with matched brokers and 
underwriters above 
 97,441 
                                                 
54 Supra note 1. 
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LESS those brokers who never get IPO or SEO deals (broker-
transaction sample) 
-0 97,441 
Less missing values of calculated market share 
Broker-IPO or SEO transaction pairs with market share 
(broker-transaction sample) 
-129 97,282 
Panel B Recommendation Optimism (from I/B/E/S) 
Available analyst-covered firm recommendations in Detail History 
File (1993-2015) 
 545,777 
LESS missing values of GVKEY -4,765 541,012 
LESS missing values of INDUSTRY data -20,766 520,246 
LESS missing values of MKTCAP, leaving the final available sample 
of analyst-covered firm recommendations 
-1,952 518,294 
No. of broker-industry-year observations for optimism, 
estimated from the analyst-covered firm recommendations 
above 
 16,703 
Panel C Data of the Change in Market Share at Broker-Industry-Year Level 
Broker-IPO or SEO transaction pairs with market share, estimated 
from broker-IPO or SEO transaction pairs with market share 
from Panel A (broker-industry-year sample, MSt) 
 10,901 
LESS missing values of calculated lead market share, leaving the 
sample of broker-IPO or SEO cases with lead market share (broker-
industry-year sample, MSt+1) 
-1,245 9,656 
LESS missing values of broker-industry-year observations for 
optimism from Panel B, leaving merged broker-industry-year 
sample with broker-industry-year observations for optimism 
-2,908 6,748 
LESS missing values of Controls -535 6,213 
LESS cases where lead market share equals to zero or one -727 5,486 
LESS cases where the change of market share is not available -792 4,694 
LESS observations before July 26th 2004 and in transition period (July 
26th , 2009 and March 26th, 2010) 
-2,776 1,918 
LESS observations in industries with infrequent incidence (indc =1 
and 10) 
Final sample of the change in market share at broker-
industry-year level 
-0 1,918 
 
Descriptive statistics for tests using the M&A context 
Table 6.5 presents frequency and descriptive statistics for the measures utilised to 
estimate the analyst optimism surrounding the M&A announcement date employed for 
tests of H9 and H10. Panel A shows the frequencies of recommendation changes for 
downgrades, flats, and upgrades in the pre-expiration (July 26, 2004 – July 26th, 2009) 
and post-expiration (March 26th, 2010 – December 31st, 2014) periods. Panel B tabulates 
statistics for long-term growth forecasts used in the calculation of my second optimism 
measure (i.e. LTG forecast optimism revisions).    
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Panel A starts with the sample of 7,603 cases during the pre-expiration period, which 
consists of 3,472 recommendation changes issued by analysts employed by the GS 
signatories (hereafter, GS analysts) and 4,131 cases issued by analysts employed by the 
non-GS signatories (hereafter, non-GS analysts). In general, there is on average a slightly 
higher frequency of downgrades (15.97%) than upgrades (15.59%) and this trend is 
stronger for non-GS analysts (18.59% downgrades, 17.70% upgrades) relative to that for 
GS analysts (12.85% downgrades, 13.08% upgrades). However, I find no univariate 
evidence that GS analysts are more optimistic in the 180-day period centred on the M&A 
announcement date in the pre-expiration period than non-GS analysts (𝑡 = 0.8707; 𝑝 = 
192; untabulated). In the rows dealing with the post-expiration period (the final section 
of Panel A), there are 6,988 cases of recommendation changes in total, which consists of 
2,854 cases issued by GS analysts and 4,134 cases issued by non-GS analysts. Both 
cohorts of GS and non-GS analysts exhibit more upgrades than downgrades (11.18% 
upgrades; 9.78% downgrades for GS analysts and 15.38% upgrades; 12.29% downgrades 
for non-GS analysts) in the post-expiration period. However, I do not find that analyst 
optimism for GS-employed analysts is greater than that for non-GS analysts in this post-
expiration period (𝑡 = 1.3963; 𝑝 = 0.920; untabulated).   
In my univariate tests using pre-post periods, I do not find that GS analysts are more 
optimistic than non-GS analysts following the 2009/10 expiration (mean of UPGRADE 
in the difference-in-difference test is -0.028; t = 1.58; p = 0.114; untabulated). However, 
the analyst optimism for affiliated analysts employed by GS signatories is significantly 
greater during the post-expiration period, than that for affiliated analysts who are also 
employed by the GS signatories during the pre-expiration period (i.e. means of 
UPGRADE for GS affiliated analysts: -0.0031 pre-expiration and 0.0268 post-expiration; 
𝑡 = 1.285; p = 0.099; untabulated).   
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Panel B of Table 6.5 shows descriptive statistics for long-term growth forecasts, which 
consists of 1,399 cases in the pre-expiration period and 625 cases in the post-expiration 
period, respectively. I find no evidence of significant difference in mean of growth 
forecasts for analysts employed by the GS signatories compared with that for non-GS 
analysts before and after the 2009/10 expiration (mean of LTG forecast in the difference-
in-difference test is 0.007; t = 0.19; p = 0.852; untabulated).   
It is worth noting that the untabulated results of univariate tests show that there is 
significant increase in LTG forecast optimism revision after the 2009/10 expiration for: 
(1) GS analysts (means of UPGRADEM&ALTG: -0.0063 pre-expiration and 0.0047 post-
expiration; 𝑝 = 0.036), (2) affiliated analysts (means of UPGRADEM&ALTG: -0.0112 pre-
expiration and 0.0046 post-expiration; 𝑝 = 0.052), and (3) affiliated analysts employed 
by the GS signatories (means of UPGRADEM&ALTG: -0.0162 pre-expiration and 0.0062 
post-expiration; 𝑝 = 0.016). However, I cannot find evidence that LTG forecast optimism 
revision by GS analysts is greater than that by non-GS analysts before and after the 
2009/10 expiration (mean of UPGRADEM&ALTG in differthe ence-in-difference test is 
0.008; t = 0.96 p = 0.337; untabulated).   
Table 6.5 Descriptive Statistics for Data Used to Calculate Recommendation and 
Long-Term Growth Forecast Optimism (M&A Context) 
Panel A Frequencies of Upgrades and Downgrades of Recommendation Changes 
Period Analyst  Total 
Downgrade Flat Upgrade 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Pre-
Expiration 
All Analysts 7,603 1,214 15.97% 5,204 68.45% 1,185 15.59% 
Affiliated 
Analysts 
880 102 11.59% 674 76.59% 104 11.82% 
Unaffiliated 
Analysts 
6,723 1,112 16.54% 4,530 67.38% 1,081 16.08% 
Issued by 
Analysts 
employed by GS 
Signatories 
3,472 446 12.85% 2,572 74.08% 454 13.08% 
Issued by 
Analysts Who are 
not employed by 
GS Signatories 
4,131 768 18.59% 2,632 63.71% 731 17.70% 
Post-
Expiration 
All Analysts 6,988 787 11.26% 5,246 75.07% 955 13.67% 
Affiliated 
Analysts 
921 68 7.38% 761 82.63% 92 9.99% 
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Unaffiliated 
Analysts 
6,067 719 11.85% 4,485 73.92% 863 14.22% 
Issued by 
Analysts 
employed by GS 
Signatories 
2,854 279 9.78% 2,256 79.05% 319 11.18% 
Issued by 
Analysts Who are 
not employed by 
GS Signatories 
4,134 508 12.29% 2,990 72.33% 636 15.38% 
Panel B Descriptive Statistics on Long-Term Growth Forecasts 
Period Analyst  N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min 
25th 
Pctl 
Median 
75th 
Pctl 
Max 
Pre-
Expiration 
All Analysts 1339 0.173 0.423 -0.159 0.100 0.140 0.200 15.000 
Affiliated 
Analysts 200 0.156 0.111 -0.068 0.090 0.138 0.196 0.680 
Unaffiliated 
Analysts 1139 0.176 0.457 -0.159 0.100 0.140 0.200 15.000 
Issued by 
Analysts 
employed by GS 
Signatories 
663 0.177 0.587 -0.068 0.090 0.130 0.180 15.000 
Issued by 
Analysts Who are 
not employed by 
GS Signatories 
676 0.168 0.131 -0.159 0.100 0.150 0.200 1.980 
Post-
Expiration 
All Analysts 625 0.112 0.188 -2.904 0.074 0.118 0.166 0.592 
Affiliated 
Analysts 132 0.133 0.119 -0.642 0.079 0.125 0.180 0.592 
Unaffiliated 
Analysts 493 0.106 0.202 -2.904 0.073 0.117 0.161 0.524 
Issued by 
Analysts 
employed by GS 
Signatories 
183 0.123 0.107 -0.642 0.075 0.120 0.163 0.592 
Issued by 
Analysts Who are 
not employed by 
GS Signatories 
442 0.107 0.213 -2.904 0.074 0.117 0.167 0.524 
Final available sample refers to the observations excluding the transition years which are used for 
regression tests.  
 
Table 6.6 summaries descriptive statistics for the variables used in the tests of my 
hypotheses based on the M&A context. The dependent variables of LTG forecast 
optimism revision (UPGRADEM&ALTG), informativeness (CARs), and profitability 
(BHARs) are all winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Panel A and Panel B of Table 
6.6 present the samples for regressions which use the recommendation changes and LTG 
forecast optimism revisions surrounding the M&A announcement date as proxies for 
analyst optimism. The majority (more than 90%) of the most recent recommendations in 
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the two-year pre-event window (LEVELprior; mean 3.60) are neutral or favourable (i.e. 
‘hold’ or ‘buy-type’).55 I also find on untabulated average 3.46 for GS-employed analysts 
and 3.71 for non-GS employed analysts in LEVELprior, suggesting analysts are still 
reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations at the time approaching to M&A deals 
(i.e. the period within 24-month and 90-day preceding the M&A announcement date) 
following the GS. The mean of Signatory suggests that approximately 43% (43%) of 
recommendations (LTG forecasts) are issued by analysts employed by GS signatory 
brokerage firms who were penalised to procure external independent research along with 
their own research to investors for five years’ time by the GS. Panel C of Table 6.6 reports 
variables of informativeness calculated as CARs of a three-day period centred on the 
issuance of the stock recommendation changes. Individually, there are samples of 2,021 
with an average 2.1% for testing the informativeness of upgrades and 1,880 with an 
average -2.8% for testing the informativeness of downgrades. The descriptive statistics 
for the control variables of momentum effects and market volatilities are similar to those 
in the literature (e.g. Kolasinski and Kothari 2008; Wu et al. 2015). Panel D of Table 6.6 
report variable of profitability calculated as BHARs of adjusted periods of one year (or 90 
days). There are, on average, negative or natural outcomes in short-term or long-term 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations (i.e. the mean of BHAR(0,90d)B/SB : -0.8% 
and the mean of BHAR(0,1y)B/SB : 1%) during my sample period. Overall, the descriptive 
statistics for the control variables are broadly consistent with those reported in the 
literature and the Table 5.6 (for the regulatory impact of 2002/03 reforms).  
                                                 
55 Of the main sample (14,591 cases), there are 13,587 cases which LEVELprior is equal to or greater than 
3 (holds or better). LEVELprior is coded such that 5 = ‘strong buy’, 4 = ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, 2 = ‘sell’, 1 = 
‘strong sell’ in the tests.  
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Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis (M&A Context) 
Panel A  Sample for Tests Using Recommendation Changes (N=14,591) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
UPGRADEM&Arec 0.01 0.53 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 0.43 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 0.48 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.12 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 7.06 1.67 1.61 3.09 4.24 5.98 7.00 8.18 9.81 11.05 12.19 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 4.46 11.98 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.39 1.10 3.59 18.17 62.96 196.72 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 9.11 1.66 1.33 5.44 6.36 7.92 9.13 10.31 11.89 12.62 13.37 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 20.48 39.45 0.00 0.16 0.39 1.84 6.15 19.74 96.63 199.66 421.73 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 6.48 4.41 0 0 0 3 6 10 14 18 21 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 15.41 7.04 1 3 5 10 15 20 28 32 40 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 57.72 33.05 0 0 1 28 68 90 90 90 90 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 28.15 23.16 1 2 5 12 24 36 69 106 215 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 3.60 0.93 1 1 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 
Panel B  Sample for Tests Using LTG Forecast Optimism and Revision (N=1,964) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
UPGRADEM&ALTG 0.00 0.08 -0.36 -0.36 -0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.27 
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 0.43 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 0.32 0.47 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.17 0.37 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 7.33 1.55 2.87 4.09 4.88 6.27 7.08 8.47 9.91 10.80 12.19 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 5.05 12.61 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.53 1.19 4.78 20.20 49.06 196.35 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 9.94 1.48 5.07 6.43 7.16 9.03 10.11 10.99 12.43 12.84 13.14 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 34.53 50.83 0.10 0.43 0.95 5.78 16.97 38.73 178.22 240.99 344.37 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 7.09 4.49 0 0 1 3 7 10 15 19 21 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 9.50 4.31 1 2 4 6 9 12 18 22 22 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 49.13 31.24 0 0 1 20 51 79 90 90 90 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 62.02 46.34 1 3 8 25 54 81 164 184 202 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟  -0.01 0.48 -7.43 -0.31 -0.12 -0.03 0 0.03 0.12 0.35 14.85 
Panel C  Sample for Tests with Investors’ Responses: CARs (N=2,021) for UPGRADE cases and CARs (N=1,880) for DOWNGRADE cases  
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
CARs for UPGRADE cases (N=2,021) 
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CAR(-1,1) 0.021 0.059 -0.149 -0.149 -0.067 -0.008 0.014 0.042 0.132 0.225 0.247 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.026 0.265 -1.087 -0.752 -0.401 -0.113 0.024 0.169 0.450 0.716 0.886 
PASTMKTPERF 0.071 0.136 -0.608 -0.425 -0.174 0.046 0.090 0.141 0.240 0.365 0.555 
MKTSD 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.024 0.030 0.030 
CARs for DOWNGRADE cases (N=1,880) 
-CAR(-1,1) 0.028 0.079 -0.271 -0.271 -0.072 -0.006 0.019 0.056 0.190 0.273 0.273 
PASTFIRMPREF -0.028 0.277 -1.087 -1.007 -0.483 -0.157 -0.021 0.128 0.380 0.716 0.886 
PASTMKTPERF 0.061 0.147 -0.608 -0.445 -0.301 0.046 0.091 0.142 0.230 0.355 0.491 
MKTSD 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.021 0.030 0.030 
Panel D  Sample for Profitability: one-year BHARs and 90-day BHARs for Buy/Strong Buy Cases (N=4,445) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,1𝑦)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  0.01 0.38 -0.79 -0.79 -0.56 -0.20 -0.005 0.18 0.65 1.53 1.53 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,90𝑑)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  -0.008 0.17 -0.45 -0.45 -0.29 -0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.29 0.46 0.46 
UPGRADEM&Arec is a categorical value that takes three values—namely, 1 if analysts improve recommendation within ±90 days of the M&A announcement, 0 if unchanged and −1 if there is a downgrade; 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀 refers 
to LTG forecast optimism, defined by individual analysts’ LTG forecast deducting unaffiliated consensus; UPGRADEM&ALTG refers to LTG forecast optimism revision within ±90 days of the M&A announcement, defined by 
individual analysts’ LTG forecast optimism deducting its latest prior value (i.e., 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀 − 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟); 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days 
(i.e., [−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as the buy and hold return for each security less the same-period buy and hold return for the portfolio of firms matched by size decile 
from CRSP. The window period of BHARs starts at the tenth day after the M&A announcement date and lasts for one year unless the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the investment bank. Note that 
here I show winsorised CARs and BHARs (0,1y) at 1/99%, and all CARs for recommendation downgrades are flipped in sign to make the interpretation consistent. 𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
output was issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage firm that was one of the original 12 sanctioned banks (and their subsequent name variations), who were directly subject to the GS, and 0 otherwise. POSTREGexp is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 26 July 2009, the date of expiration of independent research funding required by the GS for GS signatories, and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates that 
the analyst is affiliated with the acquirer’s advisor; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total consideration paid by the acquirer in 
the M&A deals. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of acquirer firms as at the last trading day of the calendar month before 
the analyst report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analyst’s first time published on I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within 
one calendar month preceding the M&A announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between the M&A announcement date and the analyst’s report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of 
analysts working for the brokerage house during the same calendar month of the M&A deal announcement date. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 represents the level of stock recommendation for the same acquirer firm, provided by the same 
analyst just before the 180-day event window. 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟is the LTG forecast optimism for the same acquirer firm, provided by the same analyst just before the 180-day event window. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents past 
firm performance, which is defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents past market performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six 
months before the recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month before the recommendation.p values in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. 
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Descriptive statistics for tests using IPO/SEO context 
Table 6.7 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used to test the impact of 2009/10 
expiration on analyst optimism using IPO/SEO context. It demonstrates substantial more 
frequencies of ‘buy-type’ recommendations than ‘hold and sell-type’ ones during either 
pre- or post-expiration period. 
Panel A shows the frequencies of three types of initial recommendation levels (i.e. ‘buy-
type’, ‘hold’, and ‘sell-type’) issued within two years after IPOs. In the rows of 
observations in the pre-expiration period (July 26th, 2004 - July 26th, 2009), there are 
4,605 observations. Of this number, 1,652 initial recommendations are issued by GS-
employed analysts and 2,953 cases by non-GS employed analysts. It is shown that non-
GS analysts issue more ‘buy-type’ recommendations (64.54%) than GS analysts do 
(51.15%) and less ‘sell-type’ recommendations (2.81%) than GS analysts do (3.39%). 
From the untabulated results of the t-test, during the pre-expiration period, the average 
level of initial recommendations issued by the non-GS analysts is significantly greater 
than that by the GS analysts (average levels of initial recommendations LEVELIPO3tier: 
3.617 for GS analysts; 3.477 for non-GS analysts; p < 0.001).56 The second section of 
Panel A shows the initial recommendations issued surrounding the IPOs 24-month 
window during the post-expiration period (March 26th, 2010 – December 31st, 2014). It 
is plausible that GS analysts who stopped providing the concurrent independent research 
after the 2009/10 expiration use significantly more optimistic recommendations (i.e. 
63.62% of ‘buy-type’ recommendations, post-expiration) for their first opinions on the 
covered IPO firm, compared with those they used before (i.e. publishing 51.15% of ‘buy-
type’ recommendations, pre-expiration).  
Also, there is a significant increase in optimism for those analysts who are working for 
the GS signatories following the 2009/10 expiration (average levels of initial 
                                                 
56 LEVELIPO3tier is coded such that 4 = ‘strong buy or buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, 2 = ‘sell or strong sell’. 
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recommendations (LEVELIPO3tier) are 3.48 pre-expiration, 3.63 post-expiration; p < 
0.001). In addition, the post-expiration increase in optimism reflected in the initial 
recommendations after IPO issues for GS analysts is greater than that for non-GS analysts 
(difference-in-difference mean: 0.036; t = 1.67 p = 0.095; untabulated).    
Panel B of Table 6.7 reports the frequencies of the three different types of initial 
recommendations applying to the post 24-month period after SEOs, taking out the 
observations in the transition period. It is shown that the analysts tend toward issuing 
optimistically of ‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’ recommendations, both to GS and non-GS analysts. 
Comparing frequencies of initial recommendations in the pre-expiration period and those 
in the post-expiration period, GS analysts issue more ‘buy-type’ recommendations 
(46.27% pre-expiration, 50.74% post-expiration), more ‘hold’ ones (45.91% pre-
expiration, 44.15% post-expiration), and more ‘sell-type’ ones (7.82% pre-expiration, 
5.10% post-expiration) after the 2009/10 expiration.  
Further, GS analysts issue more optimistic initial recommendations for SEOs before and 
after the 2009/10 expiration (average levels of initial recommendations (LEVELSEO3tier): 
3.38 pre-expiration; 3.45 post-expiration; p < 0.001).57 However, I do not find that such 
increase in analyst optimism for GS analysts following the 2009/10 expiration is 
significantly greater than that for non-GS analysts. Overall, the statistics of Panel B are 
generally consistent with those of the Panel A pertaining IPO context. 
Table 6.7 Descriptive Statistics for Data Used to Calculate Recommendation 
Optimism (IPO/SEO Context) 
Panel A Frequencies of Initial Recommendation Levels for IPO 
Period Analyst  Total 
Strong 
Buy/Buy 
Hold Strong Sell/Sell 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Pre-
Expiration 
All Analysts 4,605 2,751 59.74% 1,715 37.24% 139 3.02% 
Affiliated 
Analysts 
2,414 1,485 61.52% 893 36.99% 36 1.49% 
Unaffiliated 
Analysts 
2,191 1,266 57.78% 822 37.52% 103 4.70% 
Issued by 
Analysts 
1,652 845 51.15% 751 45.46% 56 3.39% 
                                                 
57 LEVELSEO3tier is coded such that 4 = ‘strong buy or buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, 2 = ‘sell or strong sell’. 
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employed by GS 
Signatories 
Issued by 
Analysts Who are 
not employed by 
GS Signatories 
2,953 1,906 64.54% 964 32.64% 83 2.81% 
Post-
Expiration 
All Analysts 5,441 3,836 70.50% 1,548 28.45% 57 1.05% 
Affiliated 
Analysts 
3,386 2,497 73.74% 881 26.02% 8 0.24% 
Unaffiliated 
Analysts 
2,055 1,339 65.16% 667 32.46% 49 2.38% 
Issued by 
Analysts 
employed by GS 
Signatories 
1,927 1226 63.62% 684 35.50% 17 0.88% 
Issued by 
Analysts Who are 
not employed by 
GS Signatories 
3,514 2,610 74.27% 864 24.59% 40 1.14% 
Panel B Frequencies of Initial Recommendation Levels for SEO 
Period Analyst  Total 
Strong 
Buy/Buy 
Hold Strong Sell/Sell 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Pre-
Expiration 
All Analysts 6,911 3,566 51.60% 2,936 42.48% 409 5.92% 
Affiliated 
Analysts 
2,473 1,330 53.78% 1,035 41.85% 108 4.37% 
Unaffiliated 
Analysts 
4,438 2,236 50.38% 1,901 42.83% 301 6.78% 
Issued by 
Analysts 
employed by GS 
Signatories 
2,226 1,030 46.27% 1,022 45.91% 174 7.82% 
Issued by 
Analysts Who are 
not employed by 
GS Signatories 
4,685 2,536 54.13% 1,914 40.85% 235 5.02% 
Post-
Expiration 
All Analysts 7,461 4,275 57.30% 2,913 39.04% 273 3.66% 
Affiliated 
Analysts 
3,222 1,881 58.38% 1,264 39.23% 77 2.39% 
Unaffiliated 
Analysts 
4,239 2,394 56.48% 1,649 38.90% 196 4.62% 
Issued by 
Analysts 
employed by GS 
Signatories 
2,292 1,163 50.74% 1,012 44.15% 117 5.10% 
Issued by 
Analysts Who are 
not employed by 
GS Signatories 
5,169 3,112 60.21% 1,901 36.78% 156 3.02% 
Final available sample refers to the observations excluding the transition years which are used for 
regression tests. 
 
Table 6.8 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used to test my hypotheses in the 
IPO or SEO context, which examine the effect of 2009/10 expiration on analyst optimism 
(Panel A and Panel B), informativeness (Panel C and Panel D), and profitability (Panel 
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E). The descriptive statistics for the control variables are broadly consistent with those 
reported in Kadan et al. (2009). 
In Panels A and B of Table 6.8, average 3.64 (3.50) of LEVELIPO3tier (LEVELSEO3tier) 
represents analysts are optimistically biased at the time after IPOs (SEOs) (i.e. the period 
within 24-month succeeding the IPO or SEO issue date) and unwilling to issue less 
favourable reports. Untabulated results show that more than 65.5% (54.5%) of the initial 
recommendations after IPO (SEO) are ‘buy-type’, where on average 3.57 (3.42) for GS 
analysts and 3.68 (3.53) for non-GS analysts. The main interest variable Signatory 
suggests that approximately 36% (31%) of initial recommendations for IPO (SEO) are 
provided by analysts who are employed by the GS signatories.  
Panel C and Panel D of Table 6.8 provide statistics of informativeness of all 
recommendations (CARs) of various three-day windows centred on the announcement 
date of the initial recommendation during 24-month post-IPO/SEO windows, along with 
the corresponding control variables which are consistent with those reported in previous 
studies.  
Panel E of Table 6.8 shows the profitability (BHARs) of adjusted one-year (or 90 days) 
periods. The profitability variables are calculated only for SEOs due to their required 
periods of investing windows started from the 10th day of filing dates (i.e. before issue 
dates). Overall, I find that on average there is a negative performance in both 90-day and 
one-year abnormal returns of ‘buy-type’ recommendations. 
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Table 6.8 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis (IPO/SEO Context) 
Panel A  Sample for Tests of Initial Recommendations Issued by Analysts in IPO Context (N=10,046) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
LEVEL5tier 3.92 0.86 1 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELIPO3tier 3.64 0.52 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 0.36 0.48 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 0.54 0.50 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.58 0.49 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 5.58 1.04 2.78 3.70 4.16 4.84 5.42 6.22 7.39 8.48 10.19 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.59 1.93 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.50 1.62 4.79 26.65 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 7.09 1.28 2.47 4.38 5.19 6.22 6.99 7.86 9.36 10.56 12.22 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 3.19 8.60 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.50 1.08 2.59 11.57 38.40 203.78 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 6.40 4.75 0 0 0 2 6 10 15 19 22 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 6.71 3.99 1 1 2 4 6 8 14 21 32 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 182.98 202.86 0 18 26 41 49 312 622 708 731 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 22.08 15.93 1 1 4 10 19 29 55 78 108 
Panel B  Sample for Tests of Initial Recommendations Issued by Analysts Using Non-3tier System in the pre-reform period in SEO Context (N=14,372) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
LEVEL5tier 3.74 0.93 1 1 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELSEO3tier 3.50 0.59 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 0.31 0.46 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 0.52 0.50 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.40 0.49 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 5.46 1.15 1.05 2.94 3.73 4.71 5.38 6.13 7.55 8.69 10.33 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.55 1.57 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.46 1.90 5.93 30.57 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 7.56 1.44 0.79 4.58 5.43 6.57 7.45 8.43 10.21 11.42 13.26 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 6.96 25.06 0.00 0.10 0.23 0.71 1.72 4.59 27.22 91.12 573.16 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 5.85 4.59 0 0 0 2 5 9 14 18 22 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 9.70 5.70 1 1 3 6 9 13 21 27 41 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 262.99 217.33 0 1 11 71 218 418 651 810 2381 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 23.29 18.42 1 1 4 10 20 31 56 78 215 
Panel C  Sample for Tests of Informativeness: CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (N=6,214) and CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases in IPO Context (N=6,079) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (N=6,214) 
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CAR(-1,1) 0.02 0.07 -0.17 -0.17 -0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.26 0.26 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.07 0.32 -1.44 -0.74 -0.44 -0.12 0.06 0.24 0.60 1.02 1.34 
PASTMKTPERF 0.04 0.10 -0.53 -0.41 -0.11 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.29 
MKTSD 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 
CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases (N=6,079) 
-CAR(-1,1) 0.04 0.13 -0.26 -0.26 -0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.31 0.57 0.57 
PASTFIRMPREF -0.03 0.41 -1.442 -1.101 -0.766 -0.25 -0.01 0.21 0.59 0.97 1.34 
PASTMKTPERF 0.04 0.11 -0.59 -0.42 -0.12 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.26 
MKTSD 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Panel D  Sample for Tests of Informativeness: CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (N=21,347) and CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases (N=23,041) in SEO Context 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (N=21,347) 
CAR(-1,1) 0.02 0.06 -0.15 -0.15 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.28 0.28 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.08 0.31 -1.15 -0.68 -0.36 -0.09 0.06 0.23 0.62 1.17 1.30 
PASTMKTPERF 0.04 0.11 -0.59 -0.44 -0.14 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.29 
MKTSD 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 
CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases (N=23,041) 
-CAR(-1,1) 0.03 0.11 -0.29 -0.29 -0.10 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.22 0.54 0.54 
PASTFIRMPREF -0.01 0.35 -1.15 -1.07 -0.63 -0.18 0.01 0.17 0.53 0.96 1.30 
PASTMKTPERF 0.03 0.13 -0.59 -0.46 -0.30 -0.01 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.29 
MKTSD 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 
Panel E  Sample for Tests of Profitability: : one-year BHARs and 90-day BHARs for Buy/Strong Buy Cases (N=3,688) in SEO Context 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,1𝑦)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  -0.011 0.040 -0.352 -0.352 -0.038 -0.011 -0.004 0.001 0.009 0.021 0.021 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,90𝑑)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  -0.001 0.004 -0.016 -0.016 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.009 
LEVEL5tier is the level of initial recommendation following the IPO issue or SEO filing dates, coded of the five-tier recommendations recorded on I/B/E/S such that 5 = ‘strong buy’, 4 = ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, 2 = ‘sell’ and 
1 = ‘strong sell’; LEVELIPO3tier or LEVELSEO3tier is the standardised level of initial recommendation following the IPO issue or SEO filing dates, coded of the three-tier rating system such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 
3 = ‘hold’ and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’; 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days (i.e., [−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 
are measured as the buy and hold return for each security less the same-period buy and hold return for the portfolio of firms matched by size decile from CRSP. The window period of BHARs starts at the tenth day after the 
SEO filing date and lasts for one year unless the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the investment bank. Note that here I show winsorised CARs and BHARs at 1/99% and all CARs for recommendation 
downgrades are flipped in sign to make interpretation consistent. 𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the output was issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage firm that was one of the original 12 sanctioned 
banks (and their subsequent name variations), who were directly subject to the GS, and 0 otherwise. POSTREGexp is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 26 July 2009, the date of 
expiration of independent research funding required by the GS for GS signatories, and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates that the analyst is affiliated with the IPO or SEO issuer’s underwriter; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real 
value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total proceeds amount in the IPO or SEO deals. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 
1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of IPO or SEO firms as at the last trading day of the calendar month before the analyst report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analyst’s first time published on 
I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst’s report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within one calendar month preceding the recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the 
absolute number of days between the IPO issue (or SEO filing) date and the analyst report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the same calendar month of the 
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recommendation announcement date. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents past firm performance, which is defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents past market 
performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month before the recommendation. 
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Table 6.9 reveals the descriptive statistics of variables used in regression tests of H15, 
which examines the impact of the 2009/10 expiration of independent research funding on 
the extent to which analyst optimism affects the broker’s deal flow. To mitigate the 
influence of extreme values on estimated coefficients of OLS tests, the lead value of the 
market share data are all winsorised at 1/99%.  
Panel A reports 677 observations of the change in market share at a broker-industry-year 
level in the following year (i.e. ∆MSt+1), considering the advisory mandates of M&A 
deals. It is shown that on average a broker retains 6% of the advisory business but merely 
zero in growth (mean of ∆MSt+1 is -0.002) in market share. The maximum value of 
broker-industry-year ∆MSt+1 of M&A deals is 54%, and its minimum value is about -
67% with a 4% dispersing IRQ (i.e. P75 – P25). The overall level of individual broker’s 
size-adjusted analyst recommendation optimism in the industry year is slightly towards 
pessimism (mean = -0.006% and P50 = 0 for ∆OPTt). In addition, the change in individual 
broker’s size-adjusted analyst recommendation optimism at the industry-year level is on 
average 0.006% (∆OPTt) with the maximum value at 4%, the minimum value at -5%, and 
its IRQ at 0.7%.  
Panel B shows 1,918 cases of the annual changes in market share within the industries 
(i.e. ∆MSt+1), considering the underwriting mandates of new equity issuing deals. Overall, 
a broker may retain about 3% of IPO/SEO underwriting mandates with almost unchanged 
or a very small downward trend in growth (mean of ∆MSt+1 is -0.00003) at industry-year 
level. ∆MSt+1 has a maximum value of 47% and a minimum value of about -52%, but the 
range between P75 and P25 (IRQ) spans over 2%. Finally, IRQ for ∆OPTt disperses only 
0.5% (P75 of ∆OPTt = 0.3%; P25 = -0.2% for ∆OPTt) but with a relatively large 
maximum value (8%) and small value (-9%). 
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Table 6.9 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis (Deal Flow) 
Panel A  Sample for Tests of Deal Flow in M&A Context – Expiration of Funding Independent Research (N=677) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
∆MSt+1 -0.002 0.08 -0.67 -0.29 -0.11 -0.02 0.000 0.02 0.10 0.22 0.54 
∆OPTt -0.00006 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.003 -0.00007 0.004 0.01 0.03 0.04 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝  0.46 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 0.58 0.49 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 0.06 0.51 -3.05 -1.32 -0.76 -0.22 0.06 0.33 0.85 1.53 2.41 
∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 0.0021 0.04 -0.30 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.56 
MSt 0.06 0.08 0.00003 0.0002 0.001 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.42 0.80 
Panel B  Sample for Tests of Deal Flow in IPO/SEO Context  – Expiration of Funding Independent Research (N=1,918) 
∆MSt+1 -0.00003 0.03 -0.52 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.000 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.47 
∆OPTt 0.00005 0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.002 0.00002 0.003 0.01 0.03 0.08 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝  0.53 0.50 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 0.35 0.48 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 0.05 0.76 -5.72 -2.06 -1.09 -0.31 0.05 0.38 1.22 2.22 4.63 
∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 0.0035 0.09 -1.73 -0.16 -0.05 -0.01 0.001 0.01 0.07 0.22 1.27 
MSt 0.03 0.04 0.00017 0.0008 0.002 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.58 
∆MSt+1 is the change in a broker’s industry-year market share from year t to year t+1. This is measured separately for M&A deals and IPO/SEO deals. Industry market share is calculated as the total advisory (or underwriting) 
fee raised by a broker in a particular industry in year t divided by the total advisory (underwriting) fees of all deals completed in that particular industry during year t. ∆OPTt is the change in analyst optimism (from year t−1 to 
year t), which represents the average analyst optimism of recommendations issued by the broker’s analysts relative to the consensus optimism level for the industry in the year, weighted by covered firms’ market capitalisation.  
𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the output was issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage firm that was one of the original 12 sanctioned banks (and their subsequent name variations), who were 
directly subject to the GS, and 0 otherwise. POSTREGexp is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 26 July 2009, the date of expiration of independent research funding required by 
the GS for GS signatories, and 0 otherwise. ∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the change in the average size of covered firms (nature log value of capitalisation) from year t−1 to year t for a broker in the industry; ∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 is the 
change in the industry average of all analysts’ experience from year t−1 to year t for a broker, weighted by the analysts’ contribution in the industry (i.e., the proportion of the recommendations issued by individual analysts in 
the total recommendations issued by all analysts in the industry and year t). MSt is the yearly industry-year market share in year t in M&A deals or IPO/SEO deals. 
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Multivariate Results 
This section introduces the multivariate results of tests which examine hypotheses 
relating to the impact of the expiration of funding independent research on analyst 
optimism (Section 6.5.1) and investor response and profitability (Section 6.5.2) as well 
as on the extent to which analyst optimism affects deal flow (Section 6.5.3).    
6.5.1 Results for the Tests of Hypotheses 9 and 10 - the Impact of Expiration of 
Funding Independent Research on Analyst Optimism 
H9 predicts that the impact of the 2009/10 expiration of independent research 
procurement on analyst optimism is greater for GS analysts who were obligated to provide 
the five-year independent research required by the GS, relative to non-GS analysts. The 
main tests of H9 use regressions based on the following Model 4.  
𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽3𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 4 
Control Variables 
DEALVALUE = 
The natural logarithm of the inflation-adjusted deal value (in 
billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992). 
FIRMCAP = 
The natural logarithm of the inflation-adjusted market capitalisation 
of the acquirer (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars 
in 1992) as at the last trading day of the calendar month before 
analyst recommendation/LTG forecast was issued. 
EXP = 
The number of years since the analyst first published a 
recommendation on I/B/E/S. 
FOLLOW = 
The total number of the analysts with outstanding recommendations 
for the firm in the 30-days preceding the M&A announcement date 
(or the announcement of recommendations in post IPO/SEO issue 
date/SEO filing date). 
DAYS = 
DAYS refers to the absolute number of days between M&A 
announcement date (or IPO/SEO issue date/SEO filing date) and 
analyst report date. 
BROKERSIZE = 
The number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the 
calendar month of the M&A deal announcement date (or of the 
analyst report date in IPO/SEO context). 
LEVEL = 
The level of the stock recommendation provided by the analyst for 
the acquirer prior to the 180-day event window (or for the SEO firm 
prior to the 24-month post-filing window). 
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OPTIMISMprior = 
The standardised long-term growth forecast for the acquirer 
provided by the analyst prior to the 180-day M&A event window. 
 
Where OPT represents the proxies for analyst optimism defined in Section 4.3.1.4. 
GSSignatory is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the recommendation or LTG forecast 
is issued by the analyst who is employed by one of the GS signatories (and their 
subsequent name variations), 0 otherwise. POSTREGexp is an indicator of the post-
expiration period, equaling 1 if the recommendation or LTG forecast is issued after July 
26, 2009, the expiration date, 0 otherwise. Control variables are introduced and defined 
in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.6).  
The coefficient for GSSignatory based on Model 4 measures the incremental effect on 
analyst optimism for GS analysts during the pre-expiration period. The coefficient for 
POSTREGexp captures the differential effect on analyst optimism for non-GS analysts 
during the post-expiration period. The coefficient for the interaction term GSSignatory × 
POSTREGexp captures the incremental effect for GS analysts on analyst optimism 
following the 2009/10 expiration. H9 proposes that the increase in analyst optimism of 
analyst outputs following the 2009/10 expiration should be greater for GS analysts, 
implying that if this is the case, the coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGexp should 
be significantly positive to support H9.  
H10 further proposes that the increase in analyst optimism for GS analysts following the 
2009/10 expiration should be greater if analysts’ GS signatory employer is affiliated with 
the covered firm. H10 thus examines whether the increase in analyst optimism evident in 
analyst recommendations (or LTG forecast optimism) revisions following the 2009/10 
expiration is greater for affiliated analysts who are employed by the GS signatories, 
relative to unaffiliated GS analysts. The main tests of H10 are conducted using the 
following Model 5. 
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𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 5 
 
Where AFF, the proxy for analysts’ potential conflicts of interest, equals 1 if the 
recommendations (or LTG forecasts) are issued by the analysts whose employer is 
affiliated with the covered acquirer firm as an M&A advisor (or with the covered 
IPO/SEO issuer as an underwriter), 0 otherwise. The coefficient for three-way interaction 
term GSSignatory × POSTREGexp × AFF represents the incremental optimism in the 
recommendations (or LTG forecasts) issued by affiliated analysts employed by GS 
signatories following the 2009/10 expiration, relative to that of unaffiliated analysts who 
are also hired by the GS signatories. A significant and positive coefficient for 
GSSignatory × POSTREGexp × AFF based on Model 5 thus would support H10.      
Columns 1-4 of Table 6.10 show the results of the tests for regressions of revisions to 
stock recommendations surrounding the M&A announcement date. Two samples are 
employed for testing H9 and H10 are: (1) final available sample of recommendations 
described in Table 6.1; (2) a propensity score matched (PSM) sample comprising all 
recommendations issued by GS signatory analysts who are obligated to procure 
independent research for five years (treatment observations), and matched 
recommendations issued by non-GS analysts who do not have such obligation (control 
observations). The analysis of results presented in Columns 1-4 of Table 6.10 is provided 
as follows.  
Consistent with Wu et al. (2015), the Pseudo-R-squared statistics are around 12% as 
indicative of reasonable model fit. The coefficients for control variables are consistent 
with my predictions and with prior literature as well. lnDEALVALUE is significantly 
positive, which suggests that large consideration correlated with larger advisory fees 
potentially is positively associated with greater incentives for analysts to optimistically 
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bias their reports. lnFIRMCAP is significantly positive, consistent with the notion that 
larger size firms are more likely to induce optimistic bias in analyst reports. As predicted, 
EXP is not significant, which implies that more experienced analysts are not necessarily 
optimistic. FOLLOW is significantly negative, which means that analyst herding 
behaviour where more analysts covering a same firm at the same time is negatively 
associated with excess analyst optimism. While DAYS is not significant for tests of the 
main sample, it is significantly negative for the test of PSM sample (Column 4), which 
concludes that analysts may have incentives to issue more optimistic reports close to the 
investment banking dates and this effect is more pronounced for the PSM sample. The 
coefficient for BROKERSIZE shows mixed results, suggesting brokerage size may affect 
analyst optimism in either direction. LEVEL prior optimism is significantly negative 
across all samples as expected, which suggests that the scope for change in optimism 
restrains excess optimism. 
In Column 1 of Table 6.10, I find that there is a significant increase in the level of 
optimism exhibited in the recommendation revisions by unaffiliated analysts after the 
expiration in 2009/10, reflected in an estimated coefficient for POSTREGExp of 0.2151 (𝑝 
< 0.001). However, the effect of AFF on analyst optimism is positive but not significant 
(𝛽  = 0.373, p < 0.573), which suggests that affiliated analysts were not particularly 
optimistic in the pre-expiration period. I find no significant increment in the optimism of 
the affiliated analysts in the post-expiration period, as indicated by the coefficient for 
POSTREGExp × AFF (𝛽 = 0.0305; p = 0.735). Unaffiliated analysts seem to become more 
optimistic after the 2009/10 expiration than they did before the expiration, but not for 
affiliated analysts.
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Table 6.10 Regressions of Analyst Optimism in M&A Context: Recommendation Changes and LTG Forecast Revision  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES  Model 4 Model 5 
Model 5 
(Annual PSM) 
VARIABLES  Model 4 Model 5 
Model 5 
(Annual PSM) 
          
GSSignatory  -0.3829*** -0.3663*** -0.7079*** GSSignatory  -0.0033 -0.0001 -0.0050 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.479) (0.977) (0.694) 
POSTREGExp 0.2151*** 0.2387*** 0.2428*** 0.1046 POSTREGExp 0.0040 0.0034 0.0039 -0.0067 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.363)  (0.346) (0.486) (0.421) (0.691) 
AFF 0.0373  0.2992** 0.0045 AFF -0.0076  0.0075 -0.0125 
 (0.573)  (0.020) (0.987)  (0.233)  (0.678) (0.692) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp  -0.0578 -0.1005 0.2099 GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp  0.0063 0.0004 0.0231 
  (0.409) (0.183) (0.212)   (0.400) (0.971) (0.326) 
GSSignatory ×AFF   -0.2844* 0.1179 GSSignatory ×AFF   -0.0199 -0.0362 
   (0.056) (0.715)    (0.306) (0.345) 
POSTREGExp ×AFF 0.0305  -0.0733 0.5674 POSTREGExp×AFF 0.0106  -0.0097 0.0719 
 (0.735)  (0.674) (0.104)  (0.240)  (0.679) (0.133) 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp ×AFF   0.2283 -0.6592 GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp×AFF   0.0263 -0.0155 
   (0.262) (0.112)    (0.310) (0.771) 
lnDEALVALUE 0.0395** 0.0456** 0.0474*** 0.0451 lnDEALVALUE -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0007 0.0020 
 (0.030) (0.012) (0.009) (0.150)  (0.511) (0.469) (0.582) (0.711) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0419* 0.0496** 0.0521** 0.0674* lnFIRMCAP 0.0007 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0069 
 (0.054) (0.023) (0.017) (0.081)  (0.636) (0.546) (0.573) (0.325) 
EXP 0.0059 0.0059 0.0057 0.0008 EXP 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.149) (0.917)  (0.258) (0.302) (0.271) (0.983) 
FOLLOW -0.0083* -0.0097** -0.0087* -0.0124 FOLLOW 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0031** 
 (0.068) (0.032) (0.055) (0.131)  (0.848) (0.740) (0.816) (0.035) 
DAYS -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0026** DAYS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.543) (0.237) (0.339) (0.038)  (0.949) (0.965) (0.956) (0.526) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0023*** 0.0028*** 0.0027*** 0.0029 BROKERSIZE -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.472)  (0.658) (0.807) (0.843) (0.948) 
LEVEL -1.1222*** -1.1539*** -1.1565*** -1.1897*** OPTIMISM_prior -0.0238 -0.0237 -0.0238 -0.0759*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.193) (0.195) (0.194) (0.000) 
Constant cut1 -5.6768*** -5.7600*** -5.6981*** -6.0926*** Constant -0.0070 -0.0084 -0.0097 0.0215 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.567) (0.489) (0.433) (0.617) 
Constant cut2 -1.3496*** -1.4102*** -1.3458*** -1.6415***      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp + 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp×AFF 
  0.1278 -0.4493 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp + 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp×AFF 
  0.0266 0.0076 
   (0.509) (0.234)    (0.291) (0.868) 
          
Observations 14,591 14,591 14,591 4,010 Observations 1,964 1,964 1,964 370 
R-squared 0.121 0.124 0.125 0.118 R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.319 
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F test 3346 3151 3214 779.7 F test 1.341 1.783 1.705 6.573 
UPGRADEM&Arec is a categorical value that takes on three values—namely, 1 if analysts improve recommendation within ±90 days of the M&A announcement, 0 if unchanged and −1 if there is a downgrade; 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀 refers 
to LTG forecast optimism defined by individual analysts’ LTG forecast deducting unaffiliated consensus; UPGRADEM&ALTG refers to LTG forecast optimism revision within ±90 days of the M&A announcement, defined by 
individual analysts’ LTG forecast optimism deducting its latest prior value (i.e., 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀 −  𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟);  𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the output was issued by an analyst employed by a 
brokerage firm that was one of the original 12 sanctioned banks (and their subsequent name variations), who were directly subject to the GS, and 0 otherwise. POSTREGexp is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the recommendation 
or forecast is issued after 26 July 2009, the date of expiration of independent research funding required by the GS for GS signatories, and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates that the analyst is affiliated with the acquirer’s advisor; 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total consideration paid by the acquirer in the M&A deals. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions 
of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of acquirer firms as at the last trading day of the calendar month before the analysts’ report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting 
from the analysts’ first time published on I/B/E/S until the year of the analysts’ report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within one calendar month preceding the M&A announcement 
date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between the M&A announcement date and the analysts’ report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the same 
calendar month of the M&A deal announcement date. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 represents the level of stock recommendation for the same acquirer firm, provided by the same analyst just before the 180-day event window. 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟is 
the LTG forecast optimism for the same acquirer firm, provided by the same analyst just before the 180-day event window. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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In Column 2 of Table 6.10, I report my main test of H9, which predicts that the increase 
in optimism after the 2009/10 expiration of procurement of independent research is 
greater for analysts who are employed by the GS signatories, than other analysts (i.e. 
analysts who are not working for the GS signatory brokerage firms). This regression 
includes AFF and an indicator for GS-employed analysts (GSSignatory) and its 
interaction with POSTREGExp. I do not find the significant estimated coefficient for 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp (𝛽 = -0.0578; 𝑝 = 0.409) to support H9.   
H10 predicts the impact of 2009/10 expiration on analyst optimism evident in the 
recommendation revisions is greater for affiliated GS analysts than for unaffiliated GS 
analysts. In Columns 3-4 of Table 6.10, the three-way interaction GSSignatory × 
POSTREGExp × AFF captures the extent to which the post-expiration change in analyst 
optimism is greater for affiliated analysts who are employed by the GS signatories, 
relative to unaffiliated analysts who are also employed by GS signatories. The estimated 
coefficient for Signatory × POSTREGExp × AFF is positive but not significant (𝛽 = 0.2283; 
p = 0.262). H10 is thus not supported. Lastly, the aggregate post-reform effect on 
optimism for affiliated GS-employed analysts is measured by the aggregate effect of 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp and GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF, which coefficient 
is not significant (𝛽 = 0.1854, p = 0.307).  
I re-estimate Model 5 using a propensity score matched sample. My PSM approach 
matches treatment (GSSignatory = 1) and control (GSSignatory = 0) cases according to 
DEALVALUE, FIRMCAP, BROKERSIZE, EXP and FOLLOW within each calendar year, 
such that there is no significant difference in these covariates across treatment and control 
samples. Column 4 of Table 6.5 presents the results of my PSM regressions, which are 
similar to those using the main sample. Both the coefficients for the three-way interaction 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF (β = -0.6592; p = 0.112) and the aggregate 
coefficient (β = -0.4493; p = 0.234) are not significant. In summary, I fail to find that 
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analysts employed by GS signatories who cease providing independent research reports 
in 2009/10 expiration experience a significantly greater change in optimism than other 
analysts. Neither is a differential effect of 2009/10 expiration on analyst optimism for 
analysts with a stronger potential for conflicts of interest (i.e. affiliated analysts). 
Columns 5-8 of Table 6.10 show the results of the OLS regression analyses using long-
term growth forecast optimism revision as a proxy for analyst optimism. Two samples 
are employed for testing H9 and H10 are: (1) final available sample of LTG forecast 
optimism revisions described in Table 6.1; (2) a similar propensity score matched (PSM) 
sample including all LTG forecasts issued by GS signatory analysts (treatment 
observations), and matched LTG forecasts issued by non-GS analysts (control 
observations). The analysis of results presented in Columns 5-8 of Table 6.10 is provided 
as follows.  
The models are reasonably fitted as the R2 statistics are ranging from 0.026 to 0.319, 
which are greater than those reported in Kothari and Kolanski (2008; 0.001-0.004 in Panel 
A of Table 7; p. 838). I do not find similar results of the coefficients for control variables, 
which lack of significance could be due to relatively fewer observations for tests.     
Columns 5-8 report tests of hypotheses, which examine whether the incremental effect of 
the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research on analyst optimism as reflected 
in LTG forecasts is greater for GS analysts relative to non-GS ones (H9) and furthermore 
that for affiliated GS analysts relative to unaffiliated GS analysts (H10). I find no evidence 
to support H9 and H10 and conclude that there is no differential increase in LTG forecast 
optimism revision issued by the GS analysts following the expiration in 2009/10, no 
matter whether the GS analysts are affiliated or not.  
Overall, I find no significant post-expiration increase in analyst optimism for GS analysts 
relative to non-GS analysts, using both recommendation changes and LTG forecast 
optimism revision approaching the M&A announcement date. Neither is found the 
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incremental post-expiration increase for affiliated GS analysts relative to unaffiliated GS 
analysts. Following section extends similar tests to equity issuing context, where analysts’ 
potential conflicts of interest may be amplified due to their investment banking incentives. 
Table 6.11 shows the results of testing H9 and H10, which examine the incremental 
effects of the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research on analyst optimism 
for GS analysts and for analyst affiliation. The proxy for analyst optimism is the level of 
initial recommendations issued during the 24-month window following the IPO issue date. 
The models are well fitted. The R2 statistics are ranging from 0.064 to 0.075, which are 
similar to those reported in Corwin et al. (2017, 0.051 in Table 2, p. 623). Two samples 
are employed: (1) the main sample described in Table 6.2 and (2) a similar PSM sample. 
Control variables are generally consistent with my predictions except for lnDEALVALUE, 
EXP, and BROKERSIZE. The coefficients for lnDEALVALUE are significantly negative, 
suggesting that smaller size of IPOs are associated with more favourable initial 
recommendations issued by analysts during the post-IPO periods (this result is consistent 
with those reported in Table 5.11 regarding tests of the impact of 2002/3 reforms on 
analyst optimism using IPO/SEO context). EXP is consistently positive, showing that 
more experienced analysts may be more optimistic, evident in the level of initial 
recommendations after IPO issues. BROKERSIZE is negatively associated with analyst 
optimism, which suggests that analysts employed by the smaller size of brokers may be 
more optimistic to the first recommendation following IPO issues. The results of 
regressions are analysed as follows. 
In Column 1 of Table 6.11, analyst optimism reflected in the level of initial 
recommendations increases following the 2009/10 expiration for unaffiliated analysts 
first time publish their reports after IPO offerings, as indicative of an estimated positive 
coefficient for POSTREGExp (β = 0.1193; p < 0.001). The estimated coefficient for AFF 
is positive and significant (𝛽= 0.0883, p < 0.001), suggesting that affiliated analysts are 
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significantly optimistic towards their IPO clients in the pre-2009/10 expiration. 
Consistent with the results shown in Column 1 of Table 6.10, I do not find a significant 
change in analyst optimism of affiliated analysts following the 2009/10 expiration, as 
indicated by the coefficient for POSTREGExp × AFF (𝛽= 0. 0184, p = 0.430).          
Table 6.11 OLS Regressions of Analyst Optimism in IPO Context: Level of Initial 
Recommendation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INILEVEL_3tier  Model 4 Model 5 
Model 5 (Annual 
PSM) 
     
GSSignatory  -0.0857*** -0.0697* -0.1020* 
  (0.000) (0.056) (0.098) 
POSTREGExp 0.1193*** 0.1248*** 0.1135*** 0.1396*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
AFF 0.0883***  0.1189*** 0.1466*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp  0.0212 0.0191 0.0334 
  (0.329) (0.691) (0.657) 
GSSignatory ×AFF   -0.0477 0.0284 
   (0.251) (0.696) 
POSTREGExp ×AFF 0.0184  0.0161 -0.0366 
 (0.430)  (0.540) (0.468) 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp ×AFF   -0.0011 -0.0369 
   (0.984) (0.674) 
lnDEALVALUE -0.0481*** -0.0444*** -0.0467*** -0.0492*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
lnFIRMCAP -0.0101 -0.0099 -0.0066 0.0001 
 (0.324) (0.342) (0.514) (0.993) 
EXP 0.0043*** 0.0048*** 0.0042*** 0.0056*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
FOLLOW -0.0099*** -0.0116*** -0.0103*** -0.0103** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
DAYS 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.718) (0.000) (0.755) (0.997) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0041*** -0.0022*** -0.0025*** -0.0027** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
Constant cut1 3.9799*** 4.0357*** 3.9373*** 3.8731*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp +  
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp×AFF 
  0.0179 -0.0035 
   (0.493) (0.935) 
     
Observations 10,046 10,046 10,046 3,421 
R-squared 0.070 0.068 0.075 0.064 
F test 53.82 50.37 46.23 15.27 
LEVELIPO3tier is the standardised level of initial recommendation following the IPO issue date, coded of three-tier rating system 
such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’ and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’;  𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the output was issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage firm that was one of the original 12 sanctioned banks (and their 
subsequent name variations), who were directly subject to the GS, and 0 otherwise. POSTREGexp is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 26 July 2009, the date of expiration of independent research funding required by 
the GS for GS signatories, and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹  indicates that the analyst is affiliated with the IPO issuer’s underwriter; 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of 
total proceeds amount in the IPO deal. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) 
and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of IPO firms as at the last trading day of the calendar month before the analyst’s 
report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analyst’s first published report on I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst’s report; 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊  is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within one calendar month preceding the 
recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between the IPO issue date and the analyst’s 
report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the same calendar month 
of the recommendation announcement date. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
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Column 2 of Table 6.11 provides the results of testing H9, which assumes that the general 
effect on the increase in analyst optimism following the IPO issue date is greater for 
analysts who are employed by the GS signatory brokerage firms, relative to other analysts 
who are not. The estimated coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp is positive, but I 
find no significance to support H9 (β = 0.0212; p = 0.329). However, there is a significant 
reduction in optimism for the GS analysts before the 2009/10 expiration (i.e. the 
coefficient for GSSignatory is -0.0857 at 1% significance level p < 0.001), but this 
reduction disappear following the 2009/10 expiration. It implies an increase in analyst 
optimism for the GS analysts after the expiration in 2009/10.  
Column 3 of Table 6.11 reports no evidence to support H10 which states that the 
regulatory impact of 2009/10 expiration on analyst optimism for GS-employed analysts 
is even stronger for affiliated analysts than unaffiliated ones. The three-way interaction, 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF, captures the extent to which the post-expiration 
change in analyst optimism is greater for affiliated analysts who are employed by the GS 
signatories, relative to unaffiliated analysts who are not. The coefficient for GSSignatory 
× POSTREGExp × AFF is negative and insignificant (𝛽= -0.0011; p = 0.984), which fails 
to support the proposition of H10. In Column 4, I conduct PSM test in Model 5, similarly 
after matching treatment and control firms according to deal size, firm size, analyst 
experience and following. I obtain the same results that H10 is not supported, as indicative 
of the coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF is the positive and insignificant 
(𝛽= -0.0369; p = 0.674).58  
 
Collectively, I fail to find substantial evidence on the effect of the expiration of funding 
independent research in 2009/10 on the increase in analyst optimism for GS analysts. The 
                                                 
58 I also obtain consistent results of tests using SEO context (using a proxy for analyst optimism as the level 
of initial recommendations during the 24-month window after the filing date of SEOs). Please see Appendix 
6.1. 
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results are consistent in the tests of various proxies measured as recommendation 
optimism issued surrounding the M&A announcement date as well as during the 24-
month window following IPO issue date or SEO filing date at the time when analyst first 
time publish their reports. Even though there is a general increase in analyst optimism in 
the initial recommendations issued after the offerings following the expiration, there is 
no evidence of this change related to GS-employed analysts. Nor this effect is notably 
stronger for affiliated analysts either in the M&A or IPO/SEO contexts where analysts’ 
potential conflicts of interest are amplified. 
6.5.2 Results for the Tests of the Impact of Expiration of Funding Independent 
Research on Investor Response (H11a/b and H12) and Profitability (H13 and H14) 
H11a (b) proposes that there is a negative (positive) differential effect on the conditional 
informativeness of recommendation upgrades  or ‘buy-type’ recommendations 
(downgrades or ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ recommendations) following the 2009/10 
expiration for analysts who are employed by the GS signatories relative to those who are 
not. Additionally, to the extent that a change in informativeness of upgrades or ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations (downgrades or ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ recommendations) issued by GS 
analysts following the 2009/10 expiration does occur, H12 predicts that such effects 
should be stronger for affiliated GS analysts than unaffiliated GS analysts. The tests of 
H11a/b and H12 comprise two regressions of the following forms:     
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽3𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 9 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
10 
Control Variables (in addition to the Controls defined in Model 2)  
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PASTFIRMPERF = 
The firm’s stock return in the six months prior to the 
recommendation. 
PASTMKTPERF = 
The cumulative market return in the six months prior to the 
recommendation. 
MKTSD = 
The standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month prior to 
the recommendation. 
All variables are defined in Sections 4.3.2.3-4.3.2.4 and control variables are as described 
in Section 4.4.6. 
 
The coefficient for GSSignatory in Model 9 captures the incremental effect on conditional 
informativeness in recommendations during the pre-expiration period for analysts who 
are employed by one of GS signatories. The coefficient for POSTREGExp measures the 
incremental effect on conditional informativeness for non-GS analysts in the post-
expiration period. The coefficient for the interaction (GSSignatory × POSTREGExp) 
represents the incremental effect on conditional informativeness in recommendations for 
GS analysts after 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research. H11a (11b) implies 
that the negative change in conditional informativeness of recommendation upgrades 
(downgrades) during the M&A window or that of ‘buy-type’ recommendations 
(downgrades or ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ recommendations) during the 24-month window of 
post-IPO issue/post-SEO filing after the 2009/10 expiration is greater for GS analysts 
relative to non-GS analysts. If this is the case, the coefficient for GSSignatory × 
POSTREGExp should be significantly negative.  
In Model 10, the coefficient for the three-way interaction GSSignatory × POSTREGExp 
× AFF captures the incremental effect on the conditional informativeness of upgrades or 
‘buy-type’ (downgrades or ‘hold or sell-type’) recommendations in the post-expiration 
period, for affiliated analysts who are employed by a GS signatory, than for unaffiliated 
analysts who also work for a GS signatory. H12 would be supported if this coefficient is 
significantly negative (positive), which means that the incremental change in conditional 
informativeness for GS analysts following the 2009/10 expiration proposed in H11a/b is 
greater for affiliated GS analysts than unaffiliated GS ones.      
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Table 6.12 reports the tests of the impact of 2009/10 expiration on the informativeness of 
recommendation changes (measured by CARs, cumulative abnormal returns for days [-1, 
+1]) issued during the 180-day window of M&A announcement date. Two samples are 
employed: (1) the final available sample of 2,021 cases for upgrades; (2) the final 
available sample of 1,880 cases for downgrades;59 (3) the restricted sample of 1,722 cases 
for upgrades to ‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’; (4) the restricted sample of 1,765 cases for 
downgrades to ‘hold’, ‘sell’, or ‘strong sell’.  
All models are reasonably fitted well. The R2 statistics are ranging between 0.038 and 
0.044, which are greater than those reported in Buslepp et al. (2014, Table 5, p. 38; 0.028) 
that compares between the market reaction to recommendations issued by independent 
research providers funded by the GS and that by non-GS funded independent research 
firms.   
The coefficients are generally consistent with my predictions introduced in Section 4.4.6 
except for PASTMKTPERF, MKTSD, lnDEALVALUE, and EXP. The coefficients for 
PASTMKTPERF is lack of significance for both upgrade and downgrade cases. There are 
positive coefficients for MKTSD of downgrades but not for upgrades, and insignificant 
coefficients for lnDEALVALUE, and unexpectedly significant coefficients for EXP that 
suggest investors respond more to recommendations issued by experienced analysts.    
Columns 1-4 of Table 6.12 show the results of tests related to informativeness of the 
recommendation upgrades. I do not find evidence of a significantly negative coefficient 
for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp (β= 0.0071; p = 0.202) in Column 1, failing to support 
H11a. However, the informativeness of the recommendation upgrades surrounding the 
M&A announcement by non-GS employed analysts decreases during the post-expiration 
period indicated as the negative and significant coefficient for POSTREGExp (β= -0.0060; 
p = 0.079). H12 is not supported, evidenced on the insignificant coefficient for 
                                                 
59 Both Samples 1 and 2 as well as selection process are described in Section 6.3. 
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GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF in Columns 2 (β= 0.0005; p = 0.977), which implies 
no incremental effect of affiliation status for analysts who are employed by the GS 
signatories. In Columns 3-4, I re-estimate the models used in Columns 1-2 but restrict the 
sample of ‘upgrades’ to those recommendation changes that only resulted in a ‘buy’ or 
‘strong buy’ recommendation. These results are similar to those tabulated in Columns 1-
2.  
In summary, neither the average effect of employment by the GS signatories 
(GSSignatory × POSTREGExp in Columns 1 and 3) nor the incremental effect of 
affiliation status for analysts who are employed by the GS signatory brokerage firms 
(GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF in Columns 2 and 4) are significantly negative, 
suggesting that the expiration of funding independent research in 2009/10 does not impair 
the informativeness of recommendation upgrades. 
Columns 5-8 of Table 6.12 report the results of similar tests of the conditional 
informativeness focusing on recommendation downgrades issued during the 180-day 
window of M&A announcement date. All the signs of the abnormal returns reported in 
these columns of the regression have been reversed, so that a more positive coefficient 
implies greater informativeness. The ‘credibility effect’ of procurement of independent 
research by GS signatories suggests a decrease in informativeness of downgrades for GS 
analysts. Once the GS signatories ceased to fund and provide independent research after 
the five years’ time, an increase in informativeness of downgrades issued by GS analysts 
is expected after the 2009/10 expiration.  
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Table 6.12 OLS Regressions of Conditional Informativeness of Recommendation Upgrades and Downgrades in M&A Context 
 UPGRADE DOWNGRADE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
To Buy 
/StrongBuy 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
To Buy 
/StrongBuy 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
To Hold/Sell 
/StronSignatoryell 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
To Hold/Sell 
/StronSignatoryell 
         
GSSignatory 0.0029 0.0048 0.0026 0.0041 -0.0064 -0.0046 -0.0078 -0.0065 
 (0.538) (0.324) (0.602) (0.424) (0.301) (0.473) (0.223) (0.324) 
POSTREGExp -0.0060* -0.0060* -0.0061* -0.0059 -0.0161*** -0.0171*** -0.0169*** -0.0185*** 
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.082) (0.102) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
AFF  0.0070  0.0108  -0.0184  -0.0253* 
  (0.466)  (0.260)  (0.147)  (0.052) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp 0.0071 0.0070 0.0084 0.0085 0.0124 0.0122 0.0130 0.0135 
 (0.202) (0.244) (0.151) (0.180) (0.109) (0.135) (0.101) (0.107) 
GSSignatory × AFF  -0.0182  -0.0187  -0.0067  -0.0000 
  (0.151)  (0.158)  (0.686)  (0.999) 
POSTREGExp × AFF  0.0041  -0.0002  0.0089  0.0168 
  (0.779)  (0.991)  (0.674)  (0.462) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF  0.0005  0.0020  0.0010  -0.0073 
  (0.977)  (0.916)  (0.969)  (0.799) 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.0306*** 0.0303*** 0.0310*** 0.0307*** -0.0609*** -0.0606*** -0.0630*** -0.0625*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PASTMKTPERF 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0038 0.0025 0.0109 0.0111 0.0086 0.0087 
 (0.951) (0.960) (0.709) (0.803) (0.371) (0.363) (0.502) (0.497) 
MKTSD -0.4546** -0.4498** -0.6449*** -0.6409*** 1.1175*** 1.1370*** 1.3325*** 1.3612*** 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnDEALVALUE -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0007 0.0005 
 (0.534) (0.597) (0.614) (0.704) (0.728) (0.837) (0.583) (0.709) 
lnFIRMCAP -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0090*** -0.0092*** -0.0093*** -0.0095*** 
 (0.331) (0.383) (0.195) (0.231) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXP 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0010** 0.0011** 0.0011** 0.0012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) 
FOLLOW -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.166) (0.208) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
DAYS -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0001** -0.0001** 
 (0.066) (0.076) (0.546) (0.530) (0.010) (0.012) (0.028) (0.035) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.390) (0.386) (0.688) (0.701) (0.316) (0.217) (0.352) (0.238) 
Constant 0.0464*** 0.0441*** 0.0475*** 0.0444*** 0.0805*** 0.0841*** 0.0780*** 0.0825*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp +  0.0075  0.0105  0.0132  0.0062 
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GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp×AFF 
  (0.672)  (0.567)  (0.608)  (0.820) 
         
Observations 2,021 2,021 1,722 1,722 1,880 1,880 1,765 1,765 
R-squared 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.044 0.090 0.094 0.094 0.099 
F test 6.650 5.231 6.190 4.847 15.30 12.06 15.11 12.03 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days (i.e., [−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; CARs for recommendation 
downgrades are flipped in sign to make the interpretation consistent. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents past firm performance, which is defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before the 
recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents past market performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the standard deviation 
of the daily S&P 500 index one month before the recommendation. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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In Column 5, the coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp is insignificant (𝛽 =0.0071, 
p = 0.202), failing to support H11b that proposes a post-expiration increase in the 
informativeness of downgrades issued by GS analysts. Further, I fail to support H12, 
evidenced on the coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF in Column 6 is 
insignificant ( 𝛽  = 0.0010, p = 0.969), which suggests no significant increase in 
informativeness of recommendation downgrades after the 2009/10 expiration for 
affiliated GS analysts, relative to unaffiliated GS analysts.  
In Columns 7-8 of Table 6.12, I focus only on downgrades that result in a ‘hold’, ‘sell’ or 
‘strong sell’ recommendations. I have found similar results which are like those shown in 
Columns 5-6. Thus, my analyses of the informativeness of recommendation revisions 
provide evidence of no impairment and improvement of ‘credibility’ of the 
recommendation upgrades and downgrades approaching M&A announcements issued by 
the analysts who are employed by GS signatories after the 2009/10 expiration, and this 
effect is not related to analyst affiliation either.  
Table 6.13 reports the conditional informativeness (i.e. CARs, cumulative abnormal 
returns, measured during a three-day [-1,1] period centred on the issuance of the stock 
recommendation) of all the ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued during the 24-month 
window after the IPO issues (Columns 1-3) and SEO filing dates (Columns 4-6). Two 
samples are employed here: (1) 6,214 cases of CARs for ‘buy-type’ recommendations 
issued during IPO windows and (2) 21,347 cases of that during SEO window.   
All models are fitted well. The R2 statistics are around 0.023 – 0.028 for the tests using 
IPO windows and 0.048 – 0.050 for the tests using SEO windows, which are generally 
greater than those reported in Buslepp et al. (2014, Table 5, p. 38; 0.028) that is the study 
closest to my tests here.  
The control variables are substantively similar to those shown in Table 6.12 (tests using 
the M&A context). However, coefficients for PASTMKTPERF are significantly negative 
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when I apply tests using IPO context, but no significance is found for those tests using 
SEO context. FOLLOW is positively associated with the conditional informativeness of 
‘buy-type’ recommendations, which suggests investors put more trust in analysts’ ‘buys’ 
of which the covered firms attract more analyst following.       
Columns 1-3 of Table 6.13 report the results of tests related to conditional 
informativeness of the all ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued during the post-IPO 
window. In Column 2 of Table 6.13, the coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp is 
significantly negative ( 𝛽  = -0.0074, p = 0.031), which suggests a reduction in 
informativeness of ‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’ recommendations during the post-IPO period 
issued by the GS-employed analysts after the expiration in 2009/10, support H11a. While 
the coefficient for the three-way interaction term GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF 
(𝛽 = -0.0014; p = 0.855) in Column 3 is negative consistent with my prediction, I do not 
find its significance to support H12, which suggests that there is no greater decrease in 
conditional informativeness of post-IPO recommendations for affiliated GS analysts 
following the expiration in 2009/10, relative to unaffiliated GS ones.  
Columns 4-6 of Table 6.13 report the conditional informativeness of all ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations issued during the 24-month window after the SEO filing. Both H11a 
and H12 are supported. The coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp is significantly 
negative (𝛽 = -0.0055, p = 0.003), which suggests a reduction in informativeness of ‘buy-
type’ recommendations issued after IPOs by analysts who are employed by GS 
signatories following the 2009/10 expiration (H11a). In Column 6 the significantly 
negative coefficient for three-way interaction term GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF 
( 𝛽  = -0.0077; p = 0.045) suggests that there is an incremental reduction in the 
informativeness of all ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by the GS affiliated analysts 
than that by unaffiliated GS ones following the 2019/10 expiration of funding 
independent research (H12).  
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Overall, the results, shown in the tests of informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations 
of IPO/SEO context in Table 6.13, suggest that 2009/10 expiration of providing 
independent research impaired the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations by 
GS analysts, being different from the findings in those of M&A setting. Moreover, this 
post-expiration effect is even stronger for affiliated GS analysts relative to non-affiliated 
GS analysts during the post-SEO filing period. 
Table 6.13 OLS Regressions of Conditional Informativeness of All the ‘Buy-type’ 
Recommendations in IPO and SEO Contexts  
 24-MONTH POST-IPO ISSUE 
WINDOW 
24-MONTH POST-SEO FILING 
WINDOW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 1 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 2 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 3 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 1 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 2 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 3 
       
GSSignatory  0.0067** 0.0085*  0.0070*** 0.0085*** 
  (0.023) (0.059)  (0.000) (0.000) 
POSTREGExp -0.0008 0.0018 0.0021 -0.0014 0.0004 -0.0006 
 (0.662) (0.406) (0.406) (0.112) (0.733) (0.639) 
AFF   0.0104***   0.0039** 
   (0.001)   (0.022) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp  -0.0074** -0.0072  -0.0055*** -0.0013 
  (0.031) (0.239)  (0.003) (0.629) 
GSSignatory ×AFF   -0.0073   -0.0052* 
   (0.180)   (0.056) 
POSTREGExp ×AFF   0.0007   0.0030 
   (0.875)   (0.197) 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp ×AFF   -0.0014   -0.0077** 
   (0.855)   (0.045) 
PASTFIRMPREF 0.0292*** 0.0291*** 0.0294*** 0.0426*** 0.0424*** 0.0424*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PASTMKTPERF -0.0338*** -0.0341*** -0.0332*** 0.0018 0.0013 0.0011 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.712) (0.790) (0.821) 
MKTSD -0.2414 -0.2374 -0.2107 0.3679*** 0.3706*** 0.3726*** 
 (0.130) (0.137) (0.186) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnDEALVALUE -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0011 0.0015** 0.0014** 0.0014** 
 (0.757) (0.694) (0.403) (0.023) (0.039) (0.044) 
lnFIRMCAP -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0029** -0.0054*** -0.0054*** -0.0052*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXP 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.046) (0.022) (0.023) (0.037) 
FOLLOW 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.389) (0.354) (0.159) (0.134) (0.123) (0.141) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0000** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.151) (0.036) (0.012) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0347*** 0.0345*** 0.0311*** 0.0385*** 0.0389*** 0.0364*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp + 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp×AFF 
  -0.0086*   -0.0091*** 
   (0.077)   (0.001) 
       
Observations 6,214 6,214 6,214 21,347 21,347 21,347 
R-squared 0.023 0.024 0.028 0.048 0.048 0.050 
F test 14.90 12.92 11.16 106.5 90.46 69.85 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days (i.e., 
[−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; CARs for ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations are 
flipped in sign to make the interpretation consistent. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents past firm performance, which is 
defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents past 
market performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months before the recommendation; 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷  is the standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month before the recommendation. p-values in 
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parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 6.14 reports the results of tests of H11b and H12, which examine the conditional 
informativeness of all the ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ recommendations issued during the 24-
month window after the IPO issue date (Columns 1-3) or SEO filing date (Columns 4-6). 
Two samples are employed: (1) 6,079 cases of CARs for ‘hold and sell-type’ 
recommendations issued during IPO windows and (2) 23,041 cases of that during SEO 
window.   
The R2 statistics are ranging 0.244 – 0.253 for the tests using IPO windows and around 
0.202 for the tests using SEO windows, which are greater than those reported in Buslepp 
et al. (2014, Table 5, p. 38; 0.028) that examines the price reactions to levels of 
recommendations issued by independent research firms funded by GS signatories during 
the five-year period of providing independent research.  
All control variables are generally consistent to those reported in Table 6.13 except for 
the significantly positive coefficients for PASTFIRMPREF, which implies a positive 
association with -CARs for ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations.  
Columns 1-3 report the results of tests related to conditional informativeness in 
recommendations issued during the post-IPO 24-month period. Column 1 of Table 6.14 
shows that there is an overall increase in the informativeness of all the ‘hold’ and ‘sell-
type’ recommendations during the post-expiration period, as indicative of the 
significantly positive coefficient for POSTREGExp (𝛽 = 0.0157, p < 0.001). However, I 
do not find an increase in conditional informativeness related to analysts who are 
employed by the GS signatories following the 2009/10 expiration to support H11b, 
indicated as the insignificant coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp in Column 2. 
In Column 3, I do not find evidence to support H12 which I propose this increase is greater 
for affiliated analysts who are working for the GS signatories following the 2009/10 
expiration relative to unaffiliated GS analysts. Columns 4-6 of Table 6.14 generally report 
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findings of the ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ recommendations issued during the post-SEO 
window, consistent to those reported in Columns 1-3 but with weaker significance.  
Overall, the results, shown in the tests of the impact of 2009/10 expiration on the 
conditional informativeness of ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ recommendations of IPO/SEO 
context in Table 6.14, suggest that there is a general increase in informativeness of less 
favourable recommendations after the expiration of providing independent research in 
2009/10. However, I do not find this post-expiration increase in the informativeness of 
‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ recommendations is greater for the GS analysts, nor this effect is 
greater for affiliated GS analysts who cover the issuer firms. Consistent with a market 
perception that, for an affiliated analyst to issue a downgrade, the news must be of greater 
significance. After the 2009/10 expiration, the incremental informativeness of 
downgrades issued by this group of analysts increases significantly, to the extent that 
significant difference in informativeness of downgrades between affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts disappears following the expiration.  
Table 6.14 OLS Regressions of Conditional Informativeness of All the ‘Hold’ and 
‘Sell-type’ Recommendations in IPO and SEO Contexts  
 24-MONTH POST-IPO WINDOW 24-MONTH POST-SEO WINDOW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 1 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 2 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 3 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 1 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 2 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 3 
       
GSSignatory  -0.0024 -0.0097  -0.0034 -0.0019 
  (0.615) (0.174)  (0.122) (0.462) 
POSTREGExp 0.0157*** 0.0160*** 0.0083 0.0015 0.0003 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.102) (0.278) (0.842) (0.941) 
AFF   0.0242***   0.0101*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp  -0.0006 0.0131  0.0029 0.0021 
  (0.917) (0.235)  (0.279) (0.551) 
GSSignatory ×AFF   -0.0003   -0.0078** 
   (0.976)   (0.045) 
POSTREGExp ×AFF   0.0168**   0.0021 
   (0.034)   (0.599) 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp ×AFF   -0.0262*   -0.0001 
   (0.054)   (0.987) 
PASTFIRMPREF -0.1269*** -0.1271*** -0.1279*** -0.1105*** -0.1106*** -0.1104*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PASTMKTPERF -0.0512*** -0.0512*** -0.0549*** 0.0156** 0.0157** 0.0150** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) 
MKTSD -0.5743** -0.5796** -0.4914* 0.0087 0.0098 0.0227 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.065) (0.931) (0.922) (0.819) 
lnDEALVALUE -0.0112*** -0.0111*** -0.0138*** 0.0075*** 0.0075*** 0.0072*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnFIRMCAP -0.0150*** -0.0149*** -0.0128*** -0.0216*** -0.0216*** -0.0212*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXP 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 (0.348) (0.349) (0.959) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) 
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FOLLOW 0.0025*** 0.0024*** 0.0030*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.296) (0.282) (0.534) (0.958) (0.952) (0.983) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0001** 
 (0.019) (0.153) (0.036) (0.000) (0.044) (0.022) 
Constant 0.1912*** 0.1906*** 0.1772*** 0.1298*** 0.1298*** 0.1257*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp + 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp×AFF 
  -0.0130   0.0020 
   (0.103)   (0.653) 
       
Observations 6,079 6,079 6,079 23,041 23,041 23,041 
R-squared 0.244 0.244 0.253 0.202 0.202 0.203 
F test 195.5 162.9 128.5 582.9 486 366.9 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted returns using two window periods of days (i.e., 
[−1 1]) centred on the issuance of the stock recommendation; CARs for ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendation are 
flipped in sign to make interpretation consistent. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹  represents past firm performance, which is 
defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months before the recommendation; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents past 
market performance, which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months before the recommendation; 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the standard deviation of the daily S&P 500 index one month before the recommendation. p-values in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
H13 and H14 are related to the impact of 2009/10 expiration on the profitability of ‘buy-
type’ recommendations, which is a proxy for analysts’ ability to provide profitable 
recommendations of the investment-worthiness of stocks. H13 proposes that there is a 
negative change in the long-term buy and hold abnormal returns of ‘buy’ 
recommendations following the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research for 
GS analysts relative to non-GS analysts. H14 further predicts this incremental effect on 
the profitability for GS analysts after the 2009/10 expiration is greater for affiliated GS 
analysts than for unaffiliated GS ones. Models 9 and 10 are employed to test H13 and 
H14, but the control variables for past firm and market performance as well as the 
volatility of market returns (i.e. PASTFIRMPERF, PASTMKTPERF, and MKTSD) are 
excluded for the profitability tests.  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽3𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 9 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
10 
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Where PROFIT is the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations changes (‘buy’ or 
‘strong buy’) outstanding on the 10th day after the M&A announcement or SEO filing 
dates, measured as buy and hold abnormal return for a maximum of 90 days (1 year). All 
other variables are defined in Sections 4.3.2.3-4.3.2.4 and control variables are as 
described in Section 4.4.6. 
GSSignatory in Model 9 measures the incremental effect on the profitability of ‘buy’ 
recommendations during the pre-expiration period for GS analysts. The coefficient for 
POSTREGExp represents the incremental effect on the profitability of ‘buy’ 
recommendations for non-GS analysts in the post-expiration period. The coefficient for 
the interaction (GSSignatory × POSTREGExp) captures the incremental effect on the 
profitability of ‘buy’ recommendations for GS analysts after 2009/10 expiration of 
funding independent research. H13 implies that there is a reduction in profitability of ‘buy’ 
recommendations after the 2009/10 expiration, which is particularly greater for GS 
analysts relative to non-GS analysts. If this is the case, the coefficient for GSSignatory × 
POSTREGExp should be significantly negative.  
In Model 10, the coefficient for the three-way interaction GSSignatory × POSTREGExp 
× AFF captures the incremental effect on the profitability of ‘buy’ recommendations after 
the 2009/10 expiration, for GS affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated GS analysts. H14 
will be supported if this coefficient is significantly negative, which means that the 
incremental change in the profitability of ‘buy’ recommendations for GS analysts 
following the 2009/10 expiration proposed in H13 is greater for affiliated GS analysts 
than unaffiliated GS ones.      
Table 6.15 reports the results of my tests of H13 and H14, which examine the impact of 
2009/10 expiration of funding independent research on the profitability of analyst ‘buy-
type’ recommendations outstanding at the 10th day after the M&A announcement date or 
SEO filing date. The profitability of all ‘buy-type’ recommendations is the same measure 
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as used in the previous tables (i.e. size-decile adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns to 
an investment in the acquirer’s stock initiated 10 days after the M&A announcement date 
(or SEO filing date) and extending for either 1 year or 90 days, or until the analyst first 
downgrades their recommendation or stops coverage, whichever occurs first). I report 
results using measures of the profitability winsorised at the 1st/99th percentiles. Two 
samples are employed: (1) 4,445 cases of BHARs in M&A context and (2) 3,688 cases of 
BHARs in SEO context.  
All models are reasonably fitted. The R2 statistics are between 0.012 and 0.030 for tests 
using the M&A context as well as between 0.013 and 0.020 for tests using the SEO 
context, which are greater to those reported in the Buslepp et al. (2014, 0.008 in Table 2, 
p. 35) that reports OLS results long-term future performance recommendations issued by 
independent research firms funded by the GS during the five-year period.  
Control variables are substantially consistent with my predictions (and prior studies), 
except for lnDEALVALUE, FIRMCAP, and FOLLOW. lnDEALVALUE seems positively 
associated with the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued at the 10th day 
after M&A announcement dates, which suggests more considerations of M&A deals do 
not necessarily impair to the long-term performance of ‘buy-type’ recommendations 
issued by analysts but instead enhance it. Further, FIRMCAP is positively associated with 
the profitability of outstanding recommendations at the 10th day after the SEO filing date. 
The coefficients for FOLLOW are significantly positive for one-year BHARs of 
outstanding recommendations after M&A announcement, suggesting analysts’ 
recommendations perform better when there are more analysts following the covered 
firms, but I find opposite association in tests using SEO context.            
Columns 1-4 of Table 6.15 provide the tests of H13 and H14 which examine the impact 
of 2009/10 expiration on the profitability of recommendations issued at 10th days after 
M&A announcements. In Column 1, the coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp is 
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insignificant (β = 0.0121; p = 0.607), implying no differential effect on profitability for 
GS analysts following the 2009/10 expiration so failing to support H13. I cannot find 
evidence to support H14 either, evidenced on the insignificant coefficient for the three-
way interaction term GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF (β = 0.0504; p = 0.529) in 
Column 2, suggesting that there is no incremental decrease in the profitability of 
recommendations issued by affiliated GS analysts following the 2009/10 expiration, 
relative to unaffiliated ones. Throughout Columns 3-4, I obtain similar results of tests 
using a shorter period of profitability proxied by 90-day BHARs of the outstanding 
recommendations 10th day after M&A announcement.     
Columns 5-8 of Table 6.15 report the tests of H13 and H14, which examine the 
profitability in analyst recommendations measured by the size-decile adjusted buy and 
hold abnormal returns of an investment in the issuer’s stock initiated 10 days after the 
SEO filing date. In Column 5, I do not find the negative sign and significance in the 
coefficient for GSSignatory × POSTREGExp, failing to support H13. I do not find the 
evidence on an incremental post-expiration decrease in the profitability of 
recommendations issued by affiliated GS analysts’ recommendations than that by 
unaffiliated ones and fail to support H14. Similar results are found in Column 7-8 using 
the 90-day BHARs as a proxy for profitability. 
To sum up, my results do not support the effect of 2009/10 expiration on decreasing the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations following the M&A announcement dates or 
SEO filing dates. I do not find any association between the profitability and analyst 
affiliation.  
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Table 6.15 OLS Regressions of Profitability of Recommendation in M&A and SEO Contexts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
M&A SEO 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,1y) 
Model 9 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
Model 10 
BHAR 
(0,90day) 
         
GSSignatory 0.0057 0.0081 0.0006 0.0028 -0.0058** -0.0030 -0.0636*** -0.0243 
 (0.769) (0.690) (0.949) (0.761) (0.011) (0.326) (0.005) (0.422) 
POSTREGExp 0.1076*** 0.1071*** 0.0333*** 0.0337*** -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0046 -0.0117 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.753) (0.510) (0.760) (0.548) 
AFF  -0.0766  -0.0040  -0.0054**  -0.0088 
  (0.106)  (0.850)  (0.022)  (0.706) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp 0.0121 0.0041 -0.0064 -0.0059 0.0063** 0.0020 0.0717*** 0.0449 
 (0.607) (0.869) (0.547) (0.600) (0.016) (0.602) (0.006) (0.247) 
GSSignatory × AFF  0.0248  -0.0171  -0.0036  -0.0689* 
  (0.688)  (0.540)  (0.362)  (0.079) 
POSTREGExp × AFF  0.0152  -0.0055  0.0021  0.0165 
  (0.799)  (0.838)  (0.473)  (0.574) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp × AFF  0.0504  0.0056  0.0069  0.0481 
  (0.529)  (0.876)  (0.187)  (0.358) 
lnDEALVALUE 0.0191*** 0.0183*** 0.0061*** 0.0060*** -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0398*** 0.0411*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.395) (0.640) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnFIRMCAP -0.0216*** -0.0223*** -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0014* -0.0398*** -0.0403*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.601) (0.587) (0.137) (0.077) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXP 0.0017 0.0017 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.191) (0.183) (0.768) (0.727) (0.783) (0.685) (0.683) (0.695) 
FOLLOW 0.0040*** 0.0037*** -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0057*** 0.0054*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.500) (0.441) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0002** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.520) (0.497) (0.049) (0.035) (0.663) (0.486) (0.979) (0.971) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0009* 0.0009* 
 (0.939) (0.986) (0.925) (0.875) (0.002) (0.001) (0.050) (0.057) 
Constant -0.0677* -0.0488 -0.0423** -0.0394** -0.0080** -0.0054 -0.0924*** -0.0899** 
 (0.068) (0.200) (0.011) (0.021) (0.025) (0.144) (0.009) (0.015) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp + GSSignatory × 
POSTREGExp × AFF 
 0.0544  -0.0002  0.0089**  0.0929*** 
  (0.474)  (0.993)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
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Observations 4,445 4,445 4,445 4,445 3,688 3,688 3,688 3,688 
R-squared 0.029 0.030 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.020 0.013 0.015 
F test 14.46 10.55 6.202 4.555 6.447 5.667 5.314 4.178 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 are measured as the buy and hold return for each security less the same-period buy and hold return for the portfolio of firms matched by size decile from CRSP. The window period of BHARs 
starts at the tenth day after the M&A announcement date and lasts for one year, unless the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the investment bank. This table shows winsorised 
BHARs (0,1y) and BHARs (0,90d) at 1/99%; p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Results for the Tests of the Impact of Regulatory Effect of Expiration of Funding 
Independent Research on the Extent to Which Analyst Optimism Affects Deal Flow 
(Hypothesis 15)  
H15 implies that the sensitivity of the deal flow to lagged analyst optimism increases 
following the 2009/10 expiration and this change is greater for GS signatories than other 
non-GS brokers. The main test of H15 comprises the regressions of the following general 
form:  
∆MSt+1 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 +
𝛽4∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽5∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 × 𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 +
 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽7∆𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
14 
Definitions of variables: 
∆MSt+1 
= The change in a broker’s industry-year market share from year t to 
year t+1. This is measured separately for M&A deals and IPO/SEO 
deals. Industry market share is calculated as the total advisory (or 
underwriting) fee raised by a broker in a particular industry in year t 
divided by total advisory (underwriting) fees of all deals completed 
in that particular industry during the year t.   
∆OPTt 
= The change of analyst optimism (from year t-1 to year t), which 
represents the average analyst optimism of recommendations issued 
by the broker’s analysts, relative to the consensus optimism level for 
the industry in the year, weighted by covered firms’ market 
capitalisation. 
𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 = 
The change of the average size of covered firms (nature log value of 
capitalisation) from year t-1 to year t for a broker in the industry.  
𝑐ℎ𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 = 
The change of the industry average of all the analysts’ experience 
from year t-1 to year t for a broker, weighted by the analysts’ 
contribution in the industry (i.e. the proportion of the 
recommendations issued by the individual analyst in the total 
recommendations issued by all analysts in the industry and year t). 
𝑀𝑆𝑡 = 
The broker’s industry-year market share in year t in M&A deals or 
IPO/SEO deals. 
 
Where ∆OPTt captures the average association between lagged excess optimism (from t-
1 to t) and future changes in market share (∆MSt+1, defined as MS from t to t+1) for non-
GS brokers during the pre-reform period. POSTREGExp measures the incremental average 
annual change in market share in M&A or IPO/SEO deals for non-GS brokers, where 
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abnormal optimism equals zero, for the post-expiration period relative to the pre-
expiration period. GSSignatory is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the broker is one 
of the twelve GS signatories, 0 otherwise. The two-way interaction term ∆ OPTt × 
POSTREGExp in Model 14 represents the incremental association between excess broker 
optimism and subsequent change in investment banking market share for the post-
expiration period relative to the pre-expiration period. A significant coefficient for ∆OPTt 
× POSTREGExp implies that there is a general increase in the sensitivity of the future 
change in market share to abnormal broker optimism following the 2009/10 expiration of 
funding independent research. The coefficient for the three-way interaction ∆OPTt × 
POSTREGExp × GSSignatory in Model 14 means the incremental post-expiration 
association between excess analyst optimism and subsequent changes in market share for 
GS signatory brokers relative to non-GS brokers. The significantly positive coefficient 
for ∆OPTt × POSTREGExp × GSSignatory would support H15, which proposes the 
sensitivity of the future change in market share to abnormal broker optimism following 
the 2009/10 expiration should be greater for GS brokers than non-GS ones. 
Table 6.16 shows the results of tests of H15, which examines whether the 2009/10 
expiration of funding independent research positively changes the sensitivity of the 
market shares winning M&A advisory mandates to the analyst optimism for analysts who 
are employed by the GS signatories. Two samples employed to test H15 are: (1) 677 cases 
of M&A deal flows introduced in Table 6.3 and (2) 1,918 cases of equity deal flows 
introduced in Table 6.4. The models are well fitted, which the R2 statistics are ranging 
between 0.38 and 0.43 for M&A cases and about 0.23 ~ 0.32 for IPO/SEO cases – all 
greater than those reported in Clarke et al. (2007, 13.23% – 15% in Table 5, p.541). 
The control variables are substantially as predicted. chg_lnavgSIZE are positively 
associated with the ∆ MSt+1 but lack of significance. The coefficients for 
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chg_indavgEXPwindcy are significantly positive in M&A cases but not significant for 
Equity cases (all are positive though).   
In Columns 1-3 of Table 6.16 show the tests of H15 based on the change of market share 
of M&A advisory jobs for brokers. The negative coefficient for POSTREGExp × ∆OPTt 
in Column 2 shows no positive association between excess broker optimism and 
subsequent change in market shares of M&A deals after the 2009/10 expiration. Further, 
the coefficient for the three-way interaction term, ∆OPTt × POSTREGExp × GSSignatory 
is not significantly positive (β = 0.0045; p = 0.998), failing to support H15, which posits 
an incremental increase in sensitivity of the future deal flow of M&A advisory mandates 
to lagged analyst optimism for GS brokers following the 2009/10 expiration.  
Columns 4-6 of Table 6.16 report similar tests of H15 but focusing on the change of 
market shares of IPO/SEO underwriting mandates (from t to t+1) for brokers. There is no 
evidence on a positive increase in the sensitivity of excess analyst optimism to subsequent 
market shares in brokers’ gaining IPO/SEO underwriting jobs following the 2009/10 
expiration, as indicative of the negative coefficient for POSTREGExp × ∆OPTt in Column 
5. Further, I do not find evidence to support H15, evidenced on the negative and 
insignificant coefficient for ∆OPTt × POSTREGExp × GSSignatory in Column 6 (β = -
0.3987; p = 0.179). Therefore, the post-expiration change in the sensitivity of ∆MSt+1 to 
∆OPTt is not greater for GS signatory brokers who were stopped providing independent 
research reports after 2009/10, relative to non-GS brokers.60  
In summary, during the five-year period of providing independent research, GS brokers’ 
optimism of a company may be constrained the covered firm to grant the GS brokers to 
have M&A advisory or equity underwriting mandates. However, my findings suggest that 
following the expiration of procurement of independent research in 2009/10, there is no 
                                                 
60 I obtain consistent results if using the level of future market share (MSt+1) as another dependent variable 
for tests of H15. Please see Appendix 6.2. 
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incremental association between abnormal optimism and subsequent change in market 
shares of investment banking deals for GS signatories. 
Table 6.16 OLS Regressions of Market Shares within Industries (M&A and 
IPO/SEO cases) 
 M&A Cases Equity Cases 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES DV:  
∆MSt+1 
  Model 14   Model 14 
    
   
∆OPTt -0.9552*** -0.8775* -0.1549 -0.0666 -0.0296 -0.2077  
(0.001) (0.057) (0.892) (0.344) (0.798) (0.286) 
POSTREGExp  0.0057 0.0019  -0.0020 0.0001  
 (0.266) (0.806)  (0.135) (0.959) 
GSSignatory   0.0350***   0.0287***  
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
∆OPTt × 
POSTREGExp 
 -0.1352 -0.0717  -0.0555 0.2707 
 
 (0.816) (0.959)  (0.704) (0.268) 
POSTREGExp × 
GSSignatory 
  0.0103   -0.0065** 
 
  (0.295)   (0.016) 
∆OPTt × GSSignatory   -0.8626   0.2030  
  (0.488)   (0.392) 
∆OPTt ×
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 
GSSignatory 
  0.0045   -0.3987 
 
  (0.998)   (0.179) 
chg_lnavgSIZE 0.0040 0.0032 0.0043 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008  
(0.419) (0.524) (0.371) (0.357) (0.313) (0.348) 
chg_indavgEXPwindcy 0.1792*** 0.1765*** 0.1498** 0.0076 0.0080 0.0088  
(0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.292) (0.270) (0.201) 
MS -0.5960*** -0.5984*** -0.6893*** -0.4420*** -0.4421*** -0.6128***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0323*** 0.0299*** 0.0138*** 0.0146*** 0.0157*** 0.0114***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
      
Observations 677 677 677 1,918 1,918 1,918 
R-squared 0.381 0.382 0.433 0.230 0.231 0.325 
F test 103.5 69.14 50.86 142.8 95.62 91.86 
∆MSt+1 is the change in brokers’ industry-year market share from year t to year t+1. This is measured separately for M&A deals 
and IPO/SEO deals. Industry market share is calculated as the total advisory (or underwriting) fee raised by a broker in a particular 
industry in year t divided by total advisory (underwriting) fees of all deals completed in that particular industry during year t. 
∆ OPTt is the change of analyst optimism (from year t−1 to year t), which represents the average analyst optimism of 
recommendations issued by brokers’ analysts relative to the consensus optimism level for the industry in the year, weighted by 
covered firms’ market capitalisation. ∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸  is the change in the average size of covered firms (nature log value of 
capitalisation) from year t−1 to year t for brokers in the industry. ∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 is the change in the industry average of all 
analysts’ experience from year t−1 to year t for brokers, weighted by analysts’ contributions in the industry (i.e., proportion of the 
recommendations issued by individual analysts in the total recommendations issued by all analysts in the industry and year t). MSt 
is the yearly industry-year market share in year t in M&A deals or IPO/SEO deals. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Summary, Discussion of Results, Contributions and Limitations 
Chapter 6 reports the findings of the tests of H9 – H15, which examine the regulatory 
effect of the expiration of funding independent research in 2009/10 on analyst optimism 
(H9 and H10), investor response (H11a/b and H12) and profitability (H13 and H14), as 
well as the extent to which analyst optimism affects deal flow (H15).  
Table 6.17 presents a summary of all the results for all tests of hypotheses regarding the 
regulatory impact of 2009/10 expiration on analyst optimism (Panel A), investor response 
(Panel B), profitability (Panel C), and the sensitivity of the lead market share to lagged 
excess analyst optimism (Panel D). 
Panel A summarises the results reported in Tables 6.10 - 6.11, which examine the impact 
of 2009/10 expiration on: (1) analyst upgrades to recommendation (or LTG forecast 
optimism revisions) for acquirer firms in the window surrounding M&A announcement 
dates; (2) analysts’ first recommendation during the 24-month window after the IPO issue 
dates or SEO filing dates. I show that there is neither an increase in analyst optimism 
following the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research for the analysts who 
are employed by the GS signatories nor is any evidence of incremental increase for 
affiliated analysts who work for GS signatories following the expiration.  
Panel B presents a summary of results reported in Tables 6.12 - 6.14, which are related to 
investor response (H11a/b and H12). I show that the impact of stopping providing 
independent research by the GS analysts following the 2009/10 expiration did not impair 
the informativeness of recommendation changes issued by the GS analysts surrounding 
the M&A announcement date. However, the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations issued during the 24-month window after IPO issue or SEO filing date 
by GS analysts significantly decreases after the expiration of funding independent 
research in 2009/10. Also, such post-expiration reduction is greater for affiliated GS 
analysts relative to unaffiliated GS ones.  
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Panel C briefs the results shown in Tables 6.15, reporting no evidence that the profitability 
of recommendations by GS analysts decreases following the 2009/10 expiration either 
the ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued 10 days after M&A announcement or SEO filing 
dates. Further, in Panel D that summarises the results reported in Table 6.16, no 
incremental association between broker excess optimism and following change in M&A 
or equity market shares for GS brokers is found after the expiration of procurement of 
independent research in 2009/10.     
My findings show that there is no significant change in analyst optimism before and after 
the expiration in 2009/10. The results shed light on regulators who further consider 
modifications to the GS would ponder deeply the effectiveness of requiring brokers to 
provide parallel independent research reports. I find evidence of the impairment in 
informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by the GS employed analysts after 
IPO issue and SEO filing dates. In tests of SEO cases, this effect is greater for affiliated 
analysts employed by GS signatories. Obviously, investors perceive less credibility in the 
recommendations issued by GS analysts who cover SEO issuers after the 2009/10 
expiration, especially for those affiliated ones.  
Finally, my methodology design still faces challenges of differentiating my results from 
the impact of other coincidental events which also potentially affect analysts’ evaluation 
for cover firms, especially for the subprime mortgage crisis that also occurred during the 
U.S. recession from December 2007 to June 2009.  
Table 6.17 Summary of Results for All Hypotheses Tests Regarding the Regulatory 
Impact of the 2009/10 Expiration of Funding Independent Research 
                             Hypotheses 
      Tables 
   
Panel A Tests of Hypotheses that examine the Impact of the 2009/10 Expiration on 
Analyst Optimism 
 H9 H10 (AFF)  
Table 6.10 M&A (UPGRADErec) No No  
Table 6.10 M&A (UPGRADELTG) No No  
Table 6.11 IPO (level) No No  
Panel B Tests of Hypotheses that examine the Impact of the 2009/10 Expiration on 
Investor Response 
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 H11a H11b H12 (AFF) 
Table 6.12 M&A (upgrades)(-) No  No 
Table 6.12 M&A (downgrades)(+)  No No 
Table 6.13 IPO (‘Buy and Strong 
Buy’ Cases)(-) 
Yes  No 
Table 6.14 IPO (‘Hold, Sell, and 
Strong Sell’ Cases)(+) 
 No No 
Table 6.13 SEO (‘Buy and Strong 
Buy’ Cases)(-) 
Yes  Yes 
Table 6.14 SEO (‘Hold, Sell, and 
Strong Sell’ Cases)(+) 
 No No 
Panel C Tests of Hypotheses that examine the Impact of the 2009/10 Expiration on 
Profitability 
 H13 H14 (AFF)  
Table 6.15 M&A (‘Buy and Strong 
Buy’ Cases) 
No No  
Table 6.15 SEO (‘Buy and Strong 
Buy’ Cases) 
No No  
Panel D Tests of Hypotheses that examine the Impact of the 2009/10 Expiration on the 
Extent to Which Analyst Optimism Affects Deal Flow 
 H15   
Table 6.16 M&A deals No   
Table 6.16 IPO/SEO deals No   
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Appendix 6.1 OLS Regressions of Analyst Optimism: Initial Recommendation in 
SEO Context 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES DV: INILEVELSEO3tier Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 3 
Annual PSM 
     
GSSignatory  -0.0622*** -0.0947*** -0.0788* 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.053) 
POSTREGExp 0.0690*** 0.0735*** 0.0720*** 0.0512 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.105) 
AFF 0.0393**  0.0271 -0.0183 
 (0.017)  (0.163) (0.662) 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp  -0.0283 -0.0291 -0.0085 
  (0.205) (0.386) (0.870) 
GSSignatory ×AFF   0.0537 0.0829 
   (0.103) (0.182) 
POSTREGExp ×AFF -0.0158  0.0052 0.0154 
 (0.442)  (0.832) (0.761) 
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp ×AFF   -0.0151 -0.0860 
   (0.736) (0.264) 
lnDEALVALUE -0.0532*** -0.0486*** -0.0527*** -0.0454*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0478*** 0.0476*** 0.0502*** 0.0390*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
EXP -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0013 
 (0.173) (0.218) (0.116) (0.499) 
FOLLOW -0.0125*** -0.0133*** -0.0125*** -0.0108*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0028*** -0.0015*** -0.0016*** -0.0012 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.195) 
Constant cut1 3.6389*** 3.6307*** 3.6174*** 3.6631*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
GSSignatory × POSTREGExp +  
GSSignatory ×POSTREGExp×AFF 
  -0.0442 -0.0945 
   (0.149) (0.092) 
     
Observations 14,372 14,372 14,372 4,262 
R-squared 0.040 0.042 0.043 0.029 
F test 42.49 45.91 34.23 8.320 
LEVELSEO3tier is the standardised level of initial recommendation following the SEO issue date, coded of three-tier rating system 
such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’ and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’; 𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the output was issued by an analyst employed by a brokerage firm that was one of the original 12 sanctioned banks (and their 
subsequent name variations), who were directly subject to the GS, and 0 otherwise. POSTREGexp is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the recommendation or forecast is issued after 26 July 2009, the date of expiration of independent research funding required by 
the GS for GS signatories, and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹  indicates that the analyst is affiliated with the SEO issuer’s underwriter; 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of 
total proceeds amount in the SEO deal. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) 
and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of SEO firms as at the last trading day of the calendar month before the analyst’s 
report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 is the number of years starting from the analyst’s first published report on I/B/E/S until the year of the analyst’s report; 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊  is the total number of analysts who issue a report for the same firm within one calendar month preceding the 
recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between the SEO issue date and the analyst’s 
report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the same calendar month 
of the recommendation announcement date. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
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Appendix 6.2 OLS Regressions of Market Shares within Industries (M&A and 
IPO/SEO cases) Using MSt+1 as the Dependent Variable 
 M&A Cases Equity Cases 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES DV:  
MSt+1 
  Model 14   Model 14 
    
      
∆OPTt -0.5234** -0.8499** -0.1813 0.0063 0.1611* -0.1241  
(0.038) (0.036) (0.855) (0.912) (0.086) (0.418) 
POSTREGExp  0.0045 0.0018  -0.0014 0.0002  
 (0.316) (0.782)  (0.194) (0.842) 
GSSignatory   0.0354***   0.0269***  
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
∆OPTt × POSTREGExp  0.5200 -0.0740  -0.2435** 0.1894  
 (0.307) (0.951)  (0.039) (0.325) 
POSTREGExp × GSSignatory   0.0081   -0.0051**  
  (0.343)   (0.015) 
∆OPTt × GSSignatory   -0.7873   0.3637*  
  (0.465)   (0.051) 
∆OPTt ×  𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑥𝑝 × 
GSSignatory 
  0.7992   -0.5592** 
 
  (0.547)   (0.017) 
chg_lnavgSIZE 0.0047 0.0038 0.0055 0.0008 0.0010 0.0009  
(0.274) (0.378) (0.187) (0.251) (0.186) (0.196) 
chg_indavgEXPwindcy 0.1463*** 0.1427*** 0.1200** 0.0059 0.0067 0.0083  
(0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.309) (0.249) (0.125) 
MS 0.3747*** 0.3702*** 0.2800*** 0.5243*** 0.5244*** 0.3602***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0325*** 0.0308*** 0.0145*** 0.0149*** 0.0156*** 0.0118***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
      
Observations 677 677 677 1,918 1,918 1,918 
R-squared 0.233 0.235 0.312 0.390 0.392 0.496 
F test 50.99 34.33 30.24 306.4 205.6 187.9 
MSt+1 is the brokers’ industry-year market at year t+1. This is measured separately for M&A deals and IPO/SEO 
deals. Industry market share is calculated as the total advisory (or underwriting) fee raised by a broker in a particular 
industry in year t divided by total advisory (underwriting) fees of all deals completed in that particular industry 
during year t. ∆OPTt is the change of analyst optimism (from year t−1 to year t), which represents the average 
analyst optimism of recommendations issued by brokers’ analysts relative to the consensus optimism level for the 
industry in the year, weighted by covered firms’ market capitalisation. ∆𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the change in the average 
size of covered firms (nature log value of capitalisation) from year t−1 to year t for brokers in the industry. 
∆𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑦 is the change in the industry average of all analysts’ experience from year t−1 to year t for 
brokers, weighted by analysts’ contributions in the industry (i.e., proportion of the recommendations issued by 
individual analysts in the total recommendations issued by all analysts in the industry and year t). MSt is the yearly 
industry-year market share in year t in M&A deals or IPO/SEO deals. p-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Chapter 7 Sample and Empirical Results of the Impact of the Jobs Act 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the results of regression tests regarding the regulatory 
impact of 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research. An important change 
affecting the 2002/03 SRO Rules is entailed in the JOBS Act, which allows analysts 
employed by members of the covered EGC issuer’s IPO underwriting syndicate 
(‘affiliated EGC analysts’) to have a more extensive involvement in the IPO process, 
including attendance at pitch meetings and due diligence sessions. In this chapter, I 
examine the regulatory impact of the JOBS Act of 2012 on analyst optimism (H16), 
investor response (H17a/b), and profitability (H18). Section 7.2 reports the selection 
criteria for the samples used to test hypotheses that concern the regulatory impact of the 
JOBS Act, which is followed by Section 7.3 that reports descriptive statistics for the 
samples. Section 7.4 analyses and discusses the empirical results and implications. Lastly, 
Section 7.5 concludes this chapter.     
Sample Selection 
To examine the impact of the JOBS Act of 2012, I first form a sample of analyst 
recommendations for US firms that raised capital through initial public offerings (IPOs) 
reported in the SDC Platinum database between 2004 – 2015. I further restrict this sample 
to recommendations issued by US analysts for whom an employing brokerage can be 
identified. Following Kadan et al. (2009), I exclude all IPOs for closed-end funds and 
trusts and unit investment trusts. This main sample commences in 2004 to avoid 
confounding effects of the adoption of the 2002/3 reforms. All samples employed exclude 
observations occurring between April 5th, 2012 and November 11th, 2012 to limit the 
impact of a series of regulatory developments related to the JOBS Act that take place in 
close order. During this transition period, guidance on certain provisions of the JOBS Act 
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was provided and some points of ambiguity were clarified (e.g. a Q&A release (SEC, 
2012, August 22)), while related amendments to FINRA Rules were on going (e.g. NASD 
Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 to conform to the JOBS Act requirements on October 11, 
2012).61   
Table 7.1 describes the selection procedure for my main sample of recommendations for 
initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2004 and 2015. There were 1,762 IPO deals for 
which underwriters were contracted during the sample period. I require that IPO deals 
have at least one affiliated brokerage (those in the issuers’ underwriting syndicates, 
including either lead, co-lead managers or non-managing members) and one unaffiliated 
brokerage (those are not in the underwriting syndicates) that are able to be matched to 
I/B/E/S recommendations for the issuing firm. This requirement reduces the available 
sample to 1,670 offerings. For each of these cases, I obtain all affiliated and unaffiliated 
analyst stock recommendations issued in the 24 months immediately following the IPO 
issue date. Of the 11,530 observations of recommendations issued within 24-months of 
IPO listing dates, 6,636 represent the initial recommendations issued.62 I use standardised 
level of these 6,636 initial post-issue recommendations to test the regulatory impact on 
analyst optimism. After excluding recommendations issued by analysts employed by the 
GS signatory brokers (who were not directly affected by the JOBS Act), and 42 cases 
with missing data for control variables, and recommendations issued during the transition 
period (April 5th, 2012 - November 11th, 2012), my final sample comprises 3,793 initial 
recommendations for IPO issuers between 2004-2015. 
My tests of conditional informativeness are based on a similar sample to that described 
above, but are not restricted to analysts’ initial recommendations. Of the 11,530 
recommendations issued in the 24-month window after IPOs between 2004 and 2015, 
                                                 
61 Please refer to the regulatory notice that can be downloaded on http://www.finra.org/industry/notices/12-
49 
62 I study only initial recommendations for consistency with earlier tests in different contexts introduced in 
Chapter 5 and 6. 
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6,623 cases are ‘buy-type’ and 4,907 cases are ‘hold and sell-type’. Of this number, 7,370 
have sufficient data to estimate abnormal returns over the 3-day window surrounding the 
announcement of the recommendations. After eliminating missing data, 
recommendations issued by analysts who are employed by the GS signatories and 
observations in the transition period, I obtain samples of 2,198 (1,870) for testing the 
informativeness conditional upon ‘buy-type’ (‘sell-type’) recommendations. I further 
investigate whether the JOBS Act affected analyst optimism, reflected in analysts’ ability 
and willingness to make profitable investment recommendations. In the tests of 
profitability, I restrict the sample of 6,636 initial post-issue recommendations (in tests 
related to analyst optimism) to ‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’. The number of initial post-IPO 
recommendations that were of ‘buy-type’ is 2,681, which after matching to the requisite 
return data yields a final sample of 1,191 ‘buy-type’ recommendations used in testing my 
profitability hypotheses.63  
Table 7.1 Sample Selection for Recommendations Used to Test Impact of the JOBS 
Act 
Descriptions IPO 
Total number of IPO deals with underwriters from SDC between 2004 
and 2015 
1,762 
Total number of IPO deals which can match brokers and underwriters (at 
least one matched broker as an underwriter for an IPO deal) 
1,670 
Cases merged IPO deals with recommendations  11,530 
Cases of initial recommendations after IPO  6,636 
Cases of initial recommendations after IPO, which are issued by analysts 
who are not employed by the GS signatories 
4,174 
Less missing data for controls -42 
Observations with available data 2004-2015 4,132 
Less observations between April 5th, 2012 and November 11th, 2012 -339  
Final available sample of initial post-IPO recommendations 3,793 
Available sample of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued during 24-month 
post IPO window used to test conditional informativeness 
2,198 
Available sample of ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ recommendations issued 
during 24-month post IPO window used to test conditional 
informativeness 
1,870 
                                                 
63 In tests of conditional informativeness, I observe the investor response over the two years following IPOs 
to capture investor response more broadly. The profitability tests examine whether analysts’ ability to 
identify and provide profitable recommendations is affected by the JOBS Act that potentially induced more 
conflicts of interest and potential optimistic bias in analyst report. To be consistent with earlier tests related 
to the impact of the Act on analyst optimism, I study initial recommendations for profitability tests but all 
the recommendations for the conditional informativeness test. 
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Available sample of ‘buy-type’ initial post-IPO recommendations used to 
test the profitability 
1,191 
 
Descriptive statistics in IPO/SEO context 
Table 7.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the final sample of the initial 
recommendations issued during the 24-month post-issue period for IPOs between 2004 
and 2015 (exclusive of cases in the transition period), classified by the type of 
recommendation issued. The standardised levels of recommendations (LEVELIPO3tier) are 
coded such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’. The 
total number of initial recommendations issued by the non-GS analysts following IPOs 
in my full sample is 3,793 described in Table 7.1. Higher number implies greater analyst 
optimism. The mean of the total initial recommendations is 3.68, which suggests that for 
the first time after IPOs, analysts tend to issue between a ‘hold’ and a ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for issuers, indicating a prevalence of buy-type recommendations. 
Indeed, I find that more than 69.83% of the total initial recommendations are ‘buy’ or 
‘strong buy’.  
Then Table 7.2 reports the 2,572 initial post-IPO recommendations issued by non-GS 
analysts before the JOBS Act. Approximately 85% of these (2,187 recommendations) 
were issued by analysts covering firms that would, in future, be classified by the JOBS 
Act as emerging growth companies (EGCs), and which I refer to as ‘EGCs’ throughout 
the sample period, and comprise 912 recommendations issued by affiliated analysts, and 
1,275 recommendations issued by unaffiliated analysts. The high proportion of 
observations identified to be issued by EGCs in my thesis is consistent to Barth, 
Landsman, and Taylor (2017), which states that the $1 billion in annual revenue before 
issuance as the threshold is quite lenient so that most of IPO firms became eligible for 
EGC status following the JOBS Act. Also, Latham and Watkins (2013) also reports that 
nearly 75% of IPO issuers have identified themselves as EGCs after the effective date of 
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the JOBS Act (April 5, 2012). The 912 pre-reform recommendations issued by affiliated 
EGC analysts represent a base for comparison of the post-reform behaviour of analysts 
directly affected by the JOBS Act. In addition, there are 385 initial recommendations 
issued by analysts for firms that, in future, would be classified as non-EGCs, comprising 
146 recommendations issued by affiliated analysts, and 239 recommendations issued by 
unaffiliated analysts. Univariate evidence suggests that in the pre-reform period affiliated 
analysts covering EGCs issue more optimistic initial recommendations following IPOs 
(i.e. 77.19% are ‘buy-type’ recommendations, 22.48% are ‘hold’ recommendations, and 
0.33% are ‘sell-type’recommendations) than unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs (i.e. 
63.61% are ‘buy-type’ recommendations, 33.33% are ‘hold’ recommendations, and 
3.06% of ‘sell-type’ recommendations). In addition, the average level of initial 
recommendations (LEVELIPO3tier) issued by affiliated analysts covering EGCs (mean of 
LEVELIPO3tier: 3.768) is significantly more optimistic than those issued by unaffiliated 
analysts covering EGCs (mean of LEVELIPO3tier: 3.605) (mean diff.  = 0.1631, p < 0.001). 
To conclude, before the passage of JOBS Act of 2012, affiliated analysts covering EGCs 
were more optimistic than unaffiliated analysts covering these firms.  
The lower half of Table 7.2 describes the 1,221 post-IPO initial recommendations issued 
by non-GS analysts during the post-JOBS Act period. Affiliated analysts covering EGCs 
typically issue more optimistic initial recommendations (i.e. 84.49% are ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations) than they did before the JOBS Act (i.e. 77.19% are post ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations). Also, after the JOBS Act, the affiliated analysts covering EGCs issue 
more optimistic initial recommendations (i.e. 84.49% are ‘buy-type’ recommendations, 
15.51% are ‘hold’ recommendations, and 0% are ‘sell-type’ recommendations) than 
unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs (i.e. 71.51% are ‘buy-type’ recommendations, 
27.12% are ‘hold’ recommendations, and 1.37% are ‘sell-type’ recommendations). 
Moreover, the difference in mean levels of recommendations issued by affiliated EGC 
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analysts (mean of LEVELIPO3tier: 3.844) and those by unaffiliated EGC analysts (mean of 
LEVELIPO3tier: 3.701) is positive and significant (mean diff. = 0.1435; p < 0.001). Lastly, 
the univariate difference-in-difference test shows that there is no significant change in the 
mean difference in optimism between affiliated analysts covering EGCs and unaffiliated 
analysts covering EGCs following the JOBS Act (mean diff-in-diff. = -0.020; p < 0.608).  
In summary, Table 7.2 reports the frequencies of different types of initial 
recommendations following IPOs. I find that the frequency of initial ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts is higher than that of initial ‘hold’ or ‘sell-
type’ recommendations in both pre- and post-JOBS Act periods. However, I find no 
significant post-reform change in the incremental optimism of affiliated analysts relative 
to unaffiliated analysts. 
Table 7.2 Frequencies and Mean Levels of Initial Recommendations following IPOs 
– Non-GS Analysts Only (total number of cases: 3,793)  
Period Analyst  Total 
Mean 
Rec.  
Level 
 
Mean 
difference in 
Rec. Level 
t 
(p-value) 
Buy / Strong 
Buy 
Hold 
Sell / Strong 
Sell 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
2004 -2015 3,793 3.68  2,649 69.83% 1,077 28.39% 67 1.76% 
Pre 
JOBS 
Act 
All Analysts  2,572 3.644   1716 66.72% 797 30.99% 59 2.29% 
Affiliated 
analysts 
covering 
EGCs 
912 3.7688 
diff. = 
0.1631*** 
t = 7.493 
(p < 0.001) 
704 77.19% 205 22.48% 3 0.33% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 
covering 
EGCs  
1275 3.605 811 63.61% 425 33.33% 39 3.06% 
Affiliated 
analysts 
covering non-
EGCs 
146 3.554 
diff. = 0.1238** 
t = 2.0339 
(p = 0.021) 
81 55.48% 65 44.52% 0 0.00% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts who 
covering non-
EGCs 
239 3.430 120 50.21% 102 42.68% 17 7.11% 
Post 
JOBS 
Act 
All Analysts  1,221 3.757   933 76.41% 280 22.93% 8 0.66% 
Affiliated 
analysts 
covering 
EGCs 
574 3.844 
diff. = 
0.1435*** 
t = 5.1634 
(p < 0.001) 
485 84.49% 89 15.51% 0 0.00% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts 
covering 
EGCs  
365 3.701 261 71.51% 99 27.12% 5 1.37% 
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Affiliated 
analysts 
covering non-
EGCs 
164 3.707 
diff. = 0.1310** 
t = 2.1906 
(p = 0.014) 
117 71.34% 46 28.05% 1 0.61% 
Unaffiliated 
analysts who 
covering non-
EGCs 
118 3.576 70 59.32% 46 38.98% 2 1.69% 
The univariate difference-in-difference test for whether the difference in optimism between affiliated 
analysts covering EGCs and unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs increases after the JOBS Act. diff. = -0.020 
(= 0.143 – 0.163); t = 0.51 (p = 0.608). 
 
Table 7.3 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used to test my hypotheses 
regarding the effect of the JOBS Act. Panel A is based on the full sample. The mean value 
of EGC suggests that approximately 82% of initial recommendations issued by non-GS 
analysts after IPOs relate to EGCs, similar to the 80% concentration reported by Dambra 
et al. (2018, Table 1 Panel A). The mean of POSTREGJOBS indicates that about 32% of 
observations pertain to the post-JOBS Act period. The initial recommendations issued by 
affiliated analysts (AFF) contribute about 47% (i.e. 1,796 out of 3,793 cases) to the final 
sample.  
Panels B and C show descriptive statistics for all variables partitioned by whether the 
recommendation is issued after the JOBS Act of 2012 (POSTREGJOBS). Analysts are in 
general more optimistic following the JOBS Act, evident in that the mean of 
INILEVEL3tier in the post-Act period is significantly greater than that in the pre-Act 
period (t = 6.52; p < 0.001, untabulated).  
Panel D and E show descriptive statistics for all variables partitioned by whether the 
issuers meet the definition of an EGC (EGC). Consistent with Dambra et al. (2018), about 
82% of post-IPO recommendations issued are for EGCs (3,126 out of 3,793 cases). 
Analysts appear more optimistic when covering an EGC, as shown by the mean value of 
INILEVEL3tier when EGC = 1 (3.70), which is significantly greater than that when EGC 
= 0 (3.55) (t = 7.35; p < 0.001, untabulated). 
Panels F and G report descriptive statistics for all variables partitioned according to 
whether the analyst’ employing broker is a member of the covered IPO issuers’ 
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underwriting syndicate (AFF). Affiliated analysts are generally more optimistic than 
unaffiliated analysts, shown by the significantly greater mean value of INILEVEL3tie 
when AFF = 1 (3.77) than that when AFF = 0 (3.60) (t = 10.53; p < 0.001, untabulated).       
Panel H of Table 7.3 reports descriptive statistics for measures of informativeness (CARs 
and the negative transformation of CARs for hold and sell-type recommendations), 
comprising 2,198 cases of ‘buy-type’ recommendations and 1,870 cases of ‘hold and sell-
type’ recommendations during the 24-month post-IPO period, issued by non-GS 
analysts.64 I find that, on average, there are significant positive abnormal returns to ‘buy-
type’ recommendations (1.8%) and significant negative abnormal returns to ‘hold, sell, 
and strong sell’ recommendations (mean untransformed CAR = -5.2%).  The distributions 
of the control variables (PASTFIRMPREF, PASTMKTPERF, and MKTSD) provided in 
Table 7.3 are consistent with those reported in previous studies (Carter et al., 1998; 
Jegadeesh et al., 2004).  
Panel I of Table 7.3 reports descriptive statistics for measures of the profitability (BHARs) 
of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued following IPOs. The means of BHAR(0,90d) and 
BHAR(0,1y) of ‘buy-type’ recommendations are around 2%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 All CARs for ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ recommendations shown in Table 7.3 are reversed in sign to simplify 
interpretation. 
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Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis  
Panel A Full Sample (N=3,793) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿5𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 4.07 0.89 1 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELIPO3tier 3.68 0.50 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
𝐸𝐺𝐶 0.82 0.38 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 0.32 0.47 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.47 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 5.55 1.02 2.78 3.57 4.09 4.83 5.37 6.22 7.37 8.41 8.73 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.47 0.74 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.50 1.59 4.51 6.19 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 7.08 1.29 2.83 4.33 5.15 6.19 7.00 7.86 9.36 10.34 11.77 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 3.11 7.98 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.49 1.10 2.59 11.63 30.92 128.88 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 6.77 4.99 0 0 0 2 6 10 16 19 22 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 6.98 4.14 1 1 2 4 6 9 15 20 32 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 197.79 204.79 0 11 26 41 81 336 624 706 730 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 14.68 8.74 1 1 3 8 13 21 30 40 51 
Panel B  Sample when POSTREGJOBS =0 (N = 2,572) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿5𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 4.00 0.92 1 1 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELIPO3tier 3.64 0.52 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
𝐸𝐺𝐶 0.85 0.36 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 5.46 0.99 2.78 3.48 4.03 4.78 5.32 6.10 7.28 8.16 8.73 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.42 0.64 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.45 1.45 3.52 6.19 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 6.93 1.25 3.21 4.18 5.06 6.10 6.86 7.65 9.21 10.25 11.77 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 2.78 8.68 0.02 0.07 0.16 0.44 0.95 2.10 10.03 28.27 128.88 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 5.80 4.44 0 0 0 2 5 9 14 18 20 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 7.02 4.38 1 1 2 4 6 9 16 23 32 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 232.99 214.13 0 7 40 41 151.5 400 656 714 730 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 15.36 9.25 1 1 3 9 13 21 32 44 51 
Panel C  Sample when POSTREGJOBS =1 (N=1,221) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿5𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 4.20 0.82 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELIPO3tier 3.76 0.44 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
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𝐸𝐺𝐶 0.77 0.42 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.60 0.49 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 5.74 1.06 3.51 3.82 4.42 4.90 5.49 6.39 7.87 8.48 8.52 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.60 0.89 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.24 0.60 2.62 4.79 5.02 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 7.39 1.32 2.83 4.59 5.36 6.39 7.40 8.31 9.51 10.53 10.79 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 3.78 6.19 0.02 0.10 0.21 0.60 1.63 4.08 13.47 37.34 48.67 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 8.82 5.46 0 0 0 4 9 13 18 21 22 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 6.90 3.57 1 1 2 4 6 9 13 17 19 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 123.63 160.04 1 11 26 26 39 180 490 628 724 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 13.26 7.36 1 2 4 8 11 19 26 32 38 
Panel D  Sample when EGC=0 (N = 667) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿5𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 3.88 0.94 1 1 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELIPO3tier 3.55 0.55 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 0.42 0.49 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.46 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 6.82 0.90 4.08 4.86 5.22 6.27 6.85 7.38 8.44 8.70 8.73 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 1.35 1.30 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.53 0.95 1.60 4.63 6.03 6.19 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 8.44 1.20 4.96 5.82 6.30 7.67 8.43 9.29 10.26 11.70 11.77 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 9.50 16.32 0.14 0.34 0.55 2.15 4.59 10.81 28.65 120.62 128.88 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 7.85 5.44 0 0 0 3 7 12 18 21 22 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 9.88 4.77 1 1 3 7 9 13 19 27 32 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 169.85 192.28 1 5 26 41 43 295 587 693 729 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 14.92 8.45 1 1 4 9 13 21 30 38 51 
Panel E  Sample when EGC=1 (N=3,126) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿5𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 4.11 0.88 1 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELIPO3tier 3.71 0.49 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 0.30 0.46 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.48 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 5.28 0.82 2.78 3.54 4.05 4.75 5.17 5.81 6.81 7.34 8.25 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.29 0.32 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.33 0.91 1.54 3.82 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 6.79 1.11 2.83 4.19 5.06 6.04 6.78 7.49 8.64 9.75 10.74 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 1.74 3.15 0.02 0.07 0.16 0.42 0.88 1.80 5.66 17.10 46.08 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 6.54 4.86 0 0 0 2 6 10 15 19 22 
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𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 6.36 3.71 1 1 2 4 6 8 14 19 29 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 203.75 206.90 0 11 26 41 94 345 630 707 730 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 14.63 8.80 1 1 3 8 13 21 30 41 51 
Panel F  Sample when AFF=0 (N = 1,997) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿5𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 3.95 0.95 1 1 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELIPO3tier 3.60 0.55 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
𝐸𝐺𝐶 0.82 0.38 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 5.61 1.02 2.80 3.58 4.09 4.88 5.44 6.28 7.40 8.22 8.70 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.49 0.70 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.54 1.63 3.70 6.03 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 7.24 1.28 3.22 4.62 5.34 6.38 7.13 8.01 9.62 10.58 11.77 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 3.69 9.87 0.02 0.10 0.21 0.59 1.25 3.02 15.13 39.45 128.88 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 5.91 4.97 0 0 0 1 5 9 15 19 22 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 8.27 4.53 1 1 3 5 7 10 17 24 32 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 321.55 203.25 0 5 26 152 309 481 672 716 730 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 13.62 8.99 1 1 3 7 11 18 31 46 51 
Panel G  Sample when AFF=1 (N=1,796) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿5𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 4.20 0.80 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 
LEVELIPO3tier 3.77 0.43 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
𝐸𝐺𝐶 0.83 0.38 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸(ln) 5.49 1.02 2.78 3.56 4.07 4.79 5.29 6.10 7.35 8.45 8.73 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸($b) 0.46 0.78 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.44 1.56 4.70 6.19 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(ln) 6.91 1.28 2.83 4.11 4.99 6.02 6.86 7.67 9.27 10.16 11.14 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃($b) 2.46 5.04 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.41 0.95 2.15 10.56 25.87 69.03 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 7.73 4.85 0 0 1 4 7 11 16 19 22 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 5.54 3.07 1 1 2 4 5 7 12 14 24 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 60.17 81.68 11 25 26 27 41 43 197 509 720 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 15.86 8.31 1 2 5 9 14 22 30 38 51 
Panel H  Sample for Tests of Informativeness: CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (N=2,198) and CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases in IPO Context (N=1,870) 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
CARs for Buy/StrongBuy cases (N=2,198) 
CAR(-1,1) 0.018 0.065 -0.176 -0.176 -0.075 -0.016 0.011 0.045 0.145 0.243 0.243 
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PASTFIRMPREF 0.034 0.317 -1.442 -0.886 -0.462 -0.142 0.033 0.222 0.551 0.809 1.222 
PASTMKTPERF 0.045 0.099 -0.485 -0.410 -0.105 0.016 0.060 0.093 0.157 0.231 0.394 
MKTSD 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.023 0.040 0.040 
CARs for Hold/Sell/StrongSell cases (N=1,870) 
-CAR(-1,1) 0.052 0.133 -0.261 -0.261 -0.096 -0.013 0.018 0.073 0.352 0.557 0.557 
PASTFIRMPREF -0.054 0.417 -1.442 -1.204 -0.825 -0.271 -0.028 0.212 0.563 0.961 1.340 
PASTMKTPERF 0.041 0.109 -0.524 -0.424 -0.119 0.016 0.061 0.096 0.151 0.245 0.443 
MKTSD 0.010 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.025 0.040 0.040 
Panel I  Sample for Profitability BHARs for Buy/StrongBuy (N=1,191) cases of full sample 
Variables Mean SD Min P1 P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 P99 Max 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,1𝑦)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  0.02 0.60 -1.06 -1.06 -0.79 -0.38 -0.08 0.30 1.18 2.48 2.48 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,90𝑑)𝐵/𝑆𝐵  0.02 0.30 -0.59 -0.59 -0.44 -0.17 0.00 0.17 0.55 1.11 1.11 
LEVEL5tier is the level of initial recommendation following the IPO issue, coded of 5-tier recommendations recorded on I/B/E/S such that 5 = ‘strong buy’, 4 = ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, 2 = ‘sell’, and 1 = ‘strong sell’; LEVELIPO3tier 
is the standardised level of initial recommendation following the IPO issue date, coded of 3-tier rating system such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’; 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 (cumulative abnormal returns) 
are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted return, using two window periods of days (i.e. [-1 1]) centered on the issuance of the stock recommendation; 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 (buy and hold abnormal returns) are measured 
as the buy and hold return for each security less the same-period buy and hold return for the portfolio of firms matched by size decile from CRSP. The window period of BHARs starts at the release day of initial recommendation 
after the IPO issue date and lasts for one year (oe 90 days) unless the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the investment bank. Please note that here I show winsorised CARs and BHARs at 1/99% and all 
CARs for recommendation downgrades are flipped in sign to make interpretation consistent. EGC is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the analyst recommendation relates to an emerging growth company (or a pseudo EGC 
if issued in the pre-Act period), and 0 otherwise. POSTREGJOBS is A dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO issue date is after September 23rd, 2013, the effective date of JOBS Act, and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates the 
analyst is affiliated with IPO issuer’s underwriter; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total proceeds amount in the IPO deals. 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of IPO firms as of the last trading day of the calendar month before analyst report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 
means the number of years starting from the analyst first time published on I/B/E/S until the year of analyst report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of the analysts who issue report for the same firm within one calendar month 
preceding the recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between IPO issue date and analyst report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage 
house during the same calendar month of the recommendation announcement date. 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹  represents the past firm performance which is defined as the firm’s stock return in the six months prior to the 
recommendation (or the firm’s cumulative stock return over the IPO issue date and the release date of the recommendations if this period is less than six months); 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents the past market performance 
which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months prior to the recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month prior to the recommendation. 
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Table 7.4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in regression tests 
and analyses. The correlations between EGC and DEALVALUE and EGC and FIRMCAP 
are induced by the fact that EGCs are defined by size. The statistics show that variables 
between EGC and DEALVALUE (-0.572), as well as those between EGC and FIRMCAP 
are highly negatively correlated (-0.487), which indicates firms which are involved with 
a smaller IPO deal or with a smaller firm size are more likely to enjoy the relaxation of 
restrictions offered by the JOBS Act. Also, the correlation between DEALVALUE and 
FOLLOW (0.5498), that between FIRMCAP and FOLLOW (0.6004), and that between 
DEALVALUE and FIRMCAP (0.7743) are positive and high, which taken together 
suggests the importance of including these controls, but also suggest that their strong 
collinearity affecting test variables may inflate standard errors and in a modest sample 
may make it difficult to detect any effect of JOBS Act. 
Table 7.4 Correlation Matrix for Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
 
LEVE
LIPO3
tier 
𝐸𝐺𝐶 
POST
REGJO
BS 
𝐴𝐹𝐹 
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿 
𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀 
𝐶𝐴𝑃 
𝐸𝑋𝑃 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂 
𝑊 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸 
𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 
LEVELIPO
3tier 
1          
𝐸𝐺𝐶 0.1185 1         
POSTREGJ
OBS 
0.1053 -0.0997 1        
𝐴𝐹𝐹 0.1685 0.0081 0.1807 1       
𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿 
𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 
-0.1554 -0.5724 0.1252 -0.0563 1      
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 -0.1317 -0.487 0.1669 -0.1295 0.7743 1     
𝐸𝑋𝑃 0.0599 -0.1 0.2825 0.1813 0.0695 0.1077 1    
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 -0.1966 -0.3239 -0.0134 -0.3301 0.5498 0.6004 0.0095 1   
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 -0.1191 0.063 -0.2495 -0.6374 -0.0521 0.0367 -0.1558 0.3417 1  
𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 
-0.043 -0.0124 -0.1125 0.1281 0.0416 0 -0.0108 -0.0093 -0.0184 1 
 
Multivariate Results 
This section reports the results of multivariate tests of hypotheses, which examine the 
impact of the JOBS Act on analyst optimism (Section 6.4.1) and investor response and 
profitability (Section 6.4.2). Section 6.4.1 reports and discusses the findings of tests of 
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H16 – the impact of the JOBS Act on analyst optimism, followed by Section 6.4.2 that 
reports and analyses the findings regarding the impact of JOBS Act deregulation on 
informativeness (H17a and H17b) as well as on profitability (H18).    
7.4.1 Results for the Tests of Hypothesis 16 - the Impact of the JOBS Act on Analyst 
Optimism 
H16 predicts that the increase in analyst optimism reflected in the initial 
recommendations during the 24-month post-IPO period following the JOBS Act is greater 
for affiliated analysts covering EGCs, relative to that for unaffiliated analysts covering 
EGCs. The main test of H16 use regressions of the following form: 
LEVELIPO3tier = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐺𝐶 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐺𝐶 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 ×
𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐸𝐺𝐶 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 +
𝜀, 
Model 6 
Control Variables 
DEALVALUE = The natural logarithm of the inflation-adjusted deal value (in billions 
of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992). 
FIRMCAP = The natural logarithm of the inflation-adjusted market capitalisation 
of the acquirer (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end dollars 
in 1992) as at the last trading day of the calendar month before analyst 
recommendation/LTG forecast was issued. 
EXP = The number of years since the analyst first published a 
recommendation on I/B/E/S. 
FOLLOW = The total number of the analysts with outstanding recommendations 
for the firm in the 30-days preceding the announcement of 
recommendations in post-IPO issue date). 
DAYS = The absolute number of days between the IPO issue date and analyst 
report date. 
BROKERSIZE = The number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the 
calendar month of the analyst report date in IPO context. 
More details of variable measurement are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
Where LEVELIPO3tier is a proxy for analyst optimism, reflected in the standardised levels 
of the initial recommendations issued after IPO issue date.65 EGC is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 for IPO issuers with less than $1 billion in annual revenue before the offering 
                                                 
65 To control for the fact that some analysts use a 3-tier ratings system, while others use a 5-tier system, 
LEVELIPO3tier is coded such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, and 2 = ‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’. 
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and 0 otherwise. While the term ‘EGC issuer’ has only  had legal application since the 
enactment date of the JOBS Act on April 5, 2012, I identify EGCs as firms meeting the 
revenue criteria both before and after the Act. POSTREGJOB is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 for observations in the period between November 11th, 2012 and 2015 (the post-
JOBS Act period), and 0 otherwise (i.e. the period between 2004 and April 5th, 2012). 
AFF is also a dichotomous variable, which equals 1 for recommendations issued by 
analysts whose employer is a lead, co-lead manager or non-managing member of the 
underwriting syndicate for the IPO issuer, 0 otherwise. Because the JOBS Act only targets 
analysts whose employing broker is affiliated with EGC issuer through underwriting 
mandates, the variable of interest is the three-way interaction term, EGC × POSTREGJOB 
× AFF, which measures the incremental effect on analyst optimism for affiliated analysts 
covering EGCs, relative to that of unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs after the JOBS 
Act. H16 implies that the increase in analyst optimism following the JOBS Act is greater 
for analysts who recently permitted to increase their involvement in IPO process than for 
the analysts not similarly affected. If this is the case, I expect EGC × POSTREGJOB × 
AFF to be positively correlated with LEVELIPO3tier in Model 6. Control variables are 
defined in Chapter 4.  
Table 7.5 reports the results of the OLS analyses for regression tests of H16. Two samples 
are employed for tests of H16: (1) the final available sample of all post-IPO initial 
recommendations issued by non-GS analysts (Columns 1 and 2); (2) Sample 1 (reported 
in Column 3) replicate the sample periods above, but consider only recommendations 
issued by affiliated analysts.   
The R2 statistics for regressions based on Model 6 are similar across the two samples, 
ranging from 0.071 for the main sample and 0.075 for the alternative sample. While they 
are smaller than the 0.187 reported in Dambra et al. (2018), that paper uses relative bias 
in forecast optimism as the dependent variable and does not exclude forecasts issued by 
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GS analysts. The coefficients for control variables are generally consistent with my 
predictions and with prior literature, except for DEALVALUE and FIRMCAP. The 
coefficients for DEALVALUE are negatively significant in Columns 1-2, which suggests 
a negative association between total proceeds amounts involved in the equity issue for 
IPOs and analyst optimism. FIRMCAP is unexpectedly insignificant, suggesting no 
pronounced effect on analyst optimism. Taken together, the erratic coefficients of 
DEALVALUE and FIRMCAP are likely explained by the high collinearities detected in 
Table 7.4.   
Before testing the impact of the JOBS Act on affiliated EGC analysts’ optimism (H16), I 
examine the unconditional effect of this legislation on the average level of optimism 
reflected in analysts’ initial recommendations following IPOs. In Column 1, the 
significantly positive coefficient for EGC (𝛽 = 0.0937; p = 0.002) shows that analysts 
covering EGCs in the pre-JOBS Act period are abnormally optimistic. Further, the 
coefficient for POSTREGJOBS is significantly positive (𝛽 = 0.1401; p < 0.001), which 
suggests an increase in the optimism of initial post-IPO recommendations issued by 
analysts covering non-EGCs following the JOBS Act of 2012. However, no average 
effect on optimism of initial post-IPO recommendations issued by analysts covering 
EGCs following the Act, as shown by the insignificant coefficient for EGC × 
POSTREGJOBS (𝛽 = -0.0559; p = 0.191).  
I then investigate whether there is an abnormal post-Act increase in the optimism reflected 
in initial recommendations issued by affiliated EGC analysts, relative to unaffiliated EGC 
analysts. In Column 2, the coefficient for EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF is insignificant 
(𝛽 = -0.0670; p = 0.442), providing no support for H16. Also, the combined coefficient 
for EGC × POSTREGJOBS + EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF, which captures the aggregate 
effect of the JOBS Act for affiliated analysts, is marginally insignificant (𝛽 = -0.0916; p 
= 0.133).  
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Table 7.5 OLS Regressions of Analyst Optimism Observed in Initial 
Recommendations following IPOs  
 
Results discussed above show that there was no significant difference in the post-reform 
change in optimism of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts following EGCs. To test 
whether the JOBS Act had a significant impact on the optimism of affiliated analysts 
covering EGC issuers, relative to these same analysts pre-reform behaviour when 
covering EGC issuers, I report additional regressions restricted to recommendations 
issued by affiliated analysts. In Column 3, the significantly negative coefficient for EGC 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts Affiliated analysts only 
DV: INILEVEL_3tier   Model 6  
    
EGC 0.0937*** 0.0793** 0.1516*** 
 (0.002) (0.035) (0.000) 
POSTREGJOBS 0.1401*** 0.1180** 0.1384*** 
 (0.000) (0.033) (0.004) 
AFF  0.0975*  
  (0.065)  
EGC×POSTREGJOBS -0.0559 -0.0247 -0.0941* 
 (0.191) (0.691) (0.072) 
POSTREGJOBS×AFF  0.0413  
  (0.597)  
EGC×AFF  0.0385  
  (0.486)  
EGC× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 ×AFF  -0.0670  
  (0.442)  
lnDEALVALUE -0.0428*** -0.0433*** -0.0244 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.169) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.0071 0.0107 -0.0159 
 (0.499) (0.308) (0.235) 
EXP 0.0036** 0.0025 0.0031 
 (0.030) (0.138) (0.145) 
FOLLOW -0.0148*** -0.0133*** -0.0006 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.912) 
DAYS -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0005*** 
 (0.001) (0.532) (0.000) 
BROKERSIZE -0.0018* -0.0027*** -0.0035*** 
 (0.050) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant cut1 3.8930*** 3.7983*** 3.9265*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
EGC×POSTREGJOBS + EGC×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 ×AFF 
 -0.0916  
  (0.133)  
    
Observations 3,793 3,793 1,796 
R-squared 0.062 0.071 0.056 
F test 27.64 22.07 11.73 
LEVEL5tier is the level of initial recommendation following the IPO issue, coded of 5-tier recommendations recorded on I/B/E/S 
such that 5 = ‘strong buy’, 4 = ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, 2 = ‘sell’, and 1 = ‘strong sell’; LEVELIPO3tier is the standardised level of initial 
recommendation following the IPO issue date, coded of 3-tier rating system such that 4 = ‘strong buy’ or ‘buy’, 3 = ‘hold’, and 2 = 
‘sell’ or ‘strong sell’; EGC is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the analyst recommendation relates to an emerging growth 
company (or a pseudo EGC if issued in the pre-Act period), and 0 otherwise. POSTREGJOBS is A dummy variable which equals 1 
if the IPO issue date is after September 23rd, 2013, the effective date of JOBS Act, and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐹𝐹 indicates the analyst is 
affiliated with IPO issuer’s underwriter; 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 is reported as the real value (in billions of CPI-adjusted with the year-end 
dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of total proceeds amount in the IPO deals. 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 is the real value (in billions of CPI-
adjusted with the year-end dollars in 1992) and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of IPO firms as of the last trading day of 
the calendar month before analyst report; 𝐸𝑋𝑃 means the number of years starting from the analyst first time published on I/B/E/S 
until the year of analyst report; 𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 is the total number of the analysts who issue report for the same firm within one calendar 
month preceding the recommendation announcement date. 𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 refers to the absolute number of days between IPO issue date and 
analyst report date. 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is measured as the number of analysts working for the brokerage house during the same calendar 
month of the recommendation announcement date. p-values in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level respectively. 
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× POSTREGJOBS (𝛽 = -0.0941; p = 0.072) suggests that there was a decrease in optimism 
for affiliated EGC analysts following the JOBS Act.  
In summary, there is no evidence that affiliated analysts covering EGC issuers became 
more optimistic following the passage of JOBS Act, nor did the difference between their 
average optimism and that of unaffiliated analysts increase following the Act. H16 is 
therefore not supported. Interestingly, there is some evidence (reported in Column 3 of 
Table 7.5) that suggests a post-reform decrease in affiliated analysts’ optimism when 
covering EGCs. 
7.4.2 Results for the Tests of Hypotheses 17a/b and 18 - the impact of JOBS Act on 
Investor Response and Profitability   
This section reports the results of regression tests of H17a/b, which examine the impact 
of the JOBS Act on the conditional informativeness of all recommendations issued by 
affiliated EGC analysts within the 24-month window following IPO issue dates. If there 
is an impairment in the perceived objectivity of affiliated analyst recommendations due 
to the relaxation of regulations prohibiting analyst involvement in IPO process, the post-
Act change in the conditional informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold and sell-type’) 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts covering EGCs should be more negative 
(positive) than for unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs (H17a / H17b). In addition, 
affiliated EGC analysts, who suffer potential conflicts of interest due to their greater scope 
for involvement in the IPO process under the JOBS Act, may actually compromise the 
objectivity in their recommendations, which in turn may reduce the profitability of those 
recommendations. H18 thus predicts that the change in the long-term profitability of ‘buy-
type’ recommendations following the JOBS Act will be more negative for affiliated EGC 
analysts than for unaffiliated analysts also covering EGCs. The tests of H17a/b and H18 
comprise regressions of the following form: 
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𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 𝑜𝑟  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 
= 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽4𝐸𝐺𝐶 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐺𝐶 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽7𝐸𝐺𝐶 ×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵 × 𝐴𝐹𝐹 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀, 
Model 
11 
Where, 
Control Variables (used only for tests of conditional informativeness) 
PASTFIRMPERF 
= 
The firm’s cumulative stock return in the six months prior to 
the recommendation or the cumulative stock return between 
the IPO issue date and release of the recommendation if the 
period is less than six months.  
PASTMKTPERF 
= 
The cumulative market return in the six months prior to the 
recommendation. 
MKTSD 
= 
The standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index one month 
prior to the recommendation. 
The definitions and measurements of all the other variables are described in Models 1-
2. More details of variable measurement are provided in Section 4.4. 
 
Where INFORM is informativeness conditional upon the type of recommendation (‘buy-
type’ or ‘hold and sell-type’), calculated as the three-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR(-1,1), or –CAR(-1,1)) centred on the announcement date of the recommendation. 
For tests of H17a/b, the interest variable is the three-way interaction term EGC × 
POSTREGJOBS × AFF, which captures the incremental effect of the JOBS Act on 
informativeness of recommendations issued by affiliated analysts covering EGCs, 
relative to unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs. H17a (b) implies that the Act’s relaxation 
of restrictions on analyst involvement in the IPO process potentially damaged (enhanced) 
the credibility of the initial buy-type (sell-type) recommendations issued by affiliated 
EGC analysts, which may cause the informativeness of their ‘buy-type’ (‘hold and sell-
type’) initial recommendations issued following the JOBS Act to decrease (increase) to a 
greater extent than for unaffiliated EGC analysts. If this is the case, the coefficient for 
EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF in Model 11 should be significantly negative for buy-type 
recommendations and significantly positive for hold and sell-type recommendations. 
Table 7.6 reports the results of OLS regressions of informativeness of ‘buy-type’ and 
‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations issued within 24 months firms’ IPO. To test the 
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informativeness of ‘buy-type’ or ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations, two sets of 
samples are employed: (1) the final available samples described in Table 7.1 partitioned 
according to the direction of the recommendation; (2) a similar sample further restricted 
to recommendations issued by affiliated analysts. 
The R2 statistics, ranging between 0.02 – 0.10, are simialr to those reported in Dambra et 
al. (2018; adjusted R2 statistics are -0.011 ~ 0.160 in Table 6). Control variables are 
substantively consistent with my predictions and literature, except for the coefficients for 
DEALVALUE, FIRMCAP, and FOLLOW. DEALVALUE and FIRMCAP are negatively 
correlated with –CARs for ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations. That is, unexpectedly 
small proceeds of IPO deals and issuers with unexpectedly small size are likely to 
experience investor response to their analysts’ unfavourable recommendations. FOLLOW 
is positively correlated with –CARs for ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations, which 
suggests IPO issuers with more analyst coverage are more likely to have greater investor 
response to their ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations.  The unexpected results are likely 
due to the high collinearity between these variables and EGC. 
Before testing H17a, I examine the unconditional effect of the JOBS Act on the average 
level of the informativeness reflected in analysts’ ‘buy-type’ recommendations following 
IPOs. In Column 1 of Table 7.6, there is no evidence of a general impact of the JOBS Act 
on the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by analysts covering EGCs, 
as the coefficient for EGC × POSTREGJOBS (𝛽 = 0.0056, p = 0.506) is insignificant.  H17a 
is tested by investigating the coefficient for the three-way interaction EGC × 
POSTREGJOBS × AFF (𝛽 = -0.0016, p = 0.931) in a regression estimated on a sample of 
both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts (Column 2). This insignificant coefficient 
suggests that there was no abnormal decrease in the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations issued by affiliated EGC analysts, relative to unaffiliated EGC analysts. 
Therefore, H17a is not supported. Further, results of regressions estimated on a sample 
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of affiliated analysts only (Column 3) shows that there is no pre-post difference in 
informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations for affilaited analysts covering EGCs.66  
Columns 4-6 of Table 7.6 report the tests of H17b, which examines the impact of JOBS 
Act on the informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations issued by affiliated 
analysts covering EGCs between 2004 and 2015. I first test the unconditional effect of 
JOBS Act on all analysts covering EGCs in Column 4. The coefficient for EGC × 
POSTREGJOBS is significantly positive (𝛽 = 0.0451, p = 0.005), which suggests that the 
overall change in informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations for EGCs 
following the JOBS Act, was more positive than that for non-EGCs. In Column 5, I 
further examine whether there is evidence that this association differs significantly 
according to affiliation status. The coefficient for three-way interaction term EGC × 
POSTREGJOBS × AFF is significantly positive (𝛽 = 0.0611, p = 0.060), which suggests 
an incremental increase in informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations 
issued by affiliated EGC analysts relative to unaffiliated EGC analysts. H17b is thus 
supported. In Column 6, a regression restricted to recommendations issued by affiliated 
analysts generates a significant positive coefficient for EGC × POSTREGJOBS, suggesting 
that there is an increase in the informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations 
issued by affiliated analysts covering EGCs following the JOBS Act.  
Overall, results reported in Table 7.6 show no evidence of a decrease in the 
informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by affiliated EGC analysts 
following the JOBS Act, compared to either those issued by unaffiliated EGC analysts in 
the post-JOBS Act period or by affiliated analysts when covering EGCs in the pre-JOBS 
Act period. H17a is thus not supported. In contrast, H17b is supported, evident in an 
increase in the informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations issued by 
affiliated EGC analysts following the JOBS Act, relative to both that by unaffiliated 
                                                 
66 I obtain similar results to those reported in Columns 1-3 if using the recommendations for IPO issuers 
between 2010 and 2015. 
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analysts covering EGCs in the post-Act period and that by affiliated analysts when 
covering pseudo-EGCs in the pre-JOBS Act period. While the JOBS Act’s relaxation of 
analyst research and involvement in the IPO process does not impair the credibility of 
favourable recommendations, the news in unfavourable recommendations issued by 
affiliated analysts covering EGCs becomes of greater significance following the Act. This 
is consistent with investors perceiving a reduction in affiliated EGC analysts’ objectivity 
following the JOBS Act, and thus judging ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations as 
conveying more negative news when such recommendations are issued. Superficially, my 
results appear inconsistent with Dambra et al. (2018) who find a post-reform reduction in 
relative CARs (defined as the within-firm difference between affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts within the same firm). However, Dambra et al. (2018) pool the abnormal returns 
of all types of recommendations together in their tests, and include analysts employed by 
GS-signatories (who were not impacted directly by the JOBS Act) in their sample. I, 
instead, separate tests according to the different types of recommendations after IPOs 
(‘buy-type’ and ‘hold and sell-type’) and investigate how investor responses differently 
to the two opposite investment recommendations for their investment decisions. 
Specifically, the pooled sample can be used to test the effect of the JOBS Act on overall 
change in the informativeness of stock recommendations but the tests of informativeness 
conditional upon different types of recommendations can further examine which types of 
recommendations are more or less informative following the Act.  
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Table 7.6 OLS Regressions of Conditional Informativeness Observed in All the 
Recommendations following IPOs  
 “BUY-TYPE” RECOMMENDATIONS “HOLD AND SELL-TYPE” 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Both affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts 
Only affiliated 
analysts 
Both affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts 
Only affiliated 
analysts 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 11 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
Model 11 
-CAR 
(-1,1) 
       
EGC -0.0008 -0.0033 0.0058 -0.0109 -0.0140 -0.0118 
 (0.878) (0.596) (0.552) (0.240) (0.195) (0.499) 
POSTREGJOBS -0.0036 -0.0023 -0.0085 -0.0172 -0.0025 -0.0271 
 (0.646) (0.809) (0.561) (0.221) (0.884) (0.318) 
AFF  0.0042   0.0301*  
  (0.646)   (0.055)  
EGC×POSTREGJOBS 0.0056 0.0054 0.0050 0.0451*** 0.0182 0.0724** 
 (0.506) (0.596) (0.754) (0.005) (0.360) (0.014) 
POSTREGJOBS×AFF  -0.0002   -0.0368  
  (0.988)   (0.194)  
EGC×AFF  0.0098   0.0110  
  (0.319)   (0.517)  
EGC×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 ×AFF 
 -0.0016   0.0611*  
  (0.931)   (0.060)  
PASTFIRMPREF 0.0258*** 0.0262*** 0.0458*** -0.1259*** -0.1263*** -0.1560*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PASTMKTPERF -0.0038 0.0007 0.0077 -0.0505 -0.0546* -0.0282 
 (0.829) (0.968) (0.820) (0.121) (0.090) (0.680) 
MKTSD 0.1669 0.2103 -0.0222 -0.4813 -0.3322 0.5795 
 (0.544) (0.443) (0.966) (0.349) (0.513) (0.577) 
lnDEALVALUE -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0034 -0.0133*** -0.0175*** -0.0292*** 
 (0.469) (0.293) (0.445) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) 
lnFIRMCAP -0.0010 -0.0007 0.0037 -0.0196*** -0.0160*** -0.0224*** 
 (0.613) (0.729) (0.333) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
EXP 0.0004 0.0003 0.0009 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.136) (0.264) (0.134) (0.220) (0.790) (0.901) 
FOLLOW 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0011 0.0035*** 0.0045*** 0.0086*** 
 (0.795) (0.403) (0.280) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DAYS 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.113) (0.030) (0.388) (0.976) (0.569) (0.646) 
BROKERSIZE 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0006** -0.0000 
 (0.877) (0.704) (0.753) (0.348) (0.046) (0.995) 
Constant 0.0240* 0.0219 0.0122 0.2372*** 0.2189*** 0.3165*** 
 (0.082) (0.124) (0.638) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
EGC×POSTREGJOBS + 
EGC×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 ×AFF 
 0.0038   0.0792***  
  (0.791)   (0.002)  
       
Observations 2,198 2,198 654 1,870 1,870 679 
R-squared 0.020 0.027 0.054 0.278 0.300 0.363 
F test 3.708 3.812 3.049 59.69 49.52 31.59 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 (cumulative abnormal returns) are measured as cumulative size-decile and market-adjusted return, using two window periods 
of days (i.e. [-1 1]) centered on the issuance of the stock recommendation; All CARs for recommendation downgrades are flipped 
in sign to make interpretation consistent; 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐹 represents the past firm performance which is defined as the firm’s 
stock return in the six months prior to the recommendation (or the firm’s cumulative stock return over the IPO issue date and the 
release date of the recommendations if the period is less than six months); 𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 represents the past market performance 
which is defined as the cumulative market return in the six months prior to the recommendation; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the standard deviation 
of daily S&P 500 index one month prior to the recommendation. p-values in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
Finally, I employ regressions of the form described in Model 11 to test the impact of 
JOBS Act on the profitability of initial ‘buy-type’ recommendations after IPOs. PROFIT 
is the profitability of initial ‘buy-type’ recommendations, which is measured by the buy-
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and-hold abnormal returns from the day after the issuance of the recommendation to a 
maximum of 90 days (1 year) following the recommendation date. The three-way 
interaction term EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF captures the incremental post-reform effect 
on the profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by affiliated analysts covering 
EGCs relative to unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs. H18 predicts a reduction in the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by affiliated EGC analysts relative to 
unaffiliated EGC analysts following the JOBS Act deregulation. H18 would be supported 
if the coefficient for EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF is significantly negative. All other 
variables are defined in Section 6.4.2 and control variables are described in Section 4.4.6. 
Table 7.7 reports the results for tests of H18. Once more, two samples are employed: (1) 
the final available sample described in Table 7.1; (2) the reduced sample (1) only 
including initial ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by affiliated analysts. The R2 
statistics are between 0.036 and 0.135, which are greater than those reported in Dambra 
et al. (2018; Panel B of Table 7: adjusted R2: 0.002 ~ 0.003) who estimate the cumulative 
raw and abnormal returns from the initiation of analysts’ coverage of the issuer through 
to the subsequent earnings announcement (i.e. their returns are not conditional on the 
direction of investment advice provided in recommendations). All control variables have 
the predicted sign, except for FIRMCAP and FOLLOW. FIRMCAP is positively 
associated with BHARs, which suggests that smaller IPO issuers potentially are associated 
with more profitable ‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’ recommendations in the long run. FOLLOW 
is unexpectedly negatively associated with BHARs, which implies that more analysts 
following the IPO issuers issue less profitable ‘buy-type’ recommendations. In addition, 
the erratic coefficients likely reflect their correlation with EGC that is included in the 
model. 
Before analysing tests of H18, I discuss tests of the unconditional effect of the JOBS Act 
on the profitability of ‘buy-type’ initial recommendations (Column 1). There is no 
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significant change in profitability of ‘buy-type’ initial recommendations issued by 
analysts covering EGCs following the JOBS Act. This is evident in the insignificant 
coefficient for EGC × POSTREGJOBS (𝛽= 0.0710, p = 0.543). In Column 2, I report results 
of tests of H18 using a sample comprising both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. The 
coefficient for the test variable, EGC × POSTREGJOBS × AFF, is insignificant, failing to 
support H18. In Column 3, the results of the additional test using a sample of affiliated 
‘buy-type’ initial recommendations presents similar evidence; the coefficient for EGC × 
POSTREGJOBS is insignificant, which suggests that there was no pronounced post-reform 
change in profitability of initial ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by affiliated analysts 
covering EGCs. In Columns 4-6, I report the results of similar tests to those in Columns 
1 to 3, using BHARs estimated over windows of a maximum 90 days. Once more, there 
is no discernible impact of the JOBS Act on profitability.  
Table 7.7 OLS Regressions of Profitability of Initial ‘Buy-type’ Recommendations 
after IPOs 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Both affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts 
Only affiliated 
analysts 
Both affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts 
Only affiliated 
analysts 
BHAR(0,1y) 
BHAR(0,1y) 
Model 11 
BHAR(0,1y) BHAR(0,90d) 
BHAR(0,90d) 
Model 11 
BHAR(0,90d) 
       
EGC -0.0541 -0.0790 0.1180 -0.0098 -0.0176 0.1051 
 (0.448) (0.284) (0.619) (0.782) (0.631) (0.318) 
POSTREGJOBS -0.1130 -0.0717 -0.2799 -0.0014 0.0058 0.0047 
 (0.301) (0.533) (0.404) (0.979) (0.919) (0.975) 
AFF  -0.0737   0.0302  
  (0.735)   (0.780)  
EGC×POSTREGJOBS 0.0710 0.0186 0.4428 -0.0282 -0.0349 0.0092 
 (0.543) (0.880) (0.226) (0.626) (0.566) (0.954) 
POSTREGJOBS×AFF  0.2141   0.0473  
  (0.343)   (0.673)  
EGC×AFF  -0.2396   -0.0228  
  (0.499)   (0.897)  
EGC×
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 ×AFF 
 0.4986   0.0829  
  (0.197)   (0.665)  
lnDEALVALUE -0.1036*** -0.1151*** -0.2382*** -0.0683*** -0.0743*** -0.0700* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) 
lnFIRMCAP 0.1447*** 0.1484*** 0.2227*** 0.0863*** 0.0885*** 0.0666** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) 
EXP 0.0037 0.0029 0.0108 -0.0006 -0.0009 0.0035 
 (0.288) (0.401) (0.311) (0.712) (0.588) (0.461) 
FOLLOW -0.0113** -0.0086 -0.0054 -0.0106*** -0.0093*** 0.0083 
 (0.033) (0.107) (0.779) (0.000) (0.000) (0.333) 
DAYS 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001* 0.0001** -0.0003* 
 (0.874) (0.454) (0.359) (0.052) (0.012) (0.076) 
BROKERSIZE 0.0013 0.0008 0.0026 0.0007 0.0005 0.0017 
 (0.506) (0.656) (0.646) (0.470) (0.608) (0.488) 
Constant -0.3398* -0.3294* -0.2152 -0.1667* -0.1689* -0.1404 
 (0.051) (0.059) (0.635) (0.053) (0.051) (0.484) 
TEST OF AGGREGATE EFFECT OF COEFFICIENTS 
EGC×POSTREGJOBS + 
EGC×
 0.5172   0.0479  
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𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 ×AFF 
  (0.157)   (0.791)  
       
Observations 1,191 1,191 136 1,191 1,191 136 
R-squared 0.036 0.047 0.135 0.054 0.061 0.089 
F test 4.855 4.421 2.185 7.432 5.877 1.374 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 (buy and hold abnormal returns) are measured as the buy and hold return for each security less the same-period buy and 
hold return for the portfolio of firms matched by size decile from CRSP. The window period of BHARs starts at the release day of 
initial recommendation after the IPO issue date and lasts for one year (or 90 days) unless the stock is either downgraded or dropped 
from coverage by the investment bank. Please note that here I show winsorised BHARs at 1/99%. p-values in parentheses. *,**,*** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
To sum up, H18 predicts the negative regulatory impact of the JOBS Act on the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ initial recommendations is greater for affiliated EGC analysts 
who are the target of the Act, relative to unaffiliated analysts covering EGCs. My results 
show that there is no evidence to support this prediction. It seems that there is no impact 
of the relaxation of restrictions on analyst involvement in the IPO process entailed in the 
JOBS Act on analysts’ ability to identify and recommend profitable stocks of IPO firms. 
This result may partly the possibility that affiliated analysts’ greater involvement in the 
IPO process may improve their access to value-relevant information and thus enhance the 
profitability of their recommendations.  
Conclusions and Contribution  
In this chapter, I investigated the effect of the 2012 JOBS Act on optimism reflected in 
affiliated EGC analysts’ initial recommendations issued after IPOs (H16), the 
corresponding investor response to all recommendations in the 24-month window after 
IPOs, conditional upon different types (i.e. ‘buy-type’ or ‘hold and sell-type’) (H17a/b), 
and the profitability of ‘buy-type’ initial recommendations after IPOs (H18).   
Table 7.8 summarises the findings of the tests reported in this chapter. I first tested the 
regulatory impact on analyst optimism reflected in the initial recommendations issued by 
analysts employed by non-GS signatory brokers during the 24-month window after the 
IPO issue dates. Unlike Dambra et al.’s (2018) findings of a post-Act increase in analyst 
short-term earnings forecasts for affiliated EGC analysts, I show that there is no abnormal 
increase in the initial post-IPO recommendation optimism of affiliated analysts covering 
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EGCs following the passage of JOBS Act of 2012. I also show that the JOBS Act did not 
impair the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued within 2 years 
following IPOs. However, I do find evidence that the informativeness of ‘hold and sell-
type’ recommendations issued by affiliated EGC analysts in 24-month post-IPO window 
increases following the JOBS Act, which suggests the market perceives an increase in 
underlying bias affecting the circumstances under which analyst issues hold or sell-type 
recommendations. More frequent communication and interactions between analysts and 
their employing brokers may potentially affect the objectivity of affiliated EGC analysts’ 
research. The credibility of the ‘hold or sell-type’ recommendations actually issued by 
these analysts may increases, if the market perceives that such analysts require there to 
be abnormally bad news to induce them to issue ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations 
following the JOBS Act. Lastly, I find no evidence of a negative impact of the JOBS Act 
on analysts’ ability to recommend profitable stocks in the profitability tests.   
Table 7.8 Summary of Results for All Tests of Hypotheses Regarding the Regulatory 
Impact of the JOBS Act of 2012 
                                                                        Summarised 
Results 
          Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Supported? 
Did the JOBS Act increase the optimism of affiliated EGC 
analysts? (H16) 
No 
Did the JOBS Act decrease the conditional 
informativeness of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by 
affiliated EGC analysts? (H17a) 
No 
Did the JOBS Act increase the conditional 
informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations 
issued by affiliated EGC analysts? (H17b) 
Yes 
Did the JOBS Act decrease the profitability of 
recommendations issued by affiliated EGC analysts? 
(H18) 
No 
 
While Dambra et al. (2018) find that increasing analyst involvement in the IPO process 
may encourage analysts’ and brokers’ incentives to optimistically bias research, I do not 
find evidence consistent with this notion. Interestingly, I find a post-reform decrease in 
affiliated EGC analysts’ optimism, which supports prior literature that demonstrates 
private communications improve the quality of analyst research (Soltes 2014; Brown et 
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al. 2015). Further, my results also provide insights to regulators who further consider 
modifications and extension of some provisions of SRO Rules and the JOBS Act to debt 
analysts and equity research reports. To conclude, my results do not support the criticism 
on potentially loosening investment protection by relaxing analyst involvement in the IPO 
process. I also provide some insights on the debates regarding whether the JOBS Act is 
tailored in favour of large institutional investors and potentially weaken regulatory 
protection to small investors. I use the level of initial recommendations issued after IPOs 
as a proxy for analyst optimism. Recommendation optimism is related to investment 
banking incentives and easier to be used to manipulate investors (Lin & McNichols, 1998) 
and more likely to be followed by small investors, particularly in the case of ‘buy’ and 
‘strong buy’ (Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2014). I do not find that the JOBS Act 
increased analyst optimism that potentially mislead small investors’ investment decisions. 
However, given that Dambra et al. (2018) found an increase in forecast optimism 
following the Act, 67 future research may test the impact of JOBS Act on the discrepancy 
between recommendation optimism and forecast optimism, which implies that analysts 
strategically display distorted information to investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Dambra et al. (2018) who test the relative optimism proxied by the median of affiliated analyst forecast 
bias minus the median of unaffiliated analyst forecast bias find an increase in optimism for affiliated EGC 
analysts’ forecast following the JOBS Act. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Introduction 
This chapter concludes my thesis by summarising the findings in accordance with the 
three research questions (Section 8.2), discussing the implication of my thesis (Section 
8.3), identifying and discussing the limitations (Section 8.4), and finally providing some 
future research questions (Section 8.5).  
Summary of Research Design and Findings 
The objective of my thesis is to investigate the impact on the quality of analyst reports of 
a series of regulatory changes implemented between 2002 and 2012. I first focus on the 
2002/3 reforms (e.g. the GS and SRO Rules) which intended to curb analysts’ potential 
conflicts of interest due to their investment banking incentives and the prominent 
provisions therein – the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711. I then investigate the 
subsequent regulatory changes that relaxed some of the regulatory constraints imposed in 
2002/03: the 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research and the relaxation of 
restrictions on analyst involvement in equity underwriting activities entailed in the JOBS 
Act of 2012. I thus proposed and examined three research questions: 
 
RQ1: Did the regulatory reforms affect analyst excess optimism? 
RQ2: Did the regulatory reforms affect the informativeness and profitability of analyst 
stock recommendations? 
RQ3: Did the regulatory reforms impact the extent to which analyst excess optimism 
affects the employing broker’s investment banking deal flow? 
 
The following sections describe how these research questions are addressed in my thesis 
and summarise the main findings.  
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8.2.1 Research Question One 
My first research question examined the effect of regulatory changes on analyst optimism. 
Excess analyst optimism is conceived as the extent to which analysts’ and their employing 
brokers’ potential investment banking-related conflicts of interest influence the 
objectivity of their published research, which is what the 2002/3 reforms (i.e. the SRO 
Rules and the GS) intended to address. The major provisions of the SRO Rules and the 
GS include: (1) structural reforms (i.e. physical separation between investment banking 
and research departments), (2) prohibition of research analysts’ participation in efforts to 
solicit investment banking business and any linking between investment banking 
revenues and analyst compensation, (3) stringent disclosure requirements regarding any 
influence by analysts’ potential conflicts of interest, and (4) financial penalties designated 
to investor education and the procurement of independent research for a period of five 
years (from July 26, 2004, to July 26, 2009). My thesis focused on the disclosure 
requirements in NASD 2711 (h) 4 and (h) 5 (A-D) which induced many brokerages to 
switch to a 3-tier ratings system and the later regulatory changes, such as the expiration 
of five-year period of funding independent research in 2009/10 and the relaxation of 
analyst involvement in IPO process entailed in the JOBS Act of 2012. Prior studies found 
a significant reduction in analyst optimism following the 2002/3 reforms. I predicted that 
the disclosure requirements in NASD 2711 under the SRO Rules effectively reduced 
abnormal optimism in analyst recommendations. However, the later relaxations of 
restrictions on analyst behaviour (i.e. 2009/10 expiration on independent research funding 
and the introduction of the JOBS Act of 2012) potentially had opposite effects. I further 
predicted that the regulatory reforms influence affiliated analysts to a greater extent since 
such analysts have suffered more conflicts of interest due to their more direct investment 
banking incentives than unaffiliated analysts. To test my hypotheses, I focused on analyst 
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behaviour when investment banking incentives are amplified (during M&A, IPO and 
SEO event windows). 
Based on this logic, I developed Hypotheses 1a/b and 2a/b, which examined the 
regulatory impact of 2002/3 reforms on analyst optimism, conditioned on whether 
analysts changed to use the 3-tier ratings system following the disclosure requirements of 
NASD 2711 and analyst affiliation status. Hypotheses 9 and 10 further investigate the 
impact of 2009/10 expiration of funding independent research on analyst optimism, 
conditioned on whether analysts are employed by GS signatories and analyst affiliation 
status. Lastly, Hypothesis 16 focuses on the impact of the JOBS Act on analyst optimism, 
conditioned upon whether EGC analysts are employed by any member of the issuer’s 
underwriting syndicates.  
To test H1a and H2a, I regressed the proxies for non-GS analyst optimism (reflected in 
recommendation changes/levels (H1a) and LTG forecast optimism revisions (H2a)) on 
an indicator of post-reform period observations, an indicator of observations pertaining 
to analysts who changed to the 3-tier ratings system, their two-way interaction, and 
controls. To test H1b and H2b, I added an indicator of analysts’ potential conflicts of 
interest and its two-way and three-way interactions with the test variables in H1a and H2a. 
My results for tests of H1a/b show that the change to the 3-tier ratings system encouraged 
by the NASD 2711 is associated with a decrease in analyst optimism in recommendations 
for M&A, IPO, and SEO contexts after the 2002/3 reforms and that this effect is stronger 
for affiliated analysts’ reports in M&A and IPO contexts (but not in the SEO context). 
Overall, the results substantially support my prediction that the disclosure requirements 
of NASD 2711 are effective provisions through which analyst excess optimism will be 
reduced by SRO Rules.  
To test the regulatory impact of the 2009/10 expiration of the mandatory provision of 
independent research on analyst optimism (H9 and H10), I conducted regression tests 
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similar to those for the 2002/3 reforms tests but include observations spanning 2004-2014 
for both GS and non-GS signatory analysts. To test H9, I regressed the proxies for analyst 
optimism (reflected in recommendation changes/levels and LTG forecast optimism 
revisions in M&A or IPO/SEO contexts) on an indicator of post-expiration observations, 
an indicator of whether or not analysts are employed by GS signatories, their two-way 
interaction terms, and controls. Then I further added the indicator of analysts’ potential 
conflicts of interest and its two-way and three-way interactions to the regression tests of 
H10. 
I found no evidence of an increase in the optimism of analysts employed by GS 
signatories following the 2009/10 expiration of the funding of independent research (H9), 
nor is there any evidence of an incremental increase in optimism for affiliated analysts 
who work for GS signatories following the expiration (H10). My results generally show 
no significant change in analyst optimism following the 2009/10 expiration.   
To test the impact of the JOBS Act on affiliated EGC analyst optimism (H16), I regress 
optimism (reflected in the level of the initial post-IPO recommendation issued by non-
GS analysts over the 2004-2015 period) on an indicator of post-reform period 
observations, an indicator of analysts’ affiliation status, and an indicator of whether or 
not analysts cover EGCs, their two-way and three-way interaction terms, and controls. 
My results show no incremental increase in the initial post-IPO recommendation 
optimism of affiliated analysts covering EGC following the JOBS Act.  
Table 8.1 reports a summary of the results for all the tests of hypotheses related to my 
first research question – the impacts of three regulatory events on analyst excess optimism. 
Collectively, my results demonstrate the effectiveness of disclosure requirements of 
NASD 2711 of SRO Rules by showing a reduction in analyst excess optimism in 
recommendations for analysts who switched to the 3-tier ratings system following the 
2002/3 reforms, particularly for affiliated analysts (only in M&A and IPO contexts). 
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There is no significant increase in analyst abnormal optimism following the 2009/10 
expiration of funding independent research for GS signatory analysts and no greater 
impact on affiliated GS analysts’ optimism in their reports, suggesting no direct 
association between analyst excess optimism and five-year procurement of independent 
research required by the GS. Lastly, I found no significant increase in optimism for 
affiliated analysts covering EGCs following the JOBS Act of 2012, suggesting that more 
analyst involvement in IPO process relaxed by the JOBS Act is not associated with an 
increase in analyst excess optimism caused by the potentially greater extent of conflict of 
interest due to analysts’ investment banking incentives.    
Table 8.1 Summary of Results for All Tests of the First Research Question 
Regulatory 
Events 
General High Exposure Cases 
Affiliated High 
Exposure Cases 
The 2002/3 
reforms 
A significant reduction 
in recommendation 
optimism, not in LTG 
forecast optimism 
revision 
Significantly greater 
reduction in 
recommendation 
optimism for Change 
to 3-Tier firms in 
M&A, IPO and SEO 
contexts (no such 
evidence in LTG 
forecast optimism 
revision). 
Significantly greater 
reduction in optimism 
(both recommendation 
and LTG forecast 
optimism revision) for 
affiliated analysts in 
Change to 3-Tier firms 
in M&A and IPO 
contexts, no significant 
change in SEO context. 
The 2009/10 
expiration on 
independent 
research 
funding 
A significant increase 
in recommendation 
optimism and LTG 
forecast optimism 
revision 
No significantly 
greater increase in 
optimism (both 
recommendation and 
LTG forecast optimism 
revision) for GS 
Signatory firms in 
M&A, IPO and SEO 
contexts.   
No significantly 
greater increase in 
optimism (both 
recommendation and 
LTG forecast optimism 
revision) for affiliated 
analysts in GS 
Signatory firms in 
M&A, IPO and SEO 
contexts. 
The JOBS Act 
of 2012 
N/A N/A 
No significantly 
greater increase in 
optimism (both 
recommendation and 
LTG forecast optimism 
revision) for affiliated 
analysts covering EGC 
firms. 
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8.2.2 Research Question Two 
My second research question examines the effect of the abovementioned regulatory 
changes on investor response to, and profitability of, analyst recommendations. Investor 
response (i.e. the price reaction elicited by recommendations) reflects investors’ 
perceptions of the credibility of recommendations. If investors internalised the artificial 
changes in analyst behaviour or analyst regulation exposures following the regulatory 
changes, then the recommendations in the post-reform period should entail different price 
reactions compared to the pre-reform period. If the market perceives excess optimism in 
analyst recommendations, this should induce a less positive reaction to ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations and a greater negative reaction to ‘hold’ and ‘sell-type’ 
recommendations. If the 2002/3 reforms effectively reduced abnormal optimism in 
analyst recommendations, I argued that informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold and sell-
type’) recommendations increase (decrease) following the reforms. However, there are 
potential confounding effects (‘clarity effect’ and ‘fineness effect’) of the change to the 
3-tier ratings system that potentially influence the informativeness of both ‘buy-type’ and 
‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations, and consequently, H3 is stated in a null form. 
However, in H4a (H4b) I further argued that in the cast of affiliated analysts, the 
credibility effect of changing to the 3-tier rating system should dominate and predict that 
there is an incremental increase (decrease) in informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold and 
sell-type’) recommendations issued by affiliated analysts who change to use the 3-tier 
ratings system, relative to unaffiliated analysts who also make a similar move. 
The 2009/10 expiration of the mandatory procurement of independent research and the 
relaxation of earlier provisions entailed in the JOBS Act of 2012 potentially have opposite 
effects on the conditional informativeness of recommendations to those of the 2002/03 
reforms, as each reflects a relaxation in restriction on analyst behaviour. I argued that if 
investors perceive an increase in analyst optimism following these regulatory changes, 
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they may respond less strongly to favourable analyst reports and more strongly to 
unfavourable analyst reports, and the extent of these effects will be greater for affiliated 
analysts’ reports. Based on this logic, I predicted that the change in the informativeness 
of recommendations upgrades (or ‘buy-type’ recommendations) after the 2009/10 
expiration is more negative (positive) for GS analysts, than for non-GS analysts (H11a, 
H11b). Further, I predicted that this effect should be greater for affiliated GS analysts 
relative to unaffiliated GS analysts (H12). The JOBS Act only targets the affiliated 
analysts covering EGCs. I then predicted that the change in the informativeness of post-
IPO ‘buy-type’ recommendations after the JOBS Act is more negative (positive) for 
affiliated EGC analysts, than for unaffiliated EGC analysts (H17a, H17b).    
To test hypotheses related to the impact of regulatory changes on conditional 
informativeness, I regressed the cumulative abnormal returns estimated over the 3-day 
window centred on the release of recommendations on an indicator of post-reform 
observations, an indicator of recommendations issued by analysts who changed to the 3-
tier ratings system (or other indicators of regulatory exposures), their two-way interaction 
term, and controls. Then I added the indicator of analysts’ potential conflicts of interest 
and its two-way and three-way interactions for tests of incremental effect for affiliated 
analysts. Overall, my results suggest that the switch from a 5- or 4-tier to a 3-tier scales 
in stock recommendations does not influence the informativeness of recommendations 
issued around M&A announcement dates and post-IPO period but seemingly improves 
the perceived credibility of recommendations issued following the SEOs as evidenced by 
increases (decreases) in the informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (‘hold and sell-type’) 
recommendations. Also, the informativeness of unfavourable recommendations in M&A 
and SEO contexts decreased for affiliated analysts who changed to use the 3-tier ratings 
system following the NASD 2711, which implies investors perceive less bias in their 
‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations following the 2002/3 reforms.  
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I found that the 2009/10 expiration impairs informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations issued by the GS-signatory employed analysts after IPO issues and 
SEO filing dates. In tests of SEO cases, this effect is greater for affiliated analysts 
employed by GS signatories. To sum up, investors perceive lower credibility in the 
recommendations issued by GS analysts who cover SEO issuers after the 2009/10 
expiration, especially in cases where the analysts’ employer provides investment banking 
services to the covered firm.  
I also found that the JOBS Act did not impair the informativeness of the ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations issued by the affiliated analysts covering EGCs in the two years 
following IPOs. However, I do find that the market perceives an increase in underlying 
bias affecting the affiliated EGC analysts’ hold or sell-type recommendations. These 
results suggest that greater analyst involvement in the IPO process may potentially affect 
the market’s perception on the objectivity of their research, as shown by a greater 
significance reaction to affiliated EGC analysts’ ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations 
following the JOBS Act.  
My second research question is also related to the effect of regulatory changes on the 
profitability of recommendations. Profitability reflects the analyst’s ability and 
willingness to identify and recommend investment in securities that earn investors 
positive long-run abnormal returns. Excess optimism arising from analysts’ investment 
banking related incentives may compromise the objectivity of analyst research and 
potentially decrease the profitability of recommendations. If the 2002/3 reforms 
effectively reduced abnormal optimism in analyst recommendations, the profitability of 
‘buy-type’ recommendations should increase following the reforms. Based on this logic, 
I predicted that this pre-post increase in profitability of recommendations should be 
greater for analysts who changed to the 3-tier ratings system following the NASD 2711 
than for analysts who did not (H5). Further, I predicted that this effect should be greater 
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for affiliated analysts who changed to the 3-tier ratings system than for unaffiliated 
analysts who also made a similar change (H6).   
If the regulatory relaxations (i.e. 2009/10 expiration and the JOBS Act of 2012) induced 
greater excess optimism, there should be a post-relaxation reduction in the profitability 
of recommendations. I further predicted that the change in the profitability of 
recommendations after 2009/10 expiration should be more negative for GS analysts 
relative to non-GS analysts (H13) and there should be incremental effect for affiliated GS 
analysts than for unaffiliated GS analysts (H14). 
To test these hypotheses concerning the impact of regulatory changes on profitability, I 
employed similar regressions to those for informativeness tests but focussing on long-run 
abnormal returns. Overall, I found no evidence that the profitability of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for analysts who switched the ratings systems following the 2002/3 
reforms increased following the reforms. Nor was there any evidence that the profitability 
of ‘buy-type’ recommendations issued by GS analysts decreased following the 2009/10 
expiration and neither is any incremental effect on analyst affiliation in both tests. Lastly, 
there is no evidence that the JOBS Act decreased the profitability of recommendations 
issued by affiliated EGC analysts. Table 8.2 provides a summary of the results for all the 
tests of hypotheses related to my second research question – the impacts of three 
regulatory events on investor response and profitability.    
Table 8.2 Summary of Results for All Tests of the Second Research Question 
Regulatory 
Events 
High Exposure Cases Affiliated High Exposure Cases 
The Regulatory Impacts on Investor Response 
The 2002/3 
reforms 
No significant change in the 
informativeness of ‘buy-type’ (or 
‘hold and sell-type’ 
recommendations for Change to 3-
Tier firms in M&A and IPO 
contexts. Significantly increase 
(decrease) in the informativeness of 
‘buy-type’ (or ‘hold and sell-type’ 
recommendations for Change to 3-
Tier firms in SEO context. 
Significantly greater reduction in 
informativeness of ‘hold and sell-
type’ recommendations for 
affiliated analysts in Change to 3-
Tier firms in M&A and SEO 
contexts, no significant change in 
IPO context. No significant change 
in informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for all contexts. 
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The 2009/10 
expiration on 
independent 
research 
funding 
Significantly greater reduction in 
the informativeness of upgrades or 
‘buy-type’ recommendations for GS 
Signatory firms in IPO and SEO 
contexts, no significant change in 
M&A context. No significant 
change in informativeness of ‘hold 
and sell-type’ recommendations for 
all contexts.    
Significantly greater reduction in 
informativeness of ‘hold and sell-
type’ recommendations for 
affiliated analysts in GS Signatory 
firms in SEO contexts, no 
significant change in M&A and IPO 
contexts. No significant change in 
informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for all contexts.  
The JOBS Act 
of 2012 
N/A 
Significantly greater reduction in 
informativeness of ‘hold and sell-
type’ recommendations for 
affiliated analysts covering EGC 
firms, no significant change in 
informativeness of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations. 
The Regulatory Impacts on Profitability 
The 2002/3 
reforms 
No significant change in the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for Change to 3-
Tier firms in all contexts. 
No significant change in the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for affiliated 
analysts in Change to 3-Tier firms 
in all contexts. 
The 2009/10 
expiration on 
independent 
research 
funding 
No significant change in the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for GS Signatory 
firms in all contexts. 
No significant change in the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for affiliated 
analysts in GS Signatory firms in all 
contexts. 
The JOBS Act 
of 2012 
N/A 
No significant change in the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for affiliated 
analysts covering EGCs. 
8.2.3 Research Question Three 
The third research question concerns the impact of regulation on the extent to which 
analyst optimism affects brokers’ investment banking deal flow. The sensitivity of the 
change in brokers’ investment banking market share to lagged change in the optimism of 
their analysts implies the extent to which analyst excess optimism can contribute to their 
employing brokers’ future M&A advisory or equity underwriting income. If the 2002/3 
reforms effectively decreased abnormal analyst optimism, there should be a post-reform 
reduction in the extent to which analyst optimism affects the broker’s deal flow, as clients 
may perceive a lower chance of inducing an affiliated broker to favourably bias their 
recommendations (H7). I further predicted that the pre-post decrease in the sensitivity 
should be greater for analysts who changed to the 3-tier ratings system following the 
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NASD 2711 than for analysts who did not make a similar change (H8). Further, if the 
2009/10 expiration of funding independent research may increase optimism of GS 
analysts’ reports, I predicted that there should be a pre-post increase in the extent to which 
analyst optimism affects the broker’s deal flow for GS analysts than for non-GS analysts 
(H15).  
To test these hypotheses concerning the impact of regulatory changes on the extent to 
which analyst optimism affects the broker’s deal flow, I regressed the change in market 
share of investment banking business against the change in average optimism of analysts 
working for a broker, an indicator variable of post-reform period, an indicator of brokers 
who changed to the 3-tier ratings system (or other proxies for exposure), their two-way 
and three-way interaction, and controls. Table 3 reports a summary of the results for all 
the tests of hypotheses related to my third research question. My results show that there 
is an incremental negative association between excess analyst optimism and subsequent 
market shares of equity deals following the 2002/3 reforms for brokers who switched to 
use 3-tier ratings system after NASD 2711 Rule. However, I found no evidence that the 
2009/10 expiration of mandated procurement of independent research affected the 
association between optimism and subsequent deal flow.    
 
Table 8.3 Summary of Results for All Tests of the Third Research Question 
Regulatory 
Events 
High Exposure Cases Affiliated High Exposure Cases 
The 2002/3 
reforms 
No significant change in the 
sensitivity of the change in brokers’ 
investment banking market share to 
lagged change in the optimism for 
Change to 3-Tier firms in M&A and 
IPO/SEO contexts.  
Significantly greater reduction in 
the sensitivity of the change in 
brokers’ investment banking market 
share to lagged change in the 
optimism for affiliated analysts in 
Change to 3-Tier firms in IPO/SEO 
contexts, no significant change in 
M&A context.  
The 2009/10 
expiration on 
independent 
research 
funding 
No significant change in the 
sensitivity of the change in brokers’ 
investment banking market share to 
lagged change in the optimism for 
GS Signatory firms in M&A and 
IPO/SEO contexts.  
No significant change in the 
sensitivity of the change in brokers’ 
investment banking market share to 
lagged change in the optimism for 
affiliated analysts in GS Signatory 
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firms in M&A and IPO/SEO 
contexts. 
 
Overall, my results suggest no evidence that the profitability of ‘buy-type’ 
recommendations for analysts who switched the ratings systems following the 2002/3 
reforms increased following the 2002/3 reforms. No evidence is shown that the 
profitability of ‘buy-type’ recommendations for GS analysts decreased following the 
2009/10 expiration and neither is any incremental effect on analyst affiliation in both tests. 
Lastly, no evidence shows that the JOBS Act decreased the profitability of 
recommendations issued by affiliated EGC analysts either.   
Implications 
The results reported and discussed in my thesis have several implications for regulators, 
investors and researchers. My thesis shows whether and how three significant regulatory 
changes (the disclosure requirements of NASD 2711 in 2002, the 2009/10 expiration, and 
the JOBS Act of 2012) impacted analyst recommendation optimism, investor response, 
profitability, and the extent to which analyst optimism affects the broker’s deal flow. First, 
the results of the impact of 2002/3 reforms (and the provisions therein) reported in 
Chapter 5 may be of interest to regulators contemplating modifications to the SRO Rules 
that would encourage a return to the ‘old ways’. While the three-tier system is potentially 
less informative to investors, I found no evidence of a problem in this regard, and in fact 
found some evidence of improvement, suggesting that improved credibility of 
recommendations dominates any effect of restricting analysts’ scope for signalling a 
change in opinion. The findings related to the regulatory impact of 2009/10 expiration in 
Chapter 6 suggests that regulators should question the effectiveness of the five-year 
procurement of independent research required by the GS and whether the required parallel 
independent research reports enhanced objectivity in analyst reports. There is no evidence 
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of change in analyst optimism before and after the expiration in 2009/10 but the perceived 
credibility of ‘buy’ and ‘strong buy’ recommendations has been impaired following 
2009/10, suggesting that compulsory procurement of independent research should not be 
included in the future modification and refinement of the 2002/3 reforms. Lastly, the 
results regarding the impact of JOBS Act reported in Chapter 7 reveal that greater analyst 
involvement in the IPO process entailed in the JOBS Act did not induce excess optimism 
in analyst recommendations. However, investors may perceive underlying bias in the 
affiliated analysts covering EGCs following the Act, as evidenced by an increase in the 
informativeness of ‘hold and sell-type’ recommendations. Second, the results of my thesis 
may be relevant to investors who use information in analysts’ recommendations and LTG 
forecasts to buy or sell a stock, especially for less sophisticated investors who are more 
likely to have limited knowledge of effectiveness of regulatory changes on analyst 
behaviour in association with potential analysts’ conflicts of interest due to investment 
banking incentives. Third, my thesis also offered a potential explanation for the evidence 
presented in Corwin et al. (2017) which suggest that, while the 2002/03 reforms appear 
to have reduced the optimism of affiliated analysts employed by signatories to the Global 
Settlement, no such reduction appears to have occurred for non-signatories. One 
distinction between the signatory and non-signatory brokers is that, while all signatories 
used the 3-tier ratings system in the post-reform period, a significant proportion of non-
signatory brokers maintained the old 5-tier system throughout my sample period. My 
thesis showed that the improvement in analyst behaviour concentrates in those employed 
by brokers who switched to the 3-tier system, and suggest that the lower uptake of the 
new system among non-signatory brokers may partly explain the findings in Corwin et al. 
(2017).  
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Limitations 
My thesis has several limitations. First, it is extremely challenging to extricate the impact 
of other coincidental events which also potentially influence analysts’ evaluation for 
cover firms, such as the subprime mortgage crisis that occurred during the U.S. recession 
from December 2007 to June 2009. Second, my recommendation and forecast data are 
also subject to the vagaries of the I/B/E/S service, such as lack of current translations files 
with which to definitively identify brokers and analysts, and the retrospective deletion of 
observations pertaining to brokers who no longer subscribe to the service. Further, the 
results also focus on the behaviour of analysts covering acquirers around M&A and 
underwriters for IPO, and SEO transactions, and may not generalise to other 
circumstances (e.g. analysts covering targets in M&A deals).  
Another issue of limited generalisability in the findings of this thesis is that it only 
observes the behaviour of analysts employed by non-GS signatory brokers. To 
differentiate the impact of analysts’ adoption of three-tier ratings systems following the 
NASD 2711 from that of the GS, I excluded the 12 GS signatories from the tests for 
hypotheses concerning the impact of 2002/3 reforms. Further, given that the GS 
signatories were not directly affected by the relaxation of analyst restrictions entailed in 
the JOBS Act, I exclude analysts employed by these brokers in the tests of hypotheses 
related to the impact of the JOBS Act either. Excluding the GS signatories, who comprise 
a significant part of the analyst market, renders my findings directly relevant only to 
understanding the behaviour of smaller brokers and independent research firms. However, 
given the commonality of incentives facing analysts, and the absence of any obvious 
theory suggesting a differential effect on analysts according to employer type, it appears 
reasonable conclude cautiously that the change in rating system may have impacted the 
behaviour of all analysts subject to NASD 2711.  
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Also, my results potentially are influenced by an endogenous treatment effect to the extent 
that moving to the 3-tier system is a brokerage house decision. Also, my results 
potentially are influenced by an endogenous treatment effect to the extent that moving to 
the 3-tier system is a brokerage house decision. One alternative explanation is that the 
indicator variable, ChgtoTier3, captures brokers’ (and their analysts’) voluntary adoption 
of the three-tier ratings system following the NASD 2711 in response to the broader set 
of 2002/3 reforms, rather than to the specific disclosure requirements required by the 
NASD 2711. That is, ChgtoTier3, may proxy for brokers’ overall willingness to 
participate in the reform process, and thus observed changes in behaviour may reflect the 
impact of other aspects of the reform process (such as the prohibition of links between 
analyst compensation and investment banking revenue). To reduce this confounding 
effect, I performed PSM tests to generate a sample considered balanced with respect to 
these matching variables (brokerage size, the capitalisation of the covered firms, analyst 
following and deal value) but I concede that these tests cannot fully rule out alternate 
explanations from my findings.  
Lastly, I acknowledge the difficulty in interpreting my findings in tests for hypotheses 
concerning the impact of the JOBS Act. Potentially there can be some confounding effects 
of regulatory changes on analyst optimism. First, the effect of the 2002/3 reforms 
prohibits any direct or indirect compensations granted to analysts for investment banking 
revenues. Second, the effect of the JOBS Act after 2012 allows analysts to take part in 
communications and interactions among investment banks and potential investors as well 
as management of the covered EGCs. To alleviate the confounding effects, I utilised the 
following approaches to design my tests: (1) I choose the sample period for the tests 
related to the JOBS Act starting from 2004 – two years after the effective dates of the GS 
and SRO Rules. By doing this, I ensure that all the recommendations issued by the 
analysts who are subject to the prohibitions regarding the investment banking related 
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compensations; (2) I employ conventional difference-in-difference method to test the 
impact of the JOBS Act’s deregulation in analyst restrictions on analyst optimism. The 
first difference is whether the covered IPO firm is an emerging growth company (EGC) 
that is qualified to enjoy the relaxation regarding the analyst communication/interaction 
by the Act. The second difference is whether the IPO issue date is after the effective date 
of the Act. Based on the above two approaches, I effectively capture the effect of JOBS 
Act on analyst behaviour and excludes the possible influence from the 2002/3 reforms 
regarding the analyst compensations related to investment banking activities.  
Future Research Questions 
According to the joint report by the NASD and NYSE in 2005, the GS led to a significant 
decrease in sell-side research budget and labour. Also, sell-side analysts were migrating 
to the buy-side/money management firms (FINRA, 2005) and the turnover rates among 
analysts were unusually high during this period (Fang & Yasuda, 2014), leaving many 
‘orphan’ firms that lost their analyst coverage. One implication for future research may 
be investigating the impact of reforms on these ‘orphan’ firms’ performance after analysts 
stop their following. The regulators are concerned about the appropriateness of codifying 
some of the SRO Rules, because of the costs imposed (particularly on small brokerages 
that provide both research and investment banking services). Therefore, one implication 
to future research may be comparing these regulatory impacts on the quality of the analyst 
outputs (the properties of analyst reports and analyst coverage) by focusing on not only 
the larger-size brokers but the smaller-size brokers. Further, my thesis studies the 
usefulness of analyst reports reflected in investors’ perceptions of the credibility of 
analyst research reports by including all US analysts for whom an employing brokerage 
can be identified. Future research can explore to study the impacts of regulatory changes 
on the behaviour of Institutional Investor All-America Research Team analyst (i.e. all-
star analysts), who are determined annually by the solicited votes of buy-side managers. 
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The all-star ranking reflects the overall usefulness of sell-side analysts to the buy-side (or 
customers’ satisfaction) with emphasis on larger buy-side institutions (Bagnoli et al., 
2008). My studies can also be extended to examine the impact of the JOBS Act for a 
longer period, particularly on the extent to which analyst excess optimism affects the 
brokerage’s deal flow with a longer study period.  
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